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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial conflict of interest (FCOI) relationships in medicine have been found 
to expose medical education in medical schools, medical journals, and continuing medical 
education (CME) hosted by professional medical associations (PMAs) to vulnerability to 
corporate bias. Institutional policy analysis concerning FCOI relationships and industry 
involvement in medical education in Canada is limited. Therefore, informed by neoliberal 
corporate bias theory and Mertonian norms of science, this dissertation contributes 
analyses of conflict of interest policies, disclosures, and opportunities for drug company 
involvement in the production and dissemination of medical knowledge. In a publication-
based dissertation format, the first manuscript provides an evaluation of conflict of interest 
policies at the 17 medical schools in Canada. The second manuscript provides an analysis 
of the culture of corporate science, informed by neoliberal ideology, through an 
examination of the extensive and pervasive roles of the drug promotion industry in clinical 
trial research, interpretation, writing, and publishing in medical journals. The third 
manuscript offers an evaluation of policies concerning FCOI relationships and industry 
involvement in CME development and programming adopted by 60 professional medical 
associations in Canada. The fourth and final manuscript comprises an quantitative analysis 
of FCOI relationship disclosures in Canadian clinical practice guidelines. In general, these 
evaluative efforts found that the policy environment concerning industry involvement in 
various types of medical education in Canada is permissive and FCOI relationships are 
common among guideline authors. Positioned within the context of neoliberal corporate 
bias theory and Mertonian norms of science, these findings of general policy 
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permissiveness indicate an alignment of goals between the pharmaceutical industry and 
medical education institutions. The necessity for increased transparency in terms of 
industry’s roles in not only conducting, analyzing, interpreting, and publishing 
pharmaceutical research, but also data sharing is supported by existing literature on 
financial conflict of interest relationships with the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, 
the strengthening and enforcement of policies on industry involvement and FCOI 
relationships in these areas of medical education would help to ensure that medical 
education in the public’s interest is achieved. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE FIELD OF MEDICINE 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
In 1998, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) cancelled a £360,000 
television series that received good reviews because of a “potential conflict of interest” 
where the producer of the show owned commercial property that was featured in the 
episodes (Smith, 1998). In 2015, two news television personalities were sanctioned for 
engaging in undisclosed financial conflict of interest (FCOI) relationships: One anchor at 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was fired for creating FCOI relationships 
by brokering the sale of and receiving commissions on paintings for people that he had 
dealt with in his role as a high-profile host of a popular CBC television show. The other, 
at Global Television, was suspended indefinitely for his role as a part-owner of a public 
relations firm, some of whose clients were featured on the anchor’s television show 
(Donovan, 2015; The Canadian Press, 2015). Following the CBC’s firing of its anchor, it 
instituted a ban on participating in paid appearances that were external to the CBC for all 
of its on-air journalists. The CBC issued a memo which stated that “[g]iven that paid 
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appearances can create an adverse impact on the Corporation, CBC/Radio-Canada will no 
longer approve paid appearances by its on-air journalistic employees” and that “a changing 
environment in which the public expects more transparency from institutions and the media 
is making the practice of paid outside activities for our journalists less acceptable to 
audiences” (Houpt, 2015). At least five other well-known CBC news anchors have been 
similarly criticized for potential conflict of interest (COI) relationships by receiving 
payments from organizations external to the CBC for speaking, travel expenses to speaking 
engagements, moderating seminars, and making appearances (Houpt, 2015). 
Professions including law, accounting, engineering, and architecture have 
recognized the importance of regulating COI relationships through policies and ethical 
codes to promote objectivity and maintain public trust (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2009). 
For example, in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, judges are subject to 
recusing themselves from hearing cases when there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. 
Regarding Canadian law specifically, the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) advises that 
Judges should disqualify themselves in any case in which they believe that a 
reasonable, fair minded and informed person would have reasoned suspicion of 
conflict between a judge’s personal interest (or that of a judge’s immediate family 
or close friends or associations) and a judge’s duty (Canadian Judicial Council, 
2004). 
Furthermore, in Canadian law, recusal is considered within the context of 
impartiality which is concerned with both perception and, more fundamentally, the actual 
absence of bias and prejudgement. According to the CJC, the test to determine impartiality 
in Canada is whether:  
…‘an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having 
thought the matter through –’ would apprehend a lack of impartiality in the decision 
maker. Whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias is to be assessed from 
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the point of view of a reasonable, fair minded and informed person … ‘True 
impartiality does not require that the judge have no sympathies or opinion; it 
requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain and act upon different points 
of view with an open mind’ [and that the] judge’s fundamental obligation is to strive 
to be and to appear as impartial as possible. This is not a council of perfection. 
Rather it underlines the fundamental nature of the obligation of impartiality which 
also extends to minimizing any reasonable apprehension of bias (Canadian Judicial 
Council, 2004). 
Moreover, according to the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association 
(CSCJA), judges play many roles including interpreting the law, analyzing and assessing 
the presented evidence, and controlling the manner in which hearings and trials unfold in 
their courtrooms (Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association [CSCJA], 2006). 
Applying the CSCJA’s (2006) interpretation of the roles of judges, judges and physicians 
have similar roles in their respective professions. Like judges, it is part of a physician’s 
professional role to interpret, analyze, and assess medical research and evidence 
concerning various medical and non-medical, prescription and non-prescription treatment 
options for their patients. Physicians, as with judges, are often in the position of deciding 
between two or more opposing views and must then “try the facts” to decide whether 
evidence presented to them is credible and if those who are providing the evidence are 
telling the truth.  
Just as judges are supposed to operate above the fray or dispute, physicians 
ultimately make their own independent and impartial assessments of the facts. Therefore, 
physicians and medical researchers, which hereafter will be collectively referred to as 
physicians unless referring to non-physician researchers or medical students, ought to be 
held to similarly stringent conflict of interest standards because they hold authoritative 
positions with which they can broadly influence treatment practices and research questions 
in both the medical practice and medical education realms. The effects of these 
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relationships can knowingly or unknowingly affect physicians’ teaching at medical 
schools, publishing articles and reviews in respected peer-reviewed medical journals, 
membership on committees that develop clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) and speaking 
at and organizing continuing medical education (CME) programs hosted by professional 
medical associations (PMAs). 
Compared to other professions, including law, accounting, engineering, and 
architecture, regulating conflict of interest relationships in medicine is relatively new 
(Rodwin, 1993). Similarly, the term “conflict of interest” is relatively new, with its first 
use in a court case in 1949 and its first appearance in an English dictionary in 1971 (IOM, 
2009). Prior to the 1970s, terms similar to “conflict of interest” such as “adverse interest”, 
“conflicting interest”, “bias”, and “prejudice” were used (IOM, 2009). Detailed provisions 
on COI relationships have been adopted within research ethics guidelines and regulations 
by various medical specialty organizations and medical research institutions. Many of these 
provisions exist within the bylaws and policies adopted by medical colleges and specialty 
societies (IOM, 2009). However, despite the adoption of these policies, regulation of COI 
relationships in medicine remains piecemeal, fragmented, and non-uniform. The regulation 
of COI relationships in medicine also serves as a model for the regulation of COI 
relationships in other regulated health care professions including osteopathy, dentistry, 
pharmacy, nursing, chiropractic, and others (IOM, 2009). 
Financial relationships between medical professionals and the pharmaceutical 
industry have come to undermine the confidence and trust that the public affords to 
physicians and medical researchers, as well as the integrity of medical professionals’ 
opinions and publishing interests (Cho, Shohara, Schissel, & Rennie, 2000; DeAngelis, 
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2000; Ehringhaus et al., 2008; Tattersall, Dimoska, & Gan, 2009). Medical education and 
research institutions and professional organizations should adopt and enforce established 
policies to address FCOI relationships, or where there are none create them, in the interest 
of the public. These policies should serve as genuine efforts to ensure that the medical 
professionals at those institutions and organizations make decisions based on their primary 
interests, not secondary interests, as dictated by their professions’ standards (IOM, 2009). 
FCOI relationships can compromise professional judgement through bias as well as other 
practices that violate standards of professional conduct and policies should be developed 
to help medical professionals safeguard against the influence of secondary interests. 
Studies which evaluated behaviours in the medical field before and after FCOI policy 
implementation have found that institutional and organizational policies can provide the 
most significant and meaningful protection against the possible consequences of 
professionals’ engagement in financial conflict of interest relationships (Grande, Frosch, 
Perkins, & Kahn, 2009; IOM, 2009; King, Essick, Bearman, Cole, & Ross, 2013; Langer 
et al., 2012). It is these relationships that tend to have excessive influence on professionals’ 
decisions about research conduct, teaching, treating patients, and the development of CPGs 
(IOM, 2009).  
The regulation of FCOI relationships between medical professionals and the 
pharmaceutical industry through the adoption of formal institutional policies is the focus 
of this dissertation. According to the IOM (2009), policies are most effective when they 
are preventive and corrective, rather than punitive. Policies can be effective in two 
important ways. First, policies can uphold the integrity of professional judgement and, 
second, preserve public trust and confidence in those judgements. These two objectives 
6 
 
 
 
should be the fundamental and primary goals of any meaningful conflict of interest policy. 
Importantly, these policies should not assume that any individual physician or medical 
researcher will inevitably allow financial interests to influence his or her judgements. 
Further, these policies should not imply that individual physicians or medical researchers 
are unethical people. Rather, the basis of FCOI policies should be the assumption that under 
certain conditions, there are risks that decisions may be unduly influenced by secondary 
interests (IOM, 2009).  
Physicians and medical researchers may sometimes be offended by assertions that 
they have engaged in FCOI relationships with drug companies and believe that these 
sentiments challenge their ethical integrity. Because of these sensitivities, the IOM states 
that some institutions have replaced the term “conflict of interest” with phrases including 
“relationships with industry” or “financial relationships” to describe relationships that are 
potentially conflicted or may be judged to constitute COI relationships. The IOM (2009) 
argues that using this filtered and less direct language obscures the serious risks that COI 
relationships pose. Furthermore, the IOM reasons that this language is unnecessary if it is 
recognized that the judgement that an individual has a COI is a reflection of the situation 
and not of the professional who is in the situation (IOM, 2009).  
Further to this point, professionals accused of having a COI relationship often 
respond that they would never personally allow financial interests to influence their 
professional judgement but it is more likely that their colleagues would be influenced 
(IOM, 2009; Lieb & Brandtonies, 2010; Orlowski & Wateska, 1992). This position is not 
a justifiable objection to the development and adoption of meaningful conflict of interest 
policies because a conflict of interest, as previously defined, is a situation or set of 
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conditions involving risk. Therefore, conflict of interest policies should not be directed 
toward specific motivations for decisions that individual professionals make or imply that 
these professionals are improperly motivated. Should conflict of interest policies be driven 
by these factors, professionals could respond that it is unfair to generalize in this manner 
and that their actual decisions and distinguished reputations would prove otherwise. 
However, good conflict of interest policies avoid having to investigate on a case by case 
basis (IOM, 2009).  
The IOM (2009) committee argues that conflict of interest policies need not focus 
on the motivations for individuals’ decisions for two central reasons: first, they argue that 
reliably determining or inferring motive in this context is usually impossible and this sort 
of investigation would be not only unnecessarily intrusive, but also highly time-consuming. 
Medical research, education, and patient care decisions are typically the result of many 
smaller judgements and decisions that are impractical and virtually impossible to review 
and even if they were reviewed, it is unlikely that this effort would generate a clear 
illustration of the individual’s underlying motives. For the same reasons, readers of medical 
journal articles, medical students, patients, and conflict of interest committees are unable 
to judge whether secondary, financial interests motivated a certain decision. Furthermore, 
those who are affected by the results of research, the content of lectures, or drug 
prescriptions are typically not in a position to be able to judge the legitimacy of the 
professional’s decisions. Even when people can make these judgements, this is usually 
possible only after the damage has occurred. Investigating individuals after the fact, in 
order to avoid having well-rounded preventative conflict of interest policies in the first 
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place also has the potential to violate the rights and privacy of individuals who might be 
involved in the decision-making process (IOM, 2009).  
This dissertation supports the IOM’s position on developing well-rounded, 
preventative COI policies with provisions on enforcement and dealing with violations 
when they occur. Research on both COI relationships and related policies can provide a 
stronger evidence base for policy design, development, and implementation and has the 
potential to provide institutions and organizations with the information necessary to 
develop the necessary policies (IOM, 2009). This dissertation argues that the principle goal 
of conflict of interest policies should be to protect and preserve the integrity of medical 
research, professional judgement, and public trust. In contrast, the goal of conflict of 
interest policies should not be to mitigate bias or mistrust of medical research or 
professional judgement after it occurs, although inclusion of prescribed processes to deal 
with these situations, should they occur, is also important (IOM, 2009).  
There are significant gaps in the conflict of interest literature in Canada, particularly 
in terms of policy evaluation and assessments of disclosures. Therefore, this dissertation 
comprises four manuscripts which evaluate the Canadian context of conflict of interest 
policies and disclosures in different medical fora in which medical education occurs. In 
this dissertation, the term “medical education” is used broadly to refer to the various ways 
in which clinical research results are disseminated to physicians, medical researchers, and 
medical students. Medical education, as it is used in this context, refers to a wide variety 
of medical materials and methods of distribution that are used to teach and inform 
physicians, medical researchers, and medical students about clinical knowledge and 
advancements required for medical practice and research. For example, medical students 
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receive the foundations of their medical knowledge in medical schools from physician or 
medical research faculty. Physicians receive updates and new medical treatment standards 
from CPGs.  
Physicians are also required to engage in accredited CME or continuing 
professional development (CPD). In 2011, the government of Ontario made CPD 
mandatory for physicians in Ontario (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
[CPSO], 2012). The consequences for failing to engage in CPD in Ontario are an 
assessment of the physician’s practice, or an investigation into professional misconduct by 
the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) (CPSO, 2012). Physicians typically rely on their respective 
medical associations to provide opportunities for accredited CME programs. Finally, 
medical students, physicians, and especially medical researchers regularly consult peer-
reviewed medical journals for published articles on clinical trials, the safety and efficacy 
of new drugs, and review articles summarizing the results of these studies.  
This broad conceptualization of medical education is both necessary and important 
in order to comprehensively capture the spectrum of methods by which medical knowledge 
is disseminated and sought out by medical professionals and students. Ultimately, inclusion 
of the many ways that medical schools, medical societies, medical journals, and the 
pharmaceutical industry consider providing medical education is crucial to a 
comprehensive assessment of the various ways in which FCOI relationships are handled. 
Although this is not an exhaustive list, these categories of medical education are the focus 
of this dissertation.  
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The four studies that comprise the central component of this dissertation are 
situated within the context that biomedical research and knowledge is increasingly a 
product of privatized and commercialized science and this has occurred partially through 
the development of FCOI relationships between drug companies and physicians. These ties 
serve as vectors by which science for commercial consumption is developed and 
disseminated and, therefore, must be regulated. Institutional policies are at the core of the 
efforts to regulate FCOI relationships. In order to determine whether FCOI relationships 
are effectively addressed, considered, and regulated, these policies must undergo analysis.  
 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The literature review (Chapter 2) follows this introductory chapter. The literature 
review provides additional context for the practical placement of this dissertation within 
the existing literature base on the relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical 
industry. The literature review addresses issues such as defining conflict of interest 
relationships in medicine, the need to and rationale for focusing on financial relationships 
in medicine, counterarguments to the perspective that FCOI in medicine should be 
regulated, industry involvement in medical research and research integrity, and disclosures 
of FCOI relationships in medical education.  
The theoretical chapter (Chapter 3) follows the literature review. This chapter 
considers that, although science has never been free from outside influence, the interactions 
between public science and private profit have dramatically shifted since the 1980s. This 
shift is, in large part, due to the widespread global drive toward neoliberalism. 
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Neoliberalism advocates for an ideal economy as a “marketplace of ideas”, where its 
fundamental role is to process and convey knowledge or information rather than to 
exchange material things. Neoliberal ideology assumes that it is impossible for human 
beings to create, encompass, or predict such an abstract marketplace that is able to 
simultaneously convey existing ideas and mobilize further innovation. Rather, this 
outcome is achieved by redefining the organization of knowledge using market-based 
solutions. These solutions have been made possible through the development and adoption 
of both national and international neoliberal-oriented policies that encourage and support 
private investment in science and university-industry partnerships.  
The uniqueness of neoliberalism is that it alters the very nature and existence of not 
only the market, but also society. Through the adoption of neoliberal policies, the methods, 
organization, and content of science ultimately changes. The movement toward 
neoliberalism, therefore, has had, and continues to have, profound and lasting implications 
on the organization, practice, and integrity of science (Krimsky, 2004; Lave, Mirowski, & 
Randalls, 2010). For example, a significant consequence, which will be interrogated in 
Chapter 5, is the commercialization of research through FCOI relationships with 
researchers as well as sponsors’ involvement and potential for control over all aspects of 
the research process. This control may range from the conceptualization of studies, to data 
collection and analysis, to writing and preparation of manuscripts, to correspondence with 
target journals regarding manuscript submission and revisions, to publishing through a 
process called ghost management. This process has also resulted in the dissolution and 
disappearance of the scientific author, with the proliferation of the medical ghostwriting 
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and ghost management industries, which epitomize the commodification of medical 
research (Mirowski, 2001; Sismondo, 2007, 2009).  
This dissertation uses Philip Mirowski’s work on the recent transformations in 
science as a consequence of neoliberal policies (Lave et al., 2010; Mirowski & Van Horne, 
2005; Mirowski, 2001, 2011) to investigate medical professionals’ participation in FCOI 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry in each of the four manuscripts within this 
dissertation and to provide a snapshot of the current medical research and conflict of 
interest environments. This dissertation also applies work by Sergio Sismondo on the ways 
in which the commercialization and commodification of medical research has resulted in 
the growth of the medical ghostwriting and ghost management industries (Sismondo, 2003, 
2007, 2011, 2012), both of which embody the very nature of Mirowski’s notion of the 
neoliberal “marketplace of ideas” in the changing landscape of scientific research (Lave et 
al., 2010; Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005).  
It is within this theoretical context that this dissertation positions the relevance and 
importance of FCOI relationships with industry. These formed relationships between 
physicians and the pharmaceutical industry are the vectors by which the nature of medical 
research has been, and continues to be, transformed. Similarly, these relationships support 
and contribute to the shifts in the ways that medical research is conceptualized, conducted, 
and organized. FCOI relationships with the pharmaceutical industry have led to 
consequences for physicians’ research interests as they might be limited to those which are 
commercializable rather than disinterested research for the purpose of scientific inquiry. 
These consequences extend to the delay in publishing research results, suppression of 
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negative results, and sponsors’ control over manuscript contents by requiring researchers 
to allow prepublication review of studies. 
Research on the consequences of FCOI relationships in medical education and 
research, coupled with the above theoretical perspective, have led to the four manuscripts 
(Chapters 4-7) that comprise the central pillars of this dissertation. Finally, this dissertation 
closes with the conclusion (Chapter 8), which provides both general and specific 
conclusions based on the findings of the four manuscripts as well as recommendations for 
further research and action. 
 
1.3 THE FOUR MANUSCRIPTS 
 
1.3.1 Chapter 4 – Too Few, Too Weak: Conflict of Interest Policies at Canadian 
Medical Schools 
 
Attitudes toward conflict of interest relationships with the pharmaceutical industry 
begin forming in medical school, when medical students are exposed to and taught by 
faculty, who may be academic physicians or medical researchers, who may have financial 
ties with drug companies. Medical students are also exposed to considerable contact with 
pharmaceutical marketing, which impacts future clinical decision making (Austad, Avorn, 
& Kesselheim, 2011). Industry involvement and influence in medical education manifests 
in multiple forms and at many levels, which may not always be easily identifiable. For 
instance, industry involvement and influence can occur when one or more drug companies 
sponsor education events, education materials, scholarships or awards, and clinics, 
laboratories, classrooms, and buildings in which medical students are trained. The 
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pharmaceutical industry may also have considerable influence over medical faculty, for 
example, when they receive money from industry for research, consulting, travel to medical 
meetings and CME activities, as well as participating in speakers’ bureaus, functioning as 
clinical trial investigators or recruiting patients, or for publishing industry sponsored 
research and review articles. 
Drug companies recognize that medical education is a fertile forum in which 
marketing strategies and messages can be masked as education. Medical students and 
academic physicians, who have graduated from medical school, have expressed and 
documented their concerns that the exposure of medical students to covert and overt 
industry influence has promoted a shift in prescribing and overuse of specific products for 
uses that are inconsistent with current best evidence practices. Exposure to industry 
influence as early as undergraduate medical education shapes physicians’ attitudes from 
the beginnings of their careers and plays a lasting role in shaping their clinical perspectives 
and behaviours (King et al., 2013; McCormick, Tomlinson, Brill-Edwards, & Detsky, 
2001; Persaud, 2013; Ubelacker, 2010). The early and continued exposure to industry 
influence leads to the presence of industry becoming omnipresent and normative. 
Physicians trained in residency programs with policies that limit contact with 
industry representatives have been shown to be more critical of information that they 
receive and they are less likely to prescribe costly, highly marketed, and risky medications 
when there are other safer and more cost-effective medications approved for use (Epstein, 
Busch, Busch, Asch, & Barry, 2013; King et al., 2013; McCormick et al., 2001). In spite 
of these findings, Paul Hébert and colleagues found that medical students in Canada are 
not protected from industry influence because Canadian medical schools’ conflict of 
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interest policies fail to effectively regulate relationships with industry (Hébert, MacDonald, 
Flegel, & Stanbrook, 2010). Ghislaine Mathieu and colleagues (2012) also found COI 
policies at Canadian universities to be generally weak in regulating faculty-industry 
relationships, receipt of samples, seeing sales representatives, on-site and off-site training, 
and inclusion of education on COI relationships within the curriculum  (Mathieu et al., 
2012). This study’s limitations included that the authors evaluated university-wide policies 
only, rather than including medical school-specific policies. Additionally, Northern 
Ontario School of Medicine (NOSM) was excluded from the study. The authors also did 
not contact the deans of the medical schools to ensure the completeness of their list of 
policies and relied solely on those found through a web search. Finally, the policies were 
evaluated by a single coder. The other study that evaluated COI policies at Canadian 
universities also analyzed only university-wide policies and included only 13 of the 
universities in Canada (Williams-Jones & MacDonald, 2008).  
To address these limitations, Drs. Joel Lexchin, Barbara Mintzes, Annemarie Jutel, 
Kelly Holloway, and I conducted a comprehensive evaluation of COI policies at all 17 
Canadian medical schools. In our policy evaluation, we scored for stringency of conflict of 
interest policies in 12 categories: gifts and meals, consulting relationships, industry funded 
speaking relationships and speakers’ bureaus, honoraria, ghostwriting, disclosure, industry 
sales representatives, on-site education activities, compensation for travel or attendance at 
off-site lectures and meetings, industry support for scholarships and funds for trainees, 
medical school curriculum, and samples. We also included two measures which evaluated 
whether the schools enforced these policies. The “Enforcement A” measure asked whether 
there was a clearly identified party responsible for oversight to ensure compliance and 
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“Enforcement B” asked whether there were clear sanctions for noncompliance with the 
policies (Shnier, Lexchin, Mintzes, Jutel, & Holloway, 2013). 
 
1.3.2 Chapter 5 – Honest Authorship: A Glossary and Assessment Tool to Help 
Predict Vulnerability to Corporate Bias in Manuscripts Submitted to Medical 
Journals 
 
Medical journals are an important vehicle by which medical information is 
disseminated to physicians. Over the past decade, editors of prestigious high impact 
medical journals have commented that medical journals have devolved into “marketing 
arms” of pharmaceutical companies which are, themselves, marketing machines (Angell, 
2004; Smith, 2005). Traditionally, scientific authors collect, analyze, and have access to 
raw data from which scientific, academic articles are generated (Healy & Cattell, 2003). 
However, drug companies regularly use scientific literature that is published in peer-
reviewed medical journals as marketing mechanisms to promote their products.  
The concealment of industry bias in publishing peer-reviewed articles in medical 
journals is important because these articles are considered to be the most widely accepted 
and trusted impartial forms of presenting clinical evidence. Unlike pharmaceutical ads in 
medical journals, clinical trials and review articles published in medical journals possess 
the acceptance and approval of the journal and may be distributed globally. A clinical trial 
published in a medical journal may also garner global media coverage, especially if these 
publications are simultaneously supported and promoted by press releases from the journal 
and costly public relationships firms hired by the drug company that sponsored the 
published study. Pharmaceutical companies will sometimes spend over a million dollars 
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on reprints of a favourable clinical trial to distribute to doctors because these favourable 
studies are worth thousands of pages in advertising. Similarly, a published study that 
contains a subtle endorsement for a medication, but does not mention the pharmaceutical 
company that paid for the writing of the paper, carries more weight with clinicians and 
patients, especially if the authors include prominent physicians and university professors 
(Leo, Lacasse, & Cimino, 2011; Smith, 2005).  
Modern-day marketing techniques conceal industry’s bias by obscuring its role in 
and control over the scientific process. Works by Mirowski, Robert Van Horne, and 
Sismondo inform the perspective that the peer-review process is no longer able to serve as 
a safeguard against publishing clinical and related scientific studies that promote industry’s 
commercial objectives at the expense of public health, data transparency, and true critical 
analysis of the best available evidence-based medicine (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; 
Mirowski, 2001; Sismondo, 2003, 2011). The scientific process, as well as the political, 
social, and financial structures in which medical research is conducted has been re-
engineered alongside larger political and economic trends toward the privatization of 
science. Chapter 5 discusses the presence and development of specific indicators that 
clearly illustrate that the trend toward the production of science for commercial interest has 
occurred. Because medical journals play an important and authoritative gatekeeping role 
in disseminating important medical research and knowledge, they must develop 
mechanisms by which they can safeguard against publishing industry marketing that is 
masked as scientific, disinterested research. 
The published literature on these marketing strategies has documented the shift in 
the use of scientific and medical research from its traditional role to a newer 
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commercialized role. With this shift, the roles of medical journals have similarly shifted. 
Because peer-reviewed medical journals are assumed to publish the highest quality 
scientific research, which forms the basis for subsequent research and treatment decisions, 
these journals have a responsibility to the public, researchers, physicians, and patients to 
ensure that they are publishing the highest quality, most disinterested, and reliable 
scientific results and interpretations. The privatization and commercialization of the 
medical research process has resulted in a shift in the way that scientific research is 
conducted and published. Therefore, medical journals have a responsibility to adapt their 
peer-review approval and rejection processes as well as their considerations of what 
constitutes reliable and transparent scientific research to this shift toward commercialized 
science. 
Review of the literature about the undue influence that commercial industry has on 
the medical research and publication processes identifies three thematic categories in which 
traditional conceptualizations of the scientific process have been reconceptualised to meet 
business goals. Medical journals need to be aware of these new conceptions and develop 
and adopt relevant policies to address them. The four thematic categories that are identified 
within this manuscript are: (i) financial conflict of interest disclosure, (ii) roles of 
researchers and authors in the research and publishing processes, (iii) data transparency 
and the origin of the data and published manuscripts, and (iv) enforcement and sanctions.  
Through a literature review, this study has compiled a unique and original glossary 
of 50 key terms, each of which are classified under one of the four thematic categories, 
pinpointing where the traditional meanings have been taken advantage of in the interest of 
commercial success. These terms and their new meanings in medical publishing are 
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accompanied by an original assessment tool that is informed by the glossary. The 
assessment tool can be used by researchers and staff at medical journals to predict whether 
manuscripts submitted to their journals may be vulnerable to corporate bias. Furthermore, 
medical journals can use this glossary to continue to understand the ways in which the 
scientific process has been redefined by industry so that they can then ensure that they are 
publishing research that can be trusted to be accurate and in the best interests of science 
and the public, rather than the bottom line. 
 
1.3.3 Chapter 6 – Continuing Medical Education and Pharmaceutical Industry 
Involvement: An Evaluation of Policies Adopted by 60 Canadian Professional 
Medical Associations 
 
Professional medical associations (PMAs) play an essential role in defining, 
promoting, and advancing health care standards. Medical associations unite physicians by 
specialty and subspecialty and play a pivotal role in providing and endorsing medical 
education. Medical associations also play a highly influential role in defining the 
specialty’s ethical norms, standards, and issue codes of conduct to guide the behaviour of 
their physician members (Rothman et al., 2009). PMAs are considered to be single interest 
societies for physicians and provide them with clinical resources, including knowledge 
dissemination and learning opportunities. PMAs accomplish these goals, while pursuing 
public agendas and advocating for the interests of not only their members and themselves, 
but also patients; however, these intentions may be undermined because medical societies 
receive extensive funding from drug companies (Bernat, Goldstein, & Ringel, 1998; 
Kassirer, 2007; Relman, 2007; Rothman et al., 2009). The roles of medical societies in 
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legitimizing medical knowledge and shaping medical discourse by choosing which 
knowledge to disseminate are important goals to consider alongside their financial 
relationships and interests. The regulation of these interests through the enforcement of 
strong policies is of primary importance to shaping the attitudes of both practicing 
physicians and medical students toward relationships with industry more generally. 
The literature base concerning the ethics and conduct of PMAs figures prominently 
in the discussion of medical education, but the literature pertaining to the regulation of 
FCOI relationships by these societies is young (Brody, 2010; Cosgrove, Bursztajn, & 
Krimsky, 2009; Kassirer, 2007). Moreover, there are currently no published papers that 
explicitly evaluate the policies that have been adopted by medical societies to regulate 
FCOI relationships between PMAs, their members, and industry. Similarly, there are no 
published studies, in Canada or elsewhere, that evaluate medical societies’ policies specific 
to financial relationships with industry in the context of providing accredited CME. 
Therefore, this study will address this gap in the literature and provide an evaluation of 
Canadian PMAs’ policies regulating FCOI relationships between the associations, their 
membership, and the pharmaceutical industry when designing, organizing, and holding 
accredited CME activities. Because this is the first study of its kind, there are no evaluation 
tools to assess these policies. For this reason, the policy evaluation tool used in this study 
is original and has been developed for the purpose of this study based on the relevant 
literature, reviewed by three experts in the area, and pilot tested on a sample of policies 
from Australian medical associations. 
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1.3.4 Chapter 7 – Reporting of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: A Case Study Analysis of Guidelines from the Canadian Medical 
Association Infobase 
 
The IOM defines CPGs as “…statements that include recommendations intended 
to optimize patient care that are informed by a systematic review of evidence and an 
assessment of the benefits and harms of alternative care options” (IOM, 2011). CPGs are 
important tools used by physicians and other clinicians to inform screening, diagnostic, 
treatment, and prescribing options for their patients. It is also suggested that physicians 
abide by the recommendations in CPGs for legal purposes, in order to ensure that they are 
complying with the treatments that are recommended based on current best evidence. The 
recommended treatment options in CPGs are informed by systematic reviews of evidence 
and evaluations of the benefits and risks associated with alternative care options. CPGs are 
widely distributed by medical associations with the intent to provide physicians with a 
systematic and standardized aid to making complex medical decisions.  
Although the presence of CPGs is favourable for the guidance of clinical practice 
for physicians, they are also currently a source of controversy. According to the IOM 
(2011), guidelines should be developed using a transparent and rigorous process that 
combines scientific evidence, clinician experiential knowledge, and patient values to 
enhance health care quality and outcomes. Despite this notion of how CPGs should be 
developed, the present state of many guidelines fails to meet these requirements. For 
example, a 2011 study by Todd Mendelson and colleagues (2011) found that many of the 
most recent guidelines by the American College of Cardiology (ACC) and American Heart 
Association (AHA) made treatment recommendations based on expert opinion, rather than 
clinical trial data. A 2012 study by Jacqueline Dinnes and colleagues (2012) found that 
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recommendations on “when to take action” in a sample of guidelines were based primarily 
on consensus statements and retrospective case studies, rather than scientific evidence. In 
the case of prostate cancer monitoring guidelines, the lack of a scientific systemic approach 
to the development of monitoring recommendations resulted from incomplete and 
inappropriate use of available evidence (Dinnes, Hewison, Altman, & Deeks, 2012).  
This finding of inconsistencies in the use of available evidence and weaknesses in 
recommendations within clinical practice guidelines crosses medical fields including, but 
not limited to, cardiology (Mendelson, Meltzer, Campbell, Caplan, & Kirkpatrick, 2011), 
psychiatry (Cosgrove, Bursztajn, Krimsky, Anaya, & Walker, 2009), and urology (Dinnes 
et al., 2012). Concerns over validity, non-scientific, and inconsistent recommendations in 
guidelines are compounded by the sheer number of guidelines that are now available to 
doctors. For example, the Guidelines International Network (2014), serves 73 countries 
and houses more than 6,500 guidelines, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s 
National Guideline Clearinghouse houses at least 2,400 guidelines, and the Canadian 
Medical Association (CMA) Infobase houses over 2,700 guidelines (Bell et al., 2013). 
Although there is likely to be overlap in the guidelines housed by each organization, the 
growth in the number of guidelines available to physicians is indisputable. 
Concerns about the validity, consistency, and reliability of recommendations in 
guidelines has generated concern amongst physicians regarding which recommendations 
to apply in practice (Bell et al., 2013). Despite this lack in confidence and increase in 
confusion about the application of these recommendations in practice, a 1997 Canadian 
study by Robert Hayward and colleagues (1997) found that in a sample of 1,878 physicians, 
confidence in guidelines was moderate or high when the guideline was issued by an official 
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professional medical association, as compared to the government or a third party payer. 
This study found that specialists felt more confident in guidelines issued by provincial 
colleges. Physicians without academic institutional affiliations, as compared with those 
with these affiliations, felt more confident in guidelines from the College of Family 
Physicians of Canada (CFPC). In this study, physicians were most concerned with the 
guideline endorsers and attached value to the authority of agencies that sponsored 
guidelines. The physician respondents in this study were also found to attribute additional 
value to guidelines that were endorsed by a respected colleague (Hayward, Guyatt, Moore, 
McGibbon, & Carter, 1997). 
Physicians have also become concerned with the quality of guidelines because of 
the potential for biases within the guideline development process by guideline developers 
(Bell et al., 2013). Even though guidelines are advertised as being “evidence-based”, 
scholars in this field have argued that the term “evidence” is open to interpretation. This is 
because the representation and interpretation of evidence can vary based on the 
composition of the expert panel in the guideline development group (GDG) (Guyatt et al., 
2010; Spielmans & Parry, 2010). The use of GDGs that are comprised of panel members 
who have FCOI relationships with drug companies has generated concerns that many of 
the recommendations in guidelines have become vulnerable to the secondary financial 
interests held by panelists (Guyatt et al., 2010). These FCOI relationships have the potential 
to influence the development of recommendations for drug products (Guyatt et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the public and clinicians should trust guidelines insofar as the recommendations 
accurately reflect the best evidence of benefit and harms to individual patients (Ransohoff, 
Pignone, & Sox, 2013).  
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In the interest of transparency in guideline production by GDGs, the IOM has 
published a set of recommendations in order to strengthen their quality and trustworthiness. 
These recommendations include transparent guideline development and funding processes, 
the drastic reduction or complete elimination of FCOI relationships held by members and 
chairs of GDGs, and developing GDGs that accurately reflect the stakeholders (i.e., 
inclusion of experts, patients, clinicians, methodologists, and other researchers), and 
accurate portrayals, interpretations, and representations of evidence quality and 
recommendations. Furthermore, the IOM suggests external and public review as well as 
planned updates (IOM, 2011; Ransohoff et al., 2013). Justin Kung and colleagues (2012) 
evaluated whether 114 randomly chosen American CPGs adhered to these IOM standards 
and they found, in general, that the guidelines had poor compliance with the standards. 
Adherence to IOM standards was particularly poor in the areas of committee conflict of 
interest disclosures, where fewer than 50% of guidelines included disclosures. When 
conflict of interest relationships were disclosed, they were present for 71.4% of committee 
chairs and 90.5% of committee co-chairs (Kung, Miller, & Mackowiak, 2012). 
Financial relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry are 
common and well-known (Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, & Seashore Louis, 1996; 
Boyd, Cho, & Bero, 2003; Chren & Landefeld, 1994; Mintzes et al., 2013; Zinner, Bolcic-
Jankovic, Clarridge, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2009), as are the effects of FCOI 
relationships on reporting data and prescribing decisions (Epstein et al., 2013; Rochon et 
al., 1994; Spurling et al., 2010; Symm, Averitt, Forjuoh, & Preece, 2006; Thomas Stelfox, 
Chua, O’Rourke, & Detsky, 1998). Because the express purpose of CPGs is to change 
clinical behaviour by presenting a synthesis of current evidence and recommendations 
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provided by medical experts, any biases that guideline authors exhibit as a result of their 
relationships with industry may be reproduced when transmitted through data to guideline 
readers (Choudhry, Stelfox, & Detsky, 2002; Hayward et al., 1997). 
Several studies globally have determined the extent to which guideline authors have 
financial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry (Bindslev, Schroll, Gotzsche, & 
Lundh, 2013; Choudhry et al., 2002; Cosgrove, Bursztajn, & Krimsky, 2009; Langer et al., 
2012; Norris, Holmer, Ogden, Burda, & Fu, 2013). The finding that guideline authors have 
FCOI relationships with industry is reflected across clinical areas (Bindslev et al., 2013) 
including cardiology (Mendelson et al., 2011), psychiatry (Cosgrove, Bursztajn, Krimsky, 
et al., 2009; Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan, & Schneider, 2006; Cosgrove & 
Krimsky, 2012), urology (Dinnes et al., 2012), and diabetes control (Norris et al., 2013). 
In psychiatry guidelines, Cosgrove and colleagues (2006) found that 90 percent of 
guideline authors had at least one FCOI relationship with the companies whose products 
were being considered or included in the guideline.  
Disclosure of varying FCOI relationships with industry in guidelines may be 
explained by a number of factors. It is possible that the number of physician authors 
engaging in FCOI relationships with industry is increasing. It is also possible that conflict 
of interest policies in journals in which guidelines are being published are improving, 
although there is still the concern that disclosures are voluntary, leading to conservative 
estimates of the number of COI relationships that are being reported (Bindslev et al., 2013). 
There are currently no studies examining FCOI relationships in only Canadian 
guidelines. Therefore, it is the purpose of this study to conduct an examination of FCOI 
relationships disclosed by guideline authors in their guidelines. This study is based on a 
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sample of guidelines from the CMA Infobase, the Canadian Medical Association’s 
database of CPGs. Because increased COI relationship disclosure is a relatively recent 
trend in guideline production (Mendelson et al., 2011), this study includes only guidelines 
that have been published or reviewed and re-approved between January 1, 2012 and 
November 5, 2013. Only guidelines that are provided by, and are accessible for public 
download, from the CMA Infobase were analyzed.  
The following chapter comprises the literature review for this dissertation. The 
review broadly covers the literature that provides a general rationale for the necessity of 
institutional regulation of financial conflict of interest relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry. The upcoming chapter first unpacks definitions of FCOI 
relationships in medicine and is followed by the justification for focusing on financial 
relationships in medicine. Other areas covered in the literature review include 
pharmaceutical industry funding and research integrity, FCOI relationship disclosures in 
published articles, and the destigmatization of conflict of interest. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 DEFINING CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS IN MEDICINE 
 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), now the Health and Medicine Division (HMD), 
is a division of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, that 
operates under a congressional charter from 1863 (Health and Medicine Division [HMD], 
2016a). The HMD is a private, non-profit United States (US)-based organization that 
provides independent, objective analyses and recommendations to encourage public 
policy solutions to help solve complex problems in science, technology, and medicine 
(HMD, 2016a). Over 3,000 volunteers offer their time, knowledge, and expertise when 
writing IOM reports, many of which are requested by federal agencies, independent 
organizations, or Congress (HMD, 2016b). In this dissertation, the terminology from the 
IOM, now the HMD, will be used. This body is considered to be an authoritative source 
for evidence-based public policy recommendations.  
The IOM defined a conflict of interest (COI) relationship as “…a set of 
circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgement or actions regarding a 
primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest” (Institute of Medicine 
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[IOM], 2009). The IOM committee stressed that each of these three components, the 
primary interest, the secondary interest, and the conflict, are important to not only 
understand, but also consider, when developing effective and productive policies to 
mitigate such relationships. The IOM committee defined the primary interest as the 
purpose of the professional activity and these activities differ by profession. Physicians’ 
primary interests include “…promoting and protecting the integrity of academic research, 
the welfare of patients, and the quality of medical education” (IOM, 2009). These primary 
interests are accepted by medical professionals when they accept their titles and act in their 
professional roles. Medical professionals’ decisions and judgements are trusted and 
depended on by patients, the public, research participants, medical students, residents, and 
fellows for guidance that is consistent with the medical profession’s primary interests 
(IOM, 2009).  
Secondary interests, as defined by the IOM committee, are those that may exert 
undue influence on the manner in which or whether a medical professional exercises his 
or her responsibilities according to the primary interests of the profession.  Financial 
interests need not be of great value for the influence to be reasonably considered to be 
undue. Whether influence is undue depends on the context and informed judgement of 
whether, in a particular situation, a risk of bias is unwarranted, unjustified, or 
inappropriate. Therefore, when any secondary interest possesses superior weight in a 
decision, that interest is exerting undue influence. In the context of medicine and medical 
professionals, secondary interests can reasonably include personal financial gain, 
professional advancement, recognition for personal achievements, and favours to friends, 
family, students, or colleagues (IOM, 2009). 
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Within certain parameters, financial interests are legitimate goals. Limitations 
must be imposed, however, when secondary interests do not remain subordinate to primary 
interests, including presenting medical research and scientific evidence in an unbiased 
manner in lectures, presentations, publications, or other means of dissemination. A COI 
may be formed in at least two circumstances: first, when secondary interests take 
precedence over and compromise primary interests, or second, a scenario in which primary 
interests are or will be neglected as a result of pursuing a secondary interest. The IOM 
committee states that “[a] conflict of interest exists whether or not a particular individual 
or institution is actually influenced by the secondary interest” (IOM, 2009). Similarly, 
Dennis Thompson (1993) and Jerome Kassirer and Marcia Angell (1993) all agree that 
financial conflict of interest (FCOI) relationships form as a result of a set of conditions or 
circumstances, regardless of whether financially benefitting from these conditions distorts 
physicians’ work or research outcomes. Secondary interests can also influence the 
behaviours and judgements of professionals without their awareness. For example, gifts 
of both large and small value have the potential to influence decisions and may do so 
without the professional being conscious of the influence (Dana & Lowenstein, 2003; 
Grande, Frosch, Perkins, & Kahn, 2009; Grande, Shea, & Armstrong, 2012; IOM, 2009; 
Wazana, 2000). 
Eric Campbell (2007) defines relationships with industry, at the simplest level, as 
“a relationship that exists whenever a physician accepts anything from a company whose 
products or services are related to the practice of medicine.” COI relationships occur when 
the conditions of professional judgement concerning primary interests are influenced by 
secondary interests (Thompson, 1993). Primary interests are determined by the various 
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responsibilities assigned to professionals. Within the medical field, primary interests are 
considered to be ensuring patient welfare and research validity and reliability. The 
potential for financial gain is considered to be a secondary interest in the medical context. 
When secondary interests influence the primary interests of medical professionals, a COI 
relationship is formed. Thompson (1993) argues that although secondary interests, such 
as financial gain, may be necessary and desirable, these incentives must not dominate, or 
appear to dominate, primary interests and the related decision-making patterns and choices 
of these medical professionals. Thompson (1993) states that COI relationships in the 
medical field should be mitigated in order to prevent primary interests including patients’ 
wellbeing, research integrity, and medical education, from being subjected to influence by 
financial incentives.  
Marc Rodwin (1993) and Thompson (1993) both make the case that “conflicts of 
interest” ought not to be confused with “conflicting” or “competing” interests, which occur 
when a professional may face multiple interests, each of which pull the professional in 
different decision-making directions. Competing interests may include ethical dilemmas 
regarding terminating patient care, confidentiality, or using human subjects in research 
(Thompson, 1993). These “conflicting obligations”, as explained by the IOM committee, 
can arise when there are two interests that can plausibly be considered to be primary. For 
instance, maintaining the confidentiality of a patient with a contagious disease or illness 
might conflict with preventing that patient from harming another individual. A physician 
in this situation would not be considered as engaging in a COI relationship because the 
interests are both legitimate and primary, and the decision to prioritize one over the other 
cannot be made in advance of the situation (IOM, 2009).  
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Blurring the line between a COI relationship and “conflicting” or “competing” 
interests dilutes the important distinction between the two and encourages the perspective 
that COI relationships are unavoidable (Thompson, 1993). Conceptualizing COI 
relationships is particularly important in the context of the medical field because when 
physicians engage in these relationships, their secondary interests and commitments may 
compromise their independent judgements, decision-making priorities, loyalty to their 
patients, and health and safety (Rodwin, 1993). This perspective is also particularly 
important, below, in the discussion of the perspectives of authors who seek to minimize 
the significance of not only FCOI relationships in medicine, but also the study of these 
relationships. 
Kassirer deals explicitly with FCOI relationships as secondary financial interests 
that create dilemmas for physicians. Although Kassirer agrees with Rodwin, that COI 
relationships exist when physicians have dual conflicting loyalties, Kassirer further 
maintains that FCOI relationships are formed when physicians have competing interests 
that cannot be realized simultaneously and where making a personal financial choice could 
violate a professional code or responsibility (Kassirer, 2005). Applied to academic medical 
research institutions, in the current market-driven research environment, biomedical 
researchers are likely to find themselves proposing and pursuing research areas that are of 
interest to their corporate sponsors and have a high likelihood of producing 
commercializable discoveries (Kassirer, 2005). Although proposing and pursuing these 
research areas is not inherently harmful or unfavourable, commercializable discoveries 
may not be those that meet the primary public health needs. 
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Despite the implicit understanding that the primary interests of physicians and 
biomedical researchers should be the improvement of public health, patient health 
outcomes and wellbeing, university-industry collaborations tend to result in researchers’ 
pursuing only research areas that are likely to be profitable and inconsistent with medical 
professionals’ primary interests (Downie & Herder, 2007). Leading authorities, such as 
deans of medical schools and presidents of academic medical research centres, who may 
or may not also have FCOI relationships with industry, may find themselves in similarly 
enmeshed positions because they might also possess vested interests in the successes of 
their faculty researchers in their producing of profitable innovations and products. Simply 
providing faculty with opportunities to profit substantially from innovations constructs an 
environment that is also favourable for cultivating FCOI relationships (Kassirer, 2005). 
 
2.2 WHY FOCUS ON FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS? 
 
The pharmaceutical industry plays a significant role in the research, development, 
and commercialization of medicines worldwide. The research on, and development of 
medicines often involves not only the relevant drug companies, but also the hard work of 
faculty, researchers, and students at academic medical research institutions in universities. 
Research and development (R&D) produced through these university-industry linkages 
can be essential to the advancement of medicines; however, the FCOI relationships 
between medicine and industry have the potential to undermine not only the scientific 
process, but also the quality of information on which doctors base their clinical decisions.  
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Financial relationships and interactions between physicians and the 
pharmaceutical industry are common and pervasive (Blumenthal, 2004). These 
relationships may begin as early as medical or graduate school and can last the length of 
their careers. Furthermore, these relationships can lead to the significant risk that financial 
interests will unduly influence and threaten both clinical research, on which medical 
professionals and the public rely for guidance on treatment safety and efficacy, and 
professional judgements of the medical faculty and researchers who engage in such 
relationships (Blumenthal, 2004; Lexchin, 2005). Financial relationships between the 
pharmaceutical industry and medical professionals are often complex and have become 
the subject of heated controversy. Although it has been argued that these relationships are 
favourable and necessary in the advancement of medical research (Stossel, 2005), it has 
also been argued that these relationships are problematic because they not only control, 
but also impose strong limitations on the types of research that are conducted as well as 
on the research process, and ownership, sharing, and publishing of research data and 
results (Angell, 2004; Healy, 2012; Kassirer, 2005).  
There are a number of types of COI relationships including, but not limited to, 
those that are political, religious, and financial. There are several reasons that justify the 
focus of this dissertation on FCOI relationships. While political and religious conflicts 
occur at the individual level and tend to affect that individual’s interactions, companies 
are able to exert a much more powerful influence with financial relationships (Kassirer, 
2005). Financial interests in research have increased exponentially since the 1980s as a 
result of legislative and funding agency priorities that promote commercial funding. 
Medical research is also now considered to be part of the increasingly competitive and 
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profitable biotechnology industry. This recognition has been reflected in initiatives, 
reports, and regulations produced by official organizations and governmental agencies in 
Canada, the United States, and United Kingdom, all of which acknowledge the potentially 
negative impact of financial interests on health research (Lemmens & Luther, 2007). 
Financial interests are the most objective, quantifiable, negotiable, and easily 
identifiable (IOM, 2009; Kassirer, 2005). The financial power exerted by companies can 
influence multiple people simultaneously and over time and, therefore, can have a much 
more widespread effect. Engagement in FCOI relationships for money, prestige, obtaining 
research contracts, or professional advancement requires the active choice by a 
professional to engage in such a relationship. Furthermore, engagement in FCOI 
relationships is not necessary because there are alternative means by which professionals 
may acquire income, research contracts, or promotion. FCOI relationships can be 
controlled by enforceable regulations and impartial rules; whereas, to control states of 
mind based on subjective perceptions of political or religious beliefs is impossible 
(Kassirer, 2005; Thompson, 1993). Lastly, the effects of FCOI relationships on 
physicians’ professional judgements and behaviours tend to be skewed in one direction, 
toward prescribing the more costly, more marketed, and less safe medications, when there 
are more cost-effective and safe alternatives that have been on the market for longer 
periods of time (Epstein, Busch, Busch, Asch, & Barry, 2013; King, Essick, Bearman, 
Cole, & Ross, 2013; McCormick, Tomlinson, Brill-Edwards, & Detsky, 2001).  
Prescribing behaviours to do not seem to be as influenced by non-financial 
interests as compared to financial interactions. This may be an area for further research, 
but, at this point, financial interactions with industry are more predictive of prescribing 
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behaviour when compared with the choices made by physicians without industry 
interactions. Richard Adair and Leah Holmgren (2005) conducted a randomized trial to 
determine whether access to drug samples influenced prescribing decisions of physician 
residents. Twenty-nine physician residents were divided into two groups which received 
access to either samples of highly advertised drugs or to less expensive products, over-
the-counter drugs or generics. The group of physician residents who had access to the 
samples of highly advertised drugs were less likely to choose to prescribe unadvertised 
drugs, with a pattern of use of more expensive, rather than less expensive, drugs (Adair & 
Holmgren, 2005). A study was conducted by Marissa King and colleagues (2013) to assess 
the effect of stringent policies concerning gift restriction from industry representatives. 
King and colleagues (2013) found an association between the prescribing choices made 
by physicians and the stringency of the restrictions. Physicians who graduated from 
medical schools with active gift restriction policies were less likely to prescribe newly 
marketed drugs. The length of time that medical students in this study were exposed to 
more stringent policies was associated with significantly lower prescribing rates once they 
reached clinical practice (King et al., 2013). 
The trend toward increased industry funding in health research and the growing 
commercial focus of funding agencies undoubtedly has, and continues to, influence the 
health research agenda. With increasing commercial influence and focus, it is likely that 
research will be conducted on diseases that affect only a small proportion of the world’s 
population. Another likely scenario to continue is that drug companies will invest in R&D 
for lifestyle drugs and expensive targeted therapies, which only populations in the 
developed world will be able to afford (Lemmens & Luther, 2007; Lexchin, 2001). It is 
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improbable that drug companies will dedicate R&D and resources to orphan diseases 
affecting a small portion of the global population unless there are enough people in the 
developed countries and companies can charge high enough prices for the R&D on these 
drugs to make it profitable for them. It is also not in the financial interests of drug 
companies to allocate funds to studying the impacts of non-commercial products or drug 
products that are no longer on-patent. Furthermore, drug companies are not required to 
conduct research on the long-term health effects of their products and may financially 
benefit from avoiding long-term follow up studies because serious adverse events (SAEs) 
may remain undetected or become apparent only after a long period of time (Lemmens & 
Luther, 2007); however, under Bill C-17 in Canada (Parliament of Canada, 2014) it is 
theoretically possible for Health Canada to require companies to conduct long-term 
studies. Whether Health Canada will actually use this legislation to require post-market 
studies is unknown. In some cases, drug companies have clearly failed to disclose SAEs 
about which they knew before patients in the general population began experiencing them 
and this has resulted in class action lawsuits against drug companies for harms (Bosch, 
Esfandiari, & McHenry, 2012; Field, 2010).  
In 2009, the IOM released a report called Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice, which called for the identification, limitation, and management 
of COI relationships that involve the pharmaceutical, medical device, and biomedical 
industries without affecting constructive collaborations with commercial industry. The 
IOM report identifies a series of concerns pertaining to COI relationships in medicine and 
subsequently provides 16 recommendations directed toward preventing bias, rather than 
remedying harm caused by COI relationships in medical research, education, and practice. 
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The IOM committee argues that financial interests must be more effectively and fairly 
regulated than other secondary interests (IOM, 2009). Implicitly, the IOM report uses the 
precautionary principle in its identification and regulation of FCOI relationships, rather 
than the risk assessment principle. The IOM uses the precautionary principle in the sense 
that it stresses the importance of preventing bias and mistrust as opposed to managing the 
damage after it occurs. The IOM argues that this can be done by implementing policies 
and procedures to maintain the integrity of scientific research, the objectivity of medical 
education, and the public’s trust (IOM, 2009).  
 
2.3 FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
PHYSICIANS AND INDUSTRY: PRESCRIBING CHOICES 
 
Physicians and drug companies have become enmeshed in their interactions, which 
have become both pervasive and controversial. These relationships and subsequent flows 
of money from drug companies to physicians, and the resulting influence on doctors, 
continue to attract both public and academic scrutiny. Conflict of interest policies at 
medical schools, which have a duty to regulate these relationships, will be examined in 
chapter 3. Studies from countries around the world have shown that 80-95 percent of 
physicians regularly have interactions with drug company representatives. Physicians 
engage in these interactions, despite the research that the information provided by drug 
representatives is overly positive and the result is that physicians’ prescribing practices 
are less appropriate (Moynihan, 2003). In fact, with rare exceptions, studies that have 
assessed physicians’ exposures to information originating from drug companies have 
found associations with higher prescribing frequency, higher costs, and lower prescribing 
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quality (Grande et al., 2009; Spurling et al., 2010; Symm, Averitt, Forjuoh, & Preece, 
2006).  
Most practicing physicians in the United States have relationships with drug 
companies. A survey by Campbell and colleagues (2010) assessed the difference in the 
frequency with which physicians in seven medical specialties received payments from 
industry in 2004 and 2009. While the frequency with which physicians received payments 
from industry decreased from 2004 to 2009, physicians having financial relationships with 
drug companies remained, on the whole, in the majority. The percentage of doctors who 
received any drug samples, gifts, reimbursements, payments for speakers’ bureaus, 
consulting, advisory boards, and enrolling patients in trials in 2004 was 94 percent and in 
2009 was 83.8 percent (Campbell et al., 2010). 
Campbell and colleagues (2010) attributed the decrease in physician-industry 
relationships in the United States to several factors including increased awareness and 
public attention by the media and professional organizations to issues of FCOI 
relationships. The decrease in physician engagement in FCOI relationships may also have 
been due to new policies adopted by some medical schools and hospitals in the United 
States, which have banned certain types of FCOI relationships including receiving drug 
samples, industry-sponsored meals, and participation in speakers’ bureaus. Increased 
publicly accessible reporting of FCOI relationships in the United States by drug 
companies, medical schools, states, and the federal government may have also contributed 
to physicians’ decreasing engagement in FCOI relationships with drug companies 
(Campbell et al., 2010). 
45 
 
 
 
Research on prescribing behaviours following industry sponsored symposia 
accompanied by monetary rewards illustrates that physicians’ prescribing practices tend 
to be skewed to favour the drugs presented. A study by James Orlowski and Leon Wateska 
(1992) observed physicians’ prescribing practices after the physicians attended all-
expenses paid trips to vacation destinations for educational symposia that were sponsored 
by the manufacturer of the drug being presented. The impact of the trips was evaluated by 
tracking pharmacy inventory usage reports both before and after the symposia. Both drugs 
featured in the symposia were relatively new and available only intravenously. Orlowski 
and Wateska (1992) found that the majority of physicians who attended the symposia 
insisted that their prescribing behaviours were in no way influenced by accepting elaborate 
enticements from pharmaceutical companies. Some physicians admitted enticements 
might make them consider a drug that they might not have otherwise thought of 
prescribing, while others believed that symposia may convince them that a drug had uses 
or benefits for their patients that they had not otherwise considered. When the authors 
studied changes in physicians’ prescribing behaviours before and after the symposia, they 
found that after the symposia, prescribing patterns significantly increased for the two drugs 
that were the subjects of the symposia. Importantly, these two drugs were no better than 
the drugs that the doctors were already prescribing (Orlowski & Wateska, 1992).  
The finding that accepting items of monetary value from drug companies skews 
prescribing practices continues to be supported by the literature. James Yeh, Jessica 
Franklin, Jerry Avorn, Joan Landon, and Aaron Kesselheim (2016) conducted a study to 
determine the association between drug company payments to doctors and prescribing of 
brand-name compared with generic statins. Yeh and colleagues (2016) found that industry 
46 
 
 
 
payments are associated with increased rates of physicians prescribing brand-name statins 
and, for every US$1000 received, prescriptions of brand-name statins increased by 0.1 
percent (P<0.001). Similarly, drug company payments for educational training was 
associated with a 4.8 percent increase in brand-name prescribing (P=0.004). Another 2016 
study by Ryann Grochowski Jones and Charles Ornstein (2016) of ProPublica, a non-
profit investigative journalism organization, found that physicians who received larger 
payments from drug companies more frequently prescribed brand-name drugs as 
compared with physicians who did not receive payments from drug companies. 
Grochowski Jones and Ornstein (2016) also found that the type of payment had an effect 
on prescribing. Physicians who received only meals from drug companies prescribed 
brand-name drugs more frequently than their counterparts who did not receive any 
payments from drug companies. Similarly, physicians who received payments for 
participating in speaking engagements prescribed brand-name drugs at a higher rate than 
their counterparts who received other types of payments, including honoraria, consulting 
fees, and travel compensation, from drug companies (Grochowski Jones & Ornstein, 
2016). 
A study by Barbalee Symm and colleagues (2006) looked at whether physicians’ 
prescribing practices were influenced by the use of free sample medications in clinic X, in 
2003. Clinic X, which dispensed free sample medications, was compared to clinics Y and 
Z, which did not dispense free sample medications. Clinics X, Y, and Z were similar in 
their community populations, locations, and number of physicians in the practices. All of 
the 23 doctors at these three clinics had equal access to formulary education, counter-drug 
detailing efforts such as academic detailing that relies on university or non-commercial 
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sources of evidence, and incentives to manage drug costs. Symm and colleagues (2006) 
found that clinic X physicians prescribed more costly medications per 30-day prescription 
than those in clinics Y or Z. Physicians in clinic X were responsible for prescribing drugs 
that were not included in the clinic’s formulary and had the highest total prescribing costs 
(Symm et al., 2006).  
The 2010 survey by Campbell and colleagues (2010) found that the organization 
of physicians’ practices was related to the frequency with which physicians had financial 
relationships with industry. Physicians in solo, two-person, or group practices were 
significantly more likely to receive samples, reimbursements, and gifts than those in 
hospitals and medical schools; however, physicians in medical schools were the most 
likely to accept payments from industry (Campbell et al., 2010). Physicians who engaged 
in relationships with industry had a higher propensity to prescribe brand name drugs when 
less expensive generic alternatives were available, as compared with physicians without 
industry relationships who reported that they never prescribed brand name drugs when 
less expensive generic alternatives were available (Campbell et al., 2010).  
Across primary care physicians, neurologists/psychiatrists, and cardiologists, it 
was observed that the more gifts that doctors accepted, the more likely they were to 
categorize themselves as being influenced by the interactions and this finding was 
statistically significant (Lieb & Brandtonies, 2010). A 2010 study on German physicians’ 
interactions with drug representatives in their private practices found that over three-
quarters of physicians had a minimum of one visit per week from drug representatives 
(Lieb & Brandtonies, 2010). The most commonly accepted gifts by physicians were drug 
samples and stationary. A small minority of physicians in the sample (4%) had not 
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accepted any gifts whatsoever, while the vast majority (92%) accepted drug samples either 
occasionally or always. Over three-quarters of doctors believed that it was often or always 
the intention of drug representatives to influence their prescribing practices, but only six 
percent of doctors thought that they were being influenced by these interactions with sales 
representatives and one-fifth of the doctors believed that their colleagues, not themselves, 
were being influenced (Lieb & Brandtonies, 2010).  
Although the pharmaceutical industry claims that it provides scientific and 
educational information to health care professionals, expenditures on promotion to doctors 
are aimed at maximizing returns for both the firm and its shareholders (Spurling et al., 
2010). While many physicians perceive pharmaceutical promotion to be both useful and a 
convenient source of information, other doctors deny that they, themselves, are influenced 
by drug company promotion. Some professional medical organizations have adopted the 
position that drug promotion ought to be subject to greater control and this has been 
supported by research that information provided to physicians about drugs by their 
manufacturers may be misleading (Hemminki, 1977; Mintzes et al., 2013; Montgomery, 
Mansfield, Spurling, & Ward, 2008; Othman, Vitry, & Roughead, 2009; Ziegler, Lew, & 
Singer, 1995).  
Receiving prescribing information from drug companies does not improve 
prescribing choices. A review by Geoffrey Spurling and colleagues (2010) of 58 studies 
examined the effects of exposure to information provided directly by drug companies to 
doctors. They found evidence that these exposures affect physicians’ quality, quantity, and 
cost of prescribing practices. In all studies but one (98.3%), exposure to information from 
drug companies was associated with either lower prescribing quality or no association was 
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found. Exposure to information from drug companies was also associated with increased 
prescribing frequency or no association was found. Three of the studies found that 
exposure to information from drug companies was associated with increased drug sales up 
to a point of diminishing returns, at which point more drug promotion became increasingly 
less effective (Spurling et al., 2010). In all studies but one (98.3%), physicians’ exposure 
to information from drug companies was associated with either increased prescribing costs 
or no association was found. When physicians were active participants in the information 
exchanges at drug representatives’ visits, sponsored meetings, or sponsored trials, for 
example, physicians more consistently had higher prescribing frequencies than when 
physicians experienced passive exposures to journal advertisements and mailed 
information. Spurling and colleagues (2010) did not find evidence supporting net 
improvements in physicians’ prescribing practices associated with receiving information 
from drug companies.  
Ashley Wazana (2000) conducted a systematic review of English-language articles 
on conflict of interest relationships and the drug industry between 1994 and 2000, plus 
undertook five key informant interviews. The purpose of this study was to identify the 
extent of, and attitudes toward relationships between physicians, drug companies, and 
drug company representatives as well as the effects of these relationships on the 
knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of physicians. Wazana found that physicians’ 
interactions with drug company representatives were generally encouraged and began in 
medical school. After medical school, physicians tended to continue to see drug 
representatives approximately four times per month. Wazana also found that physicians’ 
meetings with drug representatives were associated with not only those physicians’ 
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requesting drug additions to their hospital formularies, but also changes in their 
prescribing choices. Other findings from the review were that when drug companies 
sponsored CME activities, they preferentially emphasized sponsors’ drugs as compared 
with nonindustry sponsored CME activities and that accepting industry funding for travel 
or accommodations was associated with increased prescribing rates of the sponsor’s drug. 
Physicians’ attendance at presentations by drug company representatives was associated 
with their nonrational prescribing choices. The following associations were also found: 
increases in the duration of time during which physician-industry interactions occurred 
and increased prescribing and favourable attitudes toward industry, attending sponsored 
CME and increased prescribing rates of sponsors drugs, being taught by a physician drug 
representative and nonrational prescribing of sponsors’ drugs and interactions with 
company representatives and positive attitudes about the interactions.  
 
2.4 PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY FUNDING AND RESEARCH INTEGRITY 
 
The funding of research by the companies that seek to benefit from the results 
generates opportunities for the sponsors to influence and control research in ways that 
jeopardize not only research objectivity, but also its validity and reproducibility. As of 
2005, the pharmaceutical industry provided approximately 70 percent of the total funding 
allocated to clinical trials in the United States (Mello, Clarridge, & Studdert, 2005; 
Sismondo, 2008). In 2004, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms in the United States 
funded US$40.4 billion of the US$94.5 billion spent on biomedical research (Lexchin, 
2012; Moses III, Dorsey, Matheson, & Thier, 2005). A decade later, in 2014, 
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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which represents the 
United States’ leading biopharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, reported that 
these industries spent an estimated US$51.2 billion on biomedical research (17.9% of total 
sales in 2014) (Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America [PhRMA], 2015) an 
increase of 21.1% from 2004. Industry sponsorship of biomedical research has led to the 
commercialization of the scientific research process. This commercialization may deepen 
as clinical research is increasingly funded by industry and conducted by commercial 
organizations, including contract research organizations (CROs), which will be discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 5 (Bodenheimer, 2000). 
Surveys have found that, like physicians, the majority of biomedical researchers at 
universities have financial relationships with industry. A survey conducted by Darren 
Zinner (2009) and colleagues on biomedical researchers in the United States found that 
the majority of researchers had relationships with industry in the past three years. The 
most common type of researcher-industry relationship involved consulting (31.8%), 
followed by paid speaking engagements (23.8%), receiving research funding as grants or 
contracts as principal investigators (20.1%), and memberships on scientific advisory 
boards (17.7%). The academic ranking of faculty researchers was strongly associated with 
relationships with industry. Academics with higher status tended to engage in more 
academic-industry relationships and this was consistent across various types of researcher-
industry relationships (Zinner, Bolcic-Jankovic, Clarridge, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 
2009).  
Academic researchers in nonclinical research departments were more likely to 
have relationships with industry in upstream research and early stages of product 
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development through to IP licensing and the founding or managing companies. A 
significantly greater proportion of researchers in clinical departments (23.3%) received 
research grants from industry than those in nonclinical departments (9.4%). Although 
Zinner and colleagues (2009) found decreases in industry funding to universities, industry 
funds comprised a significantly greater proportion of overall research support for clinical, 
as compared with nonclinical, faculty members. Among the faculty receiving industry 
research support, it constituted almost half of all of their research funding. This industry 
funding was significantly higher in clinical as compared with nonclinical research 
departments (Zinner et al., 2009). It is clear that biomedical researchers, who may or may 
not be physicians, have FCOI relationships with industry throughout the stages of clinical 
research. Industry’s increased interest in clinical, as compared with non-clinical research 
is clear, considering that it allocated significantly more funding to clinical research. This 
difference in the allocation of funds indicates industry’s interest in the commercializability 
of biomedical clinical, rather than non-clinical, research outputs. 
 
2.4.1 Consequences Associated with Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship of 
Research 
 
Zinner and colleagues (2009) found, in a sample of 2,168 faculty members from 
clinical (n=1,071) and nonclinical (n=1,097) departments, that some faculty who received 
industry support for their research experienced restrictions on their permitted 
communications about their research as well as their choice of research. In this study, 12.9 
percent of faculty produced research that resulted in trade secrets, or information that was 
to be kept confidential to protect its proprietary value. Zinner and colleagues (2009) also 
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found that when faculty were able to choose their research topics, their choices were 
affected either somewhat or greatly by the prospect of their results having a commercial 
application. Faculty with industry funding were also more likely than faculty without 
industry funding to report the delaying of a publication for six or more months, or that the 
delay of a publication was intended to prevent the publication of unfavourable results 
(Zinner et al., 2009). These findings are supported and complimented by an earlier study 
by David Blumenthal and colleagues (1996), which found similar consequences for 
research transparency among faculty in 1996, indicating that these problems persisted 
despite advances in FCOI policies.  
Some scholars have expressed concerns about the potential for undue influence on 
research integrity when clinical studies are industry funded. Financial relationships 
between academic researchers and industry in the fields of biotechnology and biomedical 
research have faced criticism. Academic researchers who participate in these financial 
relationships engage in FCOI relationships, which are likely to be expressed in their 
research. For example, when research is industry sponsored, there is an increase in the 
likelihood that results that are favourable to industry sponsors are systematically selected 
for publication, while results that are deemed to be unfavourable to sponsors are 
suppressed (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003).  
 Products tend to be systematically favoured in published research that is 
sponsored by the drug manufacturer (Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & Clark, 2003). A 
Cochrane Collaboration review of 48 studies by Andreas Lundh and colleagues (2012) 
found that both pharmaceutical and medical device industry sponsored studies reported 
more favourable efficacy results, harms results, and overall conclusions than did studies 
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that were funded by other sources (Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, Busuioc, & Bero, 2012). 
Lundh and colleagues (2012) found that in 14 papers, which included 1,588 drug studies, 
industry sponsored studies had favourable efficacy results with significant P-values more 
often than did nonindustry funded studies (Lundh et al., 2012). 
This Cochrane review also found that two papers, which included 131 industry 
funded clinical trials on statins and thiazolidinediones, reported that when trials compared 
two drugs made by competing companies and each company sponsored a trial, the superior 
drug was reported to be the one made by the sponsoring company (Lundh et al., 2012). 
An additional paper, which included 20 selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) 
head-to-head trials, found that all 20 (100%) favoured the treatment that was manufactured 
by the sponsor of the trial, while none reported results that favoured the comparator drug. 
These findings about the relationship between sponsorship and study results are duplicated 
in the findings in the Cochrane report about trial conclusions. In 24 papers, which included 
4,616 studies of which 4,403 were drug studies, industry sponsored studies were more 
likely to reach conclusions favourable to the sponsor’s product (Lundh et al., 2012).  
Overall, Lundh and colleagues (2012) found that industry funded studies obtained 
results and conclusions that were more often favourable to the sponsors’ products than 
when studies were funded independently from industry. This review also found that when 
studies were industry sponsored, there were discrepancies between reported results and 
the wording of the conclusions, as compared with non-industry funded studies (Lundh et 
al., 2012). In practice, this means that the conclusions tended to overstate the benefits 
presented by the results. Industry funded studies were found to be just as methodologically 
rigorous as nonindustry funded studies when the traditional methods of measuring rigor, 
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i.e., use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or blinding, were evaluated. However, 
evaluating only these traditional indicators of study quality may lead to missing the more 
subtle techniques that bias trials and lead to pro-industry results (Lundh et al., 2012). 
 
2.4.1.1 Publication Bias or Selective Publication   
 
Several biasing techniques that drug companies use to ensure that their studies 
yield favourable results have been identified in the literature. Publication bias, or selective 
publication, is a well-known consequence of drug companies both conducting clinical 
trials and owning the results from them. Publication bias refers to the likelihood that 
studies with favourable results are more likely to be published than studies with results 
unfavourable to the sponsor (Fries & Krishnan, 2004). Some estimate that clinical trials 
with favourable results are twice as likely to be disseminated as trials with unfavourable 
results (Goldacre, 2013). Those with significant results are also more likely to be 
published, sometimes more than once (Schott et al., 2010). The magnitude of publication 
bias is controversial because the only way to establish whether trial results have been 
hidden is if it is known whether the trials were conducted in the first place. Although there 
have been global efforts for clinical trial registration, there are still inconsistencies in the 
registration of trials and it has been estimated by Ben Goldacre that around 50 percent of 
all clinical trials for currently used drugs remain unpublished (Goldacre, 2013). 
In 2004, the 11 leading medical journals that comprised the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) imposed the requirement that by 1 July 
2005 clinical trials had to be registered in order to have their results published in the 
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journals. Similarly, in January 2005, major pharmaceutical manufacturer organizations 
including PhRMA and the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations (IFPMA) adopted guidelines that required their members to enter trials 
prospectively into publicly accessible registries. Despite these wide-reaching 
requirements for trial registry, some data suggests that pharmaceutical companies are still 
failing to register important information on clinical trials (Law, Kawasumi, & Morgan, 
2011; Prayle, Hurley, & Smyth, 2012) and at the same time these trials are being published 
in journals that are members of the ICMJE (Mathieu, Boutron, Moher, Altman, & Ravaud, 
2009). 
Although many journals subscribe to ICMJE guidelines for trial registration and 
require a registration number for publication, some journals continue to use vague 
language to prospective authors concerning trial registration such as “[w]e encourage the 
registration of all interventional trials” (Mathieu et al., 2009). This unclear language in 
journals’ policies may help to explain both inadequate trial registration and lack of 
adherence to trial reporting guidelines (Mathieu et al., 2009). Although the ICMJE’s 
implementation of this requirement led to a sharp increase in trial registration in 
ClinicalTrials.gov, information provided by the companies on trial characteristics and 
protocols, including primary endpoints, remained either imprecise or absent (Schott et al., 
2010). 
Licensing studies are important in the assessment of new drugs, which are carried 
out almost exclusively by drug companies. In comparisons of data provided to the FDA 
versus that which has been published in medical journals, findings show that 
approximately 25 to 50 percent of studies submitted for licensing purposes remain 
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unpublished. Studies with favourable and significant findings are statistically significantly 
published more often than studies that have produced either unfavourable or non-
significant findings. In other cases, negative or unfavourable results were portrayed as 
positive or favourable findings. For example, a study on SSRI trials found that trials with 
significant results were not only more likely to be published, but also to be published more 
than once. By contrast, SSRI trials with unfavourable or non-significant results were not 
published (Schott et al., 2010).  
 
2.4.1.2 Design Bias 
 
Design bias, mentioned above, is another strategy utilized by pharmaceutical 
companies to ensure favourable results in their trials. Design bias occurs before a clinical 
trial has begun, when the trial parameters and protocols are being determined, but before 
the final decision to initiate the trial has been made. Trial design is important to companies 
because only drugs that continue to show promise through the drug development sequence 
including pharmacological studies, pharmacokinetic studies, animal studies, initial human 
studies, dose ranging studies, and toxicity studies, among others, reach the stage where 
they can be tested in RCTs. When drugs reach the RCT stage, there is already a great deal 
of information known about these drugs (Fries & Krishnan, 2004). 
Drug companies, which sponsor and run their own clinical trials, ‘design for 
success’ within well-established procedures wherein company consultants and employees 
engage in debates about what is known about the drug, its competitors, its potential 
toxicity or efficacy advantages, and the potential disease indication for the drug. It is only 
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following these discussions that clinical trials are designed. The process of designing a 
clinical trial involves considering patient populations, dosages, study duration, end-points, 
and comparators that are likely to provide a positive results for the sponsor. Also 
considered in study design is its acceptability to the FDA. Theoretically, design bias is not 
in itself a problem because drugs with promise should be studied in a way that identifies 
their therapeutic niches (Fries & Krishnan, 2004); however, in practice, problems with 
bias arise when the sponsor has a direct role in designing, monitoring, and reporting results 
of a study from which it seeks to gain revenue and in which it has invested potentially 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
2.4.1.3 Sponsor Control over Clinical Trial Protocols and Data Analysis 
 
Execution of clinical trials according to a priori protocols, as well as the objective 
interpretation and publication of results, can also be influenced through agreements and 
contracts that stipulate that the sponsoring drug company has access to trial data or that 
give it the power to restrict or prevent publication of the results (Schott et al., 2010). There 
are a number of different stages and characteristics of clinical trials that are influenced by 
drug company sponsorship. For example, internal industry documents have provided 
evidence that drug companies have failed to reveal relevant data on adverse drug reactions 
(ADRs) to the public or the FDA at the appropriate times. For example, the manufacturer 
of cerivastatin was aware of the drug’s interaction with gemfibrozil, which lead to an 
increased occurrence of rhabdomyolysis (muscle breakdown), approximately 100 days 
after the product was launched on the market. It took 18 months, however, for this 
interaction to be added to cerivastatin’s product information on contraindications. Another 
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example is that the manufacturer of rofecoxib had data on increased mortality in 
Alzheimer’s dementia patients, but failed to communicate this to both patients and the 
FDA in a timely manner. The manufacturer of rofecoxib also failed to adequately evaluate 
the occurrence of cardiovascular ADRs (Schott et al., 2010). Physician and FDA official, 
David Graham, testified on the harms data for rofecoxib and estimated that approximately 
100,000 excess cases of heart attack and sudden cardiac death occurred (Graham, 2004).   
The manufacturer of paroxetine (Paxil) failed to include known ADRs in the drug’s 
accompanying information. A 2008 study by Ivar Aursnes and Marianne Klemp Gjertsen 
explored the ADRs that had already been documented at the time that paroxetine was first 
licensed in 1989 (Aursnes & Klemp Gjertsen, 2008). The authors gained access to the 
1989 clinical data on paroxetine that was presented to drug agencies globally (Aursnes, 
Tvete, Gassemyr, & Natvig, 2005) after an unusual decision by the Norwegian Civil 
Ombudsman that the Ministry of Health should permit them to examine these documents. 
Out of 32 ADRs that the test group reported, only eight were listed as common, despite 19 
of the 32 ADRs being statistically significantly more common in the test group compared 
to the control groups. As of 2008 when this study was published, five of these 19 ADRs 
were still not mentioned in the Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC), which 
accompanies Patient Information Leaflets (PILs) for licensed medicines in Europe 
(Aursnes & Klemp Gjertsen, 2008). Included within these five unlisted ADRs were 
paresthesia and nervousness, both of which were still not mentioned in paroxetine’s 
information in 2010 in Norway, over two decades after the findings were first known 
(Schott et al., 2010).  
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A 2015 research study by Joanna Le Noury and colleagues re-analyzed SmithKline 
Beecham’s (now, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK) Study 329 on the safety and efficacy of 
paroxetine compared to imipramine, to determine whether access to and reanalysis of the 
full data set from a RCT would result in different findings than in the study originally 
published in 2001 (Le Noury et al., 2015b). Le Noury and colleagues gained access to 
77,000 pages of de-identified case report forms (CRFs). They found that neither 
paroxetine, nor imipramine proved to be effective when it was used to treat major 
depression in adolescents. In their re-analysis, they also found a clinically significant 
increase in harms with both imipramine and paroxetine (Le Noury et al., 2015b). These 
findings are extremely important because they both contrast with the originally reported 
and interpreted results in the original 2001 publication. Le Noury and colleagues also 
found that the original study employed biasing techniques in the coding of adverse events 
in the study, which masked important differences in the suicidal behaviours of the original 
participants in the study. The decision-making trail, made available by Le Noury and 
colleagues in Box 2, Appendix 3 (Le Noury et al., 2015a), leads the readers to the 
unexplainable coding choices made by the original Study 329 team. These coding choices 
transformed serious adverse events, such as intentionally swallowing 80 Tylenol tablets, 
into the misrepresentative and completely minimized category of “emotional lability” (Le 
Noury et al., 2015b). 
As the above example shows, techniques used by companies to bias study 
outcomes are both complex and comprehensive and are utilized at every level of the drug 
evaluation process, making them exceptionally difficult to detect (Lexchin, 2012). Some 
additional techniques include enrolling healthy patients in phase III trials, purposefully 
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administering an insufficient dose of the test or comparator drug, and testing the 
experimental drug against placebo when there are active medication alternatives on the 
market (Bero, Oostvogel, Bacchetti, & Lee, 2007; Chopra, 2003; Rochon et al., 1994).  
 
2.4.1.4 Use of Composite Endpoints 
 
Industry funded clinical trials have also been known to use composite outcomes 
and alter primary endpoints to achieve favourable results (Cordoba, Schwartz, Woloshin, 
Bae, & Gotzsche, 2010; Lim, Brown, Helmy, Mussa, & Altman, 2008; Schott et al., 2010). 
For example, the efficacy of gabapentin for off-label indications was inflated by altering 
the primary endpoint in a study and also ensuring that unfavourable data remained 
unpublished (Schott et al., 2010). 
Use of composite outcomes in clinical trials can provide an overall estimate of the 
effect of a drug intervention (Cordoba et al., 2010). Using composite outcomes also allows 
investigators to assess more than one aspect of a patient’s health status by allowing 
reporting on more than one outcome and reductions in sample size requirements with the 
latter reducing costs and time (Cordoba et al., 2010). However, composite endpoints can 
be manipulated, and this potential is sometimes used by drug companies to inflate the 
appearance of the benefit of their products (Cordoba et al., 2010). To determine how 
composite outcomes were used in published clinical trials in medical journals, Cordoba 
and colleagues (2010) conducted a systematic review of RCTs and found that the use of 
composite outcomes in clinical trials is problematic for a number of reasons including that 
they conflate adverse events that are not equal, for example, chest pain and angina. 
62 
 
 
 
Composite endpoints use has been characterized by a lack of rationale explaining how 
they were constructed, inconsistent and unclear reporting, post hoc changes to the 
composite outcomes when these outcomes should be determined prior to data collection, 
and cherry picking of favourable outcomes or combinations thereof.  
Cordoba and colleagues (2010) also note their encounter of “…the most ingenious 
way of getting rid of dead patients that [they had] ever seen” by way of composite 
endpoints. They noted that, “[d]eaths in a cardiovascular trial were listed only if they 
occurred before anything else. Thus, one might avoid deaths by including a component 
that precedes death, such as chest pain”. In this case, the component of the composite 
outcome considered in the analysis was not death, but chest pain.  
The authors found that components of composite outcomes are often inadequately 
reported and characterized by a “lack of logic” that inflates the appearance of a drug’s 
safety and efficacy (Cordoba et al., 2010). Another concern was that the definitions of the 
composite outcome changed from the abstract, to the methods, to the results sections of 
the published papers, indicating that the investigators chose which data to target in their 
analyses (Brody, 2011; Cordoba et al., 2010). An additional problem that Cordoba and 
colleagues (2010) found was that readers tended not to be reminded throughout the 
published trials about which components of the composite outcome had improved, with 
the article stating only that the overall composite outcome had improved. It is often 
difficult to explain or understand the true meaning of an effect on a composite outcome, 
which is why its allowance by the most highly regarded general medical journals is 
important to note. The misuse of composite outcomes and their widespread use within 
medical journals likely leaves many readers confused and with an exaggerated perception 
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of the safety and efficacy of drug interventions, which is why Cordoba and colleagues 
(2010) and Brody (2011) recommend avoiding the use of composite outcomes.  
 
2.4.1.5 Seeding Trials: Use of Post-Market Surveillance Studies (Phase IV Trials) 
 
Even after clinical trials have been conducted, drugs have been approved, 
physicians are prescribing the drugs, and patients are taking the drugs, pharmacovigilance 
must still be conducted. For the duration of the patent, manufacturers that have a financial 
interest in the success of the drug want to maintain the drug’s reputation to ensure its 
continued use. There are clear examples of efforts taken by companies to protect their 
profits, despite known drug harms that had been revealed during clinical trials. As stated 
earlier, in Canada, Bill C-17 theoretically gives Health Canada the authority to require 
post-market trials, but it is unclear if Health Canada will use this authority in practice 
(Parliament of Canada, 2014). In the United States, the FDA can mandate post-market 
trials under certain conditions (Schultz, 2007); however, industry is also known to misuse 
phase IV trials through a strategy called seeding trials.   
A “seeding trial” is a clinical study that operates under the guise of testing a 
scientific hypothesis, but in fact is intended as a marketing trial to make the drug known 
to prescribing physicians in order to increase its sales (Goldacre, 2012; Schott et al., 2010). 
Seeding trials occur when drug companies sponsor and run a trial involving hundreds of 
physicians who recruit only a few patients each. Drug companies sponsor seeding trials 
not to obtain high-quality scientific information, but to change the prescribing habits of 
many physicians in a relatively short period of time (Sox & Rennie, 2008). Physicians 
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agree to be involved in these trials because they feel flattered that the sponsor considers 
them to be key opinion leaders (KOLs) and inflates their status as research team members 
by providing them with the title of investigator. These chosen physicians are, then, paid 
by the drug company by way of consulting fees to advise the company on the use of the 
drug, plus an additional payment for each patient that they enroll. The result is that these 
physicians become invested in the future success of the drug and praise the drug to their 
medical colleagues and patients. The physician, perhaps unknowingly, becomes an 
integral part of the drug company’s marketing team (Sox & Rennie, 2008). 
Some documented seeding trials include ADVANTAGE (Assessment of 
Differences between Vioxx and Naproxen To Ascertain Gastrointestinal Tolerability and 
Effectiveness) sponsored by Merck & Co. (Hill, Ross, Egilman, & Krumholz, 2008) and 
STEPS (Study of Neurontin: Titrate to Effect, Profile of Safety) sponsored by Parke-Davis 
(previously a division of Warner-Lambert Co., now a subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.) (Krumholz, 
Egilman, & Ross, 2011). 
The ADVANTAGE trial was determined to be a seeding trial through analysis of 
internal and external Merck & Co. correspondence, reports, and presentations between 
1998 and 2006 (Hill et al., 2008). In January 1999, prior to the launch of Vioxx 
(rofecoxib), Merck & Co.’s marketing division developed the ADVANTAGE clinical 
trial. The marketing division neither revealed the promotional intent of the trial, nor its 
involvement in the trial. Rather than disclose the promotional purpose of the 
ADVANTAGE trial, the marketing division informed physician-investigators, trial 
participants, and institutional review board (IRB) members that the purpose of the trial 
was to measure the gastrointestinal safety of Vioxx. In total, there were 600 physician-
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investigators and a total of 5,557 patients enrolled in the trial (n=2,785 patients with 
osteoarthritis assigned to Vioxx; n=2,772 patients assigned to naproxen) for a three-month 
trial that began approximately two months prior to Vioxx receiving market approval by 
the US FDA on 22 May 1999 (Hill et al., 2008). Hill and colleagues (2008) located a slide 
by Merck & Co.’s marketing division, which stated that the primary goal of the 
ADVANTAGE trial was for the physician-investigators to “[g]ain experience with Vioxx 
prior to and during the critical launch phase [of Vioxx]”. The ADVANTAGE trial was 
developed by the marketing division with a marketing objective, the division was 
responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating both the scientific and marketing 
data that emerged from the trial, and Merck failed to reveal the true purposes of the trial 
to its participants, physician-investigators, and the IRB that granted ethics approval for the 
trial (Hill et al., 2008). The ADVANTAGE trial was used by Merck & Co. to illustrate the 
value of Vioxx to the physician-investigators, to carefully and precisely integrate its 
marketing staff into trial-related operations and vice versa, and to track the physician-
investigators’ prescribing of Vioxx (Hill et al., 2008). The ADVANTAGE trial was 
published in Annals of Internal Medicine in 2003 as a randomized controlled trial and 
remains available online (Lisse et al., 2003). 
The STEPS trial was determined to be a seeding trial through an examination of 
all documents, including company internal and external correspondence, reports, and 
presentations between 1990 and 2009, as well as other legal documents released in 
litigation (Krumholz et al., 2011). These documents provided evidence that STEPS was a 
seeding trial that was postured as a legitimate scientific study. The STEPS trial was a phase 
IV uncontrolled and unblinded clinical trial that was sponsored by Parke-Davis. Informed 
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consent documents show that the 2,759 participants, who were assigned to 772 physician-
investigators, were told that the stated purpose of the study was to determine the safety, 
efficacy, tolerability, and quality of life of participants who received gabapentin 
(Neurontin) without mentioning its marketing intent (Krumholz et al., 2011). The 
scientific validity and poor trial design was questioned by two institutions: The Johns 
Hopkins University IRB rejected the application and, subsequently, rejected it again on 
appeal because the IRB members disapproved of the protocol, which they believed to be 
“…too vague to allow any scientific conclusions to be reach[ed]” (Krumholz et al., 2011). 
The opinion of the FDA director of the Division of Drug Marketing Advertisements and 
Communications (DDMAC) was that the STEPS trial was favourable from a marketing 
perspective, but was not justifiable for obtaining data on high dose use (Krumholz et al., 
2011). 
The quality of the data obtained during the STEPS trial was undermined by poor 
clinical trial conduct. Parke-Davis not only recruited physician-investigators with little or 
no clinical trial experience and did not provide sufficient training or audit study sites prior 
to the beginning of the trial, but also had its data “cleaned up” and analyzed by a CRO 
(Krumholz et al., 2011). In correspondence with the Medical Scientific Affairs Senior 
Assistant Clinical Scientist at Parke-Davis, the CRO indicated that “the data clean-up 
process for STEPS has been a larger task than anticipated. The data was very dirty” 
(Krumholz et al., 2011). The CRO then provided a strategy and choices of scenarios for 
cleaning up the data (Krumholz et al., 2011). Parke-Davis’s planned marketing strategies 
relied heavily on STEPS as a key deliverable for positioning the drug to neurologists and 
primary care physicians as “the safe and easy add-on” for noncompliant seizure patients 
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(Krumholz et al., 2011). In internal marketing memos, the STEPS trial was referred to as 
“…the best tool [Parke-Davis] has for Neurontin and we should be using it wherever we 
can” (Krumholz et al., 2011). The STEPS trial resulted in two articles published in 
Epilepsy (McLean et al., 1999) and Seizure (Morrell et al., 2000) and both published 
articles are still available online. 
It is important to note that drug companies may use a combination of these 
strategies to ensure favourable outcomes. Published data may be the result of a number of 
complex and layered industry tactics aimed at shaping research data and the medical 
literature base.  
 
2.5 FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCLOSURES IN PUBLISHED 
MEDICAL RESEARCH 
 
Conflict of interest disclosures are now commonly required upon publishing 
articles, including clinical practice guidelines, in medical journals. Therefore, researchers 
have been able to assess the frequency with which authors possess and disclose FCOI 
relationships. 
 
2.5.1 Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosures and Results Published in Journal 
Articles 
 
Clifford Perlis and colleagues (2005) conducted a study that evaluated the extent 
and impact of FCOI relationships between authors and drug companies in 179 clinical 
trials published in the four highest impact dermatology journals. They found that studies 
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that named authors with disclosed FCOI were more likely to report a positive result. Roy 
Perlis (2005) and colleagues conducted a study on clinical trials published in the four 
highest impact psychiatry journals. They found that regardless of funding source, all 
studies by authors who had FCOI relationships were significantly associated with positive 
trial outcomes.  
Henry Stelfox and colleagues (1998) analyzed whether there was an association 
between authors’ positions on the safety of calcium-channel antagonists in published 
literature and their FCOI relationships with drug companies. In addition to analyzing the 
published positions of these authors, Stelfox and colleagues also surveyed them to obtain 
information about their FCOI relationships with pharmaceutical companies to assess FCOI 
relationships that potentially were not disclosed in the journal articles. Authors’ FCOI 
relationships were statistically significantly associated with their published support of 
calcium-channel antagonists (Stelfox, Chua, O’Rourke, & Detsky, 1998). Stelfox and 
colleagues also found that authors with published support for calcium-channel antagonists 
were statistically significantly more likely to have FCOI relationships with not only 
manufacturers of calcium-channel antagonists, but also any pharmaceutical manufacturer.  
 
2.5.2 Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosures and Results Published in Clinical 
Practice Guidelines 
 
Niteesh Choudhry (2012) and colleagues found, through a survey of guideline 
authors, that the vast majority reported having a relationship with industry. These 
relationships ranged from receiving funding, honoraria and support for educational 
programs to being employed by and owning equity in drug companies. Fifty-nine percent 
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of these authors also reported FCOI relationships with drug companies whose products 
were considered or included in the guideline that they authored. Despite the high number 
of FCOI relationships reported in the survey, these authors did not disclose their FCOI 
relationships in 42 of the 44 guidelines that they authored. In only 1 out of the 44 
guidelines in this study, did all authors declare that they held no FCOI (Choudhry, Stelfox, 
& Detsky, 2002). In a systematic review by Susan Norris and colleagues in 2011 on 12 
guidelines, authors on all 12 guidelines disclosed FCOI relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry (Norris, Holmer, Ogden, & Burda, 2011).  
Lisa Cosgrove and colleagues (2006) conducted a study that examined the 
financial interests of the panel members responsible for revisions of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). They decided to use the term “financial 
interests” rather than COI relationships because they stated that the term COI relationship 
implies an interpretation of the interest. Instead, the authors defined categories of financial 
interest to include real, perceived, or potential COI relationships. The DSM is the leading 
medical manual used in the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders. DSM panel members have 
a significant influence in the determination of whether new psychiatric diagnoses should 
be added to the manual, or alternatively, whether older diagnoses should be revised in the 
next edition of the manual (Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan, & Schneider, 2006).  
For 170 expert panel members on the DSM-IV, the authors screened for any 
financial affiliations that they had with the pharmaceutical industry between 1989 and 
2004 by gathering data from published papers or through Internet search methods. Ninety-
five of the 170 panel members (56%) had one or more financial interests with drug 
companies. More than 80 percent of expert panel members on six out of 18 panels had 
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financial interests in pharmaceutical companies, while 100 percent of the experts on two 
of the 18 panels had financial interests with pharmaceutical companies (Cosgrove et al., 
2006). 
Brian Pilecki (2011) and colleagues provided an analysis of financial interests of 
the 29 DSM-V task force members whose potential COI relationships at the time of the 
study were published on the DSM-V website. Of the 29 task force members, 21 (72%) 
disclosed at least one financial interest with any pharmaceutical, healthcare or insurance, 
or biotechnology corporation, resulting in 220 ties (range: 2 to 22, mean: 9.6). When 
multiple ties to individual corporations were considered, the number of financial ties rose 
to 278. Of the 29 task force members, 19 (66%) disclosed at least one association with a 
drug company, resulting in 114 associations with drug companies (Pilecki, Clegg, & 
McKay, 2011). 
In 2012, Cosgrove and Krimsky  (2012) added to the study by Pilecki and 
colleagues (2011) by also considering the 141 expert panel members who made up 13 
DSM-V teams. In total, there were 170 DSM-V members (29 task force members + 141 
panel members = 170 total DSM-V members). Sixty-nine percent of the DSM-V task force 
members disclosed financial ties with drug companies, representing a relative increase of 
21 percent in those with financial ties to industry since the DSM-IV. These authors also 
found that in both the DSM-IV and DSM-V, the panels with the most members with FCOI 
relationships with drug companies recommended pharmacological treatments as first-line 
interventions (Cosgrove & Krimsky, 2012). 
A study by G. Michael Allan and colleagues (2015) was conducted in order to 
determine the professions of guideline contributors, as well as whether those professionals 
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disclosed conflict of interest relationships through disclosure statements within primary 
care guidelines. They assessed 296 guidelines from the family medicine section of the 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) Infobase. Of these guidelines 100 were excluded 
because they had limited relevance or were duplicates and an additional 20 guidelines 
were excluded because they did not provide information on contributors, which Allan and 
colleagues (2015) defined as authors and committee members. A total of 2,495 
contributors were assessed. Of these contributors, 1,343 (53.8%) were non-family 
physician specialists, 423 (17.0%) were family physicians, 141 (5.7%) were nurses, 75 
(3.0%) were pharmacists, 269 (10.8%) were other clinicians, 203 (8.1%) were non-
clinician scientists, and 41 (1.6%) were unknown professions.  
In general, Allan and colleagues (2015) found that approximately two-thirds of the 
guidelines did not provide conflict of interest disclosures for their contributors. In this 
study, 32.8 percent of contributors who provided conflict of interest disclosures had at 
least one conflict of interest relationship. Non-family physician contributors outnumbered 
physician contributors in both industry and non-industry funded guidelines, but in non-
industry funded guidelines a higher proportion of contributors were family physicians. 
Non-family physician contributors were the most likely to report conflict of interest 
relationships (48.6%), as compared to pharmacists (30.0%), family physicians (27.7%), 
nurses (9.9%), non-clinician scientists (9.6%), and other clinicians (2.9%). Allan and 
colleagues (2015) recommend that there be a balance professional representation within 
guideline contributors and that the participation of contributors who have conflict of 
interest relationships with industry should be minimized. 
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2.6 THE DEREGULATION OF FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
RELATIONSHIPS IN MEDICINE: EFFORTS TO DESTIGMATIZE FINANCIAL 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DELEGITIMIZE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF 
REGULATION  
 
Despite the established literature base that continues to conclude that there are 
associations between FCOI relationships, published research, and physicians’ prescribing 
choices, efforts by some physicians to delegitimize this research persists using a set of 
common strategies. Some of these strategies will be both addressed and refuted in this 
section.  
 
2.6.1 Focusing Too Narrowly: Taking a Step Back to Assess the Effects of Financial 
Relationships with Industry 
 
Arguments against regulating conflict of interest relationships tend to focus too 
narrowly on the specificities of the relationship itself and not on the effects that these 
relationships tend to have more broadly. A physician who argues against strict regulation 
for FCOI relationships is Thomas Stossel, who is a senior physician in the Hematology 
Division at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, visiting scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI), and American Cancer Society Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical 
School (American Enterprise Institute [AEI], 2015). His work on conflict of interest 
relationships in medicine seeks to establish that arguments to regulate these relationships 
are informed by the myth that regulating COI undermines medical innovation (Rago, 
2015; Stossel, 2015). Stossel has framed this argument in the following way:  
What the conflict of interest movement does not yet regulate it maligns. It 
demonises ‘speakers’ bureaus,’ which organise doctors to provide company 
sponsored education, and ghostwriters, accusing professional writers hired by 
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companies of routinely creating promotional fiction that is allegedly legitimised by 
honorary academic authors (Stossel, 2008b).  
Counter to this claim, the “conflict of interest movement” asks critical questions about 
these relationships and the effects that they have. For example, with regards to speakers’ 
bureaus and company sponsored medical education, the issue is not necessarily with the 
act of speaking. The issue lies in the carefully planned nuances that make it worthwhile 
for companies to be spending money on these activities. Speakers’ bureaus and company 
sponsored medical education events are often used as physician-to-physician 
environments in which companies can identify and train strong pharmaceutical industry 
advocates and expand their rolodex of speakers and KOLs or thought leaders. When 
physicians engage in industry funded speaking relationships, they can be paid US$2,500 
to US$3,000 for delivering a single lecture, based on a lecture or slide-deck that was 
developed by the sponsoring company. Furthermore, company sponsored medical 
education has become big-business in which agencies called medical education 
communication companies (MECCs), are contracted by pharmaceutical companies, to 
produce educational and communications materials and organize grand-rounds lectures at 
hospitals, train KOLs, create their lectures and manage their speakers’ bureaus, and 
organize a number of live events including satellite symposia, podcasts, conferences, and 
advisory board meetings (Elliott, 2004). MECCs promote their abilities to provide 
“promotion through education” and that this ‘education’ can be “custom tailored to meet 
the pharmaceutical marketers’ needs” (Sismondo, 2011). These relationships, among 
others including ghostwriting, their relevance to conflict of interest regulation, and the 
effects of these relationships will be explored in Chapter 5. 
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2.6.2 Public versus Private Innovation Successes 
 
Authors who oppose conflict of interest regulation also tend to make 
overstatements without concrete data to support their assertions regarding the effects of 
private industry on research. One example of such a statement made by Stossel argued in 
favour of decreased regulation of private industry by overstating the broad successes of 
private industry: 
All of these charges obscure the fact that only private companies bring new 
products to patients and that medical care has improved steadily and spectacularly 
because of them. Fraud and pathological bias could never have conferred these 
monumental achievements (Stossel, 2008b).  
Private companies bring products to market because in the current structure of R&D, 
upstream research tends to be conducted by researchers in academic institutions. As a 
response to state budgetary cutbacks, university funding has been constrained, which has 
led to the restructuring of funding schemes for research and education. As a direct result 
of increased industry support for academic operations within universities, the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have adopted influential roles through 
university-industry partnerships. These partnerships have led to an increased focus on 
biomedical research and innovation (Krimsky, 2004). This restructuring has paved the 
way for more private sector funding to be siphoned into universities. Once university-
based research outputs reach the point at which they can be commercialized, the 
companies that funded the research take possession of them and pursue their 
commercialization for profit, rather than primarily using them to further academic interest 
or public good (Kenney, 1986; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
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The claim about private industry’s capabilities as the only provider of new medical 
technologies to patients must be considered in the context of the absolute number of drugs 
approved for market and the percent of these that are true therapeutic advances. The 
pharmaceutical industry and its analysts define and measure innovation in terms of the 
number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) in the US and New Active Substances (NASs) 
in Canada that are approved, rather than how many of these NMEs result in therapeutically 
superior new medicines. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defines NME as 
“…an active ingredient that has never before been marketed in the United States in any 
form” (US Food and Drug Administration, 2012). Health Canada defines NASs as drugs 
that contain “…a medicinal ingredient not previously approved in a drug in Canada and 
that is not a variation of a previously approved medicinal ingredient” (Health Canada, 
2015).  
Historically, researchers in public-sector research institutions (PSRIs) have been 
known to perform the upstream, basic research, while corporate researchers have 
conducted the downstream, commercializable research which has led to the development 
of drugs for the market. Ashley Stevens and colleagues (2011) conducted a study to 
determine the role of PSRIs in the applied stages of drug discovery. They identified 153 
drugs that were approved by the US FDA between 1970 and 2009 that had originated from 
public-sector research. These 153 drugs received 203 new-drug or biologics indications. 
Stevens and colleagues (2011) noted that while the 153 drugs ranged across therapeutic 
categories, perhaps the most notable was the large number of vaccines because the 
majority of the important and innovative vaccines captured in this study were developed 
by PSRIs. 
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Despite measuring industry success by the number of new drugs brought to market, 
the majority of these new drugs offer relatively very few clinical advantages compared 
with existing treatments already on the market (Light & Lexchin, 2012). For example, 
between 1978 and 1989, only 34 out of 218 (15.6%) drugs approved by the US FDA were 
determined to be important therapeutic gains. Another report found that between 1974 and 
1994, only 11 percent of drugs approved for market were considered to be therapeutically 
and pharmacologically innovative (Light & Lexchin, 2012). Independent reviews of new 
drugs approved between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s by Health Canada (Morgan et al., 
2005), the FDA (Angell, 2004), and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (Motola et 
al., 2006; van Luijn, Gribnau, & Leufkens, 2010) show that 85 to 90 percent of all new 
drugs approved for market were considered to provide few or no clinical advantages to 
patients over drugs already on the market (Light & Lexchin, 2012). Therefore, the true 
innovation crisis is that even with significant spending on R&D in the private sector, for 
the most part, only drugs with minor variations or drugs with equivalent or inferior clinical 
measures have been submitted and approved for marketing (Light & Lexchin, 2012).  
Other counterarguments to regulating COI relationships are that “…public 
investment enjoys huge return, and the solid conclusion is that society benefits 
disproportionately from having academic physicians and scientists participate in product 
development” (Stossel, 2008a). This argument must be considered in the context of public 
funding and private profit. Public funding plays an extremely important role in upstream 
research in the discovery of both drugs and vaccines. Of course, it is beneficial for 
academic physicians and scientists to participate in product development, but the public 
benefits from only the discoveries that private industry deems to be commercializable. 
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Traditionally, there has been a clear boundary between the roles of the public and private 
sectors in research concerning the development of new drugs and vaccines to meet the 
needs of the population (Stevens et al., 2011). Publicly funded research tends to lead to 
drug and vaccine discoveries that are anticipated to have disproportionately important 
clinical effects. Furthermore, both upstream and downstream research that is conducted in 
the public sector has had a more immediate effect on the improvement of population health 
than was previously recognized (Stevens et al., 2011).  
Much of the upstream research, which tends to be conducted at academic research 
institutions, is publicly funded. For example, between 2003 and 2007, the US federal 
funding sources were the largest contributors to biomedical research at academic 
institutions, contributing 65 percent of biomedical research expenditures at these 
institutions (Dorsey et al., 2010). Public funding accounts for a significant proportion of 
biomedical research funding, but when private industry commercializes the upstream 
research results, various commercial measures are imposed to protect the information that 
led to this product and private industry profits from public funds. Downstream research 
by private firms uses patenting and imposes intellectual property (IP) protection thereby 
making the research that comes out of academic institutions into commercially 
confidential information (CCI) and, therefore, the financial returns from the 
commercialization of the research goes not to the public that funded the upstream research, 
but to the firm that owns the final product.  
Arguments in support of patenting suggest that strong IP protections incentivize 
downstream investment that is crucial to biotechnology research (Gambardella, 1995; 
Jensen & Murray, 2005). Those who are in favour of patenting biomedical discoveries 
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tend to argue that it is only through patenting that inventions can be shared globally. 
Alternatively, critics of patenting tend to argue that discoveries that are made on the basis 
of public funding should be released immediately and be made freely available in the 
public domain, rather than be exploited for commercial gain. This is because the most 
important biotechnological advancements are more likely to materialize in nonexclusive 
environments, rather than in environments in which only a single firm owns exclusive 
rights to the innovated products (Bentley, 1996). IP protection is extremely incentivized 
in the current research environment and is a source of profit and prestige for both 
universities and biotechnology corporations. However, IP protection prioritizes these 
financial interests over not only public health and welfare, but also the ability of academics 
to conduct research that is free from financial interest and that contributes to the basic 
foundations of knowledge. Although the systemic incentivization of knowledge 
production and innovation has resulted in many beneficial contributions to the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, it has also resulted in the centralization of 
knowledge so that the majority of proposed and performed research projects are in 
agreement with the financial interests of commercial industry. 
Researchers in favour of deregulating COI relationships also highlight the putative 
successes of relationships with private industry and tend to follow with an example of a 
potentially unfavourable outcome from regulating these relationships. Lisa Rosenbaum, a 
physician and Instructor of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital (Harvard 
Catalyst, 2015), criticizes proponents of conflict of interest regulation. In her three-part 
series (Rosenbaum, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine (NEJM) Rosenbaum is critical of regulating COI relationships in medicine. In 
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this series, Rosenbaum posits that regulating FCOI relationships between academic 
physicians and the biomedical industry has not been shown to improve patient outcomes 
and may inhibit innovation. This series by Rosenbaum seeks to cast doubt on the negative 
findings of the literature on conflict of interest relationships. She, like Stossel, argues that 
academic-industry relationships can be positive, for the most part. Stossel states that: 
By any measure, the interactions between academic research and industrial 
research and development, as epitomized by biotechnology, have been 
overwhelmingly positive. We should celebrate their achievements and protect the 
process that led to them. Instead, the director of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) recently abolished all corporate consulting activities by NIH researchers, 
and all 18,000 NIH employees must sell any investments in health-related 
industries … Had these rules been in force in the 1970s and 1980s, they would 
have prevented the scientists from making their breakthrough contributions 
(Stossel, 2005). 
One example that Stossel provides is that academic researchers’ relationships with 
venture capitalists led to the “immense [benefit]” of the hepatitis B vaccine (Stossel, 
2005). However, the claim that “[b]y any measure, interactions between academic 
research and development, as epitomized by biotechnology, has been overwhelmingly 
positive” (Stossel, 2005) is unsupported. It is true that many of these early interactions, 
and even some of the current interactions, have been positive and have led to 
biotechnological advancements; however, these interactions must be considered within 
the appropriate context. Judging by the author’s comments on the relationship between 
financial interactions with private industry and the ability of scientists to develop 
“breakthrough contributions”, this context is therapeutic advancement and the “innovation 
crisis”, which was alluded to earlier. Since the early 2000s, industry leaders, and policy 
makers have been widely stating that scientists are experiencing an “innovation crisis” in 
pharmaceutical research and that the pipeline for new drugs is soon to be dry. Therefore, 
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proponents of the “innovation crisis” argue that scientists should stop efforts to discover 
new drugs and instead buy into discoveries that are already in the pipeline (Light & 
Lexchin, 2012). 
It has been argued that this version of the “innovation crisis” is a myth. Donald 
Light and Joel Lexchin (2012) argue that these reports promoting the “innovation crisis” 
are founded in the decline of the number of NMEs approved by the FDA since 1996. In 
1992, legislation allowed the FDA to start charging companies large user fees when these 
companies submitted applications to have new drugs approved. Using this money, the 
FDA hired additional reviewers and was able to clear the backlog in new drug applications. 
It was the clearing of the backlog that produced the appearance of a decline of NME 
approvals in 1996.  In 2005, analysts at Pfizer examined data on innovations and stated 
that the innovation crisis was a myth “…which bears no relationship to the true innovation 
rates of the pharmaceutical industry” (Light & Lexchin, 2012). Furthermore, FDA records 
indicate that pharmaceutical companies have produced innovations, including new 
biologics, at a constant rate for almost 60 years (Light & Lexchin, 2012).  
 
2.6.3 Reliability of Company Data and FDA Advisory Board Committee members 
 
Stossel argues that academic research and education may be less reliable than 
industry-originated data because industry-originated content is reviewed by the FDA: 
Purely academic research and education are arguably less reliable than their 
corporate or corporate sponsored counterparts. They are not, for example, subject 
to stringent Federal Drug Administration reporting requirements. Misconduct fells 
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a single academic miscreant but can bring down an entire company (Stossel, 
2008b).  
Although the FDA provides more information on its approved medications than does 
Health Canada and has a system of public expert advisory committee hearings for new 
drugs that Health Canada lacks (Lexchin & Mintzes, 2004), the agency has some serious 
problems in terms of the relationships that its advisory board committee members have 
with the pharmaceutical industry. Academic physicians regularly serve on advisory 
committees as experts and help in interpreting scientific evidence submitted by drug 
companies. The FCOI relationships held by these academic physicians have the potential 
to influence their advisory capabilities at the FDA and on their regulatory advice (Pham-
Kanter, 2014). These relationships may render the reliability of the members’ 
interpretations and votes in advisory meetings vulnerable to the subjective financial 
interests of each member.  
A 2006 study by Peter Lurie and colleagues (2006) examined the FCOI 
relationship disclosures at drug-related FDA Drug Advisory Committee meetings that 
took place between 2001 and 2004. Of 2,947 advisory committee members and voting 
consultants combined (1,957 advisory committee members, 990 voting consultants), 825 
(28%) disclosed COI relationships. In 73 percent of the meetings, at least one advisory 
member or voting consultant disclosed FCOI relationships, but only 22 members (1%) of 
members were recused (Lurie, Almeida, Stine, Stine, & Wolfe, 2006). It is unclear if the 
members recused themselves or a committee chair recused them.  
Disaggregated, 66 percent of all meetings included at least one advisory committee 
member with a conflict, while 53 percent of meetings that included voting consultants had 
at least one voting consultant with a conflict. At 14 percent of meetings, 75 to 100 percent 
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of advisory committee members had FCOI relationships. At 22 percent of meetings, over 
half of the advisory committee members had FCOI relationships. This study also examined 
the impact of participants’ COI relationships on their voting patterns. Seventy-six out of 
110 product-specific meetings met the inclusion criteria for this portion of the study. The 
authors found that if either advisory committee members or voting consultants with COI 
relationships were excluded from the votes, the results of the votes would have been less 
favourable to the drug in the majority of meetings, but this would not have changed the 
majority decision to favour or oppose the drug (Lurie et al., 2006). 
The results of Lurie and colleagues’ study were updated and expanded in 2014 by 
Genevieve Pham-Kanter (2014), who assessed whether advisory committee members 
voted in-line with their financial interests with industry. This study used data on voting 
behaviours and disclosed FCOI relationships of 1,379 unique FDA voting advisory 
committee members at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) who voted 
at least once between 1997 and 2011. The voting advisory meetings that were included in 
this study were concerned with branded products or drug classes that included branded 
products (Pham-Kanter, 2014). 
Pham-Kanter (2014) found that the FCOI relationships disclosed by voting 
members varied substantially across FDA advisory committee meetings and were 
sometimes extensive. The median level of FCOI in these meetings was approximately 13 
percent (range: 2% to 29%). On average, at least one person with a FCOI relationship was 
in attendance at half of the meetings. Pham-Kanter found that the most commonly reported 
FCOI relationship was consulting, followed by ownership equity or bonds and/or income 
from royalties and licenses, and research-related grants and contracts. An important and 
83 
 
 
 
statistically significant finding was that if a member has a financial relationship with a 
drug company, even if that relationship is not with the sponsor of one of the drugs on 
which they are voting, “…the odds are greater than 50–50 that she or he will vote in favor 
of the sponsor rather than against the sponsor”. This means that if a member has a financial 
relationship with a brand name drug company, they are more likely to vote in favor of 
another brand name company, rather than against it, even when drugs produced by the 
member’s brand name affiliations are not being considered in the vote. 
Moreover, if members had a FCOI relationship with a sponsor, they were 1.49 
times more likely to vote for the sponsor than members without FCOI relationships. If 
members had FCOI relationships with a competitor only, or with both a sponsor and 
competitor, then they were not more likely to vote in favour of the sponsor than those with 
no FCOI relationships. When Pham-Kanter (2014) excluded unanimous votes to analyze 
only non-unanimous votes, which reflected more ambiguous safety and efficacy evidence, 
she found that pro-sponsor bias appeared to be larger in these votes. This means that when 
evidence was unclear, there tended to be more pro-industry presence among the voting 
members. Pham-Kanter also found that the type of FCOI relationships held by members 
also matters. CDER advisory board committee members, who were also advisory board 
members for the sponsor, were much more likely to vote in favour of the sponsor.  
Robert Steinbrook (2005) commented on the effectiveness of the FDA’s detailed 
policies for balancing COI and the need for relevant expertise in advisory committee 
members. In a case he discussed, an FDA official stated aloud at the beginning of a 
meeting that because no drugs were being newly approved during this meeting and the 
issues being discussed were of broad applicability, “...potential conflicts of interest are 
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mitigated” (Steinbrook, 2005). After this meeting, it was disclosed that 10 out of 32 voting 
panel members had FCOI with the manufacturers of three drugs that were being 
considered for continued marketing. In this case, had the members with FCOI not 
participated in the vote, the results of the remaining committee members’ votes would 
have been that two of the three drugs would have been removed from market (Steinbrook, 
2005). 
Stossel (2008b) also argues that corporate promotional information is evidence-
based. However, there exists an entire literature base on direct-to-physician advertising 
(DTPA) (Lankinen, Levola, Marttinen, Puumalainen, & Helin-Salmivaara, 2004; 
Manchanda & Honka, 2005; Montgomery et al., 2008; Othman et al., 2009; Spielmans & 
Parry, 2010; Spurling et al., 2010; Vlassov, Mansfield, Lexchin, & Vlassova, 2001) and 
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) (Almasi, Stafford, Kravitz, & Mansfield, 2006; 
Frosch, Grande, Tarn, & Kravitz, 2010; Frosch, Krueger, Hornik, & Barg, 2007; Gilbody, 
Wilson, & Watt, 2005; Lexchin & Mintzes, 2002; Mintzes, 2012; Mintzes et al., 2003, 
2013; Wilkes, Bell, & Kravitz, 2000; Woloshin, Schwartz, Tremmel, & Welch, 2001) that 
disagrees with this claim and further suggests that corporate promotion fails to adequately 
address harms of the drugs that are being promoted. Research on the quality of corporate 
promotional information has found that it is often presented in such a way that benefits 
the sponsor. One study by Barbara Mintzes  and colleagues (2013) evaluated the quality 
of safety information provided to physicians by pharmaceutical sales representatives in 
Canada, France, and the United States. This study found that there was a serious absence 
of information on the harmful effects of the medications promoted to the doctors by drug 
sales representatives and information on health benefits was provided twice as often as 
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information on harms. In fact, in over half of the physician-sales representative 
interactions evaluated in this study in three North American sites, no harmful effects were 
mentioned.  
Even though harms information was absent in the information provided by drug 
sales representatives, the physicians who engaged in these interactions judged the 
information provided to them as positive and were willing to increase prescribing almost 
two-thirds of the time. Because these promotions in Canada, France, and the United States 
failed to include information on harms, these interactions violated national laws in all three 
countries (Mintzes et al., 2013). In fact, because of the mounting evidence that corporate 
promotional information cannot be considered to be “education”, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and Health Action International (HAI) developed a free handbook, 
available in English, French, Spanish, and Russian, for medical and pharmacy students to 
help them understand and respond to pharmaceutical promotion (Mintzes, Mangin, & 
Hayes, 2011). 
 
2.6.4 Delegitimization of Research and Undermining the Credibility of Researchers 
 
Some physicians take the position that FCOI relationships should be deregulated 
and have responded to pro-regulation researchers and their work by attempting to not only 
delegitimize it, but also undermine their professional credibility through the use of 
language and tone. In order to capture some of these individuals’ perspectives, statements, 
ideas, sentiments, diction, and tone, this section quotes their statements and then explores 
them in the context of stronger regulation and enforcement of FCOI relationships.  
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Stossel has published several pieces arguing for the deregulation of FCOI 
relationships, including his book called Pharmaphobia: How the conflict of interest myth 
undermines American medical innovation (2015) and his article Has the hunt for conflicts 
of interest gone too far (Stossel, 2008b)? In this article, he compares those who argue for 
strong regulation of COI relationships to “…street evangelists urging us to repent of our 
sins” and notes that “most of us politely ignore [them]”. Stossel further states that people 
who argue for this type of regulation publish “sermons” warning that medical 
practitioners, educators, and researchers who accept gifts or payments for services from 
relevant companies compromise their objectivity and calls this “…preaching by anti-
business activists” (Stossel, 2008b).  
Rosenbaum (2015a) refers to her experiences with outspoken medical school 
classmates and fellow trainees who questioned their interactions with pharmaceutical 
representatives and names them “pharmascolds” with “do-gooder sheen.”  Rosenbaum 
also stated that: 
This application of language associated with rape and child abuse to the 
circumstances of education about effective drugs reveals a feature of the conflict-
of-interest movement that has fed its contagion and rendered it virtually 
unassailable: it casts industry interactions as a moral issue (Rosenbaum, 2015a).  
Rosenbaum also judged one medical student’s expression of feeling that the norms and 
expectations of norms in academic integrity had been violated because a professor, also a 
paid consultant for several drug companies, focused too much on the benefits of statins 
and the professor belittled a student who inquired about side effects in what was supposed 
to be a protected and supportive learning environment (Rosenbaum, 2015a). Expressions 
of misgivings by the medical student about relationships with industry may indicate not 
that proponents of regulating COI relationships are attempting to inject sensationalist or 
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condescending language into the debate, as argued by Rosenbaum, but that people 
experience, perhaps unexpected, reservations concerning medical information that 
originates from industry. Nevertheless, proponents of deregulation of FCOI relationships 
need not resort to extremes of providing judgements about individuals’ characters or 
opinions about COI relationships. Moreover, proponents of regulation need not be labelled 
as “activists”, “anti-business”, “pharmascolds”, or having “do-gooder sheen” to 
reasonably expect and freely promote concepts that, on the whole, ensure the integrity of 
the medical profession and patient welfare should be prioritized over secondary financial 
interests. 
It is difficult to come to any research conclusions with certainty; however, when 
considered together, the published literature on COI relationships certainly draws concrete 
associations between engaging in these relationships and shifts in professional behaviours 
and judgements in both academic biomedical research and regulatory capacities, as well 
as conclusions from academic biomedical research. Informed by the preceding literature 
review, the following section provides an analysis of a policy update from an institution 
that regulates physicians in Ontario to provide a case study of changes in the environment 
of FCOI relationship regulation. 
 
2.7 FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS IN PRACTICE: AN 
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND 
SURGEONS OF ONTARIO POLICY ON INDUSTRY INTERACTIONS 
 
The CPSO (n.d.-a) is responsible for regulating the practice of medicine for doctors 
in Ontario in order to protect and serve the public interest. To accomplish this, under 
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Ontario provincial law, physicians have been granted a degree of authority to self-regulate 
through the CPSO. In order to practise medicine in Ontario, all physicians in Ontario are 
required to be members of the CPSO. According to the CMA (2015), Ontario’s 
concentration of physicians is the highest of all Canadian provinces at 35.3 percent of the 
doctors in Canada. Because of Ontario’s proportionately larger physician population, it is 
worthwhile to present a comparative policy case study analysis of the CPSO’s 1992 policy 
with its updated 2014 policy which dictated and now dictate, respectively, the standards 
for FCOI relationships for the CPSO’s membership. 
The policy of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) that 
regulates FCOI relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry in 
Ontario is entitled Physicians’ Relationships with Industry: Practice, Education, and 
Research and was adopted in 2014 (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
[CPSO], 2014). This policy was preceded by a 1992 policy, entitled MDs Relations with 
Drug Companies (CPSO, 1992) that was first developed and adopted by the Canadian 
Medical Association (CMA)  (CPSO, 1992). What follows is a comparative analysis of 
these two policies in order to evaluate the extent to which the 2014 policy, versus the 1992 
policy, sets standards for and regulates the interests and behaviours of physicians in 
Ontario. In the interest of providing adequate context, Table 2.1, below, quotes verbatim 
the General Principles (CPSO, 1992) and Principles (CPSO, 2014) from the 1992 and 
2014 policies, respectively. Following Table 2.1 is a comparative analysis of not only 
these principles, but also some other key sections of each policy. 
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TABLE 2.1 SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
CANADIAN PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ONTARIO (CPSO) IN THE 
1992 AND 2014 POLICIES. 
 
MDs Relations with Drug Companies 
(1992): General Principles (College 
of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
[CPSO], 1992) 
Physicians’ Relationships with 
Industry: Practice, Education, and 
Research (2014): Principles (College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
[CPSO], 2014) 
 
1. The primary objective of professional 
interactions between physicians and 
the pharmaceutical industry should be 
the advancement of the health of 
Canadians rather than the private good 
of either physicians or industry. 
2. The relationship between physicians 
and industry must always be in keeping 
with the fundamental ethical principles 
that govern social interactions in 
general. 
3. The relationship between physicians 
and industry is constrained further by 
the CMA’s Code of Ethics. 
4. The interactions between physicians 
and industry must always respect the 
fundamental values of Canadian 
society insofar as these values do not 
conflict with the fundamental 
principles of ethics. 
5. The practising physician’s primary 
obligation is toward the patient. 
Relationships with industry are 
appropriate only if they do not affect 
the fiduciary nature of the physician-
patient relationship. In particular, 
physicians should avoid any self-
interest in their prescribing practices. 
6. In any association between a physician 
who is not an employee of the 
pharmaceutical industry and the 
industry itself, the physician should 
always maintain professional 
autonomy, independence and 
commitment to the scientific method. 
1. Maintaining [physicians’] professional 
autonomy, clinical independence, and 
integrity; 
2. Fulfilling their fiduciary duties by acting 
in the best interests of their patients; 
3. Avoiding or recognizing and 
appropriately managing conflicts of 
interest that arise in relation to their 
professional duties; 
4. Being transparent in their interactions 
with industry, and proactively disclosing 
the details of those interactions where 
they may be perceived to influence the 
physician judgment; 
5. Participating in self-regulation of the 
medical profession by complying with 
the expectation set out in this policy. 
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There are considerable differences between the General Principles of the 1992 and 
the Principles of the 2014 versions of the CPSO policies. A clear difference is that the 
1992 policy repeatedly refers to the “primary obligations” of physicians, which is language 
that is consistent with the literature defining and analyzing conflict of interest relationships 
between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry. In the 2014 policy, this language is 
absent not only in the Principles quoted above, but also throughout the remainder of the 
policy. The removal of this language from the 2014 policy is important to highlight 
because the absence of discussion about the primary obligations of physicians weakens 
the way that relationships with industry are presented to, and conceptualized by physicians 
who are governed by this policy.  
Although Principle 2 in the 2014 policy states that physicians ought to “[f]ulfill 
their fiduciary duties by acting in the best interests of their patients”, the 1992 policy more 
clearly and effectively defines that the “[t]he practising physician’s primary obligation is 
toward the patient”, which is also absent from the 2014 policy. In place of statements 
regarding physicians’ primary obligations in their professional roles, the 2014 policy is 
largely concerned with defining acceptable ways for physicians to engage in relationships 
with industry. For example, where the 1992 policy states that “…physicians should avoid 
any self-interest in their prescribing practices”, the 2014 policy does not.  The term “self-
interest” is used, but is never further defined. Nevertheless, the removal of these important 
statements about physicians’ roles when it comes to their patients in the 2014 policy means 
that physicians may not be held to the standard that was previously enunciated. Physicians 
should be equipped with the necessary language and ideas to not only define their own 
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professional roles in medicine, but also be able to successfully identify and mitigate 
conflict of interest relationships should they arise.  
The 1992 policy also includes statements, which are not included in Table 2.1, 
about physicians’ participation in surveillance studies and accepting gifts. Where the 1992 
policy states that “[p]hysicians are encouraged to participate only in surveillance studies 
(i.e., phase IV research studies) that are scientifically appropriate for drugs relevant to the 
area of practice” (CPSO, 1992), the 2014 policy broadens the acceptable roles of 
physicians in clinical studies by stating that “[p]hysicians must only participate in research 
involving human participants, including post-marketing surveillance studies (phase IV 
clinical research), that has the approval of a research ethics board. This includes research 
that only involves the use of personal health information (PHI)” (CPSO, 2014). Further, 
although both policies discuss remuneration, the 1992 policy is marginally more specific 
in the circumstantial parameters within which it is acceptable for a doctor to accept 
remuneration. The 1992 policy clearly states that:  
It is ethically acceptable for physicians to receive remuneration for participation in 
approved surveillance studies only if the participation exceeds their normal 
practice pattern. This remuneration should not constitute enticement…The amount 
of remuneration should be approved by the relevant review board, agency, or body 
mentioned previously (CPSO, 1992). 
In contrast, remuneration is mentioned twice in the 2014 policy and in both cases, it is 
stated that “[r]emuneration must only be accepted if it is at fair market value and 
commensurate with the services provided” (CPSO, 2014). In both of these cases in the 
2014 policy, this remuneration is considered in the context of consultation, advisory 
boards, or investigator meetings. The 2014 policy mentions nothing about requiring the 
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amount of remuneration to be approved by a relevant committee and also does not set 
parameters for when this remuneration is acceptable. 
Both policies state that physicians must not accept personal gifts from industry. 
Expanding on this point, the 1992 policy states that “[p]ractising physicians should not 
accept a fee or equivalent consideration from pharmaceutical manufacturers or distributors 
in exchange for seeing them in a promotional or similar capacity” (CPSO, 1992). The 2014 
includes a similar statement that “[p]hysicians must not request or accept a fee or 
equivalent compensation from industry in exchange for seeing industry representatives in 
a promotional or similar capacity” (CPSO, 2014). A subtle difference in these statements 
between the two policies is that where the 1992 policy more broadly refers to 
“pharmaceutical manufacturers or distributors”, the 2014 policy refers more narrowly to 
“industry representatives”. Although the semantics here are subtle, the difference between 
“pharmaceutical manufacturers or distributors” and “industry representatives” is 
important to note. This is because “pharmaceutical manufacturers or distributors” can 
include any drug company employee, while “industry representatives” can arguably refer 
more narrowly to drug company employees such as drug detailers, or drug representatives, 
and exclude physician or non-physician consultants, practice management consultants, 
key opinion leaders or thought leaders, clinical investigators seeking physicians’ 
assistance, or industry personnel who are involved in the planning and drafting of 
publication manuscripts (see Chapter 5).  
A favourable addition to the 2014 CPSO policy is that should physicians decide to 
participate in clinical trials, the trials must be “…registered prior to the enrolment of the 
first participant in a web-accessible research registry” (CPSO, 2014). The reason that this 
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provision was not included in the 1992 policy is likely because online publicly-accessible 
clinical trial registries were not yet developed. Another positive addition to the 2014 policy 
is the definition of a conflict of interest. The 2014 policy defines COI as:  
A conflict of interest is created any time a reasonable person could perceive that a 
physician’s personal interest or relationship with industry is at odds with the 
physician’s professional responsibilities. It is important to note that a conflict of 
interest can exist even if the physician is confident that his or her professional 
judgement is not actually being influenced by the conflicting interest or 
relationship (CPSO, 2014).  
However, we see in this comparative analysis that the omission of important language 
from other areas of the policy can render it difficult to enforce this definition of conflict 
of interest relationships. 
The 2014 Principles and the remainder of the policy no longer state that physicians’ 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry are also constrained by the CMA’s Code of 
Ethics. An additional important omission from the 2014 policy that was present in the 
1992 policy is that “[m]edical curricula should include formal training that is based on 
[the 1992] guidelines.” The 2014 policy contains nothing regarding the inclusion of any 
formal or informal conflict of interest training within the medical curricula. Another area 
of weakness in the 2014 CPSO policy, as compared with the 1992 policy, is CME. The 
1992 policy states that “…CME clearly distinguishes between education, training…and 
product promotion”, while the 2014 policy makes no such statement. 
Thus, a comparative analysis of the two policies indicates that the 1992 policy 
provides stronger regulation of conflict of interest relationships between physicians and 
industry than does the 2014 policy. Although the 1992 policy has its own weaknesses that 
are not discussed here, the 2014 policy is weaker than the 1992 policy in setting 
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enforceable standards for physicians’ relationships with industry as discussed above. The 
1992 policy tended to clearly prohibit or disapprove of relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry, while the 2014 policy seems to be more concerned not with 
strong regulation of these relationships, but with the disclosure of conflict of interest 
relationships with industry in various scenarios. Despite the CPSO explanation that “…in 
all situations where a conflict of interest arises in the course of professional duties and 
activities, physicians should recognize the conflict, ensure that a patient’s best interests 
remain paramount and, where appropriate, disclose the conflict of interest to the patient” 
(CPSO, n.d.), in general, the 2014 policy is not strong enough for the CPSO or physicians 
to achieve this goal. The policy fails to define what it means by “where appropriate”, 
leaving this up to both voluntary disclosure and personal interpretation by the respective 
physician. The 2014 policy seems to provide weaker regulation of conflict of interest 
relationships between physicians and industry because it appears to be more tolerant of 
these relationships. Finally, a weakness of both CPSO policies is that they fail to mention 
any penalties should the policies be breached (CPSO, 1992, 2014). 
In order to determine whether any physician has been disciplined for violating the 
CPSO policy on conflict of interest relationships with industry, I contacted the CPSO with 
this question. According to a personal communication with the CPSO on 2 September 
2015, it is not possible to filter search results for physicians that have been disciplined for 
violating a specific policy because the committees do not reference specific policies in 
their decisions. On advice from the CPSO on 2 September 2015, I attempted to locate 
CPSO decisions pertaining to violating its relations with industry policies from both 1992 
and 2014 by searching for the key words “conflict of interest” (14 search results, 2 
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potentially relevant), “relations with industry” (0 search results), “relationship with 
industry” (4 search results, 0 potentially relevant), “drug company” (0 search results), 
“pharmaceutical company” (3 search results, 0 potentially relevant), and “pharmaceutical 
industry” (7 search results, 0 potentially relevant) in the site search. Out of the two 
potentially relevant search results from the key term “conflict of interest”, one concerned 
a physician who “…had a conflict of interest, in that he recommended cosmetic products 
in which he held a personal commercial interest to his patients” (CPSO, 2013)  while the 
second referred to a physician who “…placed himself in a conflict of interest in that he 
ordered diagnostic testing for some of his patients, to be performed at his clinic, and failed 
to disclose his proprietary interest” (CPSO, 2015). To summarize, there has been some 
focus on these issues, but it appears that the net outcome has been permissive policy 
development, no mention of penalties for policy violations, and no documented 
enforcement of the policies. 
Unfortunately, the apparent lack of application of the CPSO policies over time to 
cases of FCOI relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry does not 
mean that these relationships are absent in Canada, or that these relationships do not have 
the potential to be harmful. In fact, as we will see in the coming chapters of this 
dissertation, FCOI relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians in 
Canada are common, poorly regulated, and have the potential to lead to patient and public 
health harms. FCOI relationships have the potential to broadly affect physicians’ 
prescribing choices and patient health outcomes, in addition to threatening the integrity of 
medical research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS IN MEDICINE, THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, AND NEOLIBERAL SCIENCE 
 
3.1 CONTEXT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTER 
 
Since the 1980s, global sales of drugs have increased at a rate of over 10 percent 
per year (Sismondo, 2011). This tremendous growth in a period of just over three decades 
coincides with changes in the structure of research and the general shift toward the 
privatization of research globally. These changes have affected the means of production 
of science, arguably more than most of the public are likely to be aware of (Mirowski, 
2011; Sismondo, 2011). The commercialization and commodification of knowledge, the 
institutions in which knowledge is created, and the manner in which it is disseminated 
have been shaped not by omnipotent puppetmasters behind the scenes, but by a series of 
converging circumstances that have inspired a certain perspective on social, political, and 
economic relations (Mirowski, 2011). These sets of relations are a manifestation of the 
deregulation of industry and how it functions in the free market. These relations have come 
to position knowledge and its production in such a way that absolves the knowledge 
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creators of their academic responsibilities, for example, data transparency and pursuing 
research that advances the health and well-being of the public, to the public (Mirowski, 
2011).  
This dissertation does not assume that the pharmaceutical industry, or any industry, 
for that matter, is comprised of people with ill-will, moral challenges, or who engage in 
greedy transgressions. This dissertation considers the commercialization and 
commodification of medical research and financial conflict of interest (FCOI) 
relationships to be structural phenomena so that they can be analyzed as characteristics of 
neoliberal science. The participation of physicians in the commercialization of science has 
served to benefit the process of privatizing medical research and, therefore, these 
relationships must be analyzed within this context. This chapter explores some of the 
recent transformations in the way that medical research is conducted in the environment 
of commercialized and privately managed medical research. In this environment, without 
FCOI relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, the 
commercialization, commodification, and private management of scientific research could 
not be fully realized. FCOI relationships as normative behaviours in medicine are 
important characteristics of the transformation in the processes of conducting and 
disseminating medical research. Therefore, FCOI relationships between physicians and 
the pharmaceutical industry are the focus of the analyses in the four manuscripts, which 
are the central focus of this dissertation. 
 The upcoming sections introduce “neoliberal corporate bias” theory by Courtney 
Davis and John Abraham (Davis & Abraham, 2013) and Abraham (Abraham, 2007), 
followed by Philip Mirowski’s and Robert Van Horne’s (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; 
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Mirowski, 2011) theory of “neoliberal science”. These analyses are taken one step further 
by expanding the analysis from the individual level to the organization of medical 
scientific research at the institutional level. This institutional-level analysis is 
accomplished by analyzing some normalized institutional behaviours including FCOI 
relationships, the roles of contract research organizations (CROs), and the far-reaching 
consequences of CROs in neoliberal science. 
 
3.2 “NEOLIBERAL CORPORATE BIAS” THEORY AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY REGULATION 
 
 Neoliberal reforms in developed countries have been favourable for companies 
within the pharmaceutical industry with several important implications for the national 
authorities tasked with this regulation. These reforms have rendered Health Canada, the 
United States (US) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) increasingly financially dependent on the pharmaceutical industry for 
their operating budgets and allowed the FDA and EMA greater flexibility regarding their 
consultations with the industries that they regulate (Davis & Abraham, 2013). For 
example, the adoption of user fees, wherein drug companies that are submitting products 
for market approval are required to pay the regulator for consideration of their 
submissions, have resulted in regulatory actions that generally favour pharmaceutical 
companies in the forms of faster approval times and a greater percentage of positive 
decisions (Davis & Abraham, 2013; Lexchin, 2006). Additionally, neoliberal reforms have 
encouraged a reduction in the amount and types of evidence that drug companies are 
required to collect to demonstrate safety and efficacy of specific drug categories when 
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submitting their applications to the agencies for market approval. Rationales for these 
reforms included the argument that the public would benefit from faster access to an 
increased number of drug innovations and enhanced resources available to regulators. 
Throughout these reforms, pharmaceutical regulators have retained their legal 
responsibilities and nominal democratic role in promoting and protecting the public’s 
health, safety, and well-being (Davis & Abraham, 2013). 
“Neoliberal corporate bias” theory is comprised of two parts. The first part is 
“neoliberal theory” and the second part is “corporate bias theory” (Davis & Abraham, 
2013). Neoliberal theory explains a trend of government-instigated, pro-industry 
deregulatory reforms that are thought to be in the best interests of patients and public 
health on the assumption that pharmaceutical innovations promise therapeutic advances 
and that these objectives are best achieved through a free market approach with minimum 
regulation (Davis & Abraham, 2013). Neoliberal reforms have reshaped the interests of 
governments to be more receptive to, and convergent with, industry’s interests. In this 
position, the state’s interests become increasingly aligned with industry to the extent that 
it has fewer issues which private industry needs to negotiate or bargain about with the state 
(Abraham, 2007). With a minimalist role, the state possesses fewer resources that are 
independent of industry, so it becomes more challenging for the state to develop and 
enforce regulations that deviate from industry’s interests. The result is an informal 
atmosphere of communication and trust between the regulator and the industry that it is 
supposed to be regulating (Abraham, 2007). 
Corporate bias theory posits that some organized interest groups, including private 
industry, have gained advantageous access to the highest levels of the government and 
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regulatory agencies (Davis & Abraham, 2013). This privileged access has led to 
institutional relationships which function as partnerships between the government and 
interest groups. The organized interest groups use these partnerships to their benefit to 
influence the regulatory agenda (Davis & Abraham, 2013). Corporate bias theory leaves 
room for the possibility that a government can be relatively strong and proactive, while 
still encouraging pro-business deregulation in cooperation with industry (Davis & 
Abraham, 2013). An effect of these relationships, in practice, is that the regulatory agenda 
becomes biased in favour of the organized interest groups, regardless of other competing 
regulatory interests (Davis & Abraham, 2013).  
The addition of “neoliberal theory” to “corporate bias theory” illustrates the 
dominant political and socio-structural frameworks that inform the environments in which 
regulatory agencies have operated, particularly since 1980 (Abraham, 2007). Increasing 
participation in neoliberal regulatory ideology does not preclude states from still 
possessing their own interests (Abraham, 2007). Rather, neoliberal ideology has shaped 
and reformulated the interests of states to be less independent of industry while, at the 
same time, the state adopts a minimalist role that is consistent with neoliberalism 
(Abraham, 2007). This role has caused regulatory agencies to have a financial incentive 
in attracting drug companies as customers to whom they provide services (Abraham, 
2007). 
Neoliberal corporate bias theory advocates for the analysis of not only regulators 
and the regulated, but also the broader political and socio-economic contexts that inform 
decision-making (Abraham, 1995; Davis & Abraham, 2013). Importantly, this framework 
does not assume that regulatory agencies simply serve corporate capitalist interests 
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without question, but, rather, it presumes that governments have some “powers of 
coercion” when it comes to their ability to engage in negotiations and bargaining with 
organized interests (Abraham, 1995). Neoliberal corporate bias theory assumes that the 
state has its own interests, which are primarily concerned with financial management 
within agencies and drug cost concerns within state-funded health care provision 
(Abraham, 1995). However, state participation in negotiations and bargaining with 
industry, for example, extends beyond lobbying and pressure group politics into a 
relationship of “interest interdependence” that can make possible what Abraham (1995) 
calls a “private interest government” that allows industries to be regulated through 
“regulated self-regulation”, or “enforced self-regulation” as termed by John Braithwaite 
(1982). In regulated self-regulation, the state’s mandate to protect the public devolves into 
the responsibility of maintaining private industry clientele (Abraham, 1995). While this 
may be considered to be largely an extreme of corporatism, regulated self-regulation is 
especially relevant in the context of neoliberal corporate bias theory and pharmaceutical 
regulation (Abraham, 1995).  
An example of this regulated self-regulation can be seen in practice with regard to 
Health Canada. Until the adoption of Bill C-17 into Canadian law in 2015, Health Canada 
could withdraw its Notice of Compliance (authorization to market a product) for a 
previously approved drug, but if it did not withdraw the NOC it did not have the authority 
to order any drug company to withdraw its products from the market due to harms. In 
effect, this lack of regulatory authority required drug companies to regulate the safety of 
their own products that Health Canada had already approved. Whether Health Canada uses 
its authority from Bill C-17 to withdraw unsafe drugs from the market remains to be seen, 
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especially since the regulations for this legislation have not yet been finalized. Until Health 
Canada decides to effectively use its new authority, the level of regulated self-regulation 
continues to represent voluntary self-regulation. Braithwaite (1982) recognizes that there 
are situations in which regulated self-regulation, or enforced self-regulation, may be 
favourable. For instance, government regulators may be under fiscal strain that prevent 
government investigators from conducting their investigations. Moreover, in the 
pharmaceutical industry, corporate investigators or compliance inspectors, are employed 
by drug companies to investigate instances of corporate crime or wrongdoing (e.g., 
falsifying clinical trial results) in a compliance division that is independent of other 
departments (Braithwaite, 1982). These investigators tend to be better trained in a 
technical capacity that is relevant to the pharmaceutical industry as compared to their 
government counterparts (Braithwaite, 1982). The most clearly defined contradiction that 
results from the role that corporate investigators assume is that industry ends up regulating 
its own practices, a clear situation of conflicting interests if the employer is the company 
being investigated, or if the investigator’s employment is contingent on the company’s 
success.  
Alternatively, voluntary self-regulation is essentially the model of regulation by 
which medical schools, professional medical associations (PMAs), and medical journals 
operate. These institutions and organizations function outside of the jurisdiction of 
governments when it comes to their institutional policies on FCOI relationships between 
physicians and industry, as well as those concerning industry involvement in the 
development of medical education. Medical schools, PMAs, and medical journals each 
have their own policies, constitutions, guidelines, or a combination thereof and are, 
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therefore, responsible for regulating themselves in this regard. Because the medical 
education provided within, or hosted by, these institutions is not considered to be 
promotional in nature, the content falls outside of the governmental regulation. 
Institutional-level policies dictate the standards by which individuals within those 
institutions plan, develop, and consider collaborations for medical education. Importantly, 
medical education within these fora provide key opportunities for industry involvement if 
there are gaps in policies or if policies are non-existent. Abraham (1995) argues that 
neoliberal corporate bias theory provides a useful methodology for analyzing observations 
of potential corporate biases in the orientation and positioning of interests in government 
regulation. This theory is also applicable and useful when analyzing the orientation of 
interests in policies adopted by medical schools, professional medical associations, and 
medical journals. In this way, the shape of the analyses in the coming manuscripts is 
informed by not only neoliberal corporate bias theory, but also scientific norms and 
practices within the context of neoliberal science.  
 
3.3 SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION AND MERTONIAN NORMS OF SCIENCE 
 
 American sociologist Robert Merton’s (1910-2003) work is a baseline for the 
common understanding of how the ideal of scientific norms and practices are supposed to 
work (Hollander, 2003). Merton is recognized for founding the field of sociology of 
science. His study of the “ethos of science” in one of his major works, “The Sociology of 
Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations” (Merton, 1973), is foundational to the 
analysis of the culture of neoliberal science. Merton has argued the structural-functionalist 
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perspective that scientific research serves a social function, which provides knowledge 
that is considered to be acceptable by the professional scientific community. The social 
functions of science, therefore, determine the accepted normative behaviours of medical 
researchers who conduct this research. This structural-functionalist perspective allows 
societal norms to be analyzed according to the overarching institutions that not only 
dictate, but also govern normative behaviours in science. As an institution, the function of 
science is to provide knowledge. Similarly, the task of the field of sociology, as an 
institution, is to analyze whether the social structure of science supports this function. In 
order to determine this, Merton argues that the norms of behaviour guide which behaviours 
and ethics are accepted in scientific practice. When accepted behaviours are in line with 
institutional priorities, members of the community who abide by these norms are 
rewarded, while those who behave in opposition to these priorities are sanctioned 
(Sismondo, 2003). 
Merton (1942) presents four norms of behaviour within the ethos of science that, 
theoretically, work in tandem to help advance the institutional goal of science, which is 
the extension of certified knowledge. These four norms are universalism, “communism”, 
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Briefly, universalism calls for objectivity in 
science and in the content of scientific claims by scientists, where the merit of those claims 
can be evaluated based on their content and not on the characteristics of the scientists who 
make the claims (Merton, 1942). Therefore, when the characteristics of an individual 
scientist are questioned, the norm of universalism is violated. When Merton refers to the 
second norm, “communism”, he intends it to mean that scientific knowledge ought to be 
a commonly, rather than privately, owned goods in the public domain. The norm of 
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disinterestedness means not that scientists are expected to be completely altruistic, but that 
experts should not abuse their authority at the public’s expense. Scientific advancements 
can be appropriated for interested purposes such as those that are commercializable for 
sale to the public. This appropriation of science by its creators for public consumption 
leaves room for the public’s susceptibility to new mysticisms expressed in scientific terms 
(Merton, 1942). Therefore, scientists should disengage their research from their individual 
interests. Finally, Merton’s norm of organized skepticism balances universalism by 
contending that scientific research should be subject to scrutiny that interrogates science 
as fact as well as through competing perspectives (Merton, 1942).  
Merton’s scientific norms are introduced in this chapter as the embodiment of a 
scientific ideal, not as a golden age of science that had once existed. These norms can be 
applied in analyses of current medical research practices. For example, Merton’s principle 
of “disinterestedness” provides that science ought to be conducted by researchers who can 
disengage themselves and their interests from their actions and judgements. 
Disinterestedness assumes that scientists will report their findings fully, regardless of the 
interests supported by their results (Sismondo, 2003). The commercialization of the 
research process, which intensifies as industry increasingly funds clinical research, limits 
the control that biomedical researchers have over their research, collaborations, and 
release of their results (Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, & Seashore Louis, 1996). When 
manufacturers sponsor their own research, the results have been systematically favourable 
to the sponsors’ products and reported safety and efficacy results tend to be more 
favourable for the sponsor (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003; Downie & Herder, 2007; 
Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, Busuioc, & Bero, 2012).   
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Furthermore, when legal cases compel pharmaceutical companies to release 
internal clinical trial and marketing documents, important results that had been concealed 
or suppressed have come to light. In effect, concealing and suppressing results biases the 
knowledge base on the safety and efficacy of drugs, indicating that scientific knowledge 
continues to be constructed by the entities that are responsible for producing it. A ground-
breaking study by Le Noury and colleagues (2015b) reanalyzed the data from Study 329, 
a SmithKline Beecham funded clinical trial, which compared the efficacy and safety of 
paroxetine and imipramine. Le Noury and colleagues (2015b) recovered approximately 
77,000 pages of case report forms (CRFs), which had been kept confidential by 
SmithKline Beecham, now GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). In Table 3 of Appendix C, Le Noury 
and colleagues (2015a) revealed that SmithKline Beecham’s Study 329 coded serious 
adverse events (SAEs) in such a way that minimized the appearance of harm experienced 
by trial participants. In this Table, Le Noury and colleagues (2015a) de-code and re-code 
the SAEs and, in doing so, exposed SmithKline Beecham’s coding of cases in which 
participants were considered to exhibit suicidal and self-injurious behaviours as 
“emotional lability”. Assigning this euphemistic category to obviously alarming 
participant experiences was clearly an effort to construct the knowledge base in order to 
conceal harm while protecting the company’s product.  
Additional examples of efforts to construct the disseminated knowledge in a way 
that is favourable to industry sponsors are available in the Drug Industry Document 
Archive (DIDA) and Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID) online databases. The 
DIDA and TTID databases were created after lawsuits, and are housed, by the University 
of California San Francisco (UCSF). Release of internal pharmaceutical industry 
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documents, now accessible via DIDA, has demonstrated illegal pharmaceutical company 
advertising and marketing practices, as well as unethical conduct by these industries, 
academic journals, physicians at academic institutions, and medical education 
communication companies (MECCs) that pose considerable risks to public health 
(University of California San Francisco [UCSF], 2015a). Similarly, TTID contains 
internal tobacco industry documents on advertising, manufacturing, marketing, scientific 
research, and political endeavours by tobacco companies to promote their products 
(University of California San Francisco [UCSF], 2015c). DIDA now contains over 3,800 
internal pharmaceutical industry documents, and TTID contains over 14 million internal 
tobacco industry documents that implicate both industries in using unethical means to 
achieve profit at the expense of public health (University of California San Francisco 
[UCSF], 2015b). The presence of these archives and the internal industry documents 
within them illustrate that efforts to construct the disseminated knowledge base are not 
isolated to the pharmaceutical industry (White & Bero, 2010). While these databases are 
highly likely to be incomplete, the sheer number of documents that are already housed in 
these archives illustrate the pervasiveness and insidiousness of the profit motive affecting 
virtually every step of publishing scientific research, promoting companies’ products, and 
ensuring that these products have favourable reputations among both the academic and 
public communities. Applied here, Merton’s principle of disinterestedness as a baseline of 
common assumptions about how science operates shows how far the actual behaviours 
have deviated from those common assumptions. 
Another of Merton’s principles that serves as a baseline of common assumptions 
about how science operates in the realm of biomedical research is that of communism, the 
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notion that scientific knowledge is communal knowledge that is commonly owned. 
Merton assumes that because scientific knowledge is the most important result of scientific 
research, the reward must be the publicly owned results. According to Merton, in order to 
promote the goals of science while still reflecting its assumed traditional social role, the 
originators of knowledge can claim recognition for their work and creativity without 
owning or dictating how or by whom those ideas are to be used (Sismondo, 2003). 
Moreover, Merton has argued that these norms dictate that the results from scientific 
research should be publicized as widely and as early as possible so that the public can have 
access to the results and researchers can access more findings than they could have created 
on their own (Sismondo, 2003).  
Merton’s conception of these norms present an idealized characterization of 
science and knowledge dissemination. Instead, in contrast to Mertonian norms, normative 
behaviours in science in reality may be amenable to secrecy, interestedness, and credulity 
(Sismondo, 2003). Secrecy may be valued by researchers, especially since science is 
increasingly competitive and is often associated with financial stakes. Furthermore, with 
the push to publish, researchers want to ensure that their ideas, methods, and results are 
not used prior to their publishing them. Across academia and particularly within scientific 
disciplines, the “publish or perish” ideology of producing knowledge cultivates an 
environment in which it is believed that although “[t]o state that those who don’t publish 
may as well not do the work in the first place is undeniably harsh, [it is] not unreasonable: 
if you don’t publish, you’re wasting everyone’s time and taking much-needed funding 
away from other scientists” (Clapham, 2005). Behavioural norms in science, wherein, 
scientists act to pursue their own research and funding interests are propagated through 
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value systems that prioritize the ownership of data, rather than sharing data. These 
institutionalized value systems legitimize these behaviours and dictate the professional 
conduct of researchers. Still, Mertonian principles of disinterestedness and communal 
ownership of research continue to inform our expectation that scientific research results 
should under no circumstances be suppressed, hidden, or otherwise manipulated 
(Sismondo, 2003). These popularly understood concepts are, by contrast, playing out in 
the selective publication, suppression, hiding, and manipulation of clinical trial data 
(Fugh-Berman, 2013; Goldacre, 2013; Healy, Mangin, & Antonuccio, 2013; Le Noury et 
al., 2015b; Lexchin, 2005; Melander, Ahlqvist-Rastad, Meijer, & Beermann, 2003; Schott 
et al., 2010). 
 
3.4 ACADEMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 
 
The pharmaceutical industry benefits from the research, knowledge, and 
technology developed at academic research universities (Etzkowtiz, Webster, & Healey, 
1998). Academic research institutions possess the capacities and abilities to successfully 
produce research and results, which have been translated into practical commercializable 
products by interested political and economic actors, including government and industry 
(Etzkowtiz et al., 1998). Both governments and industrial actors have encouraged the 
development and sustainability of academic-industrial linkages and partnerships. This 
sustainability is both motivated and facilitated by governmental institutional and industrial 
policies and initiatives that promote cooperative academic-industrial partnerships 
(Etzkowtiz et al., 1998).  
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By the 1980s, academic-industrial partnerships had become widely considered to 
be normative relationships between academic researchers and companies in their research 
fields (Etzkowtiz et al., 1998). In the 1980s, in parallel with increasingly economic and 
political neoliberal ideology, there was a dramatic rise in formalized university-industry 
financial relationships (Blumenthal, Gluck, Seashore Louis, Stoto, & Wise, 1986). These 
linkages were considered to be factors that supported economic growth and sources of 
new knowledge-flows between universities and industry (Etzkowtiz et al., 1998). Since 
the 1980s, academic-industrial relationships have become increasingly important for both 
biomedical science departments at universities and the pharmaceutical industry 
(Blumenthal et al., 1986). Universities are gradually adopting policies that are aimed at 
developing favourable economic outputs by campus-based researchers, as well as the 
involvement of these researchers in knowledge production outside of the university 
(Etzkowtiz et al., 1998). Academic-industrial partnerships have become considered to be 
normative relationships, which are often justified on the basis that they foster opportunity 
for increased funding from not only government policy initiatives, but also lateral ties with 
private industry that encourage institutionally-driven systems of innovation (Etzkowtiz et 
al., 1998). A direct result of increased industry support for academic operations within 
universities has been that the sponsoring industries have adopted prominent roles in 
universities, which have led to an increased focus on university-based research and 
innovations that are commercialized for industrial profit, rather than used to further 
academic interest or the public good (Kenney, 1986; Krimsky, 2004). 
Academic research institutions figure prominently in the knowledge-based 
economy (KBE) in the global arena as a partner to industry. The entrance of universities 
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into the KBE was motivated by their partnerships with industry. These partnerships have 
encouraged universities to engage in market-oriented profit-seeking initiatives by securing 
ownership over the knowledge produced by researchers within the university. In this 
environment, commercializable and publishable knowledge have become important 
tradeable commodities. According to Sheldon Krimsky (2004), “…the successful scientist 
today is the person who can make contributions to the advancement of knowledge while 
concomitantly participating in the conversion of the new knowledge into marketable 
products”.  Krimsky (2004) argues that the transformation of universities into increasingly 
commercially-driven institutions within the new ethos of commercialism is likely to have 
pernicious effects.  
According to Krimsky (2004), the new philosophy of science within the context of 
academic commercialism is largely viewed by universities as a favourable trade-off of 
values. For example, universities consider conflict of interest (COI) relationships that are 
formed between university faculty and industry to be “…manageable and impossible to 
eliminate” (Krimsky, 2004). Krimsky’s (2004) position is that the commercial exploitation 
of university-originated knowledge transforms the nature of the traditional university into 
a commercially-driven knowledge-producing enterprise. A central consequence of this 
transformation is in the social role of universities. Krimsky (2004) compares the potential 
for knowledge production within the university to unrealized natural resources from the 
earth. In this sense, the potential for producing unrealized knowledge in universities is 
valuable to recognize as a source of knowledge that can be privately exploited. Rather, the 
assumed role of universities is that they provide environments in which academics who 
are committed to speaking truth to power can conduct their work on behalf of the public 
122 
 
 
 
good and the improvement of society. When efforts are made to restore the traditional 
values of academic science in the context of business interests, universities tend to become 
hybrid institutions and suffer the loss of their assumed traditional roles, affecting the social 
and professional interactions that are considered to be acceptable for medical researchers 
(Krimsky, 2004). 
The increased privatization of university-based research has important 
consequences for publicly-supported not-for-profit research. Faculty and students are 
chosen based on the basis of their abilities to realize commercial goals because fewer 
opportunities exist for public-interest science, encouraging FCOI relationships beginning 
during students’ training and continuing throughout their professional careers (Krimsky, 
2004). Public policies and legal decisions are developed with, and informed by, new 
incentives for universities, faculty, and not-for-profit research institutes. These institutions 
encourage the commercialization of scientific and medical research through the creation 
and maintenance of networks and partnerships with for-profit firms (Krimsky, 2004). 
These liaisons between private industry and academic institutions have resulted in secrecy 
replacing openness, the privatization of knowledge replacing communitarian values, and 
the commodification of discovery replacing the notion that university-based knowledge is 
a good that is free within the social commons (Caffentzis, 2004; Krimsky, 2004). This 
value has also been threatened by corporate outsourcing of the research that the public 
largely, still, believes is conducted in the public sector by disinterested university-based 
researchers. 
 Mass scale corporate outsourcing of scientific research to private firms has been 
motivated by factors related to the globalization of corporate research and development 
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(R&D) in the modern neoliberal regime of knowledge production (Mirowski, 2011). 
Access to lower-wage research labour that is external to universities allows corporations 
to disengage themselves from any obligations to academic freedom and ethics, and from 
providing continuing financial support for local universities or academic research centres. 
This withdrawal of funding has helped to justify the shift toward outsourcing of R&D in 
North America, China, India, Brazil, and the Czech Republic (Mirowski, 2011). Although 
multinational corporations in relatively smaller countries, including the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, have regularly internationally outsourced their R&D work, since 1980 there 
has been a sharp increase in the international outsourcing of R&D to low-cost research 
firms across the pharmaceutical, electrical machinery, computer software, and 
telecommunications sectors (Mirowski, 2011). This outsourcing is a part of the larger story 
of modifying and transforming the social, political, and economic roles of the modern 
corporation (Mirowski, 2011). The following section provides an example of this 
transformation of the social, political, and economic relations of scientific research and 
the roles of medical researchers through the creation of the CRO. 
 
3.5 FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE CONTRACT RESEARCH 
ORGANIZATION 
 
3.5.1 Pharmaceutical research in the contract research organization 
 
The changing landscape of science since the 1980s from one of largely publicly 
funded research for the public interest to one of privatized and commercialized science 
further reinforces the necessity for effective medical school, medical association, and 
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journal policies that prioritize the public’s interest in a scientific process that neither 
conceals bias, nor masks the undue influence of commercial firms on data transparency 
and results reporting. This is not to assume that scientific research has ever been 
disinterested, as all research is driven at least in part by social, economic, and political 
factors, but when research is conducted by and for a for-profit industry, those conducting 
the research are beholden to the interests of their sponsors at the expense of the public. 
Two indicators that the scientific process is undergoing transformation and that are 
directly related to the research that is published in peer-reviewed medical journals include 
the rise and dominance of the CRO as well as changing conceptions of what it means to 
hold authorship in a published medical study (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). 
Pharmaceutical research, including clinical trials, has been largely displaced from 
the university into purposefully-built, for-profit institutions. Prior to 1990, more than 80 
percent of pharmaceutical research was conducted by researchers at academic medical 
centres (AMCs); however, by 2005, this number was drastically reduced to 25 percent 
leaving 75 percent of all pharmaceutical research being conducted by for-profit companies 
(Fisher, 2008). One such type of company that has been responsible for conducting and 
managing clinical trials and, sometimes, data collection and analysis is called the contract 
research organization (Fisher, 2008).  
CROs are for-profit enterprises whose business goals run in parallel with the firms 
that pay them (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; Mirowski, 2011). They were generally 
nonexistent prior to 1980 (Mirowski, 2011) and now dominate drug development and 
clinical trial management in the pharmaceutical sector and are displacing 
biopharmaceutical and scientific research centres at  AMCs (Mirowski & Van Horne, 
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2005; Mirowski, 2011). CROs are a paradigm of the privatization and commercialization 
of science and are just one indicator that clinical pharmaceutical research in both corporate 
and academic settings has shifted to suit the needs of sponsoring firms. This is particularly 
important as CROs are expanding into nearly every stage of early pharmaceutical research, 
discovery, development, all stages of clinical trials and their management, dosage 
formulation and pharmacy services, product branding and marketing, and liaising with the 
sponsoring company throughout all stages of the regulatory process (Mirowski & Van 
Horne, 2005; Mirowski, 2011).  
The CRO has not operated in isolation of other trends toward privatization such as 
global expansion of intellectual property and harmonization of regulation, but it has been 
able to convert research protocols that had been constructed around the initiatives of 
individual scientists and the medical community into a set of protocols that are geared 
toward the initiative of controlling the R&D cycles of drugs (Mirowski & Van Horne, 
2005). Mirowski and Van Horne (2005) propose that the scientific process and the 
structures in which scientific research is conducted have been transformed alongside larger 
political and economic trends toward the privatization of science (Mirowski & Van Horne, 
2005).  
When scientific research becomes successfully privatized, the boundary between 
scientific research and marketing is blurred to the point at which they are 
indistinguishable. It becomes impossible to identify the difference between public 
relations (PR) spin and scientific research results (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; 
Mirowski, 2011). The inability to identify scientific research from PR spin and marketing 
is the essence of the “marketplace of ideas” (Mirowski, 2011). CROs and the FCOI 
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relationships that they foster, help this marketplace of ideas to be realized. Mirowski and 
Van Horne (2005) argue that this shift to privatized clinical trial management, publishing, 
displacement of clinical research, and the dominant role of CROs in the scientific process 
should be viewed, together, as structural changes in the organization of science and serve 
as an indication of the future directions of privatized science. Importantly, although the 
development and popularity of CROs have significantly contributed to the profound 
alteration of the scientific process, these firms have not functioned within a vacuum. 
Current critiques have, and continue to have to, grapple with the consolidation of trial and 
information production within CROs, but there were earlier critiques and accounts of 
industry secrecy. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, critical voices including scholars, 
research groups, and activist groups were writing about corporate crime, secrecy, 
patriarchy, and wrongdoings (Boston Women’s Health Collective, 1970; Gazit, 2003). In 
1984, Joel Lexchin (1984) published The Real Pushers: A Critical Analysis of the 
Canadian Drug Industry and in the same year, Braithwaite (1984) published Corporate 
Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry. These works alerted the public to the brewing 
problem of corporate influence. 
The neoliberal environment in which CROs have become established since the 
1980s has been conducive to the widespread expansion of the boundaries of intellectual 
property rights, international motivation for regulatory harmonization, and the 
subordination of biomedical science to be responsive to global initiatives by private 
industry (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). It is within this environment, argue Mirowski 
and Van Horne (2005), that CROs have converted traditional scientific research protocols 
into those which are better suited to controlling the development cycle of new 
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pharmaceuticals by adjusting to the rhythms of corporatized science. Therefore, rather 
than studying the future implications of these changes narrowly on the research products 
or outputs, we should instead focus our efforts on the how the scientific research process 
has changed (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). 
The commercialization of medicines began prior to the advent of the CRO. In fact, 
the development of medicines for commercial reasons has always been present as can be 
confirmed by the above critical mobilizations in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as by an 
extensive archive of drug advertisements that were intended to sell medicines for a profit 
between the 1800s and 2014 (ProCon.org, 2014). Rather, the CRO has helped to take the 
commercialization of medical research to a new level (Mirowski, 2011). Rather than 
restructuring its in-house research resources and capacities, Big Pharma contracted out its 
clinical research to CROs as free-standing commercial entities. Mirowski (2011) argues 
that although Big Pharma was passively responding to market signals when it began to 
outsource its research operations to CROs, the  CRO is the manifestation of the neoliberal 
reconstruction of clinical research.  
The growth of the CRO industry has been attributed to its increased efficiency, 
cost savings (although this is debated by Mirowski and Van Horne (2005)), ability to 
obtain targeted drug expertise, timely clinical trial completion, and outsourced resources 
for all clinical trial phases. The full-service nature of CROs has been favourable to 
pharmaceutical companies in the realm of foreign relations when it comes to regional 
regulatory differences in a globalized economy and coordination of clinical research 
globally, especially considering the harmonization of drug standards across major 
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pharmaceutical markets internationally (Lexchin, 2012; Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; 
Veerus, Lexchin, & Hemminki, 2013).  
 
3.5.2 Contract Research Organizations: Leopards in the Temple 
 
Despite their presence for almost four decades, the pervasive role of CROs in 
nearly every stage of discovery, development, and marketing of pharmaceuticals has 
received little attention by academics (Mirowski, 2011). Attention must be paid to the role 
of CROs in medical research because these companies have grown into an industry that 
provide services ranging from conducting and managing phase I-IV clinical trials to 
assistance in regulatory affairs with a commitment to “…getting drugs through the 
regulatory process as quickly as possible” (Brooks, 2006; HarrisWilliams&Co., 2014).  
The considerable growth in the presence of CROs can be illustrated by their market 
worth and recent revenue. If it is assumed that the first CRO was established in 1980, then 
we can estimate that by 1992 the CRO market reached US$1 billion and US$7.9 billion 
globally by 2001 (Mirowski, 2011). Another estimate by Miriam Shuchman in Mirowski 
(2011) proposes that the CRO market reached US$17.8 billion in 2007, while a projection 
by CenterWatch estimated that the CRO market would reach US$25.9 billion by 2010. If 
we consider revenue growth as an indicator of the growth of CROs in the medical market, 
Mirowski (2011) claims that the combined revenue of the four largest CROs in the US, all 
of which were founded in the 1980s, grew from US$3,250 million in 2000 to US$5,943 
million in 2006, an increase of almost 55 percent in seven years. A 2015 market research 
report produced by IBISWorld, estimates that US CROs have a revenue of US$17 billion 
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and employ 46,738 people in 3,118 companies (IBISWorld, 2015). Outsourcing-
Pharma.com estimates that the CRO industry was worth US$27 billion in 2014 and is 
expected to reach US$45.2 billion by 2022 (Fassbender, 2016). 
Mirowski (2011) suggests that an additional method by which the growth of the 
CRO sector can be assessed is the pharmaceutical industry’s budget for R&D that goes to 
CROs as compared to their budget for R&D conducted at academic health centres. 
Between 1988 and 1998, the industry’s budget for R&D at academic health centres 
dropped from 80 percent to 40 percent of the total amount spent. Similarly, between 1991 
and 2001, this budget dropped from 71 percent to 36 percent (Mirowski, 2011).  
Another measure of the growth of CROs is that they are now organized into their 
own association that represents and advocates for the industry. CROs globally are 
represented by the Association of Clinical Research Organizations (ACRO), which was 
founded in 2002 (Association of Clinical Research Organizations [ACRO], 2015). ACRO 
indicates that it advocates for and represents the world’s leading clinical research 
organizations “…which provide specialized services integral to the development of drugs, 
biologics and medical devices” (2015). According to ACRO, its members “[c]onduct 
thousands of clinical trials in more than 140 countries while ensuring the safety of nearly 
2 million research participants” (ACRO, 2015). These estimates all indicate that the CRO 
sector is a central player in the global knowledge economy and has grown to the extent 
that it has displaced much of the clinical work done in universities and academic hospitals. 
Although the reasons for the development of the CRO are not the centre of the 
discussion here, it is worth mentioning that CROs were an institutional response to the 
increasingly formalized and ritualized process of pharmaceutical R&D in the United States 
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after World War II (Mirowski, 2011). Independent of CROs, the regulations imposed by 
the FDA became more demanding and the pharmaceutical industry considered these new 
regulations to be extremely onerous. The necessity to recruit subjects, manage them in 
diverse trials and settings, monitor and record data, analyze the data, and write the results 
for publication proved to absorb drug companies’ time and money, which diverted their 
potential profits to FDA trials and procedures (Mirowski, 2011). Furthermore, industry 
felt that in the fast-paced, privatized global economy, academic scientists and drug 
reviewers were “…largely devoid of deadline pressure” and became considered “[d]ilatory 
and dawdling scientists” who stalled neoliberal reform (Mirowski, 2011). Despite reduced 
review and approval times for new drug applications (NDAs), increasingly automated 
research techniques that allow the screening of hundreds of compounds resulted in a tidal 
wave of compounds being submitted to the FDA for approval. This tidal wave of NDAs 
caused additional delays in the review and approval times. For example, between 1990 
and 2000, the number of phase I clinical trials in the US increased from 386 to 1,512, 
respectively (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). 
Industry believed that the solution to these delays was the corporate scientific 
researcher, who was accustomed to working with not only deadlines, but also the fine 
details of the FDA guidelines, rather than complicated patient complaints. These corporate 
scientific researchers were also favourable to their employers because they understood the 
importance of narrow research questions, cost-containment methods, and science that was 
interested in the product, rather than with academic advancement (Mirowski, 2011). 
According to Mirowski, it was not the advancement of medical knowledge that required 
more FDA resources, but the amount of data and information that could now be produced 
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by teams of corporate scientific researchers. In response to industry’s desire for a type of 
research institution that was specifically engineered to its needs, the CRO was developed 
and drug companies began to outsource their clinical work to these institutions (Mirowski, 
2011). Industry has justified, and continues to justify, the outsourcing of clinical research 
to CROs by arguing that they solve corporate financial problems and allow companies to 
develop beneficial networks with external companies that can provide clinical trial 
resources; however, industry tends to ignore important issues such as redefining the 
research process according to neoliberal objectives, the changing and profit-centred nature 
of research questions, and the consequences of globalization (Mirowski, 2011). Each of 
these manifestations of neoliberal science reaffirms the primary objectives of private 
profit, increased efficiency, and cost savings interests of these institutions.  
 
3.5.3 Normative Practices Associated with Contract Research Organizations 
 
Contract research organizations have imposed a new set of normative behaviours 
that are suited to controlling the R&D and marketing cycles of new medicines, rather than 
providing scientists and the medical community with the opportunity to construct research 
protocols for their research. CROs have constructed normative research practices that are 
suited to the cadence of corporate privatized science in the global knowledge economy. 
Some research practices that have become normative in CROs include maintaining data 
secrecy and confidentiality, avoiding extended treatment regimens that are inconvenient 
and costly and are irrelevant to the research program, minimizing patient interaction, and 
amending research protocols to achieve a favourable bottom line (Mirowski, 2011). These 
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practices can be, undoubtedly, detrimental to the health of the patients who are ultimately 
treated based on the results of research conducted in this manner. 
Although clinical trial recruitment and ethical treatment of participants are not 
within the scope of this dissertation, it is important to mention that the ability of CROs to 
recruit patients internationally has cultivated continued debate about the ethical treatment 
of research participants. While trials conducted and managed by CROs in both developed 
and developing countries may foster increased access to medicines, the recruitment of 
subjects from third world countries into clinical trials parallels vulnerability and poverty 
status (Angell, 1997; Petryna, 2007). The nefarious and unethical treatment of North 
American clinical trial participants recruited to participate in trials conducted and managed 
by CROs have also been documented (DrugWatch, 2015; Elliott, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). 
The terms “guinea pigs” and “foreign bodies for sale” have been used to refer to the 
manner in which the recruitment of international clinical trial participants by CROs is 
considered within neoliberal science (Elliott, 2010; Mirowski, 2011). 
There is limited access to trial data for academic scientific researchers, who are 
often physicians, are recruited to sign on to the publication of the research to afford it 
scientific credibility. The credibility of the physicians who are named as authors on these 
research publications disguises the fact that the authors were unlikely to have had full 
access to all of the data at each, or any, stage of the clinical and analytic processes (Moffatt 
& Elliott, 2007; Ross, Hill, Egilman, & Krumholz, 2008; Sismondo, 2007). A selling point 
of the CRO is that it accommodates private industry’s goals by only releasing data if and 
when the sponsors sanction its release (Mirowski, 2011). If a sponsor does not sanction 
the release of its data, then the CRO will keep it confidential through a series of restraint 
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clauses, confidentiality provisions, publication embargoes, and other legal methods to 
control proprietary information (Mirowski, 2011). Pharmaceutical companies have 
willingly utilized their legal powers to prevent or restrict disclosure. The CRO assists in 
these methods of restricting disclosure of almost all aspects of the clinical trial process in 
which the CRO plays a role (Mirowski, 2011).  
Mirowski (2011) explains that some commentators have put forward the 
counterargument, that when clinical trials are distributed across several clinicians at 
various geographically located sites, it is highly unlikely that the many small decisions 
made by clinicians and physicians could favourably bias the results for the sponsor; 
however, while these sorts of decisions have always affected clinical trials, the 
privatization of science has insulated these decisions from both internal and external 
critique. Overall, the result is that the published and otherwise disseminated science is 
only that which has been agreed to be released by the funder (Bekelman et al., 2003; 
Friedberg, Saffran, Stinson, Nelson, & Bennett, 1999; Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & 
Clark, 2003; Lundh et al., 2012; Mirowski, 2011; Rochon et al., 1994; Sismondo, 2008; 
Stelfox, Chua, O’Rourke, & Detsky, 1998). CROs also sidestep any issues pertaining to 
academic freedom because they only answer to the drug companies that hire them and 
hold no responsibility or accountability for the accuracy of the research results (Mirowski, 
2011). For example, CRO employees are not liable for product negligence for a number 
of reasons including that they are anonymous in the process, there is no single person or 
small number of people who stand firmly behind the research that they produce, and 
because the rate of turnover at CROs is high, employees seldom see a project through to 
its completion (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005).  
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This responsibility to only the drug company with which CROs have contracts 
further insulates the work output at CROs, which is of considerable concern, especially 
since CROs have gradually become responsible for clinical drug testing (Mirowski, 2011). 
Furthermore, it is in their contracts with drug companies that CROs will not patent any of 
the research tools that arise from their contracted research that has been conducted by 
CRO employees. Because they are, by nature, uncurious, it is the job of CROs to only 
provide their sponsors with predefined data and they neither receive credit for, nor 
contribute to, the research that comprises the body of knowledge. If employees in CROs 
do not comply with their roles, their employment is terminated (Mirowski, 2011). With 
this transformation from open science to private science, i.e., from academic centres to 
CROs, universities and academic research centres have become unable to maintain their 
mandate of science for the public good (Mirowski, 2011) to the detriment of not only the 
universities as publicly-oriented academic research institutions, but also the scientific 
research that is published in medical journals and otherwise disseminated.  
 
3.6 THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE “SCIENTIFIC AUTHOR” IN 
NEOLIBERAL SCIENCE 
 
The CRO is detrimental to the unbiased publication of science in peer-reviewed 
medical journals. Contrary to popular belief, we cannot consider the body of scientific 
results that is published in medical journals to be new, comprehensive, and objective 
information (Mirowski, 2011). Just as scientific research in private industry cannot be 
disinterested, nor can the publication of results in medical journals. In this private world 
of science, publishing scientific research in medical journals plays several multifaceted 
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roles. For example, the journal in which scientific research is published appears to serve 
as an indication of the significance of the study and that the named authors on the paper 
benefit from the scientific credit upon its publication (Mirowski, 2011). However, the 
increasing privatization and commercialization of science have resulted in the questioning 
of the very role, meaning, and nature of the scientific author. Early in the millennium, a 
series of high-profile cases of scientific fraud led to questions about who constitutes the 
designation as a scientific author and whether they are appropriately acknowledged on 
published papers (Mirowski, 2011). These fraud cases involved reputable authors who 
revealed that he or she had been inappropriately named as authors on the published papers. 
The authors argued that they were wrongfully named since they had insufficiently 
monitored or supervised the protocols of the studies, which were determined to have been 
“bogus” studies (Mirowski, 2011). These cases led to the re-evaluation of the importance 
of ghost authorship, where a writing company is hired to craft a manuscript to meet the 
sponsoring company’s needs in how a certain piece of research should be presented. Once 
the manuscript is ready, one or more researchers or physicians are recruited to sign their 
names as authors of the study, i.e., as honorary authors, effectively hiding industry’s roles 
in the data analysis and publishing processes (Barbour et al., 2009). 
Around the same time as these scientific fraud cases, additional embarrassing cases 
arose where clinical data that was published in journals differed considerably from the 
data that was reported to the FDA (Mirowski, 2011). It became evident that stakeholders, 
other than the named authors, held rights over the publications’ texts and data (Mirowski, 
2011). Ghost authorship, or the practice in which typically prominent physicians agree to 
be named on a manuscript that had been created and drafted by unnamed third parties that 
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possessed final control over the content of the manuscripts, began to be revealed in 
transcripts from lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies (Mirowski, 2011). Some of 
these transcripts can be found in the DIDA (UCSF, 2015a). Although ghostwriting occurs 
across many fields, and certainly before the advent of the CRO, medical ghostwriting 
differs because it characteristically intends to mislead its readers (Mirowski, 2011). 
The pervasive and widespread use of ghostwriting and honorary authorship in 
pharmaceutical research indicates that the roles of ghostwriters and honorary authors have 
become normative in medical research internationally (Amsterdam & McHenry, 2012; 
Barbour et al., 2009; Bosch, Esfandiari, & McHenry, 2012; Bosch, Hernandez, Pericas, & 
Doti, 2013; Fugh-Berman, 2010; Master, 2012). Medical ghostwriting and, therefore, 
ghost authorship is ubiquitous across both large-circulation and smaller-circulation 
biomedical journals, to the extent that ghost journals have also existed. For example, the 
Australasian Journal of Bone and Joint Medicine was one of six fake journals created by 
Elsevier with the express purpose of publishing articles on behalf of its pharmaceutical 
company clients (Grant, 2009; Mirowski, 2011). Mirowski assigns a central cause for the 
prevalence of ghost authorship in the current medical literature to the rise in dominance of 
CROs in conducting pharmaceutical research (Mirowski, 2011).  
Ghost authorship can be viewed as a logical extension of the functionality of 
CROs. CROs fragment various components of the scientific process, including authorship, 
which were traditionally performed by academic clinicians or professors of medicine 
(Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). CROs are neither interested in, nor pursue academic 
authorship for their employees. In fact, it would be rare for a CRO employee to expect 
credit in a publication because of the high personnel turnover and strong control over 
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intellectual property. Furthermore, doctors, bioinformatics specialists, patient recruitment 
teams, in-house statisticians, engineers, and other specialists employed by CROs to 
organize and conduct clinical trials are working for pay and are not interested in receiving 
authorship (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; Mirowski, 2011). Medical ghostwriting 
characteristically involves physician guest authors, who may be key opinion leaders 
(KOLs) or thought leaders, terms that describe prominent physicians who are engaged by 
drug companies to advise on marketing strategies and help boost sales of the companies’ 
products (Moynihan, 2008). Many leading physicians across all specialties and who work 
in both hospitals and universities are being paid generously to “…peddle influence on 
behalf of the world’s biggest drug companies” (Moynihan, 2008).  These roles constitute 
FCOI relationships. Guest authors who are recruited onto ghostwritten papers and KOLs 
are used by industry to disguise the embedded corporate interests in order to maintain a 
façade or smokescreen of independence and mask the FCOI relationships and biases that 
are created (Moffatt, 2011; Sismondo, 2011).  
FCOI relationships are an important method by which corporatized science is 
legitimated for both public and academic consumption.  Furthermore, the commonality of 
these networks has constructed an environment in which FCOI relationships are 
considered to be normative behaviours. Sismondo (2003) states that scientific knowledge 
is the product of the manipulation of local information and that this product can differ in 
its construction depending on local conditions, including financial interests. Each 
environment contains tools, such as policies, that can change the ways in which FCOI 
relationships are regulated, information is considered and, therefore, the ways in which 
knowledge is constructed and disseminated. Policies can be considered as tools that are 
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developed, revised, and adopted according to the actors’ built networks that have been 
formed, making policies politically complex documents. Therefore, if we consider 
changes to the normative scientific process as be one that is structural in nature, as above, 
then these changes ought to be regulated by policies at the structural level. 
The manuscripts that follow this chapter consider FCOI relationships as systemic 
and structural phenomena. Therefore, these relationships must be regulated at the 
structural level. Conflict of interest policies at medical schools, professional medical 
associations, and medical journals are important tools to evaluate the content and 
stringency of medical education policies in the context of neoliberal corporate bias theory. 
The theory presented within this chapter has helped to shape the questions that have led to 
the development of the upcoming manuscripts. 
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4.1 SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
The education of medical students should be based on the best clinical information 
available, rather than on commercial interests. Previous research looking at university-
wide conflict of interest (COI) policies used in Canadian medical schools has shown very 
poor regulation. An analysis of COI policies was undertaken to document the current 
policy environment in all 17 Canadian medical schools. 
Methods 
A web search was used to initially locate COI policies supplemented by additional 
information from the deans of each medical school. Strength of policies was rated on a 
scale of 0 to 2 in 12 categories and also on the presence of enforcement measures. For 
each school, we report scores for all 12 categories, enforcement measures, and summative 
scores. 
Results 
COI policies received summative scores that ranged from 0 to 19, with 0 the lowest 
possible score obtainable and 24 the maximum. The highest mean scores per category 
were for disclosure and ghostwriting (0.9) and for gifts and scholarships (0.8).  
Discussion 
This study provides the first comprehensive evaluation of all 17 Canadian medical school-
specific COI policies.  Our results suggest that the COI policy environment at Canadian 
medical schools is generally permissive.  Policy development is a dynamic process.  We 
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therefore encourage all Canadian medical schools to develop restrictive COI policies to 
ensure that their medical students are educated based on the best clinical evidence 
available, free of industry biases and COI relationships that may influence the future 
medical thinking and prescribing practices of medical students in Canada once they 
graduate. 
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4.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflicts of interest with industry may occur in medical education in the 
classroom, in the conduct and reporting of research, at the bedside, and in the treatment 
of patients. The education of medical students should be based on the best clinical 
information available, unbiased by the commercial interests of industries marketing 
pharmaceutical or other health products.  In many Canadian medical schools, students are 
taught by faculty who work in partnership with industry, e.g., receive research grants from 
companies, serve on companies’ speakers’ bureaus or advisory committees, or own shares 
in companies (Hébert, MacDonald, Flegel, & Stanbrook, 2010). The financial 
relationships of faculty with industry may affect, or reasonably appear to affect, the 
integrity of their academic or publishing interests, professional medical opinions, and the 
information that they disseminate to medical students (Cho, Shohara, Schissel, & Rennie, 
2000; Ehringhaus et al., 2008). These relationships between medical faculty and industry 
represent conflicts of interest (COI) and compromise not only the public’s confidence and 
trust in medical researchers and universities (Association of American Universities Task 
Force on Research Accountability, 2001; Cho et al., 2000; Grande, Shea, & Armstrong, 
2012), but also the potential for robust, evidence-based clinical education for medical 
students (Busing, 2008).  
When medical school faculty members have ties with, or financial interest in, 
pharmaceutical companies, they are more likely to report results that are favourable to the 
sponsoring companies (Cho et al., 2000). Faculty with financial COI tend to publish 
significantly more, and at a higher rate, than faculty without industry relationships 
(Zinner, Bolcic-Jankovic, Clarridge, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2009). At the same time, 
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these faculty members are also more likely to conduct lower quality, but more 
commercializable research, as compared with those who undertake independently funded 
research (Cho et al., 2000; Downie & Herder, 2007). Quality of research is evaluated 
based on the following criteria: whether clinical trial data is selectively reported, the 
medication being tested in a trial is compared to one that is known to be inferior, 
inappropriate doses of a competitor drug are used in a trial, and the length of clinical trials 
is altered to produce data that is favorable to the sponsors’ drugs, among other methods 
(Cho et al., 2000; Downie & Herder, 2007).  
COI relationships are present not only in the classroom, but also surface when 
industry provides resources to medical schools.  Although corporate pharmaceutical 
funding for education may offer educational opportunities for students, these programs 
tend to provide students with industry-friendly information, which can compromise 
clinical judgment if it is at odds with the scientific evidence.  For example, between 2002 
and 2006, the pain management course for medical and other health science professional 
students held at University of Toronto was partly funded by grants from Purdue Pharma 
LP, the maker of OxyContin. As part of the course, a chronic pain management book that 
was funded and copyrighted by Purdue Pharma was distributed to the students by a 
lecturer who was external to University of Toronto and had financial ties to Purdue 
Pharma.  Concerns were raised that some of the contents of the book were not consistent 
with the current best evidence for narcotic medication administration (Ubelacker, 2010). 
Without effective, stringent COI policies at medical schools to regulate such interactions 
between faculty, students, and industry, medical students are subject to direct or indirect 
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interactions with industry, as well as industry resources, that have the potential to 
influence their future medical thinking and prescribing practices. 
The implementation of COI policies has been effective in altering the future 
prescribing practices of medical residents.  Epstein and colleagues (2013) conducted an 
analysis of the antidepressant prescribing practices of 1652 graduates from 162 psychiatric 
residency programs in the US before 2001 and after these programs adopted COI policies 
in 2008. The authors found that residents who graduated before the introduction of COI 
policies in 2001 tended to prescribe less appropriately than 2008 graduates, where 
inappropriate prescribing was defined as prescribing heavily marketed and brand 
reformulated antidepressants (e.g., extended release products) at a higher rate.  
Furthermore, 2008 residents who graduated from programs with maximally restrictive 
COI policies prescribed these drugs significantly less often than 2008 graduates from 
programs with minimally restrictive COI policies. 
The Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada has voted to support the 2008 
report by the Association of American Medical Colleges (Association of American 
Medical Colleges [AAMC], 2008; Busing, 2008) to better manage and, when necessary, 
prohibit interactions between academics and industry that can create COI and undermine 
professionalism standards. Previous research on COI policies as applied to Canadian 
medical schools has shown very poor regulation. Mathieu and colleagues used the 
American Medical Students Association (AMSA) (2012) scorecard to analyze COI 
policies at Canadian universities that host medical schools. They found that the university-
wide policies were generally weak in the areas of faculty-industry relationships, samples, 
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sales representatives, on-site and off-site training, industrial relationships, and educating 
students about COI.   
However, the scope of Mathieu and colleagues’ study was limited because the 
authors only analyzed university-wide COI policies and not those specific to medical 
schools. Further, they omitted the Northern Ontario School of Medicine (NOSM) from 
their analysis. In addition, they did not contact the universities directly and only relied on 
institutional policies found via a web search.  Finally, only a single coder evaluated the 
COI policies. To address these limitations, we undertook an analysis of COI policies at 
both the university and faculty levels to document the current COI policy environment in 
all 17 Canadian medical schools. 
 
4.3 METHODS 
 
A list of all 17 medical schools (14 English language and 3 French language) in 
Canada was obtained from the web site of the Association of Faculties of Medicine of 
Canada (AFMC) <http://www.afmc.ca/faculties-e.php>. The web site of each of the 
schools was searched in late July 2011 for policies related to COI or documents 
interpreting policies using the terms “policy”, “policies”, “conflict-of-interest”, 
“conflicts-of-interest” and “COI” in English, and “politique” and “conflit d’intérêts” in 
French. The name of each policy and the latest of either the date of adoption or the date 
of the policy’s most recent review were recorded. After a preliminary list of policies for 
each school was assembled, an e-mail with the list of policies in English or French, as 
appropriate, was sent to each dean explaining the purpose of the study and requesting 
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confirmation that this list contained the pertinent policies for the particular medical school. 
These emails also requested that the deans send us any additional policies we might have 
overlooked, or draft policies not yet in place. The deans were informed that we were only 
interested in publicly available policies and while respondents’ names would be 
confidential, the medical schools and their policies would be identified in any subsequent 
publication. Two reminder emails were sent at one-month intervals. We did not search 
for, request, or analyze policies from affiliated teaching hospitals. 
Policies that were approved as of the end of September 2011 were analyzed. A 
grading system was modified from those that were already used by AMSA (2012), 
Chimonas and colleagues (2011), and Mason and Tattersall (2011) for 12 different 
categories:  
 gifts (including meals)  
 consulting relationships (excluding scientific research and speaking)  
 industry-funded speaking relationships and speakers’ bureaus  
 honoraria  
 ghostwriting  
 disclosure  
 industry sales representatives  
 on-site education activities  
 compensation for travel or attendance at off-site lectures and meetings  
 industry support for scholarships and funds for trainees  
 medical school curriculum (or other documentation of educational objectives and 
course content) 
 samples  
AMSA uses a 0 to 3 scoring system where a score of 0 indicates that schools failed 
to respond to its request to send their policies. Since we initially identified policies using 
a web search, AMSA’s definition of what constituted a score of 0 was not relevant. Both 
AMSA and Mason and Tattersall regard a permissive policy as equivalent to the absence 
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of a policy. We graded each category on a scale of 0 to 2, where 0 = no policy or 
permissive, 1 = moderate, and 2 = restrictive. (See 4.8 Appendix S1 for the detailed 
scoring criteria for each individual category.) In addition, we scored enforcement 
measures: is it clear that a party is responsible for general oversight to ensure compliance 
and is it clear there are sanctions for noncompliance? Each of these enforcement measures 
was scored either “yes” or “no.” We did not attempt to identify if policies had been 
violated or to grade the severity of sanctions. 
Scoring was done by two groups of two people, one for English (AS, KH) and one 
for French language schools (BM, AJ). Each person independently scored the policies and 
then compared results within their group. Disagreements were resolved through 
discussion. Once the scoring was completed, a follow-up e-mail in the appropriate 
language was sent to each dean. This email included the preliminary scoring for the 
medical school along with the policies that we used to obtain the score, an explanation of 
how each area was scored and a request that the dean review the scores for accuracy and 
notify us if he or she felt that a score was inaccurate. We also requested that the deans 
send us any new policies developed since the initial contact, but noted that the scores 
would be based on policies in place as of the end of September 2011. We asked the deans 
to respond within one month, and if we had not heard from them at that point, two further 
e-mail reminders were sent at one-month intervals. 
After a response from the deans, the scores were reviewed by the original set of 
scorers, and a final set of scores was derived for each school. Similarly to Chimonas and 
colleagues (2011), we summed the scores in the first 12 individual categories for each 
school to come up with a summative score. Each category was weighted equally since 
153 
 
 
 
each was identified as vital by a combination of the American Board of Internal Medicine-
Institute on Medicine as a Profession (ABIM-IMAP), American Association of Medical 
Colleges (AAMC), and the Institute of Medicine (IOM) (AMSA, 2012). We view this 
weighing system as also being applicable to the Canadian situation since the AFMC has 
endorsed the report by the AAMC on industry funding of medical education (Association 
of Faculties of Medicine of Canada [AFMC], 2008). For the enforcement categories, the 
number of “yes” and “no” for each school was summed. We report scores for each 
category for each school, the summative scores for each school, and the mean for each 
category.  
Since we collected only publicly available information about medical schools’ COI 
policies, the Human Participants Review Committee at York University, which approved 
this project, waived the requirement for informed consent from the deans of the schools 
that we contacted. 
 
4.4 RESULTS 
 
Of 17 medical schools contacted, 15 responded to the initial request for policies. 
Via web searches and responses from deans’ offices, we found a total of 50 policies and 
documents interpreting policies (collectively referred to as policies). Schools had as few 
as zero (NOSM) and as many as 8 relevant policies (University of British Columbia) per 
school. In addition, two deans sent us course outlines used in the teaching of COI to 
medical students. The dates of 16 policies were either not given (9) or were unclear (7). 
For the other 34 policies, seven were more than 10 years old (one dated back to 1976), 
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while 12 were passed within two years of September 2011 (Table 4.1). Twenty-one 
policies were at the medical school level and the remainder (29) were university-wide. 
Eleven schools responded when we asked them to review their initial scores, 
resulting in the revision of scores for five schools that provided policies that we had 
initially overlooked or that they had not initially sent us. In addition, two schools informed 
us that they had put in place new policies since our initial survey, while seven were in the 
process of developing or updating policies. 
COI policies received summative scores that ranged from 0 (NOSM) to 19 
(Western University, formerly University of Western Ontario), where 0 was the lowest 
score possible and 24 was the maximum score (Table 4.2). Twelve of the 17 schools 
scored less than 12/24 (50% of the maximum) and only one scored more than 18/24 (75% 
of maximum). Cumulative scores of 5 or less reflected ratings of mostly 0 (no policy or 
permissive) for each category, whereas cumulative scores of 8 or more reflected ratings 
of 1 or 2 (moderate or restrictive, respectively) for most categories. The highest mean 
scores were assigned to disclosure and ghostwriting (0.9) and for gifts and scholarships 
(0.8). Policies on sampling received the lowest average score (0.2), followed by policies 
on sales representatives (0.3) and speaking and curriculum (0.4). No school had a 
restrictive policy that applied to samples. Of note, no category received a mean score of 1 
or better (Table 4.3). Many COI policies with a rating less than 2 for disclosure failed to 
require disclosure of both past and present financial ties with industry on a publicly-
available website and/or disclosure of any relationships to patients when this relationship 
may represent a COI.  
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Fifteen of 17 schools had policies that identified a party responsible for 
enforcement of the policies (Table 4.2).  Examples of responsible parties included 
“Department Head or equivalent” and “Department Chair, Dean or immediate 
supervisor.” 
Eleven of 17 schools had policies that specified sanctions for noncompliance 
(Table 4.2). An example of such a policy from McGill University contains sanctions 
ranging from counselling of the individual involved all the way to termination for cause. 
Ten schools had policies that met requirements for both a specific party responsible for 
enforcement and specified sanctions for non-compliance.  
 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 
The 17 Canadian medical schools received scores that ranged from 0 to 19 out of 
a possible maximum score of 24.  The score of 0 was received by NOSM.  This low score 
may reflect, in part, the fact that the school was only established in 2005.  Western 
University received the highest score of 19.  Of the 17 medical schools in Canada, over 
half (10) received summative scores of 5 or less out of 24, indicating that in most of the 
categories they had either no policy or a permissive policy. No single category managed 
to achieve an average score of 1 or more.  
Fourteen (82%) of the schools received a rating of 0 (no policy or permissive 
policy) for samples.  Samples have been shown to influence medical residents’ prescribing 
practices, with negative implications both for costs and prescribing appropriateness. Adair 
and Holmgren (2005) have shown that access to drug samples increases the likelihood 
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that physicians will prescribe heavily advertised and more costly drugs as opposed to 
cheaper or over-the-counter drugs. We also found that most medical faculties (70%) had 
permissive policies or no policy concerning faculty involvement in companies’ speakers’ 
bureaus. The United States (US) Institute of Medicine’s (2009) recent report on COI 
recommended banning such relationships  because speakers’ bureaus represent part of a 
company’s promotional activities and the content is often under the company’s control 
(Steinbrook, 2009).  
Similarly, 70% of medical faculties had permissive or no policies concerning 
interactions with sales representatives. Sales representatives have been found to 
negatively influence prescribing practices, e.g., to lead to more frequent and expensive 
prescribing and poorer prescribing quality (Spurling et al., 2010). In a comparative study, 
recently graduated internists who had studied in a program that restricted contact with 
sales representatives were more critical of the information they provided and saw sales 
representatives less often than internists from a medical school without such restrictions 
(McCormick, Tomlinson, Brill-Edwards, & Detsky, 2001). Most schools (70%) also 
failed to cover conflicts of interest or drug promotion in the curriculum. This gap has 
important implications for students’ abilities to understand the context within which 
promotional activities occur and to weigh their own responses to ethical challenges that 
might arise (Austad, Avorn, & Kesselheim, 2011). Finally, nearly all schools had a party 
responsible for enforcing their policies (15/17) and the majority had sanctions for 
violations (10/17), but we do not have information on how often these sanctions are 
applied or how effective they are. 
We found that COI policies were most stringent in the areas of disclosure, 
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ghostwriting, gifts, (considered to be the easiest to prohibit (SCCPD working group on 
industry relations, n.d.)) and scholarships. These results parallel findings that AMSA 
obtained in its annual reviews of policies in US medical and osteopathic schools. Its 2012 
analysis found that the policy areas that received the highest ratings were those that 
addressed scholarships, off-campus continuing medical education, purchasing, and gifts 
(American Medical Student Association [AMSA], 2012). The importance of restricting 
gifts is emphasized in a review of COI policies at 14 American medical schools that found 
that exposure to a gift restriction policy during medical school was associated with 
reduced prescribing of two out of three newly introduced psychotropic medications (King, 
Essick, Bearman, Cole, & Ross, 2013).  
Our findings on ghostwriting are consistent with those of Chimonas and colleagues 
(2011), even though their rating scale separated out no policy (score = 0) and permissive 
policies (score = 1). They found that, although existing ghostwriting policies at American 
medical schools were among the most stringent of all of the policy areas, ghostwriting 
was also the most neglected policy area. Furthermore, other work has shown that 
meaningful sanctions for academic fraud are generally absent (Stern & Lemmens, 2011). 
Because universities reward academic faculty for their publication records, limited 
enforcement can mean that faculty may find themselves complicit in ghostwriting 
activities, in spite of policies prohibiting them.  
A similar study of Australian medical schools found that their COI policies were 
even weaker than those at Canadian schools.  Eleven out of 15 schools received less than 
50% of the maximum possible number of points and only one barely exceeded 66%. All 
schools either had no policies or had policies that were unlikely to have a substantial effect 
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on behavior in the areas of on- and off-campus educational activities. Lastly, policies on 
consulting relationships and disclosure had mean scores below 50% (Mason & Tattersall, 
2011).  
Our study, in conjunction with the ongoing AMSA survey, the analyses of the US 
schools by Chimonas and colleagues, and the results from the Australian schools, clearly 
establishes that the poor control of COI at medical schools is not confined to a single 
country, but is an issue that needs to be addressed at both national and international levels. 
One effort to engage medical students in these issues has come from a collaboration 
between the World Health Organization and Health Action International that has resulted 
in a manual to teach medical students about pharmaceutical promotion (World Health 
Organization & Health Action International, 2010). The manual is available in English, 
French, Russian and Spanish, and has been distributed across a wide range of countries.  
This study has some limitations. Two schools did not respond to our initial request 
for any policies that we might have missed in our web search. Six medical schools failed 
to review our ratings despite repeat requests; their input could have validated, or 
alternatively, contradicted our findings. Furthermore, only medical schools’ COI policies 
were within the scope of our study, so we did not consider the policies of affiliated 
teaching hospitals (e.g., on samples or sales representatives). Hospitals may have had 
more restrictive policies, but this is unlikely based on previous research (Naylor, 2002).  
Policy development is a dynamic process, and some Canadian medical schools 
have introduced new policies since September 2011, while others continue to revise their 
policies. It is important for medical schools to continue to develop and improve their COI 
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policies to mitigate institution-industry relationships and to address the ways in which 
those relationships may affect the information that is taught to, and the attitudes of, 
medical students. Policies must also continue to develop, especially since the role of 
industry within universities continues to evolve (SCCPD working group on industry 
relations, n.d.).  
Practices that were once entrenched into medical culture, including the receipt of 
gifts, food, and drug samples, in addition to faculty consulting and speaking engagements 
with industry (Rothman & Chimonas, 2010), should no longer play direct or indirect roles 
in the education of medical students. Student-industry interactions can influence students’ 
education (Grande, Frosch, Perkins, & Kahn, 2009). Students who have more contact with 
industry tend to have more favorable attitudes towards these types of interactions (Austad 
et al., 2011). It has been reported that students who receive gifts from industry feel obliged 
to rely on industry representatives for information on medications (Industry funding 
working group, 2011).  
More stringent policies are not the only answer for helping to ensure medical 
education is free from faculty COI, but such policies have been shown to limit the 
acceptability of promotional items (Grande et al., 2009; Sierles et al., 2005). Medical 
schools across Canada are encouraged to achieve the most effective and stringent policies 
to regulate industry relations with both faculty and students. 
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4.8 APPENDIX S1: GRADING SYSTEM FOR CATEGORIES IN POLICIES 
 
 
1. Gifts (including meals) 
 
2 = All gifts and on-site meals funded by industry are prohibited, regardless of nature or 
value. 
 
1 = Less stringent limitation on industry-funded gifts (e.g., gifts prohibited above $50/year 
– or gifts prohibited but meals allowed) 
 
0 = No policy, or policy that would not substantially reduce gifting (e.g., gifts are allowed 
but discouraged, or limited in a non-specific way to “appropriate,” or primarily for the 
benefit of patients). 
 
2. Consulting relationships (excluding scientific research and speaking) 
 
2 = Consulting relationships with industry must be subjected to institutional review or 
approval. Additionally, they must either be described in a formal contract, or payment for 
services must be commensurate to the task. 
  
1 = As above, without the institutional review or approval requirement. 
 
0 = No policy, or policy that would allow consulting relationships to occur without 
institutional scrutiny or that would allow relationships in which payments are not 
commensurate with work. 
 
3. Industry-funded speaking relationships/speakers’ bureaus 
 
2 = Speaking relationships are prevented from functioning as de facto gifts or marketing. 
An effective policy must not implicitly permit (a) long-term speaking agreements or (b) 
industry to have a role in determining presentation content. (Some effective policies may 
explicitly prohibit participation in a speakers’ bureau. Other effective policies contain 
elements such as limits on compensation and reimbursement and a requirement to ensure 
the scientific integrity of information presented.) 
  
1 = Industry-funded speaking relationships are regulated, but with less stringent limits on 
longevity, content or compensation. 
 
0 = No policy, or policy that does not define the limits on longevity, content or 
compensation. 
 
4. Honoraria 
 
2 = No acceptance of honoraria; compensation must be at fair market value and publicly 
disclosed  
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1 = Limits on accepting/disclosing honoraria.  
 
0 = No policy, or no limits on acceptance. 
 
5. Ghostwriting 
 
2 = Ghostwriting is not permitted. 
 
1 = Few or no restrictions; management is left to individual discretion. 
 
0 = No policy. 
 
6. Disclosure 
 
2 = Personnel are required to disclose past and present financial ties with industry (e.g., 
consulting and speaking agreements, research grants) on a publicly-available website 
and/or disclose such relationships to patients when such a relationship might represent an 
apparent conflict of interest. 
 
1 = Universally-required, internal disclosure to the medical school or hospital 
administration. (Policies requiring disclosure only when presenting or publishing do not 
meet this criterion.) 
 
0 = No policy. 
 
7. Industry Sales Representatives 
 
2 = Pharmaceutical and device representatives are not allowed to meet with faculty 
regardless of location, or are not permitted to market their products anywhere inside the 
medical center and associated clinics and offices. (Exceptions may be made for non-
marketing purposes, such as training on devices or equipment.) 
  
1 = Pharmaceutical representatives are permitted to meet with faculty, but with significant 
limitations (e.g., only in non-patient care areas or only by appointment). Exceptions as 
above.  
  
0 = No policy, or policy that does not substantially limit access. 
 
8. On-site Education Activities 
 
2 = Industry is not permitted to provide direct financial support for educational activities, 
including Continuing Medical Education (CME), directly or through a subsidiary 
agency.  (However, companies may contribute unrestricted funds to a central fund or 
oversight body at the academic medical center, which, in turn, would pool and disburse 
funds for programs that are independent of any industry input or control.)  
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1 = Less stringent limitations to ensure independence of educational content (e.g., 
standards to establish freedom from industry influence of content, such as review and 
approval of presentations; language that prevents industry from selecting the speaker; or 
language such as: industry funding may be allocated for a particular topic, but must be 
provided directly to the department, not to individuals).  
 
0 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially limit industry influence over 
educational activities (e.g., industry funding must be disclosed). 
  
9. Compensation for Travel or Attendance at Off-site Lectures & Meetings 
 
2 = Personnel may not accept payment, gifts or financial support from industry to attend 
lectures and meetings. (An exception may be made for modest meals, if part of a larger 
program.) Travel support may only be accepted if it is subject to institutional approval or 
industry is prevented from selecting (“earmarking”) the recipients. Note: speaking and 
consulting relationships are evaluated separately in domain 1. 
 
1 = Less stringent limitations. 
 
0 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially limit participation in industry-
funded events and meetings. 
 
10. Industry Support for Scholarships & Funds for Trainees 
 
2 = The policy must either prevent industry from earmarking or awarding funds to support 
the training of particular individuals (recipients must be chosen by the school or 
department), or the policy must mandate institutional review of the giving of funds. (This 
does not preclude grants that fund a specific research project.) 
 
1 = Less stringent limitations.  
 
0 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially regulate industry funding of 
scholarships and funds for trainees. 
 
11. Medical school curriculum (or other documentation of educational 
objectives/course content) 
 
2 = Students are trained to understand institutional conflict-of-interest policies and 
recognize how industry promotion can influence clinical judgment.  
 
1 = Curriculum addresses conflict of interest in a more limited way (e.g., training on 
policies only).  
 
0 = No policy (not addressed in curriculum or elsewhere). 
 
167 
 
 
 
12. Samples 
 
2 = Industry samples are prohibited, except under certain narrow circumstances approved 
by the institution that protects the interests of patients and prevent the use of samples as a 
marketing tool (e.g., policies that allow samples under limited circumstances with the 
approval of the Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committee or policies that incorporate 
samples into a larger program designed to ensure the availability of brand-name and 
generic medications to underinsured patients; if the circumstances of the specific program 
are not defined, the policy should define the approvals process).  Where there is a specific 
program in place, the policy must prevent samples from being given directly to physicians 
by pharmaceutical sales representatives.  Samples must not be for the personal use by 
physicians. 
 
1 = Samples or vouchers for medications may be provided, but with significant limitations 
(e.g., samples may not be given directly to physicians, samples must be dispensed or 
controlled by pharmacy department). 
 
0 = No policy, or a policy that does not substantially limit the use of samples (e.g., samples 
limited for formulary items or samples not for personal use. 
 
13. Enforcement 
 
A. Is it clear that there is a party responsible for general oversight to ensure 
compliance?  (Y/N)          
 
B. Is it clear there are sanctions for noncompliance?  (Y/N)   
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TABLE 4.1: POLICIES PER SCHOOL AND DATE OF EACH POLICY 
 
School Name of policy Date of 
adoption/most 
recent review 
Dalhousie 
University 
Guidelines for the relationship between 
medical education and health related industries 
(S*) 
September 2011 
Policy on conflict of interest (U†) June 24, 2002 
Laval Université Normes de gestion des Fonds de soutien à 
l’enseignement des programmes de residence 
(S) 
June 18, 2010 
Politique de la Faculté de médicine sur les 
relations entre les membres de la Faculté de 
médecine de l’Université Laval et les 
entreprises privées relativement aux activités et 
aux programmes de formation sous la 
responsabilité de la Faculté (S) 
December 19, 
2008 
Politique sur l’intégrité en recherché et création 
et sur les conflits d’intérêts (U) 
May 20, 2009 
McGill 
University 
Code of conduct: faculty of medicine (S) No date given 
Handbook: student rights and responsibilities 
(U) 
2010 
Recognizing conflicts (U) No date given 
Regulations concerning investigation of 
research misconduct (U) 
May 25, 2010 
Regulation on conflict of interest (U) June 15, 2009 
McMaster 
University 
Guidelines regarding management of 
commercial/private sector/government 
relationships in research and education (S) 
January 23, 2008 
Joint intellectual property policy (U) May 27, 1998 
Policy on support of continuing education 
events from commercial sources (S) 
2007 
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Postgraduate education guidelines for 
interaction with the pharmaceutical industry (S) 
No date given 
Statement on consulting policy and procedures 
(U) 
January 14, 1976 
Statement on conflict of interest in research (U) March 11, 2009 
Memorial 
University of 
Newfoundland 
Conflict of interest (U) March 31, 2011 
Integrity in scholarly research (U) February 12, 2001 
Procedure for investigation reports of 
misconduct in research (U) 
No date given 
Northern Ontario 
School of 
Medicine 
No policies No policies 
Queens 
University 
Physicians and industry – conflicts of interest 
(S) 
Date uncertain 
Policy for disclosure on conflict of interest (S) August 17, 2001 
Université de 
Montréal 
Règlement sur les conflicts d’intérêts (U) November 24, 
2009 
Université de 
Sherbrooke 
Guide sur les relations entre les milieux de 
formation en santé et les entreprises (S) 
March 17, 2010 
Politique, règles et proc édures sur l’intérité en 
recherché et sur les conflicts d’intérêts (U) 
May 30, 2006 
University of 
Alberta 
Conflict of interest and conflict of commitment 
reporting and assessment policy (U) 
November 16, 
2009 
Conflict policy – conflict of interest and 
commitment and institutional conflict (U) 
June 26, 2009 
University of 
British Columbia 
Conflict of interest/commitment declaration – 
steps (U) 
Date uncertain 
Conflict of interest and conflict of commitment 
(S) 
November 2007 
Dean’s COI/COC review committee (S) November 7, 2006 
Definitions (U) Date uncertain 
Duty to disclose (U) Date uncertain 
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Frequently asked questions (FAQs) (U) Date uncertain 
Managing conflicts – what to do (U) Date uncertain 
Reviewer resources (U) Date uncertain 
University of 
Calgary 
Conflict of interest policy (U) September 1, 1987 
Disclosure of potential financial conflict of 
interest for use by planning committees for 
continuing medical education and professional 
development programs (S) 
No date given 
Disclosure of potential financial conflict of 
interest for use by speakers for continuing 
medical education and professional 
development programs (S) 
No date given 
Research policy for integrity in scholarly 
activity (S) 
December 9, 1992 
University of 
Manitoba 
Interactions between the University of 
Manitoba’s Faculty of Medicine and the 
pharmaceutical, biotech, medical device, and 
hospital and research equipment and supplies 
industries (“Industry”) (S) 
June 3, 2009 
Policy on industry relations (S) No date given 
University of 
Ottawa 
Conflict of interest – members of staff (U) October 20, 2009 
Interacting with industries and outside agencies 
in a teaching environment (U) 
November 19, 
2008 
Interactions between the Faculty of Medicine 
and the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical 
device, and hospital and research equipment 
and supplies industries (S) 
September 2011 
Standards of ethical and professional behaviour 
(S) 
no date given 
University of 
Saskatchewan 
Conflict of interest (U) December 12, 
2008 
Research integrity policy (U) June 17, 2010 
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University of 
Toronto 
CEPD policy on support of University of 
Toronto sponsored continuing education 
activities from commercial sources (S) 
November 15, 
2004 
Policy on conflict of interest – academic staff 
(U) 
June 22, 1994 
Western 
University 
(formerly 
University of 
Western Ontario) 
Policy and guidelines for interactions between 
Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry and 
pharmaceutical, biotech, medical device and 
research equipment supplies industry 
(“Industry”) (S) 
June 4, 2010 
Recommendations and frequently asked 
questions (FAQs) (S) 
no date given 
 
*S = School-specific policy 
†U = University-wide policy 
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TABLE 4.2: MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND SCORING FOR INDIVIDUAL 
CATEGORY 
 
School Strength of policy Total score 
(percent of 
maximum) 
Enforcement 
Party 
responsible 
for 
enforcement  
Sanctions 
for 
violations  No policy 
or 
permissive  
Moderate 
policy  
Restrictive 
policy  
(score = 0) (score = 1) (score = 2) (Yes/No) (Yes/No) 
Western 
University 
(formerly 
University 
of Western 
Ontario) 
honoraria curriculum, 
sales 
representatives
, samples 
compensation, 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
ghostwriting, 
gifts, on-site 
education, 
scholarships, 
speaking 
19 (79) Yes Yes 
University 
of 
Manitoba 
curriculum
, samples 
compensation, 
disclosure, 
honoraria, 
sales 
representatives 
consulting, 
ghostwriting, 
gifts, on-site 
education, 
scholarships, 
speaking 
16 (67) Yes Yes 
University 
of Ottawa 
consulting compensation, 
curriculum, 
disclosure, on-
site education, 
samples, sales 
representatives
, speaking 
ghostwriting, 
gifts, 
honoraria, 
scholarships 
15 (63) Yes Yes 
Dalhousie 
University 
samples, 
speaking 
compensation, 
consulting, 
curriculum, 
disclosure, on-
site education, 
sales 
representatives  
ghostwriting, 
gifts, 
honoraria, 
scholarships 
14 (58) Yes Yes 
Université 
de 
Sherbrook
e 
curriculum
, speaking 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
gifts, 
honoraria, on-
site education, 
sales 
compensation, 
ghostwriting, 
scholarships 
13 (54) Yes Yes 
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representatives
, samples 
Laval 
Université  
ghostwritin
g, sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
speaking 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
gifts, 
honoraria, on-
site education 
compensation, 
curriculum, 
scholarship 
11 (46) Yes Yes 
University 
of Toronto 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, gifts, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples 
compensation, 
disclosure, 
honoraria, on-
site education, 
sales 
representatives
, samples 
consulting 8 (33) Yes No 
McMaster 
University 
compensati
on, 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, gifts, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
honoraria 
on-site 
education 
5 (21) Yes No 
University 
of British 
Columbia 
compensati
on, 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
gifts, 
honoraria, 
speaking 
 5 (21) Yes No 
McGill 
University 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
curriculum, 
disclosure 
ghostwriting 4 (17) Yes Yes 
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sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
Memorial 
University 
of 
Newfoundl
and 
compensati
on, 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
consulting, 
disclosure, 
gifts 
 3 (13) Yes Yes 
University 
of Calgary 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
curriculum
, gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
disclosure ghostwriting 3 (13) Yes No 
University 
of 
Saskatche
wan 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
curriculum
, gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
disclosure ghostwriting 3 (13) Yes Yes 
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Université 
de 
Montréal 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
disclosure, 
gifts 
 2 (8) Yes No 
Queens 
University 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
curriculum
, 
disclosure, 
ghostwritin
g, gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
speaking 
scholarships  1 (4) No No 
University 
of Alberta 
compensati
on, 
consulting, 
curriculum
, 
ghostwritin
g, gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
disclosure  1 (4) Yes Yes 
Northern 
Ontario 
compensati
on, 
  0 (0) No No 
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School of 
Medicine 
consulting, 
curriculum
, 
disclosure, 
ghostwritin
g, gifts, 
honoraria, 
on-site 
education, 
sales 
representat
ives, 
samples, 
scholarship
s, speaking 
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TABLE 4.3: NUMBER (%) OF CANADIAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS WITH POLICIES 
IN EACH CATEGORY AND STRENGTH OF POLICY 
 
 
Category 
No. of schools 
(%) with no 
policy or 
permissive 
policy (score = 
0) 
No. of schools 
(%) with 
moderate policy  
(score = 1) 
No. of schools 
(%)with 
restrictive 
policy (score = 
2) 
Mean score 
Ghostwriting 9(53) 0 (0) 8 (47) 0.9 
Disclosure 2 (12) 14 (82) 1 (6) 0.9 
Gifts 8 (47) 5 (29) 4 (24) 0.8 
Scholarships 9 (53) 2 (12) 6 (35) 0.8 
Consulting 8 (47) 6 (35) 3 (18) 0.7 
On-site 
education 
9(53) 5 (29) 3 (18) 0.6 
Compensation 10 (59) 4 (24) 3 (18) 0.6 
Honoraria 9 (53) 6 (35) 2 (12) 0.6 
Curriculum 12 (70) 4 (24) 1 (6) 0.4 
Speaking 12 (70) 3 (18) 2 (12) 0.4 
Sales reps 12 (70) 5 (29) 0 (0) 0.3 
Samples 14 (82) 3 (18) 0 (0) 0.2 
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INTEGRATIVE DISCUSSION 
 
 Medical education provided by Canadian medical schools is the first formal 
exposure that medical students in Canada receive to not only treatment and diagnostic 
information that they will use in practice, but also acceptable and appropriate professional 
conduct. Canadians rely on physicians and, therefore, on the knowledge and skills that 
these physicians receive at Canadian medical schools. At medical school, medical students 
must study and learn important clinical skills, but equally as important to patients is how 
medical students learn to apply those skills. Canadian medical schools must set an 
example and impart to their students the importance of not only their critical analysis of 
medical information, but also seeking out information that has been developed and 
analyzed independently from commercial industry. 
 In the study on Canadian medical schools’ policies on conflict of interest 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry (Chapter 4), we found the policies to be 
generally weak. The permissiveness of these policies indicate that there is room for 
industry influence in medical education. The policies were most restrictive in the areas of 
disclosure, ghostwriting, gifts, and scholarships. The policies were moderately restrictive 
in the areas of faculty’s receipt of honoraria, compensation, industry involvement in on-
site education, and participating in consulting relationships. The policies were most 
permissive in the areas of faculty’s receipt of samples, seeing drug company sales 
representatives, speaking engagements, and curriculum for students on conflict of interest 
relationships. Permissive policies in these areas provide an opportunity for the industry-
originated information that physician-faculty may receive during these interactions to be 
taught to students. Furthermore, the general lack of requirement for medical schools to 
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cover conflict of interest relationships and drug promotion in their curricula has important 
consequences for medical students. Without training on relationships with industry, how 
to accurately identify these relationships, and what these relationships mean in the context 
of conducting and interpreting medical research and knowledge, medical students 
experience a disadvantage early in their careers when it comes to understanding the 
context within which medical research, education, and promotional activities are 
conducted and disseminated. This disadvantage is especially important considering the 
growth of the for-profit drug promotion industry, which has been developed for the 
purpose of promoting and selling medications. 
 While the drug promotion industry conducts some of its promotion clearly as 
advertising, it also works behind-the-scenes of medical research that is published in 
medical journals. Both medical students and practicing physicians depend on published 
medical journal articles for clinical information and the best available evidence on which 
they can base their clinical decisions. Therefore, it is essential that the practices of 
corporate science are de-coded and critically analyzed. The next manuscript (Chapter 5) 
examines the role of the drug promotion industry in the medical research, interpretation, 
and publishing processes within neoliberal science.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
HONEST AUTHORSHIP: A GLOSSARY AND ASSESSMENT TOOL TO HELP 
PREDICT VULNERABILITY TO CORPORATE BIAS IN MANUSCRIPTS 
SUBMITTED TO MEDICAL JOURNALS 
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York University 
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5.1 SUMMARY 
 
Corporate science and scientific publishing that adheres to neoliberal objectives 
has encouraged important shifts in the processes by which medical research is conducted 
and data is collected, interpreted, and published. The literature has documented many 
strategies that have been used by the pharmaceutical industry and related entities to 
conceal not only its involvement, but also the biases that its funding brings to various and, 
in some cases, all levels of research and writing in published clinical research. A literature 
review led to the development of a glossary and assessment tool. The glossary includes a 
number of key words and academic interpretations describing practices that have been 
used by the pharmaceutical industry to meet the needs of commercial science, rather than 
the public good. The assessment tool provides a method by which researchers and journal 
editors can identify which manuscript submissions are likely to be vulnerable to bias as a 
result of industry involvement in the research and publications processes. The tool can be 
further refined to capture additional practices as the shift to increasingly privatized and 
commercialized science continues. 
 
KEYWORDS: pharmaceutical industry, promotion, medical journals, corporate science, 
neoliberal science, financial conflict of interest relationships, authorship disclosure 
policies, transparency 
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5.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Medical research and publishing continues to be increasingly conducted by, or in 
partnership with, industry (Fisher, 2008; Mirowski, 2011). Medical journals are 
gatekeepers to, and an important medium for, the dissemination of medical research to 
physicians, medical researchers, and students. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses, 
derived from research articles published in peer-reviewed medical journals, are regarded 
as the highest forms of evidence and are used alongside published clinical trials and 
supporting articles in clinical decision-making. Traditionally, medical researchers, 
physicians, and the public expect peer-reviewed medical journals to serve as 
dissemination and translation tools for critical analyses of evidence-based medicine 
(EBM); however, some published literature in medical journals has shifted in its use from 
EBM to marketing-based medicine (MBM). MBM is a term used to describe research 
results that have undergone a series of refinements that, together, influence medical 
knowledge and medical practice. Some of these practices include the suppression and 
spinning of negative data, ghostwriting, and ghost management (Healy, Mangin, & 
Antonuccio, 2013; Healy, 2012; Sismondo, 2007; Spielmans & Parry, 2010). 
The pharmaceutical promotion industry has become a profitable sector in the 
global economy. This industry is comprised of not only drug companies, but also 
supporting entities, which provide services such as running and managing clinical trials, 
collecting and analyzing clinical trial data, drafting manuscripts to be submitted to medical 
journals, and developing content for continuing medical education (CME) programs 
(Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). Together, these firms and entities employ thousands of 
marketers, writers, and publication managers, who, in the process of developing 
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manuscripts, medical lectures, commentaries, CME, and other documents aimed at 
disseminating knowledge to clinicians, shape the discourse around disease states by 
embedding pro-industry marketing messages that reflect positively on manufacturers’ 
products (Fugh-Berman, Pike McDonald, Bell, Bethards, & Scialli, 2011; Fugh-Berman, 
2010).  
This paper examines the medical publishing culture as part of the scientific process 
that increasingly operates according to the norms and values associated with neoliberal 
science. Neoliberal science refers to a regime of scientific management that commonly 
entails the rollback of public funding for universities, narrowing of research agendas to 
focus on commercializable research as defined by commercial funders, commodification 
and commercialization of knowledge, and an increasing reliance on the market as an 
indicator of scientific success (Lave, Mirowski, & Randalls, 2010). Dissolution of the 
scientific author, or the fragmentation of the traditional authorship role into a series of 
roles adopted by employees within various organizations, has also been associated with 
neoliberal science (Lave et al., 2010).  
One consequence of neoliberal science is that the role of peer-reviewed medical 
journals has been compromised by the increasingly industry-centric environment in which 
medical research and writing are conducted. Although medical journals have been 
increasingly adopting authorship, contributorship, and financial conflict of interest (FCOI) 
disclosure policies, the utilization of, requirements for, and methods of collecting this 
information tend to differ by journal (Bosch, Pericas, Hernandez, & Torrents, 2012; 
Wager, 2007). Medical journals also tend to have substantial variation in their authorship 
and FCOI disclosure policy requirements (Blum, Freeman, Dart, & Cooper, 2009). 
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Furthermore, the nature of voluntary policy adoption and enforcement by journals, in 
addition to the use of “weak definitions or convenient understandings” of scientific 
publishing roles and responsibilities, has led to industry’s exploitation of these policies in 
order to conceal its involvement in ways that violate the generally expected scientific and 
medical publishing norms (Matheson, 2011). Therefore, standardizing and understanding 
the language associated with medical publishing and developing assessment tools to 
assess medical journal policies is important to encourage uniformity in developing 
effective and enforceable authorship, FCOI, and data transparency policies. 
Internal industry documents from the Drug Industry Document Archive 
(University of California San Francisco [UCSF], 2015) have provided glimpses into the 
industry’s publishing culture. Within this culture, the pharmaceutical promotion industry 
uses interpretations of terminology that outmaneuver current authorship and FCOI 
policies, thereby, concealing its involvement in the medical research, writing, and 
publishing processes (Matheson, 2011). Therefore, a glossary and assessment tool that 
standardizes the language around drug companies’ behind-the-scenes involvement in 
publishing may assist medical journal editors and peer-reviewers in their assessments of 
the content within manuscript submissions.  
The following section provides an analysis of the implications of the changing 
landscape of science from one that traditionally was oriented to expanding scientific 
knowledge to one that is increasingly dictated by corporate interests. Simultaneously, the 
practices of clinical research and medical writing have shifted to adhere to the objectives 
of neoliberal science. This analysis proceeds through introducing a series of normative 
medical research and writing practices that work in tandem to ensure that the business 
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goals of sponsors are being met. These analyses are followed by the methodology and 
findings of this study. First, a glossary provides a modest initial entrance into, and 
understanding of, the practices of corporate medical publishing. Second, this paper 
provides a assessment tool that is informed by the glossary with an eye to disclosure and 
transparency of the roles of research teams and corporate study funders in the research 
and manuscript development processes.  
 
5.3 THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF MEDICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
  
Many of the original research and review articles concerning medications that are 
submitted to and accepted by peer-reviewed medical journals not only originate from, but 
also are funded by the manufacturers of pharmaceutical treatments that are being 
evaluated. This institutional conflict of interest relationship, in which drug companies are 
responsible for conducting their own clinical trials, analyzing and, subsequently, 
facilitating the publication of their own results, has led to the skewing of the medical 
literature and knowledge base through practices including ghost management and 
publication planning (see Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008; Sismondo, 2007, 2009), 
design bias (see Fries & Krishnan, 2004), suppressing and spinning of negative data (see 
Aursnes & Klemp Gjertsen, 2008; Le Noury et al., 2015; Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, 
Busuioc, & Bero, 2012; Melander, Ahlqvist-Rastad, Meijer, & Beermann, 2003; Ninan, 
Poole, & Stiles, 2008; Schott et al., 2010; Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & 
Rosenthal, 2008), and medical ghostwriting (see Barbour et al., 2009; Bosch, Esfandiari, 
& McHenry, 2012; Fugh-Berman, 2010; Gotzsche et al., 2007; Lacasse & Leo, 2010; Leo, 
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Lacasse, & Cimino, 2011; Logdberg, 2011; McHenry & Jureidini, 2008; Ross, Hill, 
Egilman, & Krumholz, 2008; Sismondo, 2009). These strategic practices serve to ensure 
that the medical literature is generally favourable to industry sponsors’ products and, in 
the process, traditional science and medical journals have been captured by the 
pharmaceutical industry and strategically used to increase profits for the sponsoring drug 
companies. 
Scientific research and management have shifted dramatically since the 1980s 
with the increasing adoption of neoliberal policies and regulations globally (Lave et al., 
2010). In the 1980s, critical scholars were questioning, observing, and analyzing the 
effects of private industry on pharmaceutical research and efforts to advertise their 
products. For instance, in 1984, Drs. Joel Lexchin (1984) and John Braithwaite (1984) 
separately published trailblazing books aptly titled The Real Pushers: A Critical Analysis 
of the Canadian Drug Industry and Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
respectively. Since then, academics across scholarly disciplines have undertaken research 
that critically analyzes the ways in which medical research and its management have been 
increasingly determined and dictated by neoliberal policies that prioritize private profit 
over the public’s right to access information and unbiased healthcare. Neoliberal science 
has, and continues to have, difficult to ignore consequences for the organization, practice, 
and social implications of science (Lave et al., 2010). 
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5.3.1 Contract research organizations, medical writing organizations, and medical 
communications companies 
 
Corporate scientific research within the pharmaceutical industry has grown 
through university-industry linkages and contracts with supporting entities, including 
contract research organizations (CROs), medical writing organizations (MWOs), and 
medical communications companies (MCCs) which have transformed the way that 
pharmaceutical research is conducted and communicated (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). 
MWOs and MCCs may be contracted by drug companies to write and prepare manuscripts 
for submission to medical journals and provide “near complete drafts of review 
manuscripts to authors for editing, in addition to managing submissions and revisions” 
(Cosgrove, Vannoy, Mintzes, & Shaughnessy, 2016; Ross et al., 2008). CROs have grown 
to become full-service firms that offer a range of services “…from initial screening of 
molecules for biocompatibility, in vitro screening, pharmacokinetic modeling, chemical 
synthesis and analysis, all phases of clinical testing, dosage formulation and pharmacy 
services, to all aspects of the regulatory process” (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). CROs, 
MWOs, and MCCs represent a manifestation of the privatization of science and the 
scientific process in the contemporary clinical pharmaceutical research laboratory within 
academic and corporate locales.  
Since the 1980s, CROs have grown from small specialized boutique firms that 
offered pharmaceutical companies the opportunity to outsource a limited set of services 
into an industry that has expanded its role into almost every stage of pharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D), discovery, pre-clinical and clinical trial research and 
management, and marketing phases of drug companies’ products (Mirowski & Van 
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Horne, 2005). The dominant role of CROs can be illustrated by their revenue growth from 
US$1.0 billion to US$7.9 billion between 1992 and 2001 and the growth in the number of 
clinical trial participants they oversee from 7 to 20 million, many of whom are located 
outside North America, in Asia and Eastern Europe (Sismondo, 2008). Also during this 
time, drug companies redirected approximately half of their financial support for clinical 
trials out of academic research centres and into CROs (Sismondo, 2008). This shift in 
funding from academic institutions to the private sector has been accompanied by a shift 
in research protocols that prioritize private control over the R&D cycle, predicated on the 
interests of increasing the efficiency and speed of clinical trial research and analysis in 
corporate science (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005).  
CROs manage various scientific protocols to meet the goals of their contracts with 
drug companies. This commercial-oriented management has led to consequences for 
informed consent, restrictions on disclosure of research results through combinations of 
restraint clauses, confidentiality provisions, publication embargoes, legal controls over 
information that is defined by the sponsoring company as commercially confidential 
information (CCI) or proprietary information, and the ethical treatment of clinical trial 
participants in poor and developing regions globally to the point that these participants 
have been termed “foreign bodies for sale” (Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005, p. 232). 
Importantly, because academic research centres have been unable to compete with CROs, 
they have endeavoured to increase their clinical research services in an effort to regain the 
contracts that they lost to CROs (Campbell, Weissman, Moy, & Blumenthal, 2001; 
Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005). 
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Of principal concern to CROs is the delivery of a research product within deadline 
and under budget. Characteristically, relationships between CROs and drug companies 
with which they have contracts are dictated by and subordinate to the objectives of the 
sponsor. Furthermore, the “‘sweatshop’ character of the work conducted in CROs” 
(Mirowski, 2011) adds another layer of practices that contribute to the undermining of 
assumed traditional scientific research practices. Compared with academic and 
pharmaceutical company researchers, CRO researchers are provided with little training, 
poor pay, are discouraged from exercising any scientific curiosity or initiative and, 
therefore, are prohibited from publishing on research products from their work within 
CROs (Mirowski, 2011). These conditions lead to particularly high employee turnover 
rates at CROs, raising important questions about the fragmentation of the scientific 
research process and the responsibility for legal liability for the accuracy, disclosure, and 
confidentiality of research results and analyses (Mirowski, 2011). CROs also help to 
effectively enforce private industry’s limitations on disclosure and confidentiality of 
research results by releasing data only at the company’s request (Mirowski, 2011).  
 
5.3.2 Dissolution and disappearance of the traditional scientific author: An adverse 
event of corporate science 
 
The nature of outsourced research and development (R&D), discovery, and 
clinical trial research, analysis, and reporting has increasingly led to the inevitable 
dissolution and disappearance of the traditional scientific author (Mirowski, 2001). 
Traditionally, scientific authors have collected, analyzed, interpreted, and have had access 
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to raw data, from which they develop their own interpretations and scientific academic 
articles (Healy & Cattell, 2003). Authorship in the corporate privatized version of science 
has undergone a profound modification in which the role of authors named in the bylines 
of published articles may have been limited to making a few revisions to previously 
ghostwritten manuscripts to which they were offered “guest” or “honorary” authorship 
(Mirowski & Van Horne, 2005; Moffatt & Elliott, 2007; Unknown, n.d.).  
Medical ghostwriting is considered to be a service that is provided by medical 
writers (Mack, 2009) and occurs when manuscripts are crafted by, or on behalf of, drug 
companies. Drug companies may pay CROs to conduct their trials and analyze the 
collected data in-house. Drug companies may then outsource the writing of the 
manuscripts describing the results to medical writers at MWOs or MCCs (Cosgrove et al., 
2016; Sismondo, 2007). Once a draft of the manuscript is completed, prominent 
physicians are recruited to sign their names onto the manuscripts (Unknown, 2005). One 
type of internal industry document from the Drug Industry Document Archive (DIDA), 
called “Publication Plan Tracking Reports”, illustrates the processes undertaken by a 
MWO called DesignWrite when drafting the manuscripts and deciding which physicians 
to target for each ghostwritten article, whether recruiting these physicians was successful, 
which journal will be targeted for submission of the ghostwritten article, and, ultimately, 
determining whether the manuscript was submitted and accepted, accepted with revisions, 
or rejected (Unknown, 2005).  
Another internal industry document, “Medical Education and Communications 
Plan for the Premarin Product Outline” (DesignWrite, 1996), outlines DesignWrite’s 
proposed services to help a drug company, with which it had a contract, promote its 
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products. This document includes a typical timeline for ghost authorship of manuscripts 
(Table 5.1). Accompanying this timeline are 1996-1997 costs for pre-clinical manuscripts 
(US$10,000), clinical manuscripts (US$16,000), review articles (US$20,000), poster 
presentations (US$6,000), and journal supplements (US$175,000) (DesignWrite, 1996). 
The physicians who agree to be named in the byline of the manuscript as authors are 
termed “guest authors” or “honorary authors”. Once these articles are published as part of 
the peer-reviewed medical literature, their conclusions affect the literature base and are 
used to promote drugs to physicians (Sismondo, 2007).  
Typically, the involvement of drug companies, CROs, MWOs, and MCCs is 
neither acknowledged, nor indicated within the submitted manuscript or published paper. 
However, sometimes, a specific medical writer may be acknowledged within the 
published paper, though this acknowledgement tends to be ambiguous, for instance, 
“editorial assistance” (Fugh-Berman, 2010) or “‘We thank XX’ (without specifying for 
what) or ‘XX provided editorial assistance’ (a euphemism, usually without affiliation, for 
‘XX from Company YY wrote the paper’)” (Gotzsche et al., 2009). Although ghostwriting 
occurs across many fields and occurred prior to the development of CROs, medical 
ghostwriting in particular is important to study because the increase in medical 
ghostwriting has been in part attributed to the rise of CROs (Mirowski & Van Horne, 
2005). Furthermore, the inherent intention of medical ghostwriting is to misguide and 
deceive readers about the origination of the work by carefully concealing industry’s 
involvement in all aspects of the research and writing processes.  
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5.3.3 Ghost management, publication planning, and medical ghostwriting 
 
The privatization and commercialization of the scientific research process has 
fostered an environment in which the process of R&D, discovery, clinical trials and their 
management, data collection and analysis, and writing of manuscripts has become so 
fragmented that it requires its own management structure. Ghost management describes 
the process wherein “…pharmaceutical companies and their agents control or shape 
multiple steps in the research, analysis, writing, and publication of articles” (Sismondo, 
2007). Resultant articles are considered to be “ghosted” because the roles of drug 
companies, CROs, and MWOs in this process are generally invisible. The presence of the 
guest authors, in lieu of companies as the authors or disclosures of the companies’ roles, 
paints these corporate research and review articles with a mask of independence and 
credibility (Sismondo, 2007). These articles are also considered to be “managed” because 
the companies, whose roles are invisible in the process of producing articles, shape the 
common message(s) communicated in the single article, or multiple articles, through a 
process called “publication planning” (Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008; Sismondo, 2007). 
Access to the DIDA, scholarly analyses of its documents, and written accounts and 
analyses of industry employees’ experiences have provided a unique window into 
previously confidential daily practices in which industry and guest authors engage. In the 
context of corporate science in the pharmaceutical industry, publication planning refers to 
an organizational timeline and plan that governs the dissemination of clinical information 
into the medical literature through a finely calibrated process that determines the writing 
and release of clinical trials, commentaries, research articles, and review articles 
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concerning a particular product (Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008). According to a legal 
deposition from a senior medical writer from DesignWrite, publication plans and 
strategies reflect the objectives of the sponsoring company and not the MWO that is 
contracted to produce the manuscript for publication (Unknown, 2006). This senior 
medical writer explained that the objectives of publication plans, to sell more drugs, were 
in the domain of the sales and business teams and were not necessarily clear to the writers. 
However, opposing counsel showed that the involvement of medical writers is often more 
extensive. Counsel provided a document prepared by DesignWrite called “Medical 
Education and Communications Plan For The Premarin Product Line”, which indicates 
that at least some writers at DesignWrite were tasked with developing a marketing plan 
for the sponsor’s product (Unknown, 2006). This document states that: 
DesignWrite is pleased to offer its medical education and communications 
services to [the drug company] to aid in promoting the array of Premarin products. 
Our expertise and extensive experience in the organization and development of 
scientific and technical communications, in addition to our strategic marketing 
capabilities, will prove invaluable in support of the brands (DesignWrite, 1996).  
The senior medical writer agreed that DesignWrite was contracted by a drug company to 
prepare proposals for publication plans and that “…these were prepared in the ordinary 
course of business by DesignWrite and then submitted to [the drug company]” (Unknown, 
2006).  
From the perspective of pharmaceutical companies, research is sometimes used to 
increase brand recognition. When research and brand recognition are both considered to 
be part of the marketing for drugs, the research that pharmaceutical companies conduct 
must demonstrate the effectiveness of their products (Sismondo, 2004). When industry-
sponsored clinical trials, secondary review articles, editorials, and comments are 
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published in medical journals, they serve to draw attention to the manufacturers’ products. 
The role of ghost authors, in this scenario, is to craft manuscripts that are favourable to 
the drug company that commissioned the paper (Sismondo, 2004). While ghost authors 
typically remain anonymous in the process, guest authors sign their names to the byline 
as authors of the papers. The publications are viewed as self-promotion and self-marketing 
because they contribute to professional prestige (Sismondo, 2004). The end result of a 
successfully ghost-managed and ghost-written manuscript is a published article in an 
influential journal with an appropriate target audience for the sponsor’s product, with no 
clear indication that the clinical trial was perhaps conducted by a CRO and that the 
manuscript was written by a MWO or MCC.  
The secrecy associated with industry’s involvement in the research, analysis, and 
writing processes affords the pharmaceutical industry substantial influence over not only 
the research process, but also the ways in which it is used as a vector of MBM (Sismondo, 
2007). Ghost management amplifies the already present sponsorship bias because the 
unidirectionality of motivations and influence by corporate sponsors on the research 
imposes controls on the writing and publication stages of article development. Corporate 
influence can be effectively exerted at every phase of the publishing process. The ensuing 
published article biases medical opinion, practice, and the treatment decisions that affect 
patients (Sismondo, 2007). The people who coordinate this process, publication planners, 
are supported and represented by the International Publication Planning Association 
(IPPA) and the International Society for Medical Publication Professionals (ISMPP) 
(Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008). The ISMPP now has over 1,400 members (ISMPP 
2015). Ghost management and publication planning allow industry to control both the 
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production and release of pre-clinical and clinical trials, research articles, review articles, 
and commentaries that may be published years before the sponsor’s drug is launched 
(Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008). Sismondo and Doucet (2010) state that it is reasonable 
to estimate that approximately 40 percent of journal articles pertaining to clinical trials of 
new drugs are ghost managed. When these articles are added to published meeting 
presentations on clinical trials, the percentage could be even higher. 
 
5.3.4 The roles and publishing interests of medical journals 
 
Just as the pharmaceutical industry operates in the private sector, so too do medical 
journals. Substantial medical journal income comes from publishing articles and 
supplements for which sponsoring companies will purchase reprints (Smith, 2003). 
Although medical journal editors may insist that they are unaware of ghost management, 
publication planning, and ghost writing practices, Mirowski (2011) argues that the editors 
of all major medical journals are aware that these practices occur. Sismondo and Doucet 
(2010) provide an account of medical journal editors of three of the most highly regarded 
medical journals, one representative of a journal editors organization, and a representative 
of a major international publisher of several journals who were all in attendance at an 
ISMPP meeting. Other publishers and journals promoted themselves at booths at the trade 
show associated with the ISMPP meeting (Sismondo & Doucet, 2010). The editors 
understood the role of the ISMPP members in the audience and it became clear that regular 
communication between publication planners and journal editors was the norm (Sismondo 
& Doucet, 2010); therefore, medical journals may be complicit in permitting the practices 
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of ghost management and publication planning to continue as ordinary business practices. 
A journal editor even “…expressed appreciation for medical writers” and provided advice 
to medical writers to make the submission process run more smoothly (Sismondo & 
Doucet, 2010). 
Journal editors may also correspond with medical writers instead of the authors 
listed in the byline (Sismondo & Doucet, 2010). Correspondences with medical writers 
who manage manuscripts may indicate to editors that these manuscripts are some of the 
most important pieces that the editors will accept for publication. Determination of 
manuscript importance is based, in large part, on whether the manuscripts, once published, 
will be well-cited compared to others on the same topic, considering that publication 
planners are likely to cite previously published articles that were ghostwritten. Moreover, 
if a manuscript is being managed by publication planners, then the manuscript is important 
to the commissioning company and its publication will likely lead to the purchase of 
reprints that will be distributed by sales representatives to doctors (Sismondo & Doucet, 
2010). Medical journals are not considered to be promotional material by governmental 
regulatory agencies and, so, do not fall within their jurisdictions; therefore, the 
interpretation of data and potentially embedded promotional messages in published 
articles, are not subject to government regulation (Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008). The 
important role of medical journals to publication planners and their corporate objectives 
can be illustrated by an account of an industry consultant, who had previously worked in 
government. This consultant cautioned at an ISMPP meeting that if regulators saw 
publication plans, they would be forced to regulate these practices because some 
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publication strategies explain the intent of publication planners to promote drugs off-label 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
Richard Smith, past-editor of British Medical Journal, argues in his suitably titled 
article, Medical Journals are an Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical 
Companies, that favourable clinical trials published in medical journals are among the 
most profitable forms of advertising for companies because these trials are perceived by 
physicians as the highest form of evidence and possess the journal’s “stamp of approval” 
(Smith, 2005). A positive clinical trial that is published in a reputable peer-reviewed 
medical journal can be worth thousands of pages in advertising and may also be endorsed 
in accompanying press releases from the medical journal as well as the public relations 
and medical education firms hired by the sponsoring company (Smith, 2005). Published 
articles also provide the literature on which advertising and promotional materials can be 
legitimately based in order to position a product and serve as the foundation for secondary 
and review articles (Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008).  
Marcia Angell, past-editor of New England Journal of Medicine, has described 
peer-review as part of a “broken system” of pharmaceutical research and regulation 
(Angell, 2008). Richard Horton, current editor of Lancet, has stated that “journals have 
devolved into information laundering operations for the pharmaceutical industry” (Smith, 
2005). The peer-review process has been unable to serve as a safeguard against publishing 
clinical research and related scientific studies that are written with the intention to promote 
industry’s commercial objectives at the expense of public health, data transparency, and 
true critical analysis of the best available clinical evidence. 
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Corporate scientific practices that have been undertaken by the pharmaceutical 
industry in the interest of profit have attracted the attention of researchers in the fields of 
social science (see Dana & Lowenstein, 2003; Rosenberg & Allard, 2008; Sismondo, 
2009), science and technology studies (see Lave et al., 2010; Mirowski, 2011; Packard, 
1996; Sismondo, 2003, 2011), medicine (see Fugh-Berman & Ahari, 2007; Fugh-Berman, 
2010, 2013; Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008; Lexchin, 2008, 2012; Persaud, 2013; Ross et al., 
2008; Steinman, Bero, Chren, & Landefeld, 2006), law and ethics (see Bosch, Esfandiari, 
et al., 2012; Braithwaite, 1984; Elliott, 2004, 2010; Gagnon, 2013; Lemmens & Waring, 
2006; Lemmens, 2000; Spielmans & Parry, 2010; Stern & Lemmens, 2011), and medical 
anthropology (Oldani, 2004; van der Geest, Reynolds White, & Hardon, 1996). This body 
of literature, concerned with pharmaceutical industry practices, has grown in size and 
breadth over time due to increasing access to industry insiders and internal industry 
documents. Access to these materials has provided researchers with a window into the 
culture of scientific research, writing, and publishing in the pharmaceutical industry. In 
their works, these and other researchers have individually introduced a number of terms 
that have traditional meanings that differ from the meaning that is attributed to them in 
the context of corporate scientific publishing, and in addition have added to the lexicon 
other terms that describe the various roles in the medical research and publication 
processes.  
Rochon and colleagues (2010) provide a glossary of 13 terms, which accompanies 
a four-section FCOI checklist with 15 items. The authors intend the glossary and checklist 
to be used together for specific clinical research studies by the investigators and study 
team members including study coordinators, research assistants, and study nurses 
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(Rochon et al., 2010). This paper expands on and broadens the scope of the study by 
Rochon and colleagues by presenting a glossary and assessment tool that, together, focus 
on transparency within the research and publications processes in an effort to uphold the 
academic and scientific integrity of published medical journal articles. The remaining 
sections of this paper provide the methodology for creating a glossary or compendium of 
terms including first, a definition of each term followed by, in most cases, quotations by 
academics on their research into the publishing practices within the pharmaceutical 
industry. The quotes are valuable insofar as they illustrate the current usage and 
perspectives on the relevance of the terms. The glossary provides a snapshot of 
documented practices and academic analyses of them that can be used to understand the 
normative research practices in corporate science. Drawing from the glossary, the 
assessment tool attempts to take a measured, step-wise, process-oriented view of research 
and publishing, informed by the importance for transparency in the medical research and 
publications processes. The assessment tool loosely mirrors the glossary in that it 
comprises three categories and many of the terms from the glossary. The assessment tool 
is informed by the checklist by Rochon and colleagues (2010) as well as terms in the 
glossary. 
 
5.4 METHODOLOGY 
 
5.4.1 Analyzing discourse using thick description and textual analysis 
 
“Thick description” is an anthropological methodology that allows the researcher 
to be both theoretical and analytical with the purpose of describing both abstract and 
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general patterns, as well as characteristics of social interactions, in a particular culture 
(Holloway in Ponterotto, 2006). Thick description interrogates the significance of actions 
and behaviours, experiences, sequences of events, voices of those participating, and the 
meanings of their actions (Denzin in Ponterotto, 2006). Thick description requires social 
actions and interactions to be interpreted according to circumstances, meanings, 
intentions, strategies, and motivations (Schwandt in Ponterotto, 2006). The ability for 
description to be interpreted within the appropriate context, in this case neoliberal science, 
makes it “thick”. In contrast, “thin description” allows only for a superficial account, 
limiting the abilities of researchers to interrogate underlying cultural significance 
(Holloway in Ponterotto, 2006).  
Although thick description has typically been used by anthropologists conducting 
ethnographic work, most commonly to inform participant observation, use of this 
methodology can be expanded to qualitative research in non-anthropological fields 
(Denzin in Ponterotto, 2006). For example, thick description as a methodology for textual 
analysis can allow a researcher to probe, at a deeper level, the actions and behaviours 
portrayed within the literature to reveal meanings and social discourse. The simultaneous 
use of thick description and textual analysis allows for the examination of both concepts 
and the relationships between them, creating a “web of meaning” (Carley, 1993). 
Therefore, this study borrows aspects of thick description that have allowed for the 
collection of definitions from the literature without necessarily having to cut out or 
paraphrase to shorten the definitions to prevent any obfuscation. Although thick 
description is usually used to portray interviews with research participants, it is used here 
because the ways that authors phrase and develop their definitions is important to 
201 
 
 
 
document. Nuances and meanings of the terms are reflected in the definitions as phrased 
by the authors and paraphrasing would risk loss of those nuances. The ways that the two 
or more definitions for each term fit together is also important and, so, thick description 
is used not only as a methodology, but also as a tool of analysis. 
The literature search was conducted through repeated online searches for internal 
documents, scholarly literature, and finding additional literature using the reference lists 
of this initial literature. A broad collection of literature was assembled between November 
2014 and November 2015, using a combination of key terms including, but not limited to, 
“pharmaceutical” and “drug” with “company” and “firm”, “physicians” and “doctors”, 
“conflicts of interest”, “financial conflicts of interest”, “medical ghostwriting” and 
“ghostwriting”, “litigation”, “human rights”, “access”, “medical education”, “medical 
journals”, “clinical trials”, “data sharing”, “data transparency”, “industry funding”, “drug 
company funding”, “publication”, “published results”, and “policy” or “policies”. A 
variety of books, peer-reviewed articles, industry documents, and other materials were 
also suggested by colleagues between 2009 and 2015. 
Approximately 300 sources concerning medical journal publishing practices in the 
areas of FCOI relationships, authorship and roles in publishing, and methods by which 
industry has masked its role in the research and publication processes were reviewed for 
this study. As in Lexchin et al. (2008), an instrument to extract key terms and their 
relevance to neoliberal science was developed to include the following domains: 
“Glossary Item”, “ID Number”, “Relevance”, and “Thematic Category”. The thematic 
category of each term was determined a posteriori. Using this instrument, one author 
reviewed the documents for language or terms that had either or both of the following 
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characteristics: (i) traditional meanings that differ from the meaning that is attributed to 
them in the context of corporate scientific publishing, or (ii) have been recognized within 
the published literature to be important in the context of transparency and FCOI disclosure 
in medical research settings.  
Alongside compiling these terms, the relevance of each term to the culture of 
scientific research was recorded within the glossary. As opposed to developing the 
categories and terminology to be included within the glossary a priori, the collection of 
data was informed by emergent categories, which allowed for the progressive 
identification of analytical categories as they emerge from the data (Pope, Ziebland, & 
Mays, 2000; Steinman et al., 2006). The glossary items were systematically collected and 
documented and, subsequently, grouped into core thematic categories. Accordingly, 
neither the glossary items, nor categories were predefined. Based on the interpretation of 
saturation by Padgett (2012), the collection of glossary terms and relevant content for each 
item within the glossary were considered to have reached saturation when analyzing 
additional literature was redundant and revealed no new information than that which had 
been collected from the already reviewed literature. Multiple supporting quotations for 
each term are provided in an effort to achieve comprehensiveness and an accurate 
reflection of both the literature and the layers of complexity associated with the corporate 
research and publishing practices. 
Thick description calls for the adequate presentation of the “voice” of participants 
by including long quotes or excerpts from the participants (Ponterotto, 2006), which are, 
in this case, the literature sources that engage in academic conversation by virtue of their 
public availability or being published. Engagement with this literature has allowed not 
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only for the definition of terms, but also for the development of an assessment tool. The 
glossary terms that could be assessed as part of a step-wise process of medical research 
and publishing (i.e., involvement of CROs, MWOs, or MCCs, authority over study 
protocols and content in manuscript) in addition to FCOI relationship disclosures were 
included in the tool. Where academic characterizations of corporate scientific processes 
were comprised of series of smaller steps (i.e., medical ghostwriting, ghost management), 
those terms were broken down into those steps in the tool. In this way, this instrument is 
evidence-based. 
One author consolidated the glossary terminology and developed the assessment 
tool, which were then reviewed by five experts (see Acknowledgements). Because this 
study was based on publicly available information, ethics review was not required. 
 
5.5 FINDINGS 
 
5.5.1 Glossary 
  
In total, the glossary comprises 50 terms, some of which represent academic 
interpretations of practices that have been used by drug companies to meet the needs of 
commercial science, sometimes at the expense of the public good. These 50 terms were 
identified and extracted from 118 sources, which ranged in date from 1993-2015. Each of 
these 50 terms were thematically categorized in the glossary into four core categories: 
“Category A: Financial conflict of interest disclosures for authors, research team, and 
other contributors”, “Category B: Roles in the research, writing, and publication 
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processes”, “Category C: Data sharing and data transparency”, and “Category D: 
Enforcement” (5.11 Appendix A). In each category, each term is accompanied by its 
“relevance” to medical journal publishing and relationships with the pharmaceutical 
industry and “support” in the form of direct quotes from the literature. Terms are also 
cross-referenced with each other where applicable.  
 
5.5.1.1 Category A: Financial conflict of interest disclosures for authors, research team, 
and other contributors  
 
Category A comprises 23 terms (I.D. #1-23) that describe various roles, 
relationships, and activities in which academic and practicing physicians may engage that 
have the potential to alter professional behaviours. These 23 terms include FCOI 
relationships such as receiving gifts and meals, honoraria, samples, grants, stock 
ownership, engaging in consulting relationships or industry-funded speaking 
relationships/speakers’ bureaus, continuing medical education, employment at a drug 
company or subsidiary, seeing sales representatives, practice management consultants, 
acting as a key opinion leader (KOL), and providing paid expert testimony in a court case. 
The final item in Category A (I.D. #23) explores the extent to which transparency of FCOI 
disclosures are required by medical journal policies. In Category A, each of the 23 terms 
are supported by 1 to 7 excerpts from the literature (5.11 Appendix A). 
 
5.5.1.2 Category B: Roles in the research, writing, and publication processes  
Category B comprises 14 terms (I.D. #24-37) that describe a range of roles and 
processes in which physicians and drug companies have been reported to engage in the 
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current culture of corporate scientific research and publishing. These 14 terms include the 
roles of medical writers, medical ghostwriters, the involvement of CROs, MWOs, and 
MCCs. The academic analyses of corporate scientific processes described in this category 
include medical ghostwriting, publication planning, and ghost management. The final 
item in Category B (I.D., #37) explores the roles and degrees to which named authors as 
well as whether research, writing, or communication companies are involved in the 
research, writing, and publications processes. These 14 terms in Category B are each 
supported by 1 to 14 excerpts from the literature (5.11 Appendix A). 
 
5.5.1.3 Category C: Data sharing and data transparency  
 
Category C comprises 11 terms (I.D. #38-48) that explore the extent to which 
the named authors on publications own, control, and have access to the data on which they 
are publishing in a given manuscript submitted to medical journals. These 11 terms 
include clinical trial registration, ownership of data, data sharing, origination of data, 
prepublication review and study alteration, seeding trials, and the selective reporting of 
trials. The 11 terms in Category C were supported by 1 to 6 excerpts from the literature. 
 
5.5.1.4 Category D: Enforcement  
 
Category D comprises two types of sanctions (I.D. #49-50) for extreme 
violations of medical journal policies identified in the literature. The first type of sanction 
is a ban from publishing or acting as a peer-reviewer for that journal. The second type of 
sanction is the retraction of an article in an effort to correct the literature, should the 
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published information be significantly and deliberately misleading or falsified. Each of 
these two types of sanctions are supported by 2 excerpts from the literature. 
 
5.5.2 Assessment tool 
 The assessment tool comprises three categories including “Category A: 
Financial conflict of interest disclosures for authors, research team, and other 
contributors”, “Category B: Roles in the research, writing, and publication processes”, 
and “Category C: Enforcement and sanctions” (5.12 Appendix B). In total, the assessment 
tool comprises 62 items, which are divided into the aforementioned categories. This 
assessment tool can be used by researchers to determine the types of financial 
relationships, the involvement of individuals, organizations, and companies in the 
research and publication processes, and the presence of enforceable sanctions in medical 
journal policies. By extension, analyses using this tool may also highlight the categories 
and terms that are not required by policies to be disclosed. 
 
5.5.2.1 Category A: Financial conflict of interest disclosures for authors, research team, 
and other contributors 
 
There are 23 terms (I.D. #A1-A23) in Category A in the assessment tool. The 
assessment tool terms in Category A closely parallel those in Category A of the glossary. 
For terms representing FCOI relationships in Category A, the assessment tool asks 
whether a journal’s policies require the disclosure of these relationships in present only, 
in the past 1-5 years, 6-10 years, or 10+ years. The assessment tool also asks whether the 
institutions or companies with which each of these FCOI relationships were affiliated are 
207 
 
 
 
required to be disclosed and if these disclosures and institutions are publicly accessible 
(5.12 Appendix B). 
 
5.5.2.2 Category B: Roles in the research, writing, and publication processes.  
 
Category B is comprised of two sections. The first section (I.D. #B24-B37) 
includes roles that may be undertaken by authors, members of the research team, funders 
of studies, and employees of supporting entities including CROs and MWOs. For each of 
these roles, the assessment tool asks whether journal policies require disclosure of the 
presence of these roles, their start and end dates, and whether there was past participation 
in these roles. As in Category A, the assessment tool asks whether the institution or 
company at which authors and contributors engaged in these roles are disclosed and if 
these disclosures are to be made publicly accessible (5.12 Appendix B). 
 The second section of Category B (I.D. #B38-B59) attempts to discern whether 
the responsibility for, and involvement in, the steps of a study that is being submitted for 
publication are transparently identified. The items included in this section of Category B 
are informed by the glossary in addition to the FCOI checklist by Rochon and colleauges 
(2010). This section inquires about whether journal policies require disclosure of the party 
that has ultimate authority for the completion and approval of various components of the 
research process. Also based on Rochon and colleagues (2010), the ultimate authority for 
decisions throughout the research process was divided into four categories: study team, 
funder, shared responsibility, or unclear. The assessment tool also asks whether the policy 
requires the disclosure of the name of the institution or company at which the party with 
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ultimate authority is based, as well as whether this information is publicly accessible (5.12 
Appendix B). 
 
5.5.2.3 Category C: Enforcement and sanctions.  
 
The final category in the assessment tool, Category C, comprises three items 
(I.D. #60-62). The items in this category seek to determine whether there is a party at the 
journal that is responsible for policy enforcement and whether there is a clear process by 
which the journal enforces the policy. Finally, this category provides a continuum of 
enforceable sanctions for noncompliance with, or violation of, journal policies. The 
sanctions range in severity from rejection of an article, to labeling an article with a “notice 
of correction”, to retraction of a published article. The assessment tool asks whether these 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions are clear with the options of “no”, “unclear”, and 
“yes”. The assessment tool also inquires about whether the enforced sanctions are made 
public once they have been applied (5.12 Appendix B). 
 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the literature review, a glossary listing 50 terms was compiled. Each 
source was read iteratively and distilled into the glossary, then, from the glossary the 
assessment tool was developed. Because of the subjective nature of this process, the expert 
panel helped to review the validity of the assessment tool. Organized into four categories, 
the glossary identifies not only the relevance, but also quotes from the literature indicating 
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the importance of each term to the area of medical research and publishing. As is indicated 
in the glossary, many papers produced different reasons for the relevance of the terms to 
corporate science, disclosure and transparency, and ensuring the accurate reporting of 
EBM, rather than MBM. 
The preeminent role of journals as the forum that physicians, research, medical 
students, and the public trust for important information on medical treatments, alongside 
the business-oriented environment in which medical research is conducted has informed 
this evaluative undertaking. The items in the glossary and assessment tool are important 
to consider both individually and collectively within the context of understanding of the 
processes of pharmaceutical research, publishing, and promotion. The glossary and 
assessment tool now need to be tested. The glossary informs the assessment tool, so when 
applying the tool, the terms should be defined according to the glossary. Therefore, these 
two documents should be used together.  
Alongside the glossary, the assessment tool can be used to help researchers and 
journals identify which items in the tool are most likely to predict submissions that are 
biased as a result of FCOI relationships and to design journal policies accordingly. For 
example, peer-reviewers and editors at journals can identify manuscripts with 
characteristics that they suspect to be consistent with the marketing goals for a product 
(see Barbour et al., 2016). The editors could send the assessment tool to the authors of 
these articles to fill out and, subsequently, determine which items in the tool were positive. 
Positive identification of these key items, in consultation with the glossary, could then be 
used to recommend journal policy development or amendments to existing policies in 
those areas to effectively limit the potential for bias in manuscripts. Consultation with the 
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glossary helps to ensure that the meanings of the terms are being considered during, and 
informing, policy development. 
 
5.7 LIMITATIONS 
  
This study has some limitations. The glossary and scoring tool should be 
considered preliminary because there are likely to be additional key terms that are not 
addressed, but may surface in future research or litigation that requires the release of 
additional internal industry documents. The scoring tool may also contain items that are 
not needed. Although the literature review and glossary captured researchers’ analyses of 
some documents from the DIDA, this study did not systematically analyze and extract 
terms from the internal industry documents that are currently available in the DIDA and 
this could, therefore, be the subject of future research. Additionally, the glossary and 
assessment tool are not constructed to evaluate the roles of medical journal editors, whose 
roles are crucial because the enforcement of journal policies on disclosure is largely 
voluntary (Goozner, 2004). One of the roles of journal editors is to review the disclosures 
submitted by prospective authors and then determine if their disclosed FCOI relationships 
are to be considered relevant to their submitted manuscripts, according to the standards of 
the particular journal (Goozner, 2004). Additionally, medical journal editors have been 
found to also have FCOI relationships with drug companies (Cosgrove et al., 2016) and 
the guidelines that may regulate the professional conduct and FCOI relationship 
disclosures of journal editors were not the subject of this study. Institutional FCOI 
relationships between journals’ publishing companies and the pharmaceutical industry are 
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also not addressed in this study. Another point that is not addressed is whether journals 
publish detailed accounts of their sources of revenue. Finally, this study did not look into 
whether journals have a policy of monitoring compliance with their policies or a published 
method for re-evaluating and updating their policies. 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 
 Evidence of potential biasing of the medical literature through FCOI 
relationships and various research and publishing practices, such as medical ghostwriting, 
undermines the integrity of the authorship system and research published in journals. The 
DIDA houses documents that have provided clear evidence of ongoing corporate practices 
that extend into relationships between physicians, drug companies, medical research and 
writing organizations, the careful framing and shaping of research throughout the research 
and writing processes, and publishing decisions. From the internal industry documents in 
the DIDA, as well as the published literature on FCOI relationships in medicine, it is 
increasingly the case that these relationships and behaviours have become considered as 
normative. The glossary and accompanying assessment tool provided in this study provide 
an entry-point into comprehensively addressing these issues as they pertain to the specific 
research and publication practices of contemporary medical research. 
 Gotzsche and colleauges (2007) argue that ghostly practices could be 
substantially reduced, and transparency improved, if clear and enforceable authorship 
policies were developed and adopted. It can be further argued that issues surrounding 
FCOI disclosures, ghostly practices, and data suppression practices could be considerably 
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reduced if clear policies that required transparency pertaining to not only relationships, 
but also the step-wise research and writing processes were developed, adopted, and 
enforced. Developing this glossary and assessment tool to help develop effective medical 
journal policies in the areas of FCOI relationships, roles in publishing and writing, and 
data sharing and transparency is a step towards achieving a more transparent medical 
literature. 
 The language and terminology included within the glossary can be situated 
within a specific medical-scientific and social milieu that has, over time, shaped and been 
shaped by the neoliberal-oriented corporate culture in which modern medicine operates. 
This culture has had, and continues to have, important consequences for the dissemination 
and translation of scientific knowledge, as well as the construction of the evidence base 
on which physicians rely. Sismondo and Doucet (2010) argue that asking why and how 
medical journal articles have been published is equally as important as asking if the results 
have been published. Because commercial management of medical research redirects the 
orientation of research to comply with commercial goals and can corrupt the literature 
base (Lexchin, 2005; Turner et al., 2008), medical journals ought to ensure that the 
manuscripts that they publish are not only based on ethically sound research, but also 
managed independently from industry (Sismondo & Doucet, 2010). The continued 
relationships between drug companies, CROs, MWOs, MCCs, and physicians, and the 
resultant socially established codes, have become palpable. With increasing access to 
internal industry documents and analyses of reported experiences of industry insiders and 
whistleblowers’ accounts, the industry’s socially acceptable codes and behavioural norms 
are no longer adequate; however, even with exposure these practices persist. Medical 
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journals, as one source that is responsible for the dissemination of medical research, must 
transparently pay attention to the important nuances of corporate science and address and 
regulate deceitful publishing practices by the pharmaceutical, research, and writing 
industries.   
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TABLE 5.1 TYPICAL WORK FLOW PLAN FOR DEVELOPING A MANUSCRIPT 
FOR SUBMISSION TO A PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL. ADAPTED FROM 
INTERNAL INDUSTRY DOCUMENT (DESIGNWRITE, 1996) 
 
Service provided/Action taken by 
DesignWrite 
Estimated Timeline 
Client provides data report TBD 
DesignWrite prepares outline 2 weeks 
Client internal review 2 weeks 
DesignWrite prepares first draft 4-8 weeks 
Client internal review 2 weeks 
DesignWrite addresses consolidated client 
comments (second draft) 
2-3 weeks 
Second draft reviewed by selected author 2 weeks 
DesignWrite incorporates author comments 
(third draft) 
2 weeks 
DesignWrite assists in journal submission 2 weeks 
Journal provides peer-reviewer comments TBD 
DesignWrite addresses comments; resubmits 2 weeks 
Journal acceptance and publication TBD 
 
DesignWrite. (1996). Medical Education and Communications Plan for the Premarin 
Product Line. Retrieved from 
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/drug/docs/xqdw0217 
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5.11 APPENDIX A INDEX OF GLOSSARY TERMS AND GLOSSARY 
5.11.1 INDEX OF GLOSSARY TERMS 
 
(1) COMPENSATION FOR LODGING, TRAVEL, TRANSPORTATION, ATTENDANCE, OR MEETING 
REGISTRATION FEES AT OFF-SITE LECTURES AND MEETINGS (I.E., FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL 
EDUCATION (CME) OR RESEARCH-RELATED ACTIVITIES, TRAVEL TO ADVISORY BOARDS, 
CONSULTATION, ASSISTANCE WITH GOING TO CONGRESS) .................................................... 224 
(2) CONFERENCE MODERATORS ................................................................................................... 224 
(3) CONSULTING RELATIONSHIPS (EXCLUDING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND SPEAKING 
ENGAGEMENTS) ............................................................................................................................. 224 
(4) CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION (CME) ........................................................................... 225 
(5) EXTENDED FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCLOSURE (I.E., SPOUSES OR PARTNERS, 
ADULT CHILDREN, OTHER RELATIVES) ...................................................................................... 225 
(6) GIFTS AND MEALS .................................................................................................................... 226 
(7) GRANTS: RESTRICTED AND UNRESTRICTED ......................................................................... 226 
(8) HONORARIA AND PAYMENTS ................................................................................................. 227 
(9) INDUSTRY-FUNDED SPEAKING RELATIONSHIPS/ SPEAKERS’ BUREAUS ........................... 227 
(10) INDUSTRY SUPPORT FOR FUNDS FOR TRAINEES AND JUNIOR RESEARCHERS (I.E., 
SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS) ................................................................................. 228 
(11) INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs) OR RESEARCH ETHICS BOARDS (REBs) ........... 228 
(12) KEY OPINION LEADERS (KOLs) OR THOUGHT LEADERS .................................................... 228 
(13) PAID EXPERT TESTIMONY IN COURT CASE ......................................................................... 229 
(14) PATENTS................................................................................................................................... 230 
(15) PAYMENT FOR WORKING ON OR ENROLLING PATIENTS IN CLINICAL TRIALS ............... 230 
(16) PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY SALES REPRESENTATIVES, DRUG REPS, DETAILERS, OR 
MEDICAL SCIENCE LIAISONS ....................................................................................................... 231 
(17) PRACTICE-MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT ............................................................................ 232 
(18) PROMOTION IN MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES ................................................................... 232 
(19) SAMPLES .................................................................................................................................. 233 
(20) SERVICE ON SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARDS (SABs), CONSULTANTS MEETINGS, BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, REVIEW PANELS ....................................................................................................... 233 
(21) SHORT-TERM OR LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT AT DRUG COMPANY, SUBSIDIARY, OR 
SUPPORTING ENTITY ..................................................................................................................... 233 
(22) STOCK OWNERSHIP OR OPTIONS, BONDS, AND EQUITY HOLDINGS ................................. 234 
(23) TRANSPARENCY OF FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCLOSURES ........................ 234 
(24) ACKNOWLEDGE-MENTS, “EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE”, “WRITING SUPPORT”, OR “WRITING 
ASSISTANCE” .................................................................................................................................. 234 
(25) CREATORS OF TRIAL DESIGNS AND PROTOCOLS ............................................................... 235 
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(26) GHOST MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................................... 235 
(27) STATISTICIANS ........................................................................................................................ 236 
(28) GUEST AUTHORS OR HONORARY AUTHORS ....................................................................... 236 
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5.11.2 GLOSSARY 
OF TERMS 
 
CATEGORY A: 
FINANCIAL 
CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
DISCLOSURES 
(1) 
COMPENSATION 
FOR LODGING, 
TRAVEL, 
TRANSPORTATIO
N, ATTENDANCE, 
OR MEETING 
REGISTRATION 
FEES AT OFF-
SITE LECTURES 
AND MEETINGS 
(I.E., FOR 
CONTINUING 
MEDICAL 
EDUCATION 
(CME) OR 
RESEARCH-
RELATED 
ACTIVITIES, 
TRAVEL TO 
ADVISORY 
BOARDS, 
CONSULTATION, 
ASSISTANCE 
WITH GOING TO 
CONGRESS)  
 
RELEVANCE:  
Compensation for travel, 
accommodations, 
transportation, and meeting 
registration fees may be 
provided to physicians by 
drug companies for attending 
CME programs.  
SUPPORT: 
1. “The following list, while 
not exhaustive, indicates the 
interactions with industry that 
must be addressed 
(Blumenthal, 2004):… 
payment for attendance at 
lectures and conferences, 
including online activities; 
CME for which physicians 
pay no fee; payment for time 
while attending meetings; 
[and] payment for travel to 
meetings or scholarships to 
attend meetings” (Brennan et 
al., 2006). 
2.“…[C]onference travel 
funding [is] felt to exert more 
influence than promotional 
material does. Each 
interaction elicited ethical 
concerns; travel funding 
generated the most concern” 
(Wazana, 2000). 
3.“…[T]he temporal 
direction of the association 
was established for…the 
physician prescribing rate of 
the CME sponsor’s drug 
(Bowman & Pearle, 1988); an 
increase in hospital 
prescribing rate of the 
conference travel sponsor’s 
drug (Orlowski & Wateska, 
1992)” (Wazana, 2000). 
Furthermore, “…the 
literature points to important 
concerns for…CME 
sponsorship, and conference 
travel” (Wazana, 2000). 
 
(2) CONFERENCE 
MODERATORS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Medical researchers or 
academic physicians may act 
as moderators during CME 
programs to facilitate the 
sessions. The moderator may 
receive guidance or 
instructions from a drug 
company either before or 
during the session in order to 
align the discussion with the 
commercial interests of the 
company. 
 
SUPPORT: 
1. Moderators may be 
medical researchers or 
physicians whose role in 
conferences is to facilitate 
CME sessions. Internal 
industry documents reveal a 
case in which a drug 
company helped to establish 
the agenda of an educational 
session and monitor 
teleconferences while they 
were in progress. These calls 
were organized through a 
medical education and 
communications company 
(MECC) “to discuss 
unapproved uses of 
gabapentin” and “an agenda 
was prepared for physician 
moderators directing them to 
discuss such topics as ‘how [a 
drug] evolved into a first line 
therapy option in practice.” In 
another series of 
teleconferences, which a 
third-party vendor was 
responsible for organizing, 
senior drug company 
employees “were invited to 
participate but told to 
‘instruct the teleconference 
operator that you should be in 
LISTEN ONLY mode and 
your name should NOT be 
announced during the 
introductions’ (emphasis in 
original).” Internal industry 
documents also reveal that 
conference moderators “were 
paid $250 to $500 per call and 
had other financial ties to [the 
drug company]. For example, 
each of the 10 moderators 
from one series of calls 
requested or was allocated 
between $14,800 to $176,000 
for participation in various 
[drug company]-sponsored 
activities between 1993 and 
1997” (Steinman, Bero, 
Chren, & Landefeld, 2006). 
*Cross-reference with 
Industry-funded speaking 
relationships/speakers’ 
bureaus (#9) 
 
(3) CONSULTING 
RELATIONSHIPS 
(EXCLUDING 
SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH AND 
SPEAKING 
ENGAGEMENTS) 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Physicians may be hired by 
drug companies to provide 
consultation services during 
which the physicians may 
help to advise the companies 
on their marketing strategies 
or to participate on scientific 
advisory boards. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Drug companies employ 
consultants, who may also be 
respected doctors and “key 
opinion leaders” or “thought 
leaders”, to help advise on 
marketing strategies 
(Moynihan, 2008).  
2. Consulting relationships 
can occur when physicians 
and medical research faculty 
are employed, or are under 
contractual agreement with 
one or more drug companies. 
These physicians and 
researchers might be asked to 
help advise the company on 
its marketing strategies for a 
particular drug, or to join 
advisory or consultation 
boards (sometimes called 
scientific advisory boards 
(SABs)), or to serve in these 
roles individually. 
Increasingly, pharmaceutical 
companies approach and 
engage physicians in their 
target markets in this 
capacity. Payments to 
physicians or researchers as 
advisors or consultants can 
lead to millions of dollars in 
profits per year for the 
sponsoring companies. 
Consulting relationships have 
become routine marketing 
expenses for pharmaceutical 
companies for which 
physicians take on a 
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promotional role in favour of 
the sponsor’s product (Brandt 
and Hutzler, 2015; Canadian 
Medical Association [CMA], 
2007; American Medical 
Student Association 
[AMSA], 2014).  
3. When determining the 
valuation of a physician 
consultant agreement with a 
pharmaceutical company, 
some of the factors that are 
considered include the 
number of hours required, 
duties and responsibilities, 
complexity or simplicity of 
the duties and responsibilities 
required, level of leadership 
required, objectives and 
deliverables, and potential 
impact of the thought 
leader/consultant on 
organizational and/or product 
success. Valuation of 
qualifications of the 
physicians who are 
contracted as consultants 
depends on level of 
education, credentials, 
specialized training, 
professional certifications, 
leadership experience, 
academic appointments, 
research experience and 
funding history, invited 
presentations, publication 
history, and recognition in the 
healthcare community 
(Brandt and Hutzler, 2015). 
*Cross-reference with 
Service on scientific advisory 
boards (SABs), consultants 
meetings, board of directors, 
review panels (#20) 
 
(4) CONTINUING 
MEDICAL 
EDUCATION 
(CME) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Continuing medical 
education (CME) refers to 
accredited educational 
programs in which physicians 
are typically required to 
enroll as part of their 
continuing education and 
professional development 
(American Medical 
Association [AMA], 2015; 
CMA, 2015). It is common 
for physicians to receive 
educational program support 
from the pharmaceutical 
industry (Choudhry, Stelfox, 
and Detsky, 2002).  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Doctors are required to 
maintain standards of 
medical practice by 
participation in CME, 
however this is made possible 
by funding from the 
marketing division of the 
pharmaceutical industry 
which has the NHS (National 
Health Service) as its major 
customer in the UK [United 
Kingdom]. The results from 
our study suggest that many 
doctors do rely on industry 
funding for CME. About half 
of the doctors attending 
conferences were funded by 
the industry and 
approximately one third of 
the doctors would not have 
attended the conferences if 
there had been no industry 
funding…While many 
doctors recognise the 
potential for the industry to 
influence their prescribing 
habits, few recognise that 
they themselves are 
susceptible” (Rutledge et al., 
2003).  
2. “In the business of medical 
communications, the term 
medical education covers a 
lot of ground. Most agencies 
work at least in part for the 
pharmaceutical and medical-
device industries, for which 
they produce a whole range 
of educational and 
communications materials, 
from magazine articles and 
slide kits to podcasts and 
Webinars. Many agencies 
organize grand-rounds 
lectures at hospitals, 
recruiting speakers and 
preparing their slides. Some 
agencies help pharmaceutical 
companies train ‘opinion 
leaders’ and manage their 
speakers’ bureaus. Most of 
them organize a number of 
live events, such as satellite 
symposia at conferences and 
advisory board meetings. A 
good proportion of this 
material is officially 
accredited as [CME] for 
physicians. Accredited CME 
has an enviable market niche; 
most physicians are required 
to take part in a certain 
number of CME events in 
order to maintain their 
licenses to practice. In the old 
days, CME was produced by 
universities and professional 
societies, and it was largely 
paid for by registration fees 
and the groups that were 
sponsoring it. Over time, 
however, the proportion of 
CME that is funded by the 
pharmaceutical and device 
industries has crept steadily 
upward. The sharpest uptick 
has occurred over the past 10 
years or so. Between 1998 
and 2006, commercial 
support for CME increased 
by a fourfold margin to a total 
of $1.2 billion. By 2006, over 
60 percent of CME was 
funded by commercial 
sources. During the same 
period, profit margins for 
accredited CME providers 
increased nearly sixfold, from 
5.5 percent to 31 percent, 
with total income reaching 
$2.38 billion” (Elliott, 2010). 
3. “Most practicing 
physicians can afford to pay 
for their continuing 
education. If they are 
employed, subsidies for CME 
should be a fringe benefit. In 
addition, most professional 
institutions capable of 
providing CME can afford to 
provide it at cost, without 
subsidies from the 
pharmaceutical 
business…One important 
step is to recognize that CME 
must be clearly separated 
from pharmaceutical 
marketing. Physicians may 
even have to pay more for 
CME but then may value it 
more, demand higher quality, 
and learn more from it” 
(Relman, 2001). 
4. “Support for CME comes 
from the marketing budget in 
most companies, and that 
budget must produce sales” 
(Relman, 2001).  
5. A Parke-Davis business 
plan stated that “Medical 
education drives this 
market!!” (Unknown, 1996).  
6. A 2011 study on off-label 
marketing of pharmaceuticals 
found that CME seminars 
have been “…organized with 
speakers known to promote 
off-label uses...In a few cases, 
whistleblowers reported that 
CME activities were 
organized by shell 
corporations to impart an 
appearance of scientific 
neutrality” (Kesselheim, 
Mello, and Studdert, 2011). 
 
(5) EXTENDED 
FINANCIAL 
CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
DISCLOSURE 
(I.E., SPOUSES OR 
PARTNERS, 
ADULT 
CHILDREN, 
OTHER 
RELATIVES) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
The families of medical 
researchers or physicians 
may have financial interest in 
one or more drug companies. 
These extended relationships 
have the potential to 
influence the research 
choices made by physicians. 
Disclosures in this area 
should include receipt of 
payments salient to the drug 
or treatment or disease that is 
discussed in the publication. 
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SUPPORT: 
1. In a documented case, a 
commercial ethics review 
board was owned by the wife 
of a drug testing firm, to 
which pharmaceutical 
companies outsourced their 
trials and there may have 
been undue influence on this 
review board to approve 
studies, despite trials being 
conducted in “ethically 
dubious conditions” and on 
vulnerable populations 
(Elliott, 2010; Evans, Smith, 
and Willen, 2005). 
2. “Investigators must also 
disclose the financial 
interests of spouses and 
dependent children.” 
Disclosure can extend to “… 
‘de facto spouses’, parents, 
siblings, and adult children” 
(Lo, Wolf, and Berkeley, 
2000). 
 
(6) GIFTS AND 
MEALS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Any material good that a 
pharmaceutical company, 
usually via a drug rep, gives 
to, and is accepted by, an 
author of any value. These 
may include, but are not 
limited to, notepads, medical 
supplies, prescription pads, 
pens, posters, refrigerator 
magnets, televisions for 
waiting rooms, calendars, 
books, meals, alcohol, 
sporting activities (i.e., golf 
games or gym memberships), 
sporting or theatre or musical 
event tickets, and vacations. 
Gifts can also include 
biomaterials, discretionary 
funds, and equipment. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Giving consumers small 
gifts can alter their 
perceptions of a product. 
Salespeople have long used 
gifts to increase sales. 
Different kinds of gifts may 
have different effects. Large 
gifts may act more like bribes 
or kickbacks. Small ones may 
serve as advertising or 
samples. Large gifts seem 
more suspicious than small 
gifts. They lead one to ask: 
‘Why is the firm giving the 
gift, and what does it expect 
to get in return?’ But small 
gifts can influence physicians 
as well, even if the monetary 
value of what is received is 
trivial. The notepad and pen 
or paperweight with the 
drug’s name emblazoned on 
its side is a constant reminder 
of the product. Receiving 
such gifts may not act as a 
strong financial inducement 
to use the supplier’s services, 
but it is an effective form of 
advertising. Moreover, no 
clear border divides gifts of 
value, which might 
compromise judgment, from 
gifts as advertisements. Thus, 
a case can be made for 
restricting even the smallest 
gifts” (Rodwin, 1993). 
2. “The amount of money 
residents reported having 
received was positively 
correlated with their stating 
that they would have the 
same degree of contact with 
representatives if no 
promotional gifts were 
offered…Also, the number of 
promotional items received 
was positively correlated 
with the belief that 
discussions with 
representatives have no 
impact on prescribing 
behaviour” (Hodges, 1995). 
3. “For decades the medical 
community has debated 
whether gifts and perks from 
reps have any real effect. 
Doctors insist that they do 
not. Studies in the medical 
literature indicate just the 
opposite. The pharmaceutical 
industry has managed this 
debate skillfully, pouring vast 
resources into gifts for 
doctors while simultaneously 
reassuring them that their 
integrity prevents them from 
being influenced”; however, 
“Over the past twenty years, 
the evidence that gifts and 
payments have a profound 
influence on doctors has 
become virtually 
indisputable. Doctors who are 
paid by a company are more 
likely to write prescriptions 
for that company’s drugs, 
more likely to give talks that 
are favourable to the 
company, and more likely to 
produce research that benefits 
that company. Even modest 
gifts have a substantial 
effect…[T]he more industry 
ties a doctor had, the more 
likely that doctor was to 
request specific additions to 
the formulary. In fact, doctors 
who often accepted money 
for speaking engagements 
were almost thirty times more 
likely to ask for a specific 
drug to be added to the 
formulary than doctors who 
didn’t” (Elliott, 2010). 
4. “Researchers were aware 
that something was expected 
in return for the gift. Sponsor 
expectations that the gift be 
used for its intended purpose 
and not be re-gifted, and that 
the sponsor be acknowledged 
in publications, are certainly 
reasonable. Disturbingly, 
however, about a third (32%) 
of gift recipients reported that 
the funder wanted 
prepublication review of any 
articles or reports stemming 
from the use of the gift. This 
expectation was higher for 
gifts of biomaterials…Also, 
44% of firms wanted 
assurances that the 
biomaterial was not to be 
used for applications that 
competed with company 
products” (Fugh-Berman, 
2013). 
*Cross-reference with 
Pharmaceutical industry sales 
representatives, drug reps, 
detailers, or medical science 
liaisons (#16) 
 
(7) GRANTS: 
RESTRICTED 
AND 
UNRESTRICTED 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Grants are sums of money 
that are given or awarded to 
medical researchers or 
academic physicians in 
support of their research. 
Grants may also be awarded 
to medical schools and 
academic research centres for 
maintaining or adding 
resources. There are two 
types of grants: restricted and 
unrestricted. Restricted 
grants are typically donor-
designated and earmarked 
toward a specific resource or 
research study, while 
unrestricted grants are 
generally unencumbered and 
free from any restrictions that 
may have been imposed by 
the donor.  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Increasingly, biomedical 
studies receive funding from 
commercial firms, private 
foundations, and 
government. The conditions 
of this funding have the 
potential to bias and 
otherwise discredit the 
research” (Davidoff et al., 
2001). 
2. “[Industry] [f]unding 
promotes study designs that 
are more likely to produce 
favourable results, such as 
designs involving: placebos 
or other poor comparators, 
inappropriate doses, carefully 
constructed experimental 
populations, poor surrogate 
endpoints, trial durations 
unlikely to show side effects, 
and definitions likely to show 
activity or unlikely to show 
side effects (Bekelman et al., 
2003; Djulbegovic et al., 
2000; Montori et al., 2004) 
(Sismondo, 2008a).  
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3. “Industry sponsored drug 
and device studies more often 
had favorable efficacy 
results…harms results…and 
overall conclusions… 
compared with non-industry 
sponsored drug and device 
studies…Our analysis 
suggests that industry 
sponsored drug and device 
studies are more often 
favorable to the sponsor’s 
products that non-industry 
sponsored drug and device 
studies due to biases that 
cannot be explained by 
standard ‘Risk of bias’ 
assessment tools” (Lundh et 
al., 2012). 
4. “A meta-analysis revealed 
that industry funding greatly 
increased the chances of pro-
industry results…17 analyses 
published [between 2003 and 
2008] have shown an 
association, typically a strong 
one, between industry 
support and published pro-
industry results, and 2 have 
not. Taken in conjunction 
with the earlier systematic 
reviews that found 20 of 23 
reports of positive 
associations, it is 
unequivocally the case that 
sponsorship influences 
published results” 
(Sismondo, 2008b).  
5. An unrestricted grant is one 
example of a funding 
opportunity that companies 
provide in order to exert their 
influence on a program. 
Although unrestricted grants 
are thought to reduce the risk 
of bias, unrestricted grants 
may, in some cases, be 
favourable to companies. For 
example, a drug company 
“…funded educational 
programs through 
‘unrestricted educational 
grants’ to medical education 
and communications 
companies [MECCs]…for-
profit businesses that 
specialize in producing 
conferences for physicians on 
behalf of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and are often 
subsidiaries of marketing 
firms. Under this 
‘unrestricted’ arrangement, 
[this drug company] 
relinquished control over the 
program speakers and its 
content. This allowed 
programs organized by 
medical education companies 
to discuss unapproved uses of 
gabapentin and to grant 
continuing medical education 
accredit from the 
Accreditation Council of 
Continuing Medical 
Education (ACCME), neither 
of which is permissible for 
events directly sponsored by 
drug companies… 
Unrestricted grants were used 
to underwrite other forms of 
education including 
payments to physicians to 
cover the cost of attending 
conferences (United States ex 
rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis). 
Another grant exceeding 
$300 000 funded the 
production, printing, and 
distribution of 75 000 copies 
of an epilepsy handbook, 
with half of this budget 
allocated to soliciting interest 
among and delivering books 
to high prescribers of 
anticonvulsant agents (United 
States ex rel. Franklin v. 
Parke-Davis)” (Steinman et 
al., 2006). 
6. “Most COI policies assume 
that if industry money is 
pooled (i.e. not given directly 
to one individual but rather to 
an academic department 
whose chair oversees 
expenditures), the risk of bias 
is negated. Despite the fact 
that money is not given to one 
particular researcher, a 
climate is being created when 
pharmaceutical companies 
fund academic departments, 
and this climate is not neutral 
because any chairperson is 
cognizant of the potential for 
these pooled funds to be 
withdrawn if his/her 
department starts 
disseminating research 
findings that are not pro-
industry” (Cosgrove and 
Bursztajn, 2010). 
(8) HONORARIA 
AND PAYMENTS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
In the context of medicine, 
honoraria are defined as a 
payment that is made to a 
physician or academic 
medical researcher for 
services for which fees are 
not legally necessary, or 
payment of an amount that is 
more than is traditionally 
acceptable for a given task. 
Honoraria are typically not 
bound by a contractual 
agreement. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Internal industry 
“[d]ocuments were found 
describing [a drug company] 
compensating investigators 
with honoraria for agreeing to 
serve as authors on review 
manuscripts ghostwritten on 
their behalf by medical 
publishing companies. 
Honoraria varied, ranging 
from $750 to $2500.** One 
author refused his 
honorarium from Scientific 
Therapeutics Information 
stating, ‘I really do not feel it 
is appropriate to be paid for 
this type of effort’ (Cannon, 
1999)” (Ross, Hill, Egilman, 
& Krumholz, 2008). 
*Cross-reference with Key 
opinion leaders (KOLs) or 
thought leaders (#12), 
Payment for working on or 
enrolling patients in clinical 
trials (#15), Guest authors or 
honorary authors (#28) 
**These amounts may be 
more than are usually 
acceptable or common. 
 
(9) INDUSTRY-
FUNDED 
SPEAKING 
RELATIONSHIPS/ 
SPEAKERS’ 
BUREAUS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Physicians may be paid 
US$500 to US$700 or more 
by drug companies to deliver 
lectures that were wholly or 
partially based on slides and 
information provided to the 
physicians by the companies.  
SUPPORT: 
1. A conflict of interest 
relationship that occurs when 
respected doctors are paid 
generous fees, for example 
US$500 or US$700 to 
US$2500 or US$3000, for 
delivering a single lecture 
that was largely or wholly 
based on slides supplied by 
the sponsoring company. In 
some cases, the sponsoring 
company would pay the 
speakers’ fee to the academic 
centre which would, then, 
compensate the doctor. 
Often, those who are 
speaking are classified as 
“key opinion leaders” or 
“thought leaders”. These 
speeches often take place at 
educational events sponsored 
by drug companies 
(Moynihan, 2008). Speakers’ 
bureaus may be important 
physician-to-physician fora 
in which sales employees are 
“encouraged to expand the 
speaker base – identify and 
train strong [drug] advocates 
and users to speak locally for 
[the drug]” (Steinman et al., 
2006). Speakers’ bureaus for 
lecture series may also 
include chairs of departments 
and directors of clinical 
programs at major teaching 
hospitals that are relevant to 
the drug being promoted. 
These speakers may also be 
invited to special meetings in 
which they are “updated on 
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promotional strategies for the 
drug” (Steinman et al., 2006). 
*Cross-reference with 
Conference moderators (#2) 
 
(10) INDUSTRY 
SUPPORT FOR 
FUNDS FOR 
TRAINEES AND 
JUNIOR 
RESEARCHERS 
(I.E., 
SCHOLARSHIPS, 
AWARDS, 
FELLOWSHIPS) 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Scholarships, prizes, awards, 
and fellowships are financial 
means by which companies 
can garner pro-industry 
attitudes among the 
recipients. These financial 
mechanisms often require, or 
are accompanied by, a short-
term or long-term 
relationship with the sponsor 
that is providing the financial 
opportunity. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “The following list, while 
not exhaustive, indicates the 
interactions with industry that 
must be addressed 
(Blumenthal, 2004): 
…scholarships to attend 
meetings and grants for 
research projects” (Brennan 
et al., 2006). 
2. A 2013 study on conflict of 
interest policies at Canadian 
medical schools stated in its 
policy scoring tool that “[t]he 
policy must either prevent 
industry from earmarking or 
awarding funds to support the 
training of particular 
individuals (recipients must 
be chosen by the school or 
department), or the policy 
must mandate institutional 
review of the giving of funds” 
(Shnier et al. 2013). 
 
(11) 
INSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW BOARDS 
(IRBS) OR 
RESEARCH 
ETHICS BOARDS 
(REBS) 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Institutional review boards or 
research ethics boards are 
committees whose 
responsibility is to review and 
monitor research involving 
human subjects, for example, 
clinical trials. IRBs or REBs 
are able to approve, reject, or 
require revisions for research 
protocols. IRBs or REBs may 
be for-profit or not-for-profit. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “For the past three decades, 
institutional review boards, or 
IRBs [institutional review 
boards], have been the 
primary mechanism for 
protecting subjects in drug 
trials. FDA [Food and Drug 
Administration] regulations 
require that any study in 
support of a new drug be 
approved by an IRB. Until 
recently, IRBs were based in 
universities and teaching 
hospitals and were made up 
primarily of faculty members 
who volunteered to review 
the research studies being 
conducted in their own 
institutions. Now that most 
drug studies take place 
outside academic settings, 
research sponsors can submit 
their proposed studies to for-
profit IRBs, which will 
review the ethics of a study in 
exchange for a fee. These 
boards are subject to the same 
financial pressures faced by 
virtually everyone in 
business. They compete for 
clients by promising a fast 
review. And if one for-profit 
concludes that a study is 
unethical, the sponsor can 
simply take it to another” 
(Elliott, 2010).  
 
(12) KEY OPINION 
LEADERS (KOLS) 
OR THOUGHT 
LEADERS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Key opinion leaders (KOLs), 
or thought leaders, are 
physicians who are recruited 
to serve as credible 
professionals who help to 
disseminate drug companies’ 
messages to their 
professional circles. KOLs 
receive their information 
from the drug companies with 
which they work and 
disseminate only that 
information to their networks. 
SUPPORT: 
1.“Today, the pharmaceutical 
industry uses the terms key 
opinion leader (KOL) and 
thought leader to refer to 
influential physicians, often 
academic researchers, who 
are especially effective at 
transmitting messages to their 
peers. Pharmaceutical 
companies hire KOLs to 
consult for them, to give 
lectures, and, occasionally, to 
make presentations on their 
behalf at regulatory meetings 
or hearings...KOLs do not 
exactly endorse drugs, at least 
not in ways that are too 
obvious, but their opinions 
can be used to market them – 
sometimes by word of mouth, 
but more often by quasi-
academic activities such as 
grand-rounds lectures, 
sponsored symposia, and 
articles in medical journals. 
While pharmaceutical 
companies seek out high-
status KOLs with impressive 
academic appointments, 
status is only one determinant 
of a KOL’s influence. Just as 
important is the fact that a 
KOL is, at least in theory, 
independent...[KOLs appear] 
to be impartial” (Elliott, 
2010).   
2. “Key opinion leaders [are] 
salespeople for [drug 
companies]” and the 
sponsoring companies 
“routinely measure the return 
on [their] investment, by 
tracking prescriptions before 
and after their presentations” 
and “[i]f that speaker didn’t 
make the impact the company 
was looking for, then [the 
company] wouldn’t invite 
them back”. Drug company 
marketing staff are 
encouraged to not only find 
and recruit respected doctors, 
but also work regularly with 
these doctors to develop and 
mould them into “product 
champions”. Sponsoring 
companies develop 
relationships with local and 
national opinion, or thought, 
leaders, who are respected 
doctors, to be used by drug 
companies to “help drug 
companies sell drugs” and 
“are engaged by industry to 
advise on marketing and help 
boost sales of new medicines 
[in] all specialties, in 
hospitals and universities” 
and communicate these pro-
sponsor messages to the 
public. Drug companies 
maintain central databases of 
opinion leaders and have 
developed software to 
measure the effectiveness of 
their communications by 
calculating their return on 
investment. Key opinion, or 
thought, leaders are important 
because they can “influence 
thousands of prescribers and 
hence prescriptions through 
their research, lectures, 
publications and their 
participation on advisory 
boards, committees, editorial 
boards, professional societies 
and guideline/consensus 
document development. 
These recruited doctors are 
often senior in their positions 
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and “become an integral part 
of the company’s marketing, 
education, and research 
strategies.” Senior doctors 
with long-term financial 
relationships with drug 
companies are typically free 
to speak about medicines 
other than those that they are 
hired to promote in order to 
appear balanced (Moynihan, 
2008). 
3. “Another important trick of 
the trade is to maintain 
central databases of opinion 
leaders. Some small firms 
even offer special web-based 
software to keep track of 
opinion leaders and show 
their return on investment 
(KOL, n.d.). One firm 
offering such software, called 
KOL, specialises in 
managing opinion leaders for 
drug companies. Its website 
states that although these 
‘thought leaders’ in the 
profession ‘may not write 
prescription,’ they can 
‘influence thousands of 
prescribers and hence 
prescriptions through their 
research, lectures, 
publications and their 
participation on advisory 
boards, committees, editorial 
boards, professional societies 
and guideline/consensus 
document development’ 
(KOL, n.d.)” (Moynihan, 
2008). 
4. “In the complex and 
competitive world of 
healthcare marketing, Key 
Opinion Leaders (KOLs) 
play a significant role in 
influencing the perception 
and opinion of various 
stakeholders. While large 
marketing dollars are spent 
on shaping that influence, the 
impact and reach of such 
influential opinions can be 
directly associated to the 
rigor of generating the right 
influencer pool” (GenPact, 
2012). 
5. “To market Neurontin off-
label, the company employed 
a variety of schemes, most 
involving a combination of 
rep ingenuity and payments 
to KOLs. Some KOLs signed 
ghostwritten journal articles. 
One received more than 
$300,000 to speak about 
Neurontin at conferences. 
Others were paid just to 
listen. (Simply having some 
of your KOLs in attendance 
at a dinner meeting is 
valuable...because thought 
leaders will often bring up 
off-label uses of a drug 
without having to be 
prompted” (Elliott, 2010). 
6. KOLs are identified for 
given therapeutic areas and 
geographic regions for the 
client, or pharmaceutical 
company, by tracking 
companies that use 
positional, bibliometric, and 
sociometric analyses. Once 
identified, KOLs are tracked 
by companies which have 
developed specialized 
electronic KOL tracking 
systems. These tracking 
systems allow 
pharmaceutical companies to 
merge their existing data on 
their KOLs with online data 
on their KOLs from the 
internet, social media, and 
thousands of public sources. 
KOL tracking systems allow 
pharmaceutical companies to 
obtain real-time profiles on 
their KOLs that include 
research topics, KOL type, 
personal and professional 
interests, affiliations, 
academic standing, 
publications, committee and 
group involvement, 
involvement on treatment 
guidelines, speaking 
engagements, presentations 
to congress or government 
equivalents, involvement in 
clinical trials, activities in 
hospitals and tertiary centres, 
network reach and influence, 
research and clinical 
experience, and education 
information. Additionally, 
KOLs’ past programs and 
engagements, historical 
interactions and return on 
investment, surveys and 
feedbacks, and preferred 
channels and content, web 
and social media activity, and 
news and web mentions are 
collected and analyzed in 
these tracking systems in 
order to rank and score the 
influence level of each KOL 
(YibLab, 2015; FirstWord, 
2010; GenPact, 2012). These 
software systems for 
managing KOLs who are 
“…constructed and regulated 
with respect to what they 
study, where they go, what 
they say and write, and with 
whom they interact. 
Networks among KOLs, and 
between KOLs and other 
scientists and clinicians, are 
influenced by who is invited 
to sit on advisory boards, 
supervise clinical trials and 
speak at meetings. Within the 
KOL caste there is a structure 
and hierarchy, beginning with 
new blood and ‘rising stars’ 
and culminating with the 
grandees. KOLs considered 
sympathetic to a product are 
sometimes described as 
‘friends’; those thought 
overly anxious to offer 
endorsement for rewards may 
be light-heartedly referred to 
as ‘tarts’. Importantly, KOLs 
are not biased and typically 
are excellent scientists and 
clinicians who do not 
compromise their beliefs, but 
are approached because their 
research interests converge 
with those of the company” 
(Matheson, 2008); however, 
“…academic authors 
groomed as [KOLs] may be 
used not only to endorse 
publications, but also to 
convey the impression the 
publications were originated 
by academics” (Matheson, 
2011).  
7. “Key opinion leaders were 
salespeople for us, and we 
would routinely measure the 
return on our investment, by 
tracking prescriptions before 
and after their 
presentations…I would give 
them all of the information 
that I wanted them to talk 
about. I would give them the 
slides. They would go 
through specific training 
programs on what to say, 
what not to say, how to 
answer specific questions, so 
that it would be beneficial to 
my company” (Moynihan, 
2008). 
*Cross-reference with 
Honoraria and payments (#8), 
Paid expert testimony in court 
case (#13) 
 
(13) PAID EXPERT 
TESTIMONY IN 
COURT CASE  
 
RELEVANCE:  
An expert witness is typically 
a paid consultant who 
becomes involved in a legal 
case at the request of a 
lawyer, judge, or litigant. The 
payment that an expert 
witness receives for work 
done in this role becomes a 
financial conflict of interest if 
he/she becomes an author of a 
medical journal article that 
evaluates a treatment about or 
against which he/she 
testified. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Financial relationships 
(such as…paid expert 
testimony) are the most easily 
identifiable conflicts of 
interest and the most likely to 
undermine the credibility of 
the journal, the authors, and 
of science itself…Editors 
should publish this 
information if they believe it 
will be important to readers 
judging the manuscript” 
(Davidoff et al., 2001). 
2. Regulatory approval of a 
drug can sometimes be 
“…contingent upon expert 
testimony” that concludes 
that a certain category of 
disease ought to be 
considered as a distinct 
clinical entity to be included 
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as a disorder in the relevant 
guidelines (Cosgrove et al., 
2006). 
*Cross reference with Key 
opinion leaders (KOLs) and 
thought leaders (#12) 
 
 
(14) PATENTS  
 
RELEVANCE: 
Medical researchers, 
physicians, their home 
research institutions, or the 
companies for which they 
work may possess patents. 
Depending on the patent 
holder and the agreement, the 
researchers, physicians, 
institutions, or companies 
may have financial interests 
in pursuing research on the 
patented technology. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Circumstances in which 
an author holds a patent or 
performs a diagnostic or 
therapeutic intervention that 
is well-compensated, or in the 
content of the article being 
considered could influence 
the monetary value of some 
piece of medical knowledge” 
(Knopman et al., 2011). 
2. “Any patents that are still 
active should also be 
disclosed as well as patent 
applications and intentions to 
apply for patents” (Goozner, 
2004). 
 
 
 
 
(15) PAYMENT 
FOR WORKING 
ON OR 
ENROLLING 
PATIENTS IN 
CLINICAL 
TRIALS  
 
RELVANCE:  
Doctors may work for drug 
companies on clinical trials 
and may be paid more than 
£200 per hour (Moynihan, 
2008). 
SUPPORT:  
 
1. “Manufacturers recruited 
physicians to conduct clinical 
trials for them with the intent 
of encouraging off-label use 
(“seeding trials”), rather than 
for any useful scientific or 
information-gathering 
reasons” (Kesselheim, Mello, 
and Studdert, 2011). 
“Marketing departments are 
involved because a 
considerable number of 
Phase IV trials are designed 
to familiarize physicians with 
products, to encourage 
prescriptions, or to allow 
drug representatives more 
access to prescribers. For 
example, ‘seeding trials’ pay 
physicians to prescribe 
specific drugs as part of trials 
but are aimed at increasing 
prescriptions. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies 
also support research by non-
academic 
physicians…According to 
one internal document, a goal 
of the trial was to allow 
physicians to ‘[g]ain 
experience with [the drug] 
prior to and during the critical 
launch phase.’ For this 
reason, the trial aimed to 
enroll 600 primary care 
physicians rather than a 
specific number of patients. 
The prescriptions of those 
physicians were tracked and 
compared with a control 
group of 99 physicians not in 
the trial. To the extent that 
data mattered, it was sales 
data; however, the company 
presented the trial to 
physicians as scientific 
research” (Sismondo, 2011). 
2. “In 1994, according to the 
Tufts Center for Drug 
Development, 70 percent of 
clinical researchers were 
affiliated with academic 
medical centers; by 2006 that 
figure had dropped to 36 
percent. The work can be 
lucrative and some sponsors 
offer researchers additional 
financial incentives to recruit 
subjects. One doctor told the 
Department of Health and 
Human Services that he was 
offered twelve thousand 
dollars for each subject that 
he could enroll in a trial, plus 
a thirty-thousand-dollar 
bonus and an additional six 
thousand dollars per subject 
after the first six.” University 
departments out of which 
clinical trials are run have 
also received hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from 
industry, while the principal 
investigators and co-
investigators of these trials 
have been paid over $500,000 
from industry (Elliott, 2010). 
3. “CROs [contract research 
organizations] sometimes pay 
recruitment fees to physicians 
of US$12,500 or more per 
subject” (Mirowski and Van 
Horne, 2005). 
4. “Cash payments can 
potentially influence doctors’ 
motives for joining a clinical 
trial. Some trials are designed 
by clinicians, often working 
with patients (Unknown, 
2001), to answer important 
clinical questions. Other 
trials, especially in general 
practice, are different. They 
are sponsored and funded by 
pharmaceutical companies 
and are designed to achieve 
objectives that are at least in 
part commercially 
determined. Doctors who join 
have little or no control over 
the research question, design, 
methods, safety monitoring, 
analysis, reporting, or even 
the decision whether or not to 
publish the results 
(Unknown, 2001). Such trials 
depend on paying doctors to 
recruit patients. The size of 
the payment and not the buzz 
of research is what motivates 
doctors to join such trials” 
(Rao and Sant Cassia, 2002).  
“Over the years we have seen 
the payments on offer soar to 
thousands of pounds per 
completed patient. Well 
organised British general 
practices can earn an extra 
£15 000 annually for three 
hours’ work a week 
(Unknown, 1996)” (Rao and 
Sant Cassia, 2002).  
“As a result, trials designed 
by non-commercial sponsors 
aiming to answer clinically 
important questions but 
without the funding available 
to pay recruiters fail to attract 
doctors (Wilson, Delaney, 
Roalfe & Hobbs, 1999). So 
called postmarketing research 
(phase IV) studies is the 
biggest culprit. As 
uncontrolled observational 
cohort studies, these studies 
make no attempt to address 
important areas of clinical 
uncertainty. Their stated 
purpose is to familiarise 
doctors with new and recently 
licensed drugs (La Puma et 
al., 1995). This is marketing 
thinly disguised as research 
and is greatly helped by—and 
probably not possible 
without—a system of 
undisclosed payments” (Rao 
and Sant Cassia, 2002).  
“A system that allows 
commercially driven and 
clinically dubious research to 
crowd out good and much 
needed clinical trials, and that 
denies patients the 
opportunity to put their 
altruism to the best possible 
use, is unethical and 
unacceptable…Payments 
often overtly on a per capita 
basis, have reached levels 
that are of serious concern to 
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research ethics committees. 
Commercial sponsors 
regularly flout the implicit 
ban on per capita payments 
by claiming to pay for the 
work involved in conducting 
the trial (rather than for 
recruiting patients), and then 
overestimating the amount of 
time required for each 
patient. Such payments are in 
addition to the doctor’s 
regular income and can result 
either in overwork or in 
displacing other more 
pressing clinical activity” 
(Rao and Sant Cassia, 2002). 
*Cross-reference with 
Honoraria and payments (#8) 
 
(16) 
PHARMACEUTIC
AL INDUSTRY 
SALES 
REPRESENTATIV
ES, DRUG REPS, 
DETAILERS, OR 
MEDICAL 
SCIENCE 
LIAISONS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Pharmaceutical industry sales 
representatives, or drug reps, 
are employees of drug 
companies whose job is to 
increase sales of his/her 
employer’s products (Elliott, 
2010).  
SUPPORT: 
1. “To ‘detail’ a doctor is to 
give that doctor information 
about a company’s new drugs 
with the aim of persuading 
the doctor to prescribe 
them…Drug reps today are 
often young, well groomed, 
and strikingly good-looking. 
Many are women. They are 
usually affable and 
sometimes very smart. Many 
give off a kind of glow, as if 
they have just emerged from 
a spa or salon. And they are 
always, hands down, the best-
dressed people in the 
hospital. Drug reps have been 
calling on doctors since the 
mid-nineteenth century, but 
during the late 1990s their 
numbers increased 
dramatically. From 1996 to 
2001 the pharmaceutical 
sales force in America 
doubled, to a total of 90,000 
reps. By 2005, there was a 
drug rep for every 2.5 doctors 
in America. One reason is 
simple: good reps move 
product. Detailing is 
expensive, but almost all 
practicing doctors see reps at 
least occasionally, and many 
doctors say they find reps 
useful. One study found that 
for drugs introduced after 
1997 with revenues 
exceeding $200 million a 
year, the average return for 
each dollar spent on detailing 
was $10.29…almost twice 
the return on investment in 
medical-journal advertising, 
and more than seven times 
the return on direct-to-
consumer advertising…The 
first duty of doctors, at least 
in theory, is to their patients. 
Doctors must make 
prescribing decisions based 
on medical evidence and their 
own clinical judgements. 
Drug reps, in contrast, are 
salespeople. They swear no 
oaths, take care of no 
patients, and profess no high-
minded ethical duties. Their 
job is to persuade doctors to 
prescribe drugs that are 
marginally effective, 
exorbitantly expensive, 
difficult to administer, or 
even dangerously toxic. Reps 
that succeed are rewarded 
with bonuses or 
commissions. Reps that fail 
may find themselves 
unemployed…A rep at the 
door means a delivery has 
arrived: takeout for the staff, 
trinkets for the kids, and, 
most indispensable, drug 
samples on the house…Drug 
reps may well have more 
influence on prescriptions 
than anyone in America other 
than doctors 
themselves…Reps can be 
found in hospitals, waiting 
rooms, and conference halls 
all over the country.” For 
drug reps, “effective selling is 
all about developing a 
relationship with a 
doctor…‘a lot of doctors just 
write for who they 
like.’…For most reps, market 
share is the yardstick of 
success. The more scripts 
their doctors write for their 
drugs, the more the reps 
make…Reps are pressured to 
‘make quota’ or meet yearly 
sales targets, which often 
increase from year to year. 
Reps who fail to make quota 
must endure the indignity of 
having their district manager 
frequently accompany them 
on sales calls. Those who 
meet quota are rewarded 
handsomely. The most 
successful reps achieve minor 
celebrity within the 
company” (Elliott, 2010). 
2. Drug companies now use 
prescription tracking, or 
script tracking, which aids 
drug reps in their choices of 
doctors to target. Script 
tracking reports can “be 
accompanied by a profile of a 
physician put together by 
reps…‘A profile would be: 
‘Husband, three kids, loves 
needlepoint, off on 
Wednesdays. Amiable/ 
expressive, brought up 
suicidality four times. High 
writer of [drug X]. Won’t 
accept tickets. Nurse says 
loves red wine, only French.’’ 
Reps could get direct 
feedback on which tactics 
were working. If a gift or a 
dinner presentation did not 
result in more scripts, they 
knew to try another 
approach…[S]cript-tracking 
data [has] changed the way 
that reps [think] about 
prescriptions. The old system 
of monitoring prescriptions 
was very inexact, and the 
relationship between a 
particular doctor’s 
prescriptions and the work of 
a given rep was relatively 
hard to measure. But with 
precise script-tracking 
reports, reps started to feel a 
sense of ownership about 
prescriptions. If their doctors 
started writing more 
prescriptions for their drugs, 
the credit clearly belonged to 
the reps. However, more 
precise monitoring also 
invited micromanagement by 
the reps’ bosses. They began 
pressuring reps to concentrate 
on high prescribers, fill out 
more paperwork, and report 
back to management more 
frequently. ‘Script tracking… 
made everyone a potentially 
successful rep… Reps didn’t 
need to be nearly as 
resourceful and street-savvy 
as in the past; they just 
needed the script-tracking 
reports. The industry began 
hiring more and more reps, 
with many backgrounds in 
sales (rather than in, say, 
pharmacy, nursing, or 
biology)” (Elliott, 2010).  
3. A 2011 study reports 
“…that pharmaceutical sales 
representatives were given 
access to patients’ 
confidential medical records 
at physicians’ offices for the 
purposes of trolling for 
prospective targets for illegal 
direct-to-consumer 
promotion of off-label uses” 
(Kesselheim, Mello, and 
Studdert, 2011). 
4. “In addition to sales 
representatives, large 
companies also employ 
‘medical science liaisons’, 
whose job it is to provide 
physicians with information 
without engaging in 
promotion, says ethics 
seminar leader FJ: The 
medical sales liaison is to the 
sales representative as the 
publication planner is to the 
marketer. Unlike sales 
representatives, medical 
science liaisons have 
advanced degrees in relevant 
sciences, and do not have 
prescription quotas they are 
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expected to meet. 
Communications between 
these professionals and 
physicians are deemed to fall 
under the scientific ‘safe 
harbor’, as long as they do not 
involve promotion” 
(Sismondo & Green, 2015). 
*See also (Fugh-Berman and 
Ahari, 2007). 
*Cross-reference with Gifts 
and meals (#6) 
 
(17) PRACTICE-
MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANT 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Practice-management 
consultants can be hired by 
physicians whose practices 
are struggling or to improve 
business strategy. Practice-
management consultants, 
often financial planners and 
accountants, are provided by 
drug companies to advise 
medical practices on how to 
run a more effective and 
profitable business (Elliott, 
2010). 
SUPPORT: 
1. In a documented case, a 
drug company agreed to pay a 
practice-management 
consultant “a flat fee of about 
$50,000 to advise the clinic. 
But they also gave him 
another incentive...‘We told 
him that if he was successful 
there would be more business 
for him in the future, and by 
successful, we meant a rise in 
prescriptions for our drugs. 
The consultant did an 
extremely thorough job. He 
spent eleven or twelve hours 
a day at the clinic for months. 
He talked to every employee, 
from the secretaries to the 
nurses to the doctors. He 
thought carefully about every 
aspect of the practice, from 
the most mundane 
administrative details to big-
picture matters such as bill 
collection and financial 
strategy. He turned the 
practice into a profitable, 
smoothly running financial 
machine. And prescriptions 
for [the drug company] 
soared. When...asked...how 
the consultant had increased 
[the drug company’s] market 
share within the clinic so 
dramatically, he said that the 
consultant never pressed the 
doctors directly. Instead, he 
talked up [the drug rep from 
the same company who 
frequently visited the office]. 
The consultant emphasized 
what a remarkable service the 
practice was getting, how 
valuable the financial advice 
was, how everything was 
going to turn around for them 
– all courtesy of [the drug 
rep]. The strategy worked... 
Doctors at the newly vitalized 
practices prescribed so many 
[drugs from the sponsoring 
company] that [the drug rep] 
got a $140,000 bonus. The 
scheme was so successful that 
[the drug rep] and his 
colleagues [at the drug 
company] decided to 
duplicate it in other practices” 
(Elliott, 2010). 
 
(18) PROMOTION 
IN MEDICAL 
JOURNAL 
ARTICLES 
 
RELEVANCE:  
It is now widely accepted that 
industry-sponsored articles 
publish conclusions that are 
favorable to the sponsoring 
company (Perlis et al., 2005; 
Lundh et al., 2012; Bero et 
al., 2007; Dwan et al., 2008; 
Lexchin, 2012b; Lexchin et 
al., 2003; Kelly et al., 2006). 
Drug company-sponsored 
research and publications 
may serve as key elements in 
the marketing strategy for a 
drug (Fugh-Berman, 2010; 
Steinman et al., 2006).  
SUPPORT: 
1. Published articles may be 
used to obtain FDA approval 
for a new “on-label” 
indication or to “disseminate 
the information as widely as 
possible through the world’s 
medical literature, 
stimulating off-label 
prescribing despite lack of 
FDA approval…The success 
of this strategy depend[s] on 
publications being favourable 
to [the drug]. Some 
employees of [drug 
companies] felt an obligation 
to publish studies with 
unfavourable results, and in a 
number of instances such 
results were published. 
However, management 
expressed concern that 
negative results could harm 
promotional efforts, and 
several documents indicate 
the intention to publish and 
publicize results only if they 
reflected favourably on [the 
drug]. As stated in the 
marketing assessment, ‘The 
results of the recommended 
exploratory trials in [a disease 
category], if positive, will be 
publicized in medical 
congresses and published.’ 
Similarly, in discussing 2 
nearly identical trials that 
yielded conflicting results on 
[a drug as] monotherapy, the 
‘core marketing team’ 
concluded that ‘the results of 
[the negative trial] will not be 
published…Beyond 
publishing its own clinical 
trials, [drug companies 
expand] the literature on 
[drugs] by contracting with 
medical education companies 
to develop review papers, 
original articles, and letters to 
the editor about [their drugs] 
for $13,375 to $18,000 per 
article, including a $1000 
honorarium for the physician 
or pharmacist author. For 
example, one ‘grant request’ 
from a medical education 
company to Parke-Davis 
proposed a series of 12 
articles, each with a 
prespecified topic, target 
journal, title, and list of 
potential authors (to be 
‘chosen at the discretion of 
[the drug company]’). This 
proposal noted that ‘all 
articles submitted will 
include a consistent 
message…with particular 
interest in proper dosing and 
titration as well as emerging 
[off-label] uses,’ mirroring 
[the drug company’s] 
promotional goals for the 
drug” (Steinman et al., 2006). 
2. “Manufacturers sought to 
promote off-label drug use 
through journal 
publications...These practices 
included falsely reporting 
outcomes from patients in 
manufacturer-sponsored 
studies and publishing 
“ghostwritten” articles 
supporting an unapproved 
use written by the 
manufacturer under the name 
of a respected scientist” 
(Kesselheim, Mello, and 
Studdert, 2011). 
“Competition gives industry-
backed scientists incentives 
to stretch the truth. 
‘Manuscripts have to be 
framed in a certain way 
because of the spin that the 
company wants”’ (Elliott, 
2010). 
3. Companies have paid 
billions of dollars in fines for 
off-label promotion, often 
using company-generated 
research, company-paid 
speakers, and ghostwritten 
articles to imply clinical 
benefits in the absence of 
clinical trials (or the presence 
of negative trials); fines have 
also been imposed for 
suppressing risks or 
misleading clinicians about 
risks” (Fugh-Berman, 2013). 
*Cross-reference with Stock 
ownership or options, bonds, 
and equity holdings (#22), 
Reprints and ePrints (#36), 
Off-label indications (#41) 
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(19) SAMPLES  
 
RELEVANCE:  
One purpose of providing 
free samples to prescribers is 
to promote off-label 
prescription of those 
medications.  
SUPPORT: 
1. A 2011 study found that 
free samples “…were 
intended to encourage 
physicians to use a product on 
the basis of convenience, 
even though it might not be 
approved for a certain use. In 
addition...free samples were 
intended to introduce 
unapproved patient 
populations to the 
manufacturer’s product with 
the intention of stimulating 
their continued use” 
(Kesselheim, Mello, and 
Studdert, 2011). 
2. “Accepting samples was 
associated with awareness, 
preference and rapid 
prescription of a new drug 
(Peay & Peay, 1988), and a 
positive attitude toward the 
pharmaceutical 
representative (Thomson, 
Craig & Barham, 1994)” 
(Wazana, 2000). 
3. “Although samples are the 
single largest marketing 
expense for the drug industry, 
they pay handsome 
dividends: doctors who 
accept samples of a drug are 
far more likely to prescribe 
that drug later on than doctors 
who don’t” (Elliott, 2010). 
4. “The purpose of supplying 
drug samples is to gain entry 
into doctors’ offices and to 
habituate physicians to 
prescribing targeted drugs. 
Physicians appreciate drug 
samples, which can be used to 
start therapy immediately, 
test tolerance to a new drug, 
or reduce the total cost of a 
prescription. Even physicians 
who refuse to see drug reps 
usually want samples (these 
docs are denigrated as 
‘sample-grabbers’). Patients 
like samples too; it’s nice to 
get a little present from the 
doctor. Samples also double 
as unacknowledged gifts to 
pay physicians and their staff. 
The convenience of an in-
house pharmacy increases 
loyalty to both the reps and 
the drugs they represent… 
Studies consistently show 
that samples influence 
prescribing choices (Chew et 
al., 2000; Groves, Sketris & 
Tett, 2003; Adair & 
Holmgren, 2005). Reps 
provide samples only of the 
most promoted, usually most 
expensive, drugs, and 
patients given a sample for 
part of a course of treatment 
almost always receive a 
prescription for the same 
drug” (Fugh-Berman and 
Ahari, 2007). 
 
(20) SERVICE ON 
SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISORY 
BOARDS (SABS), 
CONSULTANTS 
MEETINGS, 
BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS, 
REVIEW PANELS  
 
RELEVANCE:  
The stated purpose of 
scientific advisory boards and 
consultants meetings is to 
obtain physician feedback on 
clinical trial design, 
educational curriculum 
development, and marketing 
strategies for medications, 
and there are also aspects of 
these meetings that suggest 
promotional intentions 
(Steinman et al., 2006).  
 
 
SUPPORT: 
1. “For example, attendees at 
one consultants meeting were 
invited largely because of 
their high rates of 
anticonvulsant prescribing, 
and sales representatives 
were given ‘trending 
worksheets’ to track 
prescribing behavior before 
and after the event…Some 
meetings resembled 
educational conferences, with 
dozens of participants and an 
agenda dominated by lectures 
from physician ‘faculty’. 
Other meetings seemed to 
focus on cultivating 
relationships with thought 
leaders, as in one meeting at 
which lecture notes for the 
regional business director 
notified attendees that ‘we 
would like to develop a close 
business relationship with 
you.’ Participants in advisory 
boards and consultants 
meetings received honoraria 
in addition to paid travel, 
lodging, and amenities at the 
resorts and luxury hotels at 
which such events were held. 
In addition, a number of 
faculty at these events 
received thousands of dollars 
in honoraria and grants from 
participating in these and 
other [drug company] 
activities. These faculty may 
have been carefully vetted. 
As described by a medical 
education company that 
organized meetings, ‘it is 
[our] policy to complete a 
literature search to determine 
who authors favorable 
articles on the topics 
outlined’. In addition, the 
company reserved the right in 
nonaccredited programs ‘to 
probe the faculty further to 
definitively establish 
presentation content and 
make the appropriate changes 
and/or recruit an alternate 
speaker” (Steinman et al., 
2006). 
2. Drug companies employ 
doctors, who may also be 
“key opinion leaders” or 
“thought leaders”, who can 
earn up to US$400 per hour, 
$3000 for a “scientific 
speech”, and more than 
US$25,000 per year in 
advisory fees (Moynihan, 
2005). Participants, many of 
whom are faculty at 
universities, received 
thousands of dollars in 
honoraria and grants for their 
participation in these drug 
company-run advisory boards 
(Steinman et al., 2006). 
*Cross-reference with 
Consulting relationships (#3) 
 
(21) SHORT-TERM 
OR LONG-TERM 
EMPLOYMENT 
AT DRUG 
COMPANY, 
SUBSIDIARY, OR 
SUPPORTING 
ENTITY 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Short-term or long-term 
employment refers to an 
individual occupying a full-
time position that is 
potentially permanent within 
a drug company or supporting 
entity (i.e., CRO, MECC, 
medical writing organization 
(MWO)). As an employee, 
he/she has been trained by the 
company and does not 
simultaneously provide 
services for any other 
company and works in a 
company-directed schedule at 
a company-defined location.  
He/she attends in-house 
meetings with other company 
employees and receives a 
stable and consistent amount 
of remuneration (Flanagan et 
al., 2005).  
SUPPORT: 
1. Direct employment at a 
pharmaceutical company, 
subsidiary, or supporting 
entity. People who hold a 
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short-term or long-term paid 
position at a drug company or 
a drug company subsidiary 
have, or have had, an interest 
in the financial success of 
their employer(s). At large 
drug companies, especially 
employees in 
“…management positions 
earn significant bonuses in 
cash and stock options. At 
many biotech companies, all 
employees receive stock 
options, which, if the 
company does well, can be 
lucrative” (WetFeet, 2012). 
*Cross-reference with Stock 
ownership or options, bonds, 
and equity holdings (#22) 
 
(22) STOCK 
OWNERSHIP OR 
OPTIONS, BONDS, 
AND EQUITY 
HOLDINGS  
 
RELEVANCE:  
Stock ownership, options, 
bonds, and equity are forms 
of financial interest that may 
be given to employees to 
provide them with a stake in a 
company’s success.  
SUPPORT:  
1. The provision of corporate 
stock options to both 
executive and non-executive 
employees in the 
pharmaceutical industry is 
common. For example, 
researchers who dictate how 
drugs should be prescribed 
may have extensive financial 
ties, including stock 
ownership or options, bonds, 
and equity holdings, with the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Firms tend to use greater 
stock option compensation to 
attract and retain certain types 
of employees and to create 
incentives to increase firm 
value. Providing researchers 
who publish articles on 
prescribing choices with 
these financial incentives is a 
direct financial conflict of 
interest because their 
published recommendations 
and expert opinions have a 
direct effect on sales and, 
therefore, the price of the 
stocks that they are receiving 
(Core and Guay, 2001; 
Taylor and Giles, 2005; 
Bekelman, Li, and Gross, 
2003). 
2. Financial interest in 
companies may reasonably 
appear to affect and be 
affected by research. “Such 
interests include stock and 
stock options totaling more 
than $10,000” (Lo, Wolf, and 
Berkeley, 2000). 
*Cross-reference with 
Promotion in medical journal 
articles (#18), Short-term or 
long-term employment at 
drug company, subsidiary, or 
supporting entity (#21) 
 
(23) 
TRANSPARENCY 
OF FINANCIAL 
CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
DISCLOSURES 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Transparency focuses on not 
only the degree to which 
disclosures are required, but 
also whether they are made 
publicly available by peer-
reviewed academic medical 
journals once they are 
disclosed. 
SUPPORT: 
1. It is generally agreed upon 
that financial ties and conflict 
of interest relationships 
should be disclosed when 
publishing articles in 
academic peer-reviewed 
medical journals (Mendelson 
et al., 2011). However, 
disclosure alone is only a first 
step toward protecting the 
integrity of academic medical 
publishing. While there is a 
recent trend toward increased 
disclosure (Mendelson et al., 
2011), transparency and 
public availability of 
disclosures must also be 
ensured, as studies have 
found that authors’ 
disclosures are often missing 
or inconsistent across their 
published medical (Langer et 
al., 2012; Cosgrove and 
Krimsky, 2012; Cosgrove et 
al., 2009; Norris et al., 2013; 
Neuman et al., 2011; 
Papanikolaou et al., 2001; 
Brix Bindslev et al., 2013; 
Weinfurt et al., 2008). When 
information is available, a 
large percentage of authors 
often disclose financial 
conflicts of interest (Langer 
et al., 2012). 
2. “Over the past 25 years, it 
has become standard practice 
in medical journals to require 
authors to disclose 
relationships with industry 
(Institute of Medicine, 2009; 
International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors, 
1993; Relman, 1984). 
However, the requirements 
vary across journals and often 
lack specificity. It is left to 
authors to determine the 
appropriate period for 
disclosure or the relevance of 
a financial relationship to a 
submitted article. As a result, 
disclosures may be 
inconsistent, with neither 
reviewers nor readers fully 
informed of the ties between 
authors and industry 
(Weinfurt et al., 2008)… 
Findings indicate that current 
journal disclosure policies do 
not yield complete or 
consistent information 
regarding industry payments” 
(Chimonas, Frosch, and 
Rothman, 2010). 
3. “Authors of original 
articles, reviews, and 
editorials that appear in 
academic journals should be 
required to disclose to journal 
editors all financial 
arrangements with private 
firms within the past three 
years, whether or not those 
arrangements are directly 
related to the subject of the 
article…Journal editors 
should amend their disclosure 
policies to include all 
conflicts of interest that are in 
any way related to articles 
submitted for publication. 
Standards that require 
‘relevance’ or ‘direct 
relevance’ for a conflict to be 
disclosed provide a loophole 
for many researchers who do 
not with their relationships 
with companies be revealed” 
(Goozner, 2004). 
 
CATEGORY B: 
ROLES IN THE 
RESEARCH, 
WRITING, AND 
PUBLICATION 
PROCESSES 
(24) 
ACKNOWLEDGE-
MENTS, 
“EDITORIAL 
ASSISTANCE”, 
“WRITING 
SUPPORT”, OR 
“WRITING 
ASSISTANCE” 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Individuals may be thanked 
for “editorial assistance”, 
“writing assistance”, or 
“writing support” in the 
acknowledgements sections 
of published manuscripts. 
Researchers have found that 
this typically implies that 
medical writers, or 
ghostwriters, wrote the 
manuscript and the named 
authors on the published 
paper are guest authors 
(Elliott, 2010; Healy and 
Cattell, 2003; Leo, Lacasse, 
235 
 
 
 
and Cimino, 2011; Fugh-
Berman, 2013).  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Perhaps the most 
pernicious practice in 
ghostwriting involves 
thanking writers for 
providing ‘editorial 
assistance’ in the 
acknowledgements section of 
the paper instead of the 
authorship byline, which 
essentially changes the rule of 
authorship attribution so that 
ghostwriting is acceptable. 
Several groups in medicine 
including the European 
Medical Writers Association 
(EMWA) sanction this 
practice. While the average 
reader likely interprets 
‘editorial assistance’ as help 
with grammar or 
improvements to the overall 
readability of the article, in 
reality, such ‘assistants’ make 
major contributions to papers, 
and would commonsensically 
be considered co-authors. 
Tellingly, many medical 
writers are ‘editorial 
assistants’ on some scientific 
papers, but co-authors on 
others. It would seem obvious 
that someone employed as a 
‘medical writer’ would be an 
author, but current dialogue 
on ghostwriting ignores such 
common-sense interpret-
ations” (Leo, Lacasse, and 
Cimino, 2011). 
2. “Listing ghost authors as 
editorial assistants allows 
pharmaceutical companies to 
publish articles with 
conflicts-of-interest that are 
not transparently reported. 
Editorial assistants are not 
mentioned in the abstract, are 
not indexed in publication 
databases, are not mentioned 
in subsequent citations, and 
are never mentioned in news 
media accounts of the article. 
In other words, the fact that a 
pharmaceutical company 
directly co-authored the 
paper is concealed from view. 
That this is seen as acceptable 
in an era of increased 
disclosure of conflicts-of-
interest is puzzling” (Leo, 
Lacasse, and Cimino, 2011). 
3. Editorial assistance is 
“often an industry code word 
for ghostwriting” (Fugh-
Berman, 2013) and “[…] may 
be so widespread that it is 
considered normal. This 
could explain why several 
authors of ghostwritten 
articles have defended their 
involvement” (Fugh-Berman, 
2010). 
4. “[A]s Senator Grassley 
pointed out in his letter to 
Wyeth, the final journal 
publications only 
acknowledged the medical 
writers for the ‘editorial 
assistance’ or ‘assistance.’ 
The articles did not disclose 
that Wyeth had initiated and 
paid DesignWrite for the 
development of the 
manuscripts and that the 
medical writers were hired 
and compensated by 
DesignWrite. Wyeth stated 
that DesignWrite was 
compensated for its work in 
getting manuscripts drafted 
and submitted for publication 
but payments were not 
allocated for individual 
articles” (United States 
Committee on Finance, 
2010). 
5. “The first author on the 
[Assessment of Differences 
between Vioxx and Naproxen 
To Ascertain Gastrointestinal 
Tolerability and Effective-
ness (ADVANTAGE) 
seeding] trial report said that 
Merck came to him after the 
study was completed and 
asked him to help with the 
editing. He was paid, which is 
highly unusual for a first 
author of a trial report, and 
the report was already written 
up by Merck; a Merck 
employee was thanked for 
‘assistance with manuscript 
preparation’ (Lisse et al., 
2003)” (Gotzsche, 2013). 
*Cross-reference with Guest 
authors or honorary authors 
(#28), Medical writers, 
medical ghostwriters, or 
ghost authors (#33) 
 
(25) CREATORS 
OF TRIAL 
DESIGNS AND 
PROTOCOLS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
The people who design 
clinical trials and their 
protocols may be company 
employees who may have 
incentive to design the trials 
and the involvement of 
investigators in a way that is 
favourable to the sponsoring 
company. 
SUPPORT:  
1. “In some multicenter trials, 
authors may not even have 
access to all their own data. 
The Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of 
America, the trade 
association of the industry, 
justified withholding data in 
this way: ‘As owners of the 
study database, sponsors have 
discretion to determine who 
will have access to the 
database.’ At its extreme, 
investigators have become 
little more than hired hands, 
supplying patients and 
collecting data according to 
the company protocol” 
(Angell, 2008). Company 
employees who design 
clinical trials and their 
protocols are commonly 
unacknowledged contributors 
to published articles 
(Sismondo, 2007). 
 
(26) GHOST 
MANAGEMENT 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Ghost management is an 
academic analysis of the 
process by which medical 
journal articles may be 
ushered through a careful 
process of production, 
revision, and shaping to 
contribute to a larger 
promotional narrative about a 
drug or disease state that can 
be treated by a drug 
manufactured by the 
sponsoring company. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Ghost management of 
medical research and 
publishing occurs “when 
pharmaceutical companies 
and their agents control or 
shape multiple steps in the 
research, analysis, writing, 
and publication of articles. 
Such articles are ‘ghostly’ 
because signs of their actual 
production are largely 
invisible – academic authors 
whose names appear at the 
tops of ghost-managed 
articles give corporate 
research the appearance of 
independence and credibility. 
They are ‘managed’ because 
those companies shape the 
eventual message conveyed 
by the article or by a suite of 
articles…A substantial 
percentage of medical journal 
articles…are ghost managed, 
allowing the pharmaceutical 
industry considerable 
influence on medical 
research, and making that 
research a vehicle for 
marketing” (Sismondo, 
2007). 
2. “We apply the term ghost 
management when 
pharmaceutical companies 
and their agents control or 
shape several crucial steps in 
the research, writing, and 
publication of articles… 
Companies aim to maximize 
the number of publications 
from positive trials, minimize 
those from negative trials, 
and ensure that the results of 
the study are published 
promptly and in prominent 
journals (Melander et al., 
2003). Ghost management 
makes apparently scientific 
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research a marketing tool” 
(Sismondo and Doucet, 
2010). 
3. Ghost managed articles are 
common in the published 
medical literature and 
“amounts to thousands of 
articles per year – 
publications plans for 
‘blockbuster’ drugs (one with 
annual sales of US$1 billion 
or more) can involve 80 to 
100 articles appearing in 
reputable medical journals 
over the course of a few 
years…In the ghost 
management of knowledge, 
and its dissemination through 
KOLs, we see the 
pharmaceutical industry 
going to great lengths to hide 
or disguise the interests 
behind its research and 
education” (Sismondo, 
2011). 
4. “On the basis of the data 
they produce, as well as 
publicly available medical 
research, pharmaceutical 
companies and their agents 
produce substantial numbers 
of scientific manuscripts on 
major current drugs. They 
recruit academic researchers 
to serve as the listed authors 
of those manuscripts; those 
authors’ contributions 
typically range from having 
supplied some of the patients 
for a clinical trial, to editing 
the manuscript, to simply 
signing off on the final draft. 
The companies submit the 
manuscripts to medical 
journals, where they 
generally get published, 
contributing to received 
scientific opinion. Marketing 
departments of the companies 
involved often buy thousands 
of reprints from the journals, 
so that their sales 
representatives can present to 
physicians supposedly 
independent scientific 
evidence of the safety and 
efficacy of the drugs in their 
portfolios. Roughly 40% of 
the sizeable medical research 
and literature on recently 
approved drugs is ‘ghost 
managed’ in the above way 
by the pharmaceutical 
industry and its agents 
(Sismondo, 2007)” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
5. “Ghost management of 
medical journal publications 
is clearly a substantial 
business, employing 
thousands of marketers, 
writers, and managers. It is 
large enough that the industry 
has established the 
International Publication 
Planning Association. This 
organization, which appears 
to be dominated by 
pharmaceutical companies, 
organizes meetings, keeps a 
directory of experts, and 
gives awards to honor 
planners (The International 
Publication Planning 
Association, 2006). In 
addition, the International 
Society for Medical 
Publication Professionals 
also organizes meetings, has 
committees to develop 
policy, and posts job 
advertisements (International 
Society for Medical 
Publication Professionals, 
2006). Both of these 
associations compete with 
for-profit companies offering 
similar services, such as the 
Center for Business 
Intelligence, which held 
forums for Strategic 
Publication Planning in 2005 
and 2006 (Center for 
Business Intelligence, 2006)” 
(Sismondo, 2007). 
*Cross-reference with 
Publication planning (#35) 
 
(27) 
STATISTICIANS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Statisticians on clinical 
papers may be employed by 
either the sponsoring 
pharmaceu-tical company 
(Sismondo, 2007) or the 
CROs (Wager, 2011) to 
which the pharmaceutical 
companies outsource their 
research.  
 
SUPPORT: 
1. Drug company statisticians 
are commonly unacknowled-
ged contributors to published 
articles (Gotzsche et al., 
2007). 
2. “In the paper by Gotzsche 
and colleagues (2007) the 
high prevalence of ghost 
statisticians was particularly 
troubling. If no one named on 
a paper was actually 
responsible for the analysis, 
which was instead done by a 
shadowy group of unnamed 
individuals, then it is hard to 
have any confidence in the 
findings overall” (Barbour, 
2010). 
3. “We take issue with this 
widespread practice of not 
including statisticians as 
authors for reports of 
randomised trials…the 
statistical report is a 
fundamental part of the 
research that has a crucial 
influence on what is written 
in the publication. Omission 
of a company statistician, 
usually also from the 
acknowledgement section, 
deprives readers of a key 
insight into the role of the 
company, although it is 
sometimes evidence that 
reports of industry-sponsored 
trials contain sophisticated 
statistical analyses that are 
beyond the capabilities of the 
authors (Senn, 2002). We 
cannot exclude the possibility 
that data analyses in some of 
the trials, and corresponding 
sections in protocols, were 
performed by company 
employees who were named 
authors but not statisticians, 
but it is unlikely since the 
pharmaceutical corporations 
usually have strong 
departments of statistics 
(Senn, 2002)” (Gotzsche et 
al., 2007). 
4. “Execution of the study 
according to plan and 
objective depiction of the 
results can also be influenced, 
e.g., by contractual 
stipulations that grant the 
pharmaceutical company 
access to the trial data or give 
it the power to prevent the 
publication of results. 
Moreover, the presentation of 
results can be manipulated by 
ghostwriters and guest 
authors…This includes 
statisticians who analyze the 
results” (Schott et al., 2010). 
 
(28) GUEST 
AUTHORS OR 
HONORARY 
AUTHORS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Guest authors, sometimes 
referred to as honorary 
authors, tend to be prominent 
physicians or researchers 
who are recruited by MWOs 
or drug companies to sign 
onto papers as authors, 
despite that they neither 
conducted the study, nor 
wrote the manuscript 
(Unknown, 2006). Case 
studies of internal industry 
documents in the Drug 
Industry Documents Archive 
(DIDA) exemplify that the 
practice of inappropriate 
authorship attribution is 
common (Ross et al., 2008). 
In academia it is common for 
senior researchers and 
department chairs to be 
honorary authors on 
publications completed by 
their own research teams 
(Support #1 below); however, 
the type of honorary 
authorship with which this 
glossary is concerned is 
associated with industry 
originated manuscripts and 
the practice of medical 
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ghostwriting (Support #2-6 
below).  
SUPPORT: 
1. Honorary, or gift, 
authorship is a term that has 
been used when “[i]n some 
academic units, for example, 
junior scholars are expected 
to list their department chairs 
or lab chiefs as coauthors on 
all their publications, whether 
or not these people have 
actually contributed anything 
to the paper...Some senior 
academics argue that they 
should be listed as coauthors 
on anything that is written by 
anyone being paid out of their 
grants.” This practice is 
“…typically frowned upon 
by journal editors but that 
remains relatively common. 
A more benign version of 
honorary authorship is when 
a senior academic lists a 
junior partner (such as a 
graduate student or research 
assistant) as a coauthor on a 
publication out of generosity, 
even though that person has 
contributed very little. As a 
result, it can be difficult to 
look at the list of authors on a 
research paper and decode 
exactly who did what. An 
author may be the head of the 
department where the article 
was produced, or the person 
who wrote the grant that 
funded it, or simply a 
powerful senior physician to 
whom a junior academic has 
offered authorship in order to 
curry a favor” (Elliott, 2010).  
2. “A particularly pernicious 
kind of honorary authorship 
occurs when distinguished 
academic researchers are 
listed as the authors of papers 
ghostwritten by industry. In 
these cases, the sham 
academic author is used to 
hide conflicts of interest and 
to give the resulting paper the 
appearance of impartiality. 
This is what I call deceptive 
honorary authorship (as 
opposed to nondeceptive 
honorary authorship, in 
which there are no 
ghostwriters or undisclosed 
conflicts of interest). These 
labels highlight the difference 
in motivations underlying 
each type of honorary 
authorship. Deceptive 
honorary authorship occurs 
when honorary authors put 
their names on papers to 
intentionally mislead the 
scientific community and 
public about who funded and 
performed the research. In 
this context, deceptive 
honorary authorship is part of 
a deliberate attempt to 
manipulate the biomedical 
literature for financial gain. 
Sponsoring companies place 
favorable articles promoting 
their marketing messages in 
well-respected scientific 
journals under the names of 
well-respected academic 
scientists to increase the 
effectiveness of their 
marketing by making it seem 
impartial when, in fact, it is 
not. Since doctors use these 
articles to guide their 
prescribing practices, this 
kind of honorary authorship 
leads to increased sales, as 
doctors are impressed by the 
prestige of the sham author 
and the seemingly impartial 
results. In addition, the 
honorary author also benefits, 
usually by an honorarium and 
by being able to use the 
publication credit towards 
professional advancement… 
The honorary author is guilty 
of academic dishonesty (i.e., 
plagiarism) in taking 
academic credit for another’s 
work. Additionally, the 
honorary author deliberately 
conceals underlying conflicts 
of interest. Ghostwritten 
articles necessarily conceal 
conflicts of interest because 
transparency makes a paper 
not ghostwritten. The end 
result of this behavior is that 
the deceptive honorary author 
undermines the system of 
scientific communication in a 
way that has the potential to 
seriously harm people. 
Industry groups rely on 
ghostwritten articles to give 
their preferred messages the 
appearance of impartiality. 
This deception directly 
influences the treatment 
provided by medical 
professionals mislead by the 
deliberate manipulation of 
the scientific literature which 
can lead to real harm. 
Deceptive honorary authors’ 
complicity in an elaborate 
scheme of scientific 
deception makes them guilty 
of serious breach of research 
ethics…The potential for 
harm due to the manipulation 
of a scientific literature is 
high. Recent documents 
revealed in court cases 
surrounding the drug 
rofecoxib (sold under the 
brand name Vioxx by Merck) 
suggest that significant 
portions of the biomedical 
literature relating to the safety 
and efficacy of 
pharmaceutical products are 
written by third-party 
scientific communications 
companies contracted by 
pharmaceutical companies 
and published under the 
names of academic authors 
who did not write the papers 
in question” (Moffatt, 2011). 
3. After an article, written by 
a ghostwriter or medical 
writer, is approved by the 
sponsoring company or 
MECC, the guest author, who 
was recruited to sign his or 
her name to the pre-crafted 
manuscript, “submits the 
manuscript as his or her 
original work to a journal 
specified by the 
pharmaceutical company. If 
the journal asks for revisions 
or clarifications, the medical 
writer writes the response, 
again for the guest author’s 
signature” (Fugh-Berman and 
Dodgson 2008). Some guest 
authors “…take an active role 
in the process and make 
changes at the outline and 
manuscript stages, but at 
every stage, the manuscript is 
monitored by the agency and 
the pharma company to 
ensure it remains on-
message. After pharma sign-
off, the ‘author’ is generally 
asked to submit to the journal 
directly to minimize the 
appearance of pharma 
involvement, and then 
receives an ‘honorarium’. 
Increasingly, companies no 
longer pay ‘authors’ directly, 
but reward them 
intermittently for their 
interest by providing 
‘research grants’” (Matheson, 
2008). 
4. “Many authors on ghost-
managed manuscripts are 
medical specialists…[and] 
have established relationships 
with [the sponsoring 
pharmaceutical company]. 
They are typically faculty in 
medical schools, generously 
called ‘thought leaders,’ ‘key 
opinion leaders,’ or more 
normally ‘KOLs’. 
Publication planners make 
KOLs their authors on 
articles, and their speakers at 
conferences, workshops, and 
other events. In so doing, they 
build reputations, turning 
people into opinion leaders 
who are even more ‘key.’ 
Because medical schools 
place unrealistic expectations 
on their researchers, 
academic KOLs are keen to 
add to their CVs; it is not 
unheard of for researchers to 
list a thousand authored and 
coauthored scientific 
publications. Most medical 
science articles have multiple 
authors, so researchers are 
used to making modest 
contributions to published 
research. Publication 
planners further pare down 
the necessary work. To some 
KOLs, a free manuscript may 
feel like another perk of 
having good relations with a 
drug company, 
complementing the dinners, 
the trips to meetings and 
conferences, speaking and 
consulting fees. In some 
cases, academic authors may 
not even be fully aware, or 
may decide not to be aware, 
that they are freeloading off a 
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drug company…Among 
themselves, planners portray 
authors as lazy, greedy, and 
prone to miss deadlines. For 
the sake of legitimacy, 
planners would like authors 
to make some contribution to 
manuscripts. However, they 
need to be coaxed and 
coached” (Sismondo, 2011). 
5. “Authors, it seems, are 
largely interchangeable. They 
were all ‘to be determined’ 
until the publication team 
thought that the manuscript 
was nearly ready to be sent 
out to a journal. At that point, 
Wyeth appears to have 
determined who the authors 
would be, and contacting 
them was added to its ‘to do’ 
list. Perhaps there was not 
much consultation even then. 
When [an author] established 
ties with Organon [a medical 
writing organization], [the 
drug company] no longer 
wanted to work with her and 
simply replaced her with two 
other authors. It is not clear 
that she was ever notified that 
she had been put on or taken 
off the author list” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
6. “Guest authors and KOLs 
more generally are part of a 
largely successful attempt to 
disguise conflicts of interest 
and the biases they create” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
*Cross-reference with 
Honoraria and payments (#8), 
Acknowledgements, 
“editorial assistance”, 
“writing support”, or “writing 
assistance” (#24), Medical 
writers, medical ghostwriters, 
or ghost authors (#33) 
 
(29) INDUSTRY 
OBSERVERS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Observers may be drug 
company employees who 
may attend study committee 
meetings and ascertain the 
use of company data in order 
to ensure that their 
company’s data is being 
interpreted favourably in 
comparison to competitor 
products’ data. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Observers…are not 
uncommon. The idea is that 
they are invited to see at first 
hand what is going on and to 
sit in at study committee 
meetings, but not usually to 
contribute or have a vote. 
You get observers of this sort 
in many areas, not just 
science. The issue in this 
setting…is that private data 
from many companies’ trials 
are being pooled for meta-
analysis. Companies are 
increasingly allowing this but 
they remain very scared that 
their data will be analyzed to 
show weaknesses in the 
products. So they need all 
sorts of guarantees that head-
to-head comparisons of rival 
drugs will not be carried out 
etc. I expect the inclusion of 
observers [in this case] is 
primarily to assuage the 
concerns of pharma…it is 
likely their presence would 
only be possible with, and in 
turn would reinforce, an 
industry-friendly culture and 
climate within the research 
group” (Personal 
communication, 2015). 
(30) 
INVOLVEMENT 
OF A MEDICAL 
WRITING 
ORGANIZATION 
(MWO) OR 
MEDICAL 
COMMUNICATIO
NS COMPANY 
(MCC) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
The term medical writing 
organization (MWO) is 
sometimes used 
synonymously with Medical 
Education Communications 
Company (MECC), Medical 
Communications Company 
(MCC), and Medical 
Publications Company. 
These organizations can be 
contracted to work 
independently from, or with, 
each other to write 
manuscripts with embedded 
promotional messages. The 
manuscripts are later signed 
by recruited guest authors. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Drug companies have 
contracted with “medical 
publishing companies to have 
manuscripts prepared.” These 
companies sometimes 
describe themselves as “a full 
service medical publishing 
group specializing in the 
development of scientific 
literature and other resource 
media with a direct 
application to clinical 
therapeutics” and some of 
these companies have been 
“‘serving members of the 
pharmaceutical industry and 
medical associations since 
1985’ [or] ‘a full-service 
health marketing 
communications company 
committed to the highest 
quality of service…We’re 
there pre-launch, preparing 
the market for a product’s 
introduction. At launch, we 
establish the foundation for 
product uptake.’ Documents 
were found demonstrating 
that medical publishing 
companies provided near 
complete drafts of review 
manuscripts to authors for 
editing, in addition to 
managing submissions and 
revisions’” (Ross et al., 
2008). Documents have been 
“…found describing [drug 
company] employees 
contracting with medical 
publishing companies to 
ghostwrite review 
manuscripts focused on [a 
drug] and subsequently 
recruiting external, academic 
affiliated investigators to be 
guest authors” (Ross et al., 
2008). Documents also show 
that these publishing 
companies provide updates 
on the “development and 
estimated delivery dates for 
[a number of] manuscripts 
related to [a drug] that the 
company was preparing, 
including intended titles, 
authors, and journals” (Ross 
et al., 2008). “Documents 
also were found 
demonstrating that medical 
publishing companies played 
critical roles in overseeing the 
development, organization, 
and manuscript drafting of 
supplemental issues focused 
on [the drug] for journals” 
(Ross et al., 2008).  These 
companies also “…manage 
article submissions to 
meetings, and as samples of 
its service it provides 
hypothetical lists of abstracts 
and presentations, with their 
status, dates of presentation, 
etc.” (Sismondo, 2007). 
2. Internal industry 
documents show that 
“[p]rimary publications 
(articles that report clinical 
trials) ghostwritten by [a 
MWO] included four 
manuscripts on [trials of a 
drug] for which [the MWO] 
paid US$25,000 each. 
Secondary publications 
(articles that follow clinical 
trial reports and contain 
‘subsequent analyses and 
reviews of the drug and its 
field use’) included 20 review 
articles that [the MWO] was 
assigned to write in 1997 for 
$20,000 each, a price that 
later rose to $25,000. 
Abstract production cost 
$4,000. [The MWO] charged 
$10,000 for editing 
manuscripts and $2,000 for 
editing abstracts ‘written by 
author or other agency’. As 
part of its publication 
planning, [a drug company’s] 
Marketing Department 
convened monthly meetings 
to discuss publication 
strategies, draft outlines, and 
sometimes adjust the overall 
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publication plan. In 2002, for 
example, [a drug company’s] 
management ‘charged the 
Publication Committee with 
increasing the number of 
positive [drug]-related 
publications’” at the rate of 1 
publication per month (Fugh-
Berman, 2010). 
3. “In addition to the 
publication planners, a much 
higher number of medical 
writing companies and 
individual writers create 
articles and presentations 
without engaging in broader 
publication planning; these 
may be adjuncts to 
publication planners. To 
provide an indication of the 
scale, the American Medical 
Writers Association boasts a 
membership of more than 
5,000 (American Medical 
Writers Association, 2007a); 
judging from the 
organization’s officers and 
the content of its conferences, 
it appears to be dominated by 
MECCs (American Medical 
Writers Association, 2007b; 
American Medical Writers 
Association, 2007c)” 
(Sismondo, 2007). 
4. Internal industry 
documents have shown that 
employees from medical 
publication companies or 
medical writing organizations 
“…manag[e] submissions 
and revisions. For instance, in 
preparing one manuscript, 
[the medical publications 
company] indicate[d] in a 
publications status report that 
the first draft was sent to [the 
drug company] and the 
[publications] company was 
awaiting comments, but an 
author needed to be invited. 
In another e-mail that 
discusses an article with 
which the company was 
involved, a [publications 
company] representative 
states: ‘The .1439 journal 
article that was submitted to 
Pharmacotherapy by Dr. 
William Garnett has been 
accepted (I believe) with 
revisions. He has faxed me 
only the reviewers’ 
comments, but is mailing me 
the entire packet that they 
sent to him. He would like us 
to make the revisions, as he is 
too busy at the moment to 
make them himself. 
According to the proposal 
(Doc #66468) there is no 
mention of whether revisions 
are included, or can be done 
for an additional fee” (Ross et 
al., 2008). 
5. An important role of 
MWOs or publications 
companies is “…to manage 
‘authors’ and journals…[A 
MWO’s] ghostwriters also 
managed journals by 
responding to the editor and 
reviewer comments. 
Ghostwriters argued for 
retention of specific 
marketing messages, 
sometimes scolding 
reviewers under the guise of 
defending peer-review. 
Responses to one presumably 
unfavourable review 
included: ‘The review of the 
current paper is not the 
appropriate place to criticize 
methodologic flaws of 
published papers’; and ‘The 
reviewer’s suggestion to 
revise the statement on page 
8…is not justified. This 
interpretation is well 
documented.’ In one case, a 
ghostwriter asked the author 
for assistance in preparing a 
response: ‘…If you have any 
thoughts about how we might 
reply to this reviewer’s 
comment, please let us 
know’” (Fugh-Berman, 
2010). 
*Cross-reference with 
Involvement of a contract 
research organization (CRO) 
or site-management 
organization (SMO) (#31), 
Involvement of a medical 
education communication 
company (MECC) medical 
communications company 
(MCC), medical education 
company (MEC), or medical 
education service supplier 
(MESS) (#32), Publication 
planning (#35) 
(31) 
INVOLVEMENT 
OF A CONTRACT 
RESEARCH 
ORGANIZATION 
(CRO) OR SITE-
MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
(SMO) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Contract research 
organizations and site-
management organizations 
are for-profit research 
companies that may be 
contracted by drug 
companies to conduct a 
clinical trial, collect, analyze, 
and interpret the data (Fisher, 
2008).  
SUPPORT: 
1. The commercial-research 
enterprise has grown and 
“[t]he largest of the new 
businesses are called contract 
research organizations” and 
include companies 
worldwide. CROs are 
“…hired to shepherd a 
product through every aspect 
of its development, from 
subject recruitment and 
testing through FDA 
approval. Speed is critical: a 
patent last twenty years, and a 
drug company’s aim is to get 
the drug on the shelves as 
early in the life of the patent 
as possible” (Elliott, 2010). 
“Of industry funding, 70% 
goes to CROs that neither 
make ownership claims on 
data nor expect to publish the 
data themselves: CROs 
perform research to order. By 
its nature, CRO research 
tends to be ghostly. The 30% 
of industry funding that goes 
to academic researchers often 
also comes with strings 
attached that can allow 
sponsors to prepare drafts, 
edit drafts, delay publication, 
prevent full access to data, 
and so on – in short, creating 
conditions that allow for 
ghost management” 
(Sismondo, 2007). 
2. Most researchers have little 
to say in research design, 
since the majority of the 
industry’s spending on 
clinical trials goes to CROs 
[contract research 
organizations], and even 
academic researchers are 
heavily influenced by 
sponsors’ designs and 
requests (Abraham, 2005)” 
(Sismondo, 2008a). 
3. “Conflicts of interests may 
trouble academics, but they 
do not seem to present 
obstacles for CROs. Once 
CROs entered the arena, 
AHCs [academic health 
centers] could no longer 
engage in older vintages of 
‘open science’. According to 
some estimates, one-third to 
one-half of the clinical trial 
contracts in the 1990s with 
AHCs...contained restraint 
clauses, confidentiality 
provisions, publication 
embargoes, and a host of 
other legal controls over 
proprietary information” 
(Mirowski and Van Horne, 
2005).  
4. “CROs participate in an 
altogether different kind of 
economy, in which various 
claims about drugs are being 
‘sold’ to regulators, doctors 
writing prescriptions, and 
increasingly, to the patient 
end-user. Should these claims 
of efficacy be challenged, 
they could then potentially be 
litigated in a court of law and 
negotiated in terms of 
monetary liability of a 
corporate entity. The 
‘responsibility’ in question 
[is] that of a commercial 
corporation to its 
shareholders, the regulators, 
and (to a lesser extent) its 
customers...Especially for the 
CRO, there exists no single 
person or small number of 
people whose probity stands 
planted firmly behind the 
information disseminated 
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(after all, mostly they are 
merely employees; many 
have moved on even before 
the project was completed; 
and corporate officers are not 
personally liable for product 
negligence); there are only 
the contractual obligations of 
the corporations...The scribe 
who puts her pen to paper is 
just one more employee, 
enjoying the same social 
obligations and dispensations 
as the laboratory technician 
(with probably 
commensurate job security)” 
(Mirowski and Van Horne, 
2005). 
5. “Commercially oriented 
networks of contract-research 
organizations (CROs) and 
site-management 
organizations (SMOs) have 
altered the drug-trial 
landscape, forcing academic 
medical centers to rethink 
their participation in 
industry-funded drug 
research…CROs may 
subcontract with for-profit 
SMOs [site management 
organizations] to organize 
networks of community 
physicians, ensure rapid 
enrollment of patients, and 
deliver case-report forms to 
the CRO...Companies may 
design studies likely to favor 
their products [using 
strategies like testing the 
sponsor’s drug] in a healthier 
population…with an 
insufficient dose…[using] 
surrogate end points that may 
not correlate with more 
important clinical end points” 
(Bodenheimer, 2000). 
6. “…[T]rials conducted in 
the commercial sector are 
heavily tipped toward 
industry interests, since for-
profit CROs and SMOs, 
contracting with industry in a 
competitive market, will fail 
if they offend their funding 
sources” (Bodenheimer, 
2000). 
*Cross-reference with 
Involvement of a medical 
writing organization (MWO) 
or medical communications 
company (#30), Involvement 
of a medical education 
communication company 
(MECC) medical 
communications company 
(MCC), medical education 
company (MEC), or medical 
education service supplier 
(MESS) (#32), Publication 
planning (#35) 
 
(32) 
INVOLVEMENT 
OF A MEDICAL 
EDUCATION 
COMMUNICATIO
N COMPANY 
(MECC), 
MEDICAL 
EDUCATION 
COMPANY (MEC), 
OR MEDICAL 
EDUCATION 
SERVICE 
SUPPLIER (MESS) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Medical education 
communication companies 
(MECCs), or medical 
education service suppliers 
(MESSs), sometimes referred 
to as medical 
communications companies 
(MCCs), are among the most 
significant but least analyzed 
health care stakeholders. 
Supported mainly by drug 
and device companies, they 
are vendors of information to 
physicians and consumers 
and sources of information 
for industry (Rothman et al., 
2013). These companies 
usually compete for contracts 
for specific drugs (Matheson, 
2008). 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Some conflicts of interest 
are invisible. Pharmaceutical 
companies routinely seed 
medical literature with 
reviews or commentaries that 
advantageously frame a 
marketed drug, but some 
sponsored articles never 
mention the targeted drug. 
Both types of articles are 
usually written by a medical 
education company (MEC) 
that receives funding from a 
pharmaceutical company… 
The arrangements made 
between drug companies or 
MECs and physicians are 
often discreet; negotiations 
are done over the phone, or in 
telegraphic e-mails. Paper 
trails are minimized; there are 
no invoices, no contracts, and 
no written scope of work. 
Payments may not be 
traceable to services 
rendered, or to the sponsoring 
pharmaceutical company” 
(Fugh-Berman, 2005). 
2. Companies can hire one or 
multiple MECCs to work on 
the promotion of one drug 
(Sismondo, 2011). “Between 
1998 and 2006, commercial 
support for CME increased 
by a fourfold margin to a total 
of $1.2 billion. By 2006, over 
60 percent of CME was 
funded by commercial 
sources. During this same 
period, profit margins for 
accredited CME providers 
increased nearly sixfold, from 
5.5 percent to 31 percent, 
with total income reaching 
$2.38 billion” (Elliott, 2010). 
“Unsurprisingly, MECCs 
advertise their ability to do 
‘promotion through 
education’ and that CME can 
be ‘custom tailored to meet 
the pharmaceutical 
marketers’ needs’” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
3.“Pharmaceutical 
companies also have a 
presence in continuing 
medical education (CME), 
required of most physicians 
in North America in order to 
maintain their accreditation. 
More than 60% of all support 
for CME comes from 
pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies 
(Steinbrook, 2008). The 
MECCs that organize the 
courses are legally allowed to 
provide organization, pay for 
speakers, help speakers 
prepare for their talks, and 
provide entertainment for 
participants. The companies 
do not control the content of 
CMEs, but if they have 
chosen their speakers well, 
supported those speakers’ 
research, and given speakers 
templates and slides for their 
talks, these courses will 
convey preferred messages 
(Elliott, 2004; Steinman & 
Baron, 2007). An industry 
education specialist says that 
the idea is ‘control – leaving 
nothing to chance’ 
(Bohdanowicz, 2009). This is 
the best kind of marketing, 
directed at audiences needing 
to educate themselves, and 
provided by sources that the 
audiences have reasons to 
trust. Unsurprisingly, 
MECCs advertise their ability 
to do ‘promotion through 
education’ (Research and 
Markets, 2001) and that 
CMEs can be ‘custom 
tailored to meet 
pharmaceutical marketers’ 
needs’ (MD NetGuide, 
2004)” (Sismondo, 2011). 
4. “Known best for arranging 
continuing medical education 
(CME) programs, they also 
may develop prelaunch and 
branding campaigns and 
produce digital and print 
publications...[MCCs 
promote] online CME 
courses as a convenient and 
cost-free alternative to live 
CME courses...To enrol in 
the CME course, physicians 
had to provide personal 
information, such as name, e-
mail address, specialty, and 
license number. How MCCs 
might use the personal data 
and track physician web 
activity was described in the 
Privacy Policies sections of 
their websites.” Some MCCs 
use tools such as “cookies” 
and web “beacons” and share 
personal information with 
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third parties, including 
“unnamed third parties” and 
“companies with which they 
worked or might merge.” A 
2013 study found that 
“among the 14 companies 
that released data in 2010, 
MCCs received an aggregate 
of $170 million, more funds 
than any other recipient, 
including academic medical 
centers, professional 
associations, and research 
organizations. The top 5%, 
almost all for-profit 
companies, received 59% of 
the funds. Absent industry 
disclosures, none of this 
information would have 
become publicly available... 
Medical communication 
companies receive substantial 
support from industry, and 
the majority are for-profit, 
conduct CME programs, 
track website behavior, and 
may share information with 
third parties” (Rothman et al., 
2013).  
5. MECCs are also hired to 
organize teleconferences, 
coordinate advisory boards 
and consultants meetings, and 
conduct tactical planning to 
promote drugs. When drug 
companies hire MECCs for 
this many purposes, they 
have “incentive to develop 
educational programs that are 
consistent with the marketing 
goals and to control content 
in a way that reflected 
favorably on the sponsor. For 
example, in 1996, one 
medical education company 
prepared a marketing 
proposal for [its drug 
company sponsor] outlining 
24 tactics to increase 
[prescriptions of a drug] 
shortly after using an 
unrestricted grant from the 
drug company to organize a 
series of study programs on 
the use of [related 
medications]. Although the 
educational program 
prepared by this company 
was accredited by ACCME, 
[drug company] 
representatives were invited 
to a curricular development 
meeting, recruited physicians 
to participate in the course, 
and followed attendance 
counts at each program 
meeting” (Steinman et al., 
2006). “In another case, 
another medical education 
company that organized 
consultants meetings for [the 
drug company] received a 
grant to assemble and train 
speakers to deliver grand 
rounds lectures on [a class of 
drugs for a specific disease 
state] at approximately 70 
community and teaching 
hospitals across the 
northeastern United States. 
[The drug company] also 
sought to provide unrestricted 
educational grants to locally 
organized symposia at which 
it expected [its drug] to be 
favourably discussed” 
(Steinman et al., 2006). 
6. MECCs also offer 
substantial assistance in the 
development of manuscripts 
including assisting the author 
with “identifying and 
collecting…appropriate 
cases, analyzing data, writing 
a manuscript, or whatever 
[the author] needs” 
(Steinman et al., 2006). 
7. “Many pharmaceutical 
companies use medical 
education communication 
companies (MECCs) to 
recruit academic physicians 
and scientists to “author” 
publications crafted by 
industry. Articles may be 
ghostwritten by a medical 
writer. Authors who actually 
write their own articles may 
still submit to “ghost-
management”, allowing a 
company to provide 
statistical analysis or 
“editorial assistance” (often 
an industry code word for 
ghostwriting), either of which 
provides a company the 
opportunity to insert 
marketing messages into an 
article. Ghostwriting has been 
used to promote Zyprexa 
(olanzapine), Paxil 
(paroxetine) “Fen-phen” 
(fenfluramine and 
phentermine, used for weight 
loss), Vioxx (rofecoxib, an 
analgesic), and Zoloft 
(sertraline, an 
antidepressant). Undoubted-
ly, many other drugs are 
promoted by ghostwriting... 
The extent to which basic 
scientists participate in 
ghostwritten articles is 
unknown...Even if a 
researcher does not allow a 
sponsor to ghostwrite an 
article, industry review of 
articles by a sponsor may 
result in the insertion of 
subtle marketing messages 
that researchers may not 
recognize as advertisements” 
(Fugh-Berman, 2013). 
8. Drug companies have 
“‘…turned to the medical 
education and 
communication companies 
(MECCs) DesignWrite, 
Parthenon Publishing, and 
Oxford Clinical 
Communications to work on 
publication plans and 
publications for [drugs]. 
These agencies created suites 
of articles and conference 
presentations that were 
intended to maintain and 
expand the market for drugs 
like [X, Y], and related 
products. Over the course of 
6 years, DesignWrite 
produced for [a drug 
company] ‘over 50 peer-
reviewed publications, more 
than 50 scientific abstracts 
and posters, journal 
supplements, internal white 
papers, slide kits, and 
symposia’ (DesignWrite, 
2005)” (Sismondo, 2011). 
*Cross-reference with 
Involvement of a medical 
writing organization (MWO) 
or medical communications 
company (#30), Involvement 
of a contract research 
organization (CRO) or site-
management organization 
(SMO) (#31). 
(33) MEDICAL 
WRITERS, 
MEDICAL 
GHOSTWRITERS, 
OR GHOST 
AUTHORS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Medical writers are also 
commonly known as 
“ghostwriters” or “ghost 
authors”. The use of medical 
writers and, therefore, the 
practice of ghostwriting, is so 
prevalent that there now exist 
medical writers associations 
that provide resources to 
medical writers. In the United 
States, this association is 
called American Medical 
Writers Association 
(AMWA) (American 
Medical Writers Association 
[AMWA], 2015) and the 
AMWA-Canada (AMWA, 
2009) is the Canadian chapter 
of this association. The 
comparable association in 
Europe is called the European 
Medical Writers Association 
(EMWA) (European Medical 
Writers Association 
[EMWA], 2015). 
SUPPORT: 
1. Medical ghostwriting is 
“the practice through which 
researchers agree to put their 
names on texts that had been 
composed by unnamed third 
parties, who held final control 
over the content of the 
manuscript” (Mirowski and 
Van Horne, 2005). In ghostly 
papers, “[a]uthors, it seems, 
are largely interchangeable. 
They were all “to be 
determined” until the 
publication team thought that 
the manuscript was nearly 
ready to be send out to a 
journal. At that point, [the 
drug company] appears to 
have determined who the 
authors would be, and 
contacting them was added to 
its ‘to do’ list…Even before 
their authors are chosen, drug 
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company articles run a 
gauntlet of reviews by 
planners and company 
scientists and are vetted and 
revised many times. Those 
articles have been given 
much more thorough reviews 
than medical journals can 
ever give. Authors have little 
to add other than their names, 
and by adding their names 
they gain prestigious 
publications, which are the 
basic measure of worth in 
academic settings” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
2. “Medical writers, who are 
often scientists or health 
professionals, are crucial to 
publication planning. They 
ensure that manuscripts are 
scientifically correct, 
professional, organized, 
readable, persuasive, and 
submitted on time. Medical 
writers prepare primary and 
secondary publications, 
including clinical trial reports 
and reviews; they may also 
prepare meeting materials 
and abstracts. They may work 
directly for pharmaceutical 
companies, most often as 
freelancers, or they may be 
employed by medical 
education communications 
companies (MECCs), which 
derive most of their income 
from pharmaceutical 
companies. A pharmaceutical 
company may create a 
publication plan internally or 
work with a MECC on the 
plan...Potential guest authors 
may also be listed. Once the 
topic of an article is chosen, a 
medical writer generates an 
outline, which is approved by 
the sponsoring pharmaceu-
tical company. The writer 
then researches and writes the 
paper, incorpor-ating the 
appropriate marketing 
message; an experienced 
writer may be able to 
communicate messages that 
align with a sponsor’s 
marketing objectives even 
when specific messages are 
not provided. After the 
completed article is 
approved, the guest author, 
usually an academically 
affiliated physician, is 
approached by the sponsor. 
Guest authors (who may 
receive payment through a 
MECC) are generally offered 
the option to contribute to or 
amend the article; they 
usually realize that edits 
disadvantageous to a 
sponsoring company’s 
marketing goals will result in 
the article not being 
published – or being 
published under another 
physician’s name” (Fugh-
Berman and Dodgson, 2008).  
3. Medical writers may 
perceive their role to be noble 
in ensuring that research is 
reported responsibly (Wager, 
2011). Medical writers are 
typically paid $90 to $120 per 
hour and the average 
freelance medical writer in 
the United States can make 
$120,000 to $150,000 or 
more per year, depending on 
level of education and 
experience. Each manuscript 
usually costs the sponsor 
between $1,000 and $2,500 
(Fugh-Berman and Dodgson, 
2008); and publishing a paper 
in a high-impact medical 
journal could net the 
ghostwriter payment of 
approximately US$20,000 
(Mirowski and Van Horne, 
2005). 
4. “Some medical writers 
distinguish between ghost 
authoring and ghostwriting. 
‘Ghost authoring is ‘We write 
it, you sign it’”, while 
“[g]hostwriting...is closer to a 
kind of joint authorship, 
where a writer collaborates 
with an author but without 
receiving any formal 
acknowledgement. This 
practice is more 
controversial. Critics of 
ghostwriting say the lack of 
acknowledgement is an effort 
to hide the involvement of 
industry and make it appear 
as if the article has originated 
from a university. Defenders 
say that often the writer 
simply has not done enough 
intellectual work to be 
formally acknowledged. 
They see the work of a 
medical writer as similar to 
that of a secretary or, at best, 
an editor” (Elliott, 2010).  
5. “Generally, the work of the 
medical writer and the agency 
goes unmentioned, unless 
they are thanked in the 
acknowledgements section 
for writing assistance. 
[Medical writers] rarely even 
[see] the published articles 
[they have] written. In 
fact...the articles can be pretty 
hard to track down” (Elliott, 
2010). 
6. “It is becoming more 
common for organisations to 
employ professional editors 
to assist with medical writing 
(both papers and grant 
applications). These editors 
are often termed ‘ghost 
writers’ as their names do not 
appear on the paper. Some 
commentators argue that in 
such cases perhaps no one 
really qualifies for 
authorship. The scientists 
cannot claim authorship since 
they did not write the work 
and ghost writers cannot 
claim it either as they can 
defend the writing but not the 
science (Simkhada, van 
Teijlingen & Hundley, 
2013)” (Hundley, van 
Teijlingen, and Simkhada, 
2013). 
7. Pharmaceutical companies 
have “…hired contractors to 
ghostwrite “false and 
misleading” articles” with the 
purpose of claiming the 
demonstrated safety and 
efficacy of a medication, 
“…despite the fact that the 
study cited failed to 
demonstrate efficacy in its 
primary and secondary 
endpoints [while minimizing] 
adverse events” (Fugh-
Berman, 2013). 
8. It is unclear how much raw 
data ghostwriters are able to 
view before writing the 
manuscript. “In fact, one of 
the extra benefits of this way 
of working – from a 
company’s perspective – is 
that the writer will often only 
see tables and results that 
have already been prepared 
by the company statistician, 
tailored to tell a specific 
story” (Goldacre, 2012). 
9. “[Writer]: I’m given an 
outline about what to talk 
about, what studies to cite. 
They want us to be talking 
about the stuff that makes the 
drug look good. 
[Interviewer]: They don’t 
give you the negative studies? 
[Writer]: There’s no 
discussion of certain adverse 
events. That’s just not 
brought up…As long as I do 
my job well, it’s not up to me 
to decide how the drug is 
positioned. I’m just following 
the information I’m given. 
[Interviewer]: Even though 
you know that the 
information is often biased? 
[Writer]: The way I look at it, 
if doctors have their name on 
it, that’s their responsibility, 
not mine (Johnson, 2003)” 
(Mirowski and Van Horne, 
2005). 
10. A medical writer 
described her responsibilities 
as: “[she] wrote slide kits, 
monographs, executive 
summaries, journal articles, 
backgrounders, newsletters, 
competitive analyses, 
publication plans, video 
scripts, audio scripts, and 
continuing medical education 
(CME) programs for 
physicians and nurses. Each 
piece (‘job’, in 
advertisingspeak) was born 
out of the publications 
planning strategy developed 
for a fee by the medical 
education (meded) company 
for the pharmaceutical 
corporation” (Logdberg, 
2011). 
11. The problem with 
ghostwriting “…is the 
specific ways in which these 
collaborations [of academics 
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with medical writers] are 
disguised, manipulated, and 
used as tools for marketing 
drugs” (Moffatt & Elliott, 
2007). 
12. “Medical writing involves 
more than just putting the 
words on the paper[;] Often 
involves 
negotiation/liaison[;] May 
raise ethical issues[;] Often 
exists at the borderline 
between science and 
commerce” (Wager, 2011). 
13. “Some countries and 
organizations have 
recognized and begun to 
tackle the problem of 
ghostwriting and guest 
authorship. Danish law, for 
instance, regards 
misappropriation of 
authorship as research 
misconduct (Danish Ministry 
of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation, 2005). In regard 
to ghostwriting, the law on 
scientific dishonesty, which 
came into force in 2009, 
includes the definition of 
dishonesty as ‘false credit 
given to the author or authors, 
misrepresentation of title or 
workplace’” (Bosch, 2011). 
14. “Medical writers often 
have to: liaise between 
authors and sponsors; liaise 
with journals…Journals and 
editors are not all the 
same…medical writers need 
to know how to identify and 
handle different varieties” 
(Wager, 2011). 
*Cross-reference with 
Acknowledgements, 
“editorial assistance”, 
“writing support”, or “writing 
assistance” (#24), Guest 
authors or honorary authors 
(#28), Non-author 
contributor(ship) (#34) 
 
 
(34) NON-AUTHOR 
CONTRIBUTOR(S
HIP) 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Non-author contributors are 
individuals who have made 
important contributions to a 
manuscript, but do not meet 
the criteria for being named 
as an author under the 
International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors 
(ICMJE) criteria.  
SUPPORT: 
1. Contributors who do not 
meet the four ICMJE criteria 
for authorship “…should not 
be listed as authors, but they 
should be acknowledged. 
Examples of activities that 
alone (without other 
contributions) do not qualify 
a contributor for authorship 
are acquisition of funding, 
general supervision of a 
research group or general 
administrative support; and 
writing assistance, technical 
editing, language editing, and 
proofreading. Those whose 
contributions do not justify 
authorship may be 
acknowledged individually or 
together as a group under a 
single heading (e.g. ‘Clinical 
Investigators’ or 
‘Participating Investigators’) 
and their contributions should 
be specified (e.g., ‘served as 
scientific advisors,’ 
‘critically reviewed the study 
proposal,’ ‘collected data,’ 
‘provided and cared for study 
patients,’ ‘participated in 
writing or technical editing of 
the manuscript’” (ICMJE, 
2015). 
2. The definition of non-
author contributorship by the 
ICMJE provides loopholes 
for medical writers and 
medical editors to function as 
ghostwriters without being 
named as authors. The 
statement that those who 
provided “writing assistance” 
and “participated in 
writing…of the manuscript” 
effectively allows for 
manuscripts to be written by 
individuals who are not listed 
as authors in the author byline 
(Matheson, 2011). 
*Cross-reference with 
Medical writers, medical 
ghostwriters, or ghost authors 
(#33) 
 
(35) 
PUBLICATION 
PLANNING 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Publication planning is a term 
of academic analysis of the 
process by which companies 
strategically shape the 
scholarly literature base using 
carefully planned 
manuscripts with the 
intention that, once 
published, the articles 
contribute to the promotional 
plan to sell the company’s 
product. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Publication planning is 
the process by which 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and 
medical device companies 
produce and release articles 
in medical journals and 
posters at meetings to 
establish key marketing 
messages. Some companies 
employ medical writers and 
publication planners, and 
most hire medical education 
and communication 
companies (MECCs) to 
create publications” (Fugh-
Berman, 2010).  
2. “The business of 
publication planning 
established itself during the 
1990s, as industry profits 
were escalating and clinical 
research was moving out of 
academic health centres and 
into contract research 
organizations. Publication 
planning is seen as essential 
to the marketing plan for any 
new drugs and it begins years 
in advance of a launch. 
Publication planners will help 
a pharmaceutical company 
design scientific articles that 
reinforce a larger marketing 
plan – or, as one agency puts 
it, help them ‘connect data to 
key messages to support 
product positioning’... 
Publication planners will ask 
how a new drug differs from 
other drugs on the market, 
which practitioners need to be 
reached, and what sort of 
scientific journals should be 
targeted. They will debate the 
finer points of general 
journals versus throwaways, 
and the merits of industry-
supported journal supple-
ments (“‘The value of journal 
supplements is that [they 
allow] you to better tailor 
your marketing message 
since it is a manufacturer-
sponsored publication 
form’”) (Fugh-Berman, 
2010).  
3. “The details of publication 
planning can sound arcane to 
outsiders, yet the business has 
become large enough to 
support two international 
professional societies: an 
industry-run organization 
called the International 
Publication Planning Assoc-
iation, and a non-profit group, 
the International Society for 
Medical Publication Profess-
ionals. The scientific publica-
tions themselves are 
produced by professional 
medical writers, many of 
whom have backgrounds in 
science” (Elliott, 2010). 
“Medical journals have high 
rejection rates, as high as 
94% in the case of the Journal 
of the American Medical 
Associa-tion and the British 
Medical Journal. Meanwhile, 
planning agencies appear to 
be very successful, claiming, 
for example, an “acceptance 
rate on first submission of 
94% for abstracts [to 
conferences] and 78% for 
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manuscripts [to journals]. 
Systematic reject-ion is 
presumably for independent 
academics, not, it seems, for 
Big Pharma” (Sismondo, 
2011). “Ultimate-ly, 
pharmaceutical compan-ies 
demand that publication 
planners generate revenue by 
producing and publicizing 
information that increases 
sales” (Sismondo, 2011).  
4. “In a primer on publication 
planning, the director of one 
MECC defines the activity as: 
‘gaining product adoption 
and usage through the 
systematic planned 
dissemination of key 
messages and data to 
appropriate target audiences 
at the optimum time using the 
most effective communic-
ation channels. These 
channels are such things as: 
‘publications, journal 
reviews, symposia, work-
shops, advisory boards, 
abstracts, educational 
materials/PR’” (Sismondo, 
2007). 
5. “Several of the publication 
planning firms…are owned 
by major publishing houses. 
For example, Excerpta 
Medica is ‘an Elsevier 
business’ and writes that its 
‘relationship with Elsevier 
allows…access to editors and 
editorial boards who provide 
professional advice and deep 
opinion leader networks’. 
Wolters Kluwer Health draws 
attention to its publisher 
Lippincott Williams & 
Wilkins, with ‘nearly 275 
periodicals and 1,500 books 
in more than 100 disciplines,’ 
and to Ovid and its other 
medical information provid-
ers, emphasizing the links it 
can make between its 
different arms” (Sismondo, 
2007). 
6. “A good publication 
planner will help identify 
ways that more than one 
paper could be produced from 
each piece of research, so 
creating a broader palette of 
promo-tional activities” 
(Goldacre, 2012).  
7. “Typically, a publication 
plan includes a timeline and 
lists of articles, grouped 
under specific messages, with 
proposed titles and journals to 
target for submission” (Fugh-
Berman and Dodgson, 2008). 
8. “Ultimately, pharmaceu-
tical companies demand that 
publication planners generate 
revenue by producing and 
publicizing information that 
increases sales” (Sismondo, 
2011). 
9. “Pharmaceutical comp-
anies have the resources to 
create rigorous science that 
supports their marketing 
plans. In so doing they 
integrate science and 
marketing, which we might 
see as an ethically dubious 
activity, with problematic 
consequences for the political 
economy of knowledge. 
Were the companies to 
present their research and 
marketing material without 
disguises, [Sismondo] 
argue[s] that material would 
often be judged in terms of 
corporate interests. Thus, the 
KOLs [key opinion leaders] 
who disguise those interests 
are valuable to the extent that 
they can maintain an 
appearance of independence” 
(Sismondo, 2011). 
10. “The work of publication 
planners is largely unseen. To 
gain commercial value from 
research, articles publicizing 
it are written under the names 
of independent medical 
researchers, though company 
authors may also be 
recognized. The work of 
pharmaceutical company 
statisticians, reviewers from a 
diverse array of departments, 
medical writers, and the 
publication planners them-
selves is only rarely 
acknowledged in journal 
publications (Gotzsche et al., 
2007). Even sponsorship, the 
company funding of the trial, 
is omitted from many 
meeting abstracts (Finucane 
& Bolt, 2004). For this 
reason, we might see 
publication planning as the 
‘ghost management’ of 
medical research and 
publication” (Sismondo and 
Doucet, 2010). 
*Cross-reference with Ghost 
management (#26), 
Involvement of a medical 
writing organization (MWO) 
or medical communications 
company (#30), Involvement 
of a contract research 
organization (CRO) or site-
management organization 
(#31) 
 
(36) REPRINTS 
AND EPRINTS 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Reprints are copies of a 
published article that can be 
ordered from the journal for 
wide distribution of a 
particular study or set of 
studies.  Reprints of a single 
clinical trial with favourable 
results for a company can be 
worth thousands of pages in 
advertising when distributed 
to doctors (Leo, Lacasse, & 
Cimino, 2011; Smith, 2005). 
Similarly, ePrints are 
electronic copies of published 
articles that are available for 
purchase in multiple units and 
comply with copyright. 
ePrints can be downloaded 
from the publisher for 
internal and external use 
(British Library, n.d.). 
SUPPORT: 
1. “[R]eaders see randomized 
controlled trials as one of the 
highest forms of evidence. A 
large trial published in a 
major journal has the 
journal’s stamp of approval 
(unlike advertising), will be 
distributed around the world, 
and may well receive global 
media coverage, particularly 
if promoted simultaneously 
by press releases from both 
the journal and the expensive 
public-relations firm hired by 
the pharmaceutical company 
that sponsored the trial. For a 
drug company, a favourable 
trial is worth thousands of 
pages of advertising, which is 
why a company will 
sometimes spend upwards of 
a million dollars on reprints 
of the trial for worldwide 
distribution. The doctors 
receiving the reprints may not 
read them, but they will be 
impressed by the name of the 
journal from which they 
come. The quality of the 
journal will bless the quality 
of the drug...The evidence is 
strong that companies are 
getting the results they want, 
and this is especially 
worrisome because between 
two-thirds and three-quarters 
of the trials published in the 
major journals – Annals of 
Internal Medicine, JAMA 
[Journal of the American 
Medical Association], 
Lancet, and New England 
Journal of Medicine – are 
funded by the 
industry...Publishers know 
that pharmaceutical 
companies will often 
purchase thousands of 
dollars’ worth of reprints, and 
the profit margin on reprints 
is likely to be 70%. Editors, 
too, know that publishing 
such studies is highly 
profitable, and editors are 
increasingly responsible for 
producing a profit for the 
owners. Many owners – 
including academic societies 
– depend on profits from their 
journals. An editor may thus 
face a frighteningly stark 
conflict of interest: publish a 
trial that will bring 
US$100,000 of profit or meet 
the end-of-year budget by 
firing an editor” (Smith, 
2005). 
 
*Cross-reference with 
Promotion in medical journal 
articles (#18) 
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(37) 
TRANSPARENCY 
OF AUTHORSHIP 
ROLES 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Transparency regarding the 
roles of various researchers, 
departments, and companies 
is important to establish the 
origination of the manuscript.  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Authors who ‘sign-off’ on 
or ‘edit’ original manuscripts 
of reviews written explicitly 
by pharmaceutical industry 
employees or by medical 
publishing companies should 
offer full authorship 
disclosure, such as, ‘drafting 
the manuscript was done by 
representatives from XYZ 
Inc; the authors were 
responsible for critical 
revisions of the manuscript 
for important intellectual 
content’” (Ross et al., 2008). 
 
CATEGORY C: 
DATA SHARING 
AND DATA 
TRANSPARENCY 
(38) 
ACCELERATED 
APPROVAL 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Drug companies that are 
submitting a drug for market 
approval can request that it is 
reviewed as part of an 
accelerated approval program 
that allows drugs that fill an 
unmet need and for serious 
conditions to be granted 
priority review. The duration 
of a priority review is shorter 
than regular review times. 
 
SUPPORT: 
1. Accelerated approval is 
part of a trend toward 
deregulation for the benefit of 
industry and, except in a 
selection of circumstances, 
does not serve to benefit 
patients (Goldacre, 2012; 
Davis and Abraham, 2011). 
2. There are some cases in 
which the length of time that 
it takes for a drug to be 
approved may put patients’ 
health at risk; however, there 
are other cases in which the 
priority of drug companies is 
to get their drug approved for 
market as quickly and 
cheaply as possible to avoid 
loss of revenue. Loss of 
revenue is of concern from 
the beginning of the drug’s 
research and development 
process, especially when the 
drug or parts of it are 
patented. Patent expiration is 
a strong commercial 
incentive, which companies 
use to pressure governments, 
which pressure regulators to 
approve drugs more quickly. 
The speed of the approval 
process is typically a key 
outcome measurement for 
regulators’ performance. 
Although this pressure comes 
from both drug companies 
and regulators, speeding up 
the approval process for 
drugs can lead to patient 
harms. With hastened review 
processes, data may be of 
lower quality and the 
regulator might not impose 
requirements for strong 
evidence upon submission 
and may accept the promise 
for better studies to follow. 
This was the case with a drug 
submission to the United 
States (US) FDA for 
midodrine, which “was 
approved on the basis of three 
very small, very brief trials 
(two of them only two days 
long) in which many of the 
people receiving the drug 
dropped out of the study 
completely. These trials 
showed a small benefit on a 
surrogate outcome – changes 
in blood-pressure recordings 
when the participants stood 
up – but no real benefit on 
real-world outcomes like 
dizziness, quality of life, 
falls, and so on. Because of 
this, after midodrine was 
approved through the urgent 
approval scheme, the 
manufacturer, Shire had to 
promise it would do more 
research once the drug was on 
the market. Year after year, 
no satisfactory trials appeared 
[and] fourteen years later, the 
FDA announced that unless 
Shire finally produced some 
compelling data showing that 
midodrine improved actual 
symptoms and day-to-day 
function, rather than some 
numbers on a blood pressure 
machine after one day, it 
would take the drug off the 
market for good” (Goldacre, 
2012).  
3. Once a drug is approved for 
market, it is very rare for a 
regulator to remove it from 
the market, especially if the 
only issue with the 
submission is lack of 
efficacy, rather than patient 
deaths from adverse events. 
Furthermore, no drug in the 
US has ever been withdrawn 
from the market because of a 
drug company’s failure to 
submit outstanding trial data 
to the regulator. “Post-
marketing trials requested by 
regulators are often 
neglected…Accelerated 
approval is not used to get 
urgent drugs to market for 
emergency use and rapid 
assessment. Follow-up 
studies are not done. These 
accelerated approval 
programmes are a smoke-
screen” (Goldacre, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
(39) CLINICAL 
TRIAL 
REGISTRATION  
 
RELEVANCE:  
The registration of clinical 
trials in online publicly run 
and accessible databases 
helps to ensure that all 
clinical trials are accounted 
for and works as a measure to 
prevent the selective 
publication of clinical trials. 
For example, when clinical 
trials on drugs are registered 
in ClinicalTrials.gov, the 
United States National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) 
database, trial participants, 
researchers, and the public 
are eventually able to 
determine whether certain 
trials have been excluded 
from publication while other 
favourable trials have been 
published.   
SUPPORT: 
1. “The selective publication 
of clinical trials (clinical bias) 
and their outcomes (outcome 
reporting bias) have been 
identified as major problems 
distorting scientific evid-
ence”, resulting in a skewed 
literature base that 
overestimates benefits and 
downplays harms. “To solve 
the problem, study 
registration (disclosure at 
inception that a study is being 
conducted) and results 
registration (posting results 
after a study has been 
completed) have been partly 
implemented using publicly 
accessible databases. 
Usually, the details provided 
at inception and after 
completion both include 
information on study 
methods” (Weisler et al., 
2011).  
2. An open database in which 
researchers are compelled to 
publish their protocol, in full, 
before beginning clinical 
trials. This provides the 
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opportunity for officials or 
researchers to consult the 
database to see whether the 
trials that have been 
conducted have also been 
published. Registering 
clinical trials and their 
protocols is important 
because the protocol provides 
a detailed technical 
description of all aspects of 
the trial including the number 
of patients that will be 
recruited, where the patients 
will come from, how the 
patients will be divided in the 
trial, what treatment each 
group of patients will receive 
in the trial, and what outcome 
will be measured to establish 
if the tested treatment was 
successful. Once this protocol 
is submitted to the clinical 
trial registry, it can be used to 
check not only whether the 
trial was published, but also if 
its methods were at all 
distorted during the trial so 
that its results were 
exaggerated. Although 
journal editors have no legal 
force, they possess the 
authority to accept or reject 
major journal publications. 
Furthermore, only half of all 
clinical trials are published 
and those with unfavorable or 
negative results are two-times 
more likely to be suppressed 
than trials with favorable or 
positive findings. Without all 
of these trials both registered 
and published, there is no 
way for prescribers and 
patients to know the true risks 
of medicines. By insisting on 
pre-registration of trials, 
journal editors are helping to 
take a step forward in data 
transparency efforts 
(Goldacre, 2012). 
3. All clinical trials are 
conducted on individual 
patient participants. The 
results obtained from each of 
these individual patients is 
collected, stored, and 
summarized in the summary 
analysis at the end of the 
study. While patient-level 
data should not be posted on 
a publicly available website 
in a manner in which the 
patients could be easily 
identified by their patient 
histories, patient-level data 
should be made available to 
academics who are able to 
scrutinize the results of the 
trials. Making this patient-
level data, rather than just the 
summaries, available to 
academics has notable 
advantages for prescribers 
and patients. Making this data 
available acts as a safeguard 
against “dubious analytical 
practices”, for example, 
imposing questionable cut-
off-dates for measuring more 
serious adverse events 
compared with less serious 
adverse events that had later 
measurement dates (VIGOR 
trial, Vioxx), or switching the 
primary outcomes described 
in the protocol (key epoetin 
trial) (Goldacre, 2012).  
 
(40) DATA 
SHARING 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Data sharing refers to the 
practice of making the 
anonymized data from 
clinical trials publicly 
accessible. Data sharing is 
important so that researchers 
can, in the public interest, 
interrogate the data to ensure 
that any published research 
conclusions were reasonably 
interpreted from the primary 
and analyzed data. Data 
sharing also provides insights 
into results from both 
favourable and unfavourable 
trials so that research efforts 
are not duplicated regionally 
or globally. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Sharing trial data would 
also allow researchers “to 
conduct more exploratory 
analyses of data, and to better 
investigate – for example – 
whether a drug is associated 
with a particular side effect. It 
would also allow cautious 
‘subgroup analyses’, to see if 
a drug is particularly useful, 
or particularly useless in 
particular types of patients. 
The biggest immediate 
benefit from data sharing is 
that combining individual 
patient data into meta-
analyses gives more accurate 
results than working with the 
crude summary results at the 
end of the paper” (Goldacre, 
2012). 
2. “In their statements, 
authors should indicate 
whether any, all or portions of 
the data are available to 
others; where, through 
whom, when and on what 
terms data will be available; 
and how it may be accessed. 
Some medical journals, such 
as BMJ [British Medical 
Journal] and PLoS Medicine 
[Public Library of Science 
Medicine], have encouraged 
data sharing for several years 
and last year BMJ made data 
sharing a condition of 
publication for trials… 
Ensuring the credibility of 
published research is the 
central focus of academic 
peer review, yet his process is 
a notoriously poor detector of 
error or fraud. Existing 
editorial policies allow 
editors to ask authors for the 
original data as part of the 
peer-review process. 
However, an individual paper 
is often reviewed by only a 
handful of people before 
publication. Extending the 
scrutiny of the underlying 
data into the post-publication 
period is a logical step” 
(Fletcher, 2014). 
3. Le Noury and colleagues 
argue that “…although CSRs 
[clinical study reports] are 
useful…analysis of adverse 
events requires access to 
individual patient level data 
in case report forms” (Le 
Noury et al., 2015b). 
4. “Clinical study reports 
represent a hitherto mostly 
hidden and untapped source 
of detailed and exhaustive 
data on each trial. They 
should be consulted by 
independent parties interested 
in a detailed record of a 
clinical trial, and should form 
the basic unit for evidence 
synthesis as their use is likely 
to minimise the problem of 
reporting bias…CSRs are 
usually written for regulators 
following guidelines 
developed by the industry 
regulatory collaborative 
effort ‘International 
Conference on 
Harmonisation of Technical 
Requirements for 
Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use’ (ICH)…CSRs are but 
one category of information 
that is transmitted from study 
sponsors to regulators, but are 
important as they contain 
substantially more 
information and detail on the 
intervention being tested than 
published versions of the 
same trial. The wealth of 
information may be sought 
with increasing frequency by 
researchers appraising single 
trials, entire trial 
programmes, or by those 
synthesizing evidence (Chan, 
2012; Grens, 
2012)…Examination of 
CSRs revealed scores of 
important technical 
contributions to the design, 
conduct, and reporting of 
each trial. These included 
contributions from data-base 
programmers, records 
officers and CSR writers, 
often invisible in the 
published journal article. In 
some cases, we found no 
mention in CSRs of 
individuals who figured as 
authors of subsequent 
published trial reports while 
individuals named as CSR 
authors went unacknowledg-
ed in journal publications…If 
the contribution to the trial of 
most people goes unrecorded, 
so does their individual 
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responsibility for what is 
produced” (Doshi and 
Jefferson, 2013). 
5. “The proactive EMA 
[European Medicines 
Agency] policy will provide 
an easily accessible window 
to look at CSRs. When you 
read the statements ‘placebo 
controlled’ or ‘matching 
placebo’ or ‘double blind’ in 
a journal article you can now 
go and check if that is really 
the case. And if, for example, 
the certificate of analysis is 
missing from the CSR that 
you are accessing, you can 
ask EMA why that is so, 
introducing an unheard 
degree of accountability. An 
ever growing body of 
scientific evidence shows that 
journals do not give the 
whole story (although some 
go to extraordinary lengths). 
This point reflects simple 
arithmetic: the ratio of CSR 
pages to publication pages for 
the same trial can be as much 
as 8000 to 1. To maintain 
their credibility, journals will 
have to either provide access 
to CSRs, or stop publishing 
trials altogether and offer 
commentaries on trials only. 
One further option, that of 
asking for the complete CSR 
to be made available for each 
trial on submission, is also at 
present unrealistic, as current 
peer-reviewers are unskilled 
in making sense and 
reviewing a CSR, especially 
if time constrained. My 
experience also tells me that 
every trial should be looked 
at in the context of the whole 
trial programme, for example 
to avoid a piecemeal 
approach to the assessment of 
potential harms” (Jefferson, 
2014). 
*Cross-reference with 
Ownership of data (#42) 
 
 
(41) OFF-LABEL 
INDICATIONS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
It is illegal to promote drugs 
for uses other than those 
which have been approved by 
the applicable national 
regulatory authority 
(Lexchin, 2012a).  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Companies have paid 
billions of dollars in fines for 
off-label promotion, often 
using company-generated 
company-paid speakers, and 
ghostwritten articles to imply 
clinical benefits in the 
absence of clinical trials (or 
the presence of negative 
trials); fines have also been 
imposed for suppressing risks 
or misleading clinicians 
about risks” (Fugh-Berman, 
2013). 
2. “Prescribing drugs for 
purposes outside those 
approved by [an applicable 
regulatory agency] – ‘off-
label’ use – is common in 
clinical practice and may be 
appropriate if well-grounded 
in solid clinical trial findings 
(Radley, Finkelstein and 
Stafford, 2006)…Litigation 
documents reveal that 
pharmaceutical companies 
have paid physicians to 
promote off-label uses of 
their products through a 
number of different 
avenues…All of the 
relationships we identified 
were alleged by 
whistleblowers with special 
knowledge of company 
practices, although none of 
the complaints were subject 
to full trial and evaluation by 
judge or jury. We found that, 
of 91 authors who had 
financial relationships with 
pharmaceutical companies in 
the context of off-label drug 
marketing, 39 authored 404 
related articles in the three 
years following their 
engagement. However, only 
two-thirds of those articles 
contained any type of 
disclosure statement, one-
quarter contained a disclosure 
statement that mentioned the 
relevant pharmaceutical 
company and one in seven 
made disclosures that 
adequately described their 
relationship with the 
manufacturer” (Kesselheim 
et al., 2012). 
3. “The most prevalent 
strategy involved expanding 
use on the basis of diagnosis 
– that is, seeking off-label 
uses for disease entities 
distinct from those approved 
uses by the FDA…The 
second most common 
strategy for off-label 
promotion was to expand the 
product’s use to different 
variations of the same 
condition…In some cases, 
the off-label disease was 
closely related to the 
approved one – for example, 
when a product was 
specifically approved for a 
severe manifestation of a 
condition but then promoted 
for milder forms…One 
prominent subcategory of this 
type of off-label promotion 
focused on patient subgroups 
different from those 
contemplated in the FDA 
approval…The final, and 
least common, variety of off-
label expansion was off-label 
prescribing based on different 
dosing regimens than that 
approved by the FDA” 
(Kesselheim, Mello, and 
Studdert, 2011). 
4. “Nearly half of 
whistleblowers also alleged 
that manufacturers sought to 
promote off-label drug use 
through journal 
publications…These 
practices included falsely 
reporting outcomes from 
patients in manufacturer-
sponsored studies (US ex rel. 
Gallagher v. Intermune, Inc.) 
and publishing ‘ghostwritten’ 
articles supporting an 
unapproved use written by 
the manufacturer under the 
name of a respected scientist 
(US ex rel. Westlock v. 
Pfizer, Inc., et al., 2008). 
Finally, a minority of 
whistleblowers alleged that 
manufacturers recruited 
physicians to conduct clinical 
trials for them with the intent 
of encouraging off-label use 
(‘seeding trials’), rather than 
for any useful scientific or 
information-gathering 
reasons…Many of the 
complaints describing 
internal practices…pointed to 
specific efforts by drug 
manufacturers to conceal off-
label marketing activities. 
Some described warnings 
from legal teams to avoid off-
label marketing… [which] 
were widely undermined 
through strateg-ies such as 
verbal orders diverging from 
what was declared in their 
company policies (US, et al. 
ex rel. Lauterbach v. Orphan 
Medical Inc., Jazz 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Dr. 
Peter Gleason, 2006). For 
example, one whistleblower 
reported that his company 
purposefully designed ‘do not 
detail’ labels on materials 
related to off-label uses that 
could easily be removed by a 
sales representative (US ex 
rel. Collins, et al. v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 2007). A third of 
complaints included reports 
of direct orders to conceal, 
such as ‘cleaning’ internal 
reports and memoranda of all 
mentions of off-label 
marketing” (Kesselheim, 
Mello, and Studdert, 2011). 
5. “Our findings show that 
off-label marketing practices 
have a broad reach. Similar 
behaviours and strategies 
were linked to manufacturers 
of varying sizes across drugs 
in virtually all therapeutic 
classes; they extended to 
many aspects of the health 
care system; they affected a 
multitude of players 
(prescribers, pharmacies, 
disease advocacy groups, 
CME organizations, consum-
ers); and were pursued 
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through virtually every facet 
of physician-industry 
relationships (paid consultan-
cies, preceptorships, and 
collaboration in clinical trial 
and research publications)… 
Nearly a quarter of the 
whistleblowers alleged that 
pharmaceutical sales repres-
entatives were given access to 
patients’ confidential medical 
records at physicians’ offices 
for the purposes of trolling 
for prospective targets for 
illegal direct-to-consumer 
promotion of off-label uses” 
(Kesselheim, Mello, and 
Studdert, 2011). 
6. “Once a drug is on the 
market, it can be prescribed 
‘off-label’ – that is, for any 
condition other than that for 
which the drug was approved. 
Although it is legal for 
physicians and other 
prescribers to prescribe a 
drug off-label, it is illegal for 
pharmaceutical companies to 
promote drugs off-label…It 
is unknown how much off-
label use is due to 
promotion…Pharmaceutical 
companies use paid speakers, 
consultants, and researchers 
to promote off-label use” 
(Fugh-Berman, 2013). 
*Cross-reference with 
Promotion in medical journal 
articles (#18) 
 
(42) OWNERSHIP 
OF DATA 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Transparency pertaining to 
which institution, research 
centre, or company owns 
clinical trial data is important 
because the owner of the data 
can dictate the terms of its 
release and under what terms 
it can be published. 
SUPPORT: 
1. As of 2007, approximately 
70% of the funding for all 
clinical trials was sponsored 
by industry (Sismondo, 
2008b). When clinical trials 
are funded by industry, it is 
common for academic 
medical centres to allow drug 
companies to own the data 
(Mello, Clarridge, and 
Studdert, 2005). 
2. “The habitual lying took a 
new turn in 2012 when 
investors’ lawyers accused [a 
drug company] of having 
destroyed documents about 
the development of celecoxib 
and valdecoxib in bad faith 
and compounded their initial 
misconduct by making false 
statements about the 
existence of centralised 
databases (Feeley & Van 
Voris, 2012). [The drug 
company] denied the 
existence of electronic 
databases containing millions 
of files about the drugs and 
argued that the existence of 
‘e-Rooms were a figment of 
plaintiffs’ imagination’. 
However, [drug company] 
officials later acknowledged 
the rooms existed and turned 
over documents stored 
electronically. The lawyers 
also complained that [the 
drug company’s] technical 
staff undertook ‘two 
dismantling projects while 
this case was pending’. In 
response, [the drug 
company’s] lawyer filed a 
new lie saying, ‘At no time 
did [the drug company] ever 
mislead plaintiffs concerning 
the existence of databases’” 
(Gotzsche, 2013). 
*Cross-reference with Data 
sharing (#40), Prepublication 
review and study alteration 
(#45), Research and clinical 
trial contractual confident-
iality and nondisclosure 
agreements (#46), Seeding 
trials (#47), Selective 
reporting or selective 
publication of clinical trials 
(#48) 
 
(43) 
ORIGINATION OF 
THE 
MANUSCRIPT 
AND 
MANUSCRIPT 
OUTLINE 
 
RELEVANCE:  
The facility or facilities in 
which clinical trial 
manuscripts are actually 
created and drafted are 
extremely important to 
disclose and analyze. It is 
widely believed that 
scientific journal articles are 
written by the named authors 
within their academic 
institutions; however, this is 
not always the case.  
SUPPORT: 
1. When medical writers are 
involved in the publication 
process, they pitch ideas for 
articles to the drug company 
that hires their team by 
“…draw[ing] up 
justifications for each article 
to sell the concept within the 
pharma company. These 
justifications may be couched 
overtly in terms of the 
article’s marketing relevance, 
or more euphemistically in 
terms of ‘medical need’ and 
‘educational value’. 
Following discussions with 
the in-house pharma team, 
more detailed outlines are 
next developed for approved 
articles. Around this time 
‘authors’, who are usually 
leading clinicians (KOLs…) 
are approached. Next, the 
outline (though seldom the 
‘key messages’, which 
generally remain 
confidential) is introduced to 
the ‘author’ and a manuscript 
is subsequently ghostwritten” 
(Matheson, 2008). Evidence 
of scientific manuscripts 
originating and being tracked 
by medical writing 
organizations can be found in 
the Drug Industry Documents 
Archive (University of 
California San Francisco 
[UCSF], 2015). MECCs or 
MCCs are jointly responsible 
“…for the masking of 
corporate origination within 
the medical literature” 
(Matheson, 2011). 
2. “Some multicenter trials 
have publication committees, 
which may be dominated by 
in-house or outside 
investigators, that write up 
the results for publication. In 
other cases, the company or 
CRO writes the reports for 
publication, circulating draft 
manuscripts to the 
investigators who will be 
listed as authors” 
(Bodenheimer, 2000). 
3. Medical writing organiza-
tions may consider 
manuscript outlines to be 
“…a concept of an idea”, 
which is developed by 
“…review[ing] the literature 
and you see that there is a 
number of studies and [the 
idea] can be put in…a 
summation, which is 
essentially a review paper… 
and so what we would do 
is…scour the literature to see, 
is there enough information 
to then be used in a 
summation document, which 
is essentially a review paper” 
(Unknown, 2006). This 
outline then serves as the 
beginning to the ghost-
written and, subsequently, 
guest-authored review 
manuscript. The outline may 
be sent to the guest author for 
comments.   
*Cross-reference with 
Origination of data (#44), 
Prepublication review and 
study alteration (#45) 
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(44) 
ORIGINATION OF 
DATA 
 
RELEVANCE:  
The facility or facilities in 
which the data was originally 
collected, analyzed, and 
stored are extremely 
important to disclose and 
analyze. Pharmaceutical 
companies are involved in 
every stage of the clinical 
trial process from designing 
the protocols to analyzing and 
publishing the collected data. 
These companies also own 
the resultant data and 
analyses, which leads to 
questions about which data 
are published and which are 
suppressed.  
SUPPORT: 
1. “Large drug companies 
often create their own study 
designs and contract with 
CROs to develop a network 
of sites, implement the trial 
protocol at those sites, and 
send report forms to the 
sponsoring company, which 
performs the data analysis. 
Smaller pharmaceutical firms 
may hire a CRO to manage 
the entire trial, including 
study design, data analysis, 
and preparation of 
[applications to regulators for 
marketing approval], and 
journal articles” 
(Bodenheimer, 2000).  
“Some trials have four layers 
(manufacturer, CRO, SMO 
[site management 
organization], and physician-
investigator), a situation 
reminiscent of the multitiered 
managed-care model 
(employer, health 
maintenance organization, 
independent practice 
association, and physician)… 
SMOs provide community-
physician investigators with 
administrative support and 
help market investigators’ 
services to pharmaceutical 
companies. They have been 
criticized for producing data 
of poor quality, inadequately 
training investigators, and 
costing more than a system of 
independent sites unassoc-
iated with an SMO” 
(Bodenheimer, 2000). 
2. “A study’s raw data are 
generally stored centrally at 
the company or CRO. 
Investigators may receive 
only portions of the data. 
Some principal investigators 
have the capacity to analyze 
all the data from a large trial, 
but companies prefer to retain 
control over this process. A 
physician-executive at one 
company explained, ‘We are 
reluctant to provide the data 
tape because some 
investigators want to take the 
data beyond where the data 
should go” (Bodenheimer, 
2000). 
3. Without transparency of 
the facility or facilities in 
which data was collected and 
analyzed and without open 
access to data, the coding of 
patient reports on side effects, 
for example, remain 
unknown and unanalyzed 
until such data becomes 
released (Le Noury et al., 
2015a, 2015b). The 
restriction of release of data is 
often protected by 
companies’ legal experts, 
whose responsibility is to 
protect their employers’ 
interests (Matheson, 2008; 
Parker, 2012). 
*Cross-reference with 
Origination of the manuscript 
and manuscript outline (#43), 
Prepublication review and 
study alteration (#45), 
Research and clinical trial 
contractual confidentiality 
and nondisclosure 
agreements (#46), Seeding 
trials (#47) 
 
(45) 
PREPUBLICATIO
N REVIEW AND 
STUDY 
ALTERATION 
 
RELEVANCE:  
When clinical trials are 
funded by industry, it is 
common for academic 
medical centres to allow the 
drug company sponsors to 
review manuscripts written 
by the investigators for an 
agreed-on period before 
publication (Mello, 
Clarridge, and Studdert, 
2005). Furthermore, when 
researchers have financial 
ties including gifts to drug 
companies that manufacture 
medications about which they 
are writing, the sponsor 
sometimes requires 
prepublication review of any 
articles or reports resulting 
from use of the funds or gifts 
and this expectation increases 
when the gifts are 
biomaterials (Fugh-Berman, 
2013). Requesting prepublic-
ation review encourages a 
pro-sponsor environment of 
manuscript preparation. 
Disclosure of whether 
sponsors requested prepublic-
ation review as well as any 
revisions made by sponsors is 
important in the assessment 
of industry involvement in 
manuscript preparation. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “In recent years… 
sponsoring companies have 
become intimately involved 
in all aspects of research on 
their products. They often 
design the studies; perform 
the analysis; write the papers; 
and decide whether, when, 
and in what form to publish 
the results. In some 
multicenter trials, authors 
may not even have access to 
all their own data” (Angell, 
2008). 
2. In a 2009 survey, 61% of 
respondent researchers 
reported being asked by their 
research sponsors to give the 
sponsor prepublication 
review (Tereskerz et al., 
2009). 
3. “Even if a researcher does 
not allow a sponsor to 
ghostwrite an article, industry 
review of articles by a 
sponsor may result in the 
insertion of subtle marketing 
messages that researchers 
may not recognize as 
advertisements. Marketing 
messages may not mention 
the targeted drug; for 
example, marketing 
messages may claim that a 
targeted disease is 
underdiagnosed, that a 
mechanism of action is 
particularly exciting, that a 
class of drugs has unique 
benefits, or that a competing 
drug has significant 
drawbacks. Marketing 
messages are disseminated in 
research studies, case reports, 
reviews, commentaries, and 
letters, as well as in 
presentations and posters at 
medical meetings (Fugh-
Berman & Melnick, 2008)” 
(Fugh-Berman, 2013). 
4. When clinical trials are 
funded by industry, it is 
common for academic 
medical centres to allow drug 
company sponsors to alter the 
study design after the clinical 
trial agreement has been 
executed (Mello, Clarridge, 
and Studdert, 2005). 
*Cross-reference with 
Ownership of data (#42), 
Origination of the manuscript 
and manuscript outline (#43), 
Origination of data (#44) 
 
250 
 
 
 
(46) RESEARCH 
AND CLINICAL 
TRIAL 
CONTRACTUAL 
CONFIDENTIALIT
Y AND 
NONDISCLOSURE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Confidentiality and 
nondisclosure clauses are 
typically included in 
contracts for medical 
researchers to sign prior to 
beginning their industry-
sponsored studies.  
SUPPORT: 
1. These clauses are used to 
“maintain a degree of control 
over clinical research that is 
far greater than most 
members of the 
public...realize.” This is 
achieved through not only 
selective disclosure, but also 
imposed restraints on almost 
all aspects of the clinical trial 
process (Mirowski and Van 
Horne, 2005; Olivieri, 2003; 
Krimsky, 2004). Similarly, 
restrictive provisions in 
clinical trial agreements 
between industry sponsors 
and academic medical 
researchers are typically 
contractually-binding 
statements that permit 
industry sponsors to have 
very involved roles in the 
development, conducting, 
data collection, and data 
analysis of clinical trials. 
These roles are usually not 
disclosed in published 
clinical trial articles. These 
restrictive provisions include, 
but are not limited to, 
permitting the industry 
sponsor to revise a 
manuscript written by 
investigators (not including 
revisions related to protecting 
proprietary information), and 
gagging clauses that allow 
sponsors to decide which 
results should be published 
(Mello, Clarridge, and 
Studdert, 2005). 
2. It is common for the terms 
of clinical trial agreements 
with drug company sponsors 
of clinical trials to be 
confidential (Mello, 
Clarridge, and Studdert, 
2005).  
3. Site agreements between 
researchers and industry 
sponsors of multicenter 
clinical trials may include 
provisions concerning: 
Design of the trial (i.e., plan 
for data collection, data 
analysis and interpretation, 
involvement of an 
independent data and safety 
monitoring board), access to 
data (i.e., whether all data is 
accessible to authors of 
reports on multicenter trials, 
whether site investigators 
analyze and publish site data, 
and whether site data may be 
used for other educational or 
research purposes), 
publication of results (i.e., 
whether all trial results will 
be published, whether an 
independent writing or 
publications committee will 
have a role, whether criteria 
for authorship of reports on 
trial results will be addressed, 
how decisions will be made 
about which journals should 
be considered target journals 
for the manuscripts on these 
trials, and whether there is a 
commitment to publish the 
results of subsequent research 
related to original trial), and 
other issues (i.e. whether 
confidentiality clauses and 
other restrictive provisions 
are permitted and present that 
restrict rights to publication, 
how conflicts between the 
agreement and protocol will 
be handled, whether the 
affiliated academic institution 
is required to follow protocol, 
and whether the sponsor is 
required to follow the 
protocol) (Schulman et al., 
2002).  
4. “Only 4% [of respondents] 
reported that a sponsor had 
ever asked them to withhold 
research results from 
publication, but 13% said 
they had been asked to delay 
publication of research 
results. Nearly 8% have been 
asked by a sponsor to present 
research results in a way that 
favours the sponsor’s drug or 
product. About 7% have been 
asked by an industry sponsor 
to keep the research results 
secret. Far more common… 
were reports of being asked to 
give the sponsor 
prepublication review (61%) 
and being asked to 
acknowledge the sponsor in 
the publication (62%)” 
(Tereskerz et al., 2009). 
*Cross-reference with 
Ownership of data (#42), 
Origination of data (#44) 
 
(47) SEEDING 
TRIALS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Seeding trials are clinical 
trials that are conducted by 
pharmaceutical companies 
and are designed to appear to 
answer a scientific question, 
but are carried out in order to 
primarily fulfill the 
marketing objectives of the 
sponsoring company. These 
trials have been used to 
promote drugs by finding 
favourable results and 
increase prescribing in the 
investigators who become 
involved in helping to 
conduct these trials 
(Krumholz, Egilman, and 
Ross, 2011; Hill et al., 2008). 
SUPPORT: 
1. “… [P]hase IV ‘seeding’ 
trials [are] trials designed to 
promote the prescription of 
new drugs rather than to 
generate scientific data. In 
2004, 13.2% (US$4.9 billion) 
of R&D expenditures by 
American pharmaceutical 
firms was spent on phase IV 
trials (Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers 
of America, 2006). Almost 
75% of these trials are 
managed solely by the 
commercial, as opposed to 
the clinical, division of 
biopharmaceutical compan-
ies, strongly suggesting that 
the vast majority of these 
trials are done just for their 
promotional value (La Puma 
& Seltzer, 2002)” (Gagnon 
and Lexchin, 2008).  
2. “Pharmaceutical 
companies use a variety of 
techniques to promote their 
products, including ‘seeding 
trials.’ Seeding trials are 
clinical trials, deceptively 
portrayed as patient studies, 
which are used to promote 
drugs recently approved or 
under review by [an 
applicable regulatory agency] 
by encouraging prescribers to 
use these medications under 
the guise of participating as 
an investigator on a clinical 
trial (Kessler, Rose, Temple, 
Schapiro and Griffin, 1994). 
In fact, marketing 
departments, rather than 
clinical research departments, 
are known to design and 
conduct these trials (Hill, 
Ross, Egilman and 
Krumholz, 2008). Although 
seeding trials are not illegal, 
they are unethical. Their 
primary goal is to expose 
physicians to a new drug and 
have them interact with the 
pharmaceutical company 
sponsor and its sales 
representatives in order to 
influence prescribing 
decisions, independent of any 
findings from the actual 
study. In addition, physician 
‘investigators’ are the actual 
trial subjects, and this 
information is neither 
disclosed to them nor the 
human participants. There are 
no current estimates of how 
frequently seeding trials are 
conducted, and most 
evidence of their planning 
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and conduct has come from 
documents produced in tort 
litigation against 
pharmaceutical companies 
(Kesselheim & Avorn, 
2007)” (Krumholz, Egilman, 
and Ross, 2011). 
3. Marketing departments are 
involved because a 
considerable number of 
Phase IV trials are designed 
to familiarize physicians with 
products, to encourage 
prescriptions, or to allow 
drug representatives more 
access to prescribers. For 
example ‘seeding trials’ pay 
physicians to prescribe 
specific drugs as part of trials 
but are aimed at increasing 
prescriptions. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies 
also support research by 
nonacademic 
physicians…According to 
one internal document, a goal 
of the trial was to allow 
physicians to ‘[g]ain 
experience with [a drug] prior 
to and during the critical 
launch phase.’ For this 
reason, the trial aimed to 
enroll 600 primary care 
physicians rather than a 
specific number of patients. 
The prescriptions of those 
physicians were tracked and 
compared to a control group 
of 99 physicians not in the 
trial. To the extent that data 
mattered, it was sales data; 
however, the company 
presented the trial to 
physicians as scientific 
research” (Sismondo, 2011). 
4. “Seeding trials are clinical 
trials designed by 
pharmaceutical companies to 
promote the use of 
pharmacotherapies that were 
recently approved or are 
under review by [an 
applicable regulatory 
agency]. Seeding trials are 
designed to appear as if they 
answer a specific question, 
but primarily fulfill 
marketing objectives…[A 
drug company]’s marketing 
division…handled the 
scientific and marketing data, 
including collection, 
analysis, and dissemination 
(Weiner, 2008)” (Hill et al., 
2008). 
5. Seeding trials are 
“[c]linical trials of a drug or 
device among human 
participants that are 
conducted for the purpose of 
promotion of the drug or 
device and encouraging its 
use directly to physicians 
under the guise of their 
participating as an 
investigator in a clinical trial, 
without disclosing the 
marketing objectives to 
patients, physicians, regulat-
ors, or institutional review 
board members… These 
trials may be less likely to be 
published because they are 
designed and conducted by 
marketing. Finally, these 
trials are often redundant and 
examine scientific questions 
that the company has already 
formally investigated” (Ross, 
Gross, & Krumholz, 2012).  
*See Ezetimibe Plus 
Simvastatin Versus Simva-
statin Alone on Atheroscl-
erosis in the Carotid Artery 
(ENHANCE) trial 
(Greenland and Lloyd-Jones, 
2008), Study of Neurontin: 
Titrate to Effect, Profile of 
Safety (STEPS) trial 
(Krumholz, Egilman, and 
Ross, 2011), ADVANTAGE 
trial (Gotzsche, 2013; Hill et 
al., 2008), Predictable Results 
and Experience in Diabetes 
through Intensific-ation and 
Control to Target: An 
International Variability 
Eval-uation (PREDICTIVE) 
study (Yudkin, 2012).  
*Cross-reference with 
Ownership of data (#42), 
Origination of data (#44) 
 
(48) SELECTIVE 
REPORTING OR 
SELECTIVE 
PUBLICATION OF 
CLINICAL 
TRIALS 
 
RELEVANCE:  
Selective reporting or 
selective publication of 
clinical trials occurs when 
favourable results are 
published, while 
unfavourable results are 
suppressed by not publishing 
them.  
SUPPORT: 
1. Drug companies conduct 
many clinical trials. When the 
results from any of these 
trials are unfavorable to the 
company, it can choose not to 
publish them. These missing, 
unfavorable trials are 
important to publish for many 
reasons including that their 
not being published distorts 
the literature base and 
prevents researchers from 
truly excluding bias from 
studies. Selective reporting 
also keeps negative findings 
from researchers and funding 
agencies globally, so that 
time and money is wasted 
because they may be 
conducting those same 
studies over again, reaching 
the same unfavorable results, 
and again failing to publish. 
In the current publishing 
environ-ment, failures are 
simply brushed under the rug, 
leading to important 
consequences for the cost of 
replicating research. It is also 
important to publish clinical 
trials that have resulted in 
negative outcomes or 
revealed adverse events, 
which may be unfavorable to 
the company’s profits from 
that drug, but will 
undoubtedly be beneficial to 
prescribers and patients 
taking those medications. 
This leads to ‘publication 
bias’ where negative results 
remain unpublished and, 
therefore, are not subjected to 
scrutiny or further analysis in 
meta-analyses or systematic 
reviews, which are typically 
used to make drug 
recommendations in clinical 
practice guidelines. Further-
more, researchers are 
incentivized by crude 
publication metrics, such as 
the number of papers they 
have published, the number 
of times that their papers have 
been cited, and the impact 
factors of the journals in 
which they publish. 
Moreover, positive findings 
are more likely to be 
published than negative 
findings (Goldacre, 2012). 
2. “Selective publication of 
studies that favor a sponsor’s 
drug has obvious commercial 
benefits. According to the 
former pharmaceutical 
execu-tive who shared his 
persp-ective on the condition 
of anonymity: ‘It is to 
industry’s advantage to 
selectively support particular 
researchers whose point of 
view supports marketing 
goals, and to encourage 
selective publication of 
articles’” (Fugh-Berman, 
2013). 
3. “In 2002, a Pfizer 
sponsored meta-analysis was 
published in the BMJ (Hyde, 
2012), which shows how 
risky it is to collaborate with 
industry, even for a skilled 
statistician who has done a lot 
of good work for the 
Cochrane Collaboration. The 
paper surprised many of his 
Cochrane colleagues when it 
came out. It claimed that 
celecoxib leads to fewer 
serious gastrointestinal 
events, and the abstract only 
mentioned relative benefit, 
not absolute benefit, which 
was far more modest. The 
authors only included the 
misleading 6 months data for 
the CLASS trial, which was 
by far the biggest one. What 
was most strange, however, 
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was that, although the 
gastrointestinal events were 
described in detail over 
several pages, including 
many graphs, there were no 
data on thromboses, which 
makes the review completely 
worthless. The authors, one 
of which was from Pfizer, 
explained that the review was 
limited to assessing only 
upper gastrointestinal safety, 
with the excuse that the trials 
did not report on thromboses. 
This excuse is pathetic. It is 
irresponsible not to report the 
number of thromboses, given 
that is the most important 
harm of COX-2 inhibitors. 
Furthermore, the clinicians 
are obliged to report all 
serious adverse events 
immediately to the company, 
which means that the 
company must have had data 
on thromboses, whether or 
not they preferred to forget 
about them. In fact, 
thromboses were reported in 
the CLASS trial, and even 
using only the misleading 6 
months data, there were 4.3% 
serious adverse events with 
celecoxib and 4.2% with the 
other two drugs, i.e. no 
advantage at all for celecoxib. 
The manipulations paid off, 
as they always do. About 
30,000 reprints were bought 
from the publisher and less 
than 2 years after its 
publication, the CLASS trial 
had already been cited 169 
times, and sales increased 
from $2.6 billion to $3.1 
billion in just 1 year. The 
fraud in JAMA, which has 
been propagated in many 
meta-analyses, must have 
been worth billions of dollars 
for the company” (Gotzsche, 
2013). 
*Cross-reference with 
Ownership of data (#42) 
 
 
 
CATEGORY D: 
ENFORCEMENT 
(49) SANCTION: 
BAN FROM 
PUBLISHING IN 
JOURNAL OR 
ACTING AS A 
PEER-REVIEWER 
FOR THAT 
JOURNAL 
 
RELEVANCE: 
A ban from publishing in, or 
acting as a peer-reviewer for, 
a journal when a named 
author has violated the 
journal’s policies has been 
suggested as a consequence. 
SUPPORT: 
1. Journal editors should 
adopt strong sanctions for 
failure to disclose conflicts of 
interest, such as a three-year 
ban on publications within 
the pages of that journal when 
an undisclosed conflict of 
interest is brought to light. 
The threat of sanctions will 
improve compliance in this 
self-regulated field” 
(Goozner, 2004). 
2. “Penalties for misrepres-
entation of authorship should 
be severe, because misrepres-
entation of authorship 
constitutes fraud, and Plastic 
and Reconstructive Surgery 
will investigate cases of 
ghostwriting and will 
consider such cases as 
scientific misconduct. The 
Journal’s policy of 
investigating instances of 
plagiarism, duplicate 
publication, and other forms 
of scientific misconduct has 
been previously formulated, 
and will be applied to 
allegations of 
ghostwriting…Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgery takes 
the role of authorship 
seriously. In publishing a 
policy statement on 
authorship criteria, we 
believe the role of authorship 
will be clarified and hope that 
authors will better understand 
what activities constitute 
legitimate authorship on their 
manuscripts” (Sullivan and 
Rohrich, 2011). 
 
(50) SANCTION: 
RETRACTION 
 
RELEVANCE: 
Retraction refers to the 
withdrawal of a published 
study from a journal. 
SUPPORT: 
1. “Retraction is one of the 
most serious sanctions a 
journal can take against 
authors in cases of 
misconduct, and can cause 
permanent damage to 
reputations and academic 
careers. Therefore, 
retractions should be handled 
carefully and journals should 
have a process for deciding 
when and how to retract 
articles” (Wager & Williams, 
2011). 
2. “Journal editors and 
publishers should take 
responsibility for everything 
published in their journal. 
Therefore, if anything 
misleading, incorrect, or 
fraudulent is published, it is 
important that the record is 
corrected so that readers are 
not misled. For small errors, 
such as a misplaced figure 
legend or an omitted 
reference, a correction is 
usually sufficient…However, 
when large sections or even 
entire articles are affected, 
either by misconduct or by 
honest errors, then a 
retraction is usually required. 
The COPE [Committee on 
Publication Ethics] retraction 
guidelines state that the 
purpose of retractions is to 
correct the literature rather 
than to punish the authors. 
Nevertheless, most authors 
take a negative view of 
retractions and may fear that 
they will harm their 
reputation. It is therefore 
important that journals have 
policies to ensure that 
retraction is used fairly and 
consistently and also to 
ensure that the reason for any 
retraction is always clearly 
stated. Researchers should be 
encouraged to notify the 
journal if they discover a 
problem with their work and, 
if this was due to an honest 
error, should not fear that 
readers might infer that the 
resulting retraction was a sign 
of misconduct. Similarly, 
authors should not be 
stigmatized for 
administrative errors caused 
by the journal (e.g., if the 
same article is accidentally 
published twice). Journals 
therefore have a duty to 
ensure that retractions due to 
misconduct and those due to 
honest errors are clearly 
distinguished…In cases of 
suspected misconduct, 
editors may want to alert 
readers to possible problems 
with an article but may not 
feel it is appropriate to retract 
the publication until the 
investigation has 
concluded… Retractions are 
a sign that a journal takes its 
responsibilities to publication 
integrity seriously and should 
never be considered a sign of 
failure. Peer review cannot be 
expected to detect all cases of 
fraud (especially if it is well 
concealed) or honest errors 
(which are not even initially 
visible to authors). Therefore 
retractions do not necessarily 
imply failures in the peer 
review process, although it is 
always good to learn from 
experience and consider how 
such problems might be 
detected in the future” 
(Wager, 2015).
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5.12 APPENDIX B MEDICAL JOURNAL POLICY ASSESSMENT TOOL 
CATEGORY A: FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCLOSURES FOR AUTHORS, RESEARCH TEAM, AND OTHER 
CONTRIBUTORS 
FOCUS: DOES THE MEDICAL JOURNAL POLICY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF THESE ITEMS FOR NAMED AUTHORS, INVESTIGATORS, ALL STUDY TEAM MEMBERS, AND 
CONSULTANTS? 
*A CHECKED BOX INDICATES AN ANSWER OF “YES” 
ID ITEM NO/ 
UNCLEAR 
YES, YEAR RANGES FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURES INSTITUTION
/COMPANY 
NAME(S) 
DISCLOSED? 
IS THIS 
INFORMATION 
PUBLICLY 
ACCESSIBLE? 
N/A 
PRESENT ONLY PAST:1-5  PAST: 6-10 PAST: 10+  
A1 Compensation: travel, transportation, attendance, 
or meeting registration fees at off-site lectures 
and meetings (i.e., continuing medical education 
(CME) or research-related activities, travel to 
advisory boards, consultation, assistance with 
going to congress) 
        
A2 Conference moderating         
A3 Consulting relationships         
A4 Extended disclosures (i.e., spouses or partners, 
adult children, other relatives) 
        
A5 Gifts and meals         
A6 Honoraria and payments         
A7 Industry support funds for trainees and junior 
researchers (i.e., scholarships, awards, 
fellowships) 
        
A8 Industry-funded CME programs         
A9 Industry-funded speaking relationships/speakers’ 
bureaus 
        
A10 Institutional or company affiliations and 
employment 
        
A11 Paid expert testimony in court case         
A12 Patents/royalties         
A13 Payment for working on or enrolling patients in 
clinical trials 
        
A14 Promotional visits with drug sales 
representatives 
        
A15 Receipt of drug samples         
A16 Restricted and unrestricted grants         
A17 Scientific advisory board memberships, 
consultants meetings, board of directors 
appointments, review panel participation 
        
A18 Stock ownership or options, bonds, and equity 
holdings 
        
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A19 Work with a practice management consultant         
A20 Financial interests related to the funder(s) of 
study 
        
A21 Financial interests related to the competitor(s) of 
the funder(s) of the study 
        
A22 Personal financial gain from this study         
A23 Financial gain for employing 
institution/company from this study 
        
          
CATEGORY B: ROLES IN THE RESEARCH, WRITING, AND PUBLICATION PROCESSES 
FOCUS: DOES THE MEDICAL JOURNAL POLICY REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE AND DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND PARTICIPATION OF PEOPLE/COMPANIES IN 
THE FOLLOWING ROLES FOR A SUBMITTED STUDY? 
*A CHECKED BOX INDICATES AN ANSWER OF “YES” 
ID ITEM NO/ 
UNCLEAR 
YES, YEAR RANGES FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURES INSTITUTION
/COMPANY 
NAME(S) 
DISCLOSED? 
IS THIS 
INFORMATION 
PUBLICLY 
ACCESSIBLE? 
N/A 
PRESENCE IN 
ROLE ONLY 
START 
DATE 
END DATE PREVIOUS 
ROLES 
B24 Named author(s)         
B25 Principal investigator(s)         
B26 Co-investigator(s)         
B27 Paid consultant(s)         
B28 Members of steering committee         
B29 Participant recruiter(s)         
B30 Funder(s)          
B31 Type of support provided by funder(s) (i.e., 
provision of financial, equipment, testing kit, 
drug, or device resources?) 
        
B32 Research assistant(s)         
B33 Contract research organization(s)         
B34 Medical writing organization(s)         
B35 Medical writer(s) or medical editor(s)         
B36 Corresponding author/liaison         
B37 Statistician(s)         
 Observer(s)         
ID ITEM1 NO ULTIMATE AUTHORITY AND/OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVER 
STUDY PROCESS COMPONENTS
1 
INSTITUTION
/COMPANY 
NAME(S) 
DISCLOSED? 
IS THIS 
INFORMATION 
PUBLICLY 
ACCESSIBLE? 
N/A 
STUDY TEAM FUNDER SHARED UNCLEAR 
B38 Conceptualizing and designing the study         
B39 Approving the final design         
B40 Approving the final data analysis plan         
                                                 
1 Based on Rochon and colleagues. Financial conflict of interest checklist 2010 for clinical research studies (2010). 
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B41 Recruiting participants         
B42 Collecting or assembling data         
B43 Analyzing the data         
B44 Interpreting the data         
B45 Supervising or coordinating the study         
B46 Deciding on the dissemination plan related to 
study results 
        
B47a Deciding whether a drug’s off-label indications 
will be analyzed and/or recommended in 
manuscript 
        
B47b Approved indication of the drug in the journal’s 
country of publication 
        
B48 Drafting all or parts of the manuscript         
B49 Revising the manuscript for important 
intellectual content 
        
B50 Final approval of the version of the manuscript 
to be published 
        
B51 Deciding target journal for publication         
B52 Deciding the timing of the manuscript 
submission for publication 
        
B53 Deciding authorship         
B54 Deciding authorship order         
B55 Acting as study guarantor         
B56 Corresponding author         
B57 Providing administrative, technical, or logistic 
support 
        
B58 Registering the clinical trial         
B59 Ownership of data         
CATEGORY C: ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS 
FOCUS: DOES THE MEDICAL JOURNAL POLICY HAVE CLEAR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND SANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE? 
ID ITEM  NO UNCLEAR YES IS THIS 
INFORMATION 
PUBLICLY 
ACCESSIBLE? 
N/A 
C60 Is there a party responsible for policy 
enforcement? 
     
C61 Is there a clear process by which the medical 
journal enforces the policy? 
     
C62 Does the journal have a range of sanctions that 
can be enforced should the policy be violated at 
various levels of seriousness? 
     
C62a Rejection of article      
C62b Amendment to material      
C62c Relabeling of material      
265 
 
 
 
C62d Label published on electronic version of article 
(i.e., “Notice of correction: this paper has been 
corrected because of violations A, B, and C. See 
addendum for details). 
     
C62e Author suspension from publishing      
C62f Retraction of article      
C62g Are the enforced sanctions made public?      
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INTEGRATIVE DISCUSSION 
 
Peer-reviewed medical journals are, arguably, the most trusted source for the 
highest forms of clinical evidence that physicians can rely on and apply in their medical 
practices. However, medical research is increasingly being defined, conducted, 
interpreted, and published by for-profit entities that comprise the drug promotion 
industry. The pervasive roles of contract research organizations, medical writing 
organizations, and drug companies in the medical research and publishing processes have 
transformed the way in which medical science is conducted, interpreted, and 
disseminated. Chapter 5 first provided an analysis of neoliberal science through 
considering the roles of employees at contract research organizations and medical 
writing organizations. This chapter also analyzed the resultant fragmentation of the 
research and authorship roles, which are divided amongst for-profit entities that decide 
when to involve the physicians who will be named as authors on the published studies.  
In Chapter 5, a literature review of sources that have critically analyzed the 
involvement of industry in the medical research and publishing processes resulted in a 
glossary of 50 key terms. Each of these terms is accompanied by a definition and 
supporting content from the sources assessed during the literature review. The terms 
from the glossary were, subsequently, thematically categorized and appropriated to 
create a assessment tool. This assessment tool has the central purpose of assisting in the 
assessment of transparency throughout medical research via disclosures of financial 
conflict of interest relationships and the roles and responsibilities of the authors and other 
contributors to manuscripts that are submitted to medical journals. In consultation with 
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the glossary, the transparency of roles and responsibilities that results from use of the 
assessment tool can help journal editors to predict submissions that are likely to be biased 
as a result of FCOI relationships and the involvement of drug promotion industry entities 
throughout the research and publication processes. 
Medical journals are an important medium by which medical research and 
knowledge is disseminated to physicians. In fact, medical journals are so highly regarded 
that some professional medical associations (PMAs) will accredit journal clubs as 
continuing medical education (CME) activities. PMAs are similarly highly regarded 
organizations that unite physician specialties and provide CME opportunities for their 
members. Because accredited CME programs across specialties have received financial 
support from industry, the content of the programs has been questioned. Furthermore, 
even when these programs do not receive commercial funding, sessions may still be 
conducted by speakers who have financial relationships with industry. The next 
manuscript (Chapter 6) examines the policies adopted by PMAs pertaining to industry 
involvement in accredited CME programs. 
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6.1 SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
Professional medical associations (PMAs) play a crucial role in providing accredited 
continuing medical education (CME) to physicians. Funding from the pharmaceutical 
industry may lead to biases in CME. This study examines publicly available policies on 
CME, adopted by Canadian PMAs as of December 2015. 
Methods 
Policies were evaluated using an original scoring tool comprising 21 items, two questions 
about PMAs’ general and CME funding from industry, and three enforcement measures.  
Results 
We assessed 235 policies adopted by 60 Canadian PMAs (range, 0 to 32). Medical 
associations received summative scores that ranged from 0% to 52.4% of the total 
possible points (maximum score=63). Twenty-six associations received an overall score 
of 0%. The highest mean scores were achieved in the areas of commercial involvement 
in planning CME activities (mean: 1.1/3), presence of a review process for topics of 
CME activities (mean: 1.1/3), content review for balanced information (mean: 1.1/3), 
and responsibility of distribution of funds (mean: 1.0/3). The lowest mean scores were 
achieved in the areas of awards (mean: 0.0/3), industry personnel, representatives, and 
employees (mean: 0.1/3), distribution of industry-funded educational materials at CME 
activities (mean: 0.1/3), and distinction between marketing and educational materials 
(mean: 0.1/3). 
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Discussion 
These results suggest that Canadian PMAs' policies on industry involvement in CME are 
generally weak or non-existent; therefore, the accredited CME that is provided to 
Canadian physicians may be viewed as open to bias. We encourage all Canadian medical 
associations to strengthen their policies to avoid the potential for commercial influence 
in CME. 
 
KEYWORDS: Continuing medical education (CME), Canadian professional medical 
associations (PMAs), physician education, pharmaceutical industry, scoring tool, policy 
evaluation   
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 6.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
Professional medical associations (PMAs) provide members with professional 
educational opportunities including accredited continuing medical education (CME) or 
continuing professional development (CPD); hereinafter, collectively referred to as 
CME. However, the CME that these organizations offer may be undermined because of 
a perception of bias due to funding that they receive from pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies (Bernat, Goldstein, & Ringel, 1998; Kassirer, 2007; Relman, 2001; 
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It is important for physicians to participate in CME to not only maintain their 
credentials, but also to keep informed of new pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
treatments. The integrity and credibility of CME provided by medical associations has 
been questioned because it has become so closely linked with the marketing initiatives 
of the pharmaceutical industry (Avorn & Choudhry, 2010; Relman, 2001, 2003; Spithoff, 
2014). Data from the United States (US) suggests that, in 2014, commercial support 
accounted for approximately 25% of total income reported by CME providers 
(Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education [ACCME], 2015). Although 
industry representatives maintain that the intention of their funding of CME is motivated 
by the desire to provide up-to-date information to doctors, researchers independent from 
industry suggest that this financial support is used to advance sponsors’ marketing 
interests (Relman, 2001; Rodwin, 2010; Steinbrook, 2008). Funding for CME is 
generally paid out of companies’ marketing budgets, which are dedicated to producing 
sales (Relman, 2001). Fugh-Berman and Hogenmiller (2015) argue that even when CME 
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activities have not received commercial funding, speakers who are funded by industry 
can still be used.  
Tools developed for evaluating the potential for bias within CME presentations 
do not evaluate the policies that medical associations have adopted to guide industry 
involvement prior to the CME event (Barnes et al., 2007; Dyck & Kvern, 2008; Takhar 
et al., 2007). The purpose of this study is twofold: we present an original tool for 
evaluating policies adopted by PMAs concerning financial conflict of interest (FCOI) 
relationships and industry involvement in CME. We, then, use the tool to conduct a 
systematic evaluation of CME policies that have been adopted by Canadian PMAs. 
 
 6.3 METHODS 
 
6.3.1 Creation of the scoring system 
 
The items included in the tool for evaluating the policies of the PMAs were 
compiled based on the works by Barnes and colleagues (2007), Dyck and Kvern (2008), 
Takhar and colleagues (2007), Kassirer (2007), and Rothman and colleagues (2009).  
Three experts (see Acknowledgements) independently reviewed both the list of 
items and the draft scoring system for face validity. The tool was modified based on their 
feedback regarding clarity and consistency between scores so that the range of scores for 
each item had comparable restrictiveness.  
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The two authors pilot tested and modified the items and the scoring system based 
on the policies of 10 Australian PMAs. Australian associations were deemed to be 
appropriate for the pilot test because the Australian medical system is broadly similar to 
that of Canada. Further refinements were made to the scoring tool in the process of the 
actual policy reviews.  
The final scoring tool comprises 21 categories, two questions, and three 
enforcement measures. Each of the 21 categories is rated on a 4-point scale, where 0=no 
policy found, 1=weak or permissive policy, 2=moderate policy, and 3=strong or 
restrictive policy (6.11 Appendix 1). Therefore, the highest attainable score is 63, while 
the lowest possible score is 0. Across items in the scoring tool, a score of 3 indicates no 
commercial involvement and no financial ties with industry. A score of 2 indicates that, 
where there is industry involvement in planning or presenting CME programs, the PMA 
retains ultimate authority. A score of 1 indicates that the item was addressed in the policy, 
but that industry involvement was still permitted without clearly stating that the PMA 
retained ultimate authority over CME decisions. Scores for each PMA are expressed as 
percentage of the maximum possible score. 
The two questions (Q1 and Q2) inquire about PMAs’ general and CME funding 
from industry. The three enforcement measures (EA, EB, and EC) seek to determine 
whether a party is clearly identified as being responsible for general oversight to ensure 
compliance, sanctions for noncompliance (Shnier, Lexchin, Mintzes, Jutel, & Holloway, 
2013), and investigations into noncompliance (6.11 Appendix 1). The results of the 
questions and enforcement measures are represented as binary outcome measures (i.e., 
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yes or no). We did not attempt to ascertain whether PMAs’ policies had been violated, 
nor did we measure the severity of the sanctions identified within policies. 
One author initially scored policies for all of the PMAs and the second author 
independently conducted duplicate scoring for each fifth PMA policy. Results were 
compared and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
 
6.3.2 Policy collection 
 
We obtained a list of 58 PMAs from the Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada (RCPSC) website 
(http://www.royalcollege.ca/rcsite/resources/national-specialty-societies-e). We also 
included the College of Family Physicians of Canada (CFPC) and the RCPSC 
(hereinafter collectively included within the definition of PMAs). The RCPSC was 
included because many of the individual PMAs referenced its policies and because it 
also accredits CME. Similarly, the CFPC accredits CME for family physicians. 
Therefore, we searched the websites of 60 associations for publicly available English-
language policies, guidelines, or interpretive documents (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as “policies”) specifically related to accredited CME activities. An example of an 
interpretive document is a conflict of interest disclosure form. We limited our search to 
publicly available policies because we felt that they need to be readily accessible in order 
to ensure public trust in the operation of these associations and so that doctors are able 
to assess how commercial involvement in CME is dealt with before they attend events.  
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When PMAs’ websites had search-bars, we used the search terms “policy”, 
“policies”, “accreditation”, “accredited”, “medical education”, “continuing medical 
education”, “CME”, and “continuing professional development”, “CPD” to locate the 
policies. When using the search bar did not return any results or in the absence of a search 
bar, we made an effort to manually search the association’s website to find policies.  
When PMAs’ websites referred to external documents, but provided no link to 
them, we did not collect these documents. Additionally, when PMAs referred to general 
college websites, such as that of the RCPSC, but did not provide the link to a particular 
policy, we did not conduct a search of the external site. When PMAs provided documents 
from, or direct links to, industry codes (i.e., Rx&D Code of Conduct (Rx&D, 2012) 
MEDEC Code of Conduct (MEDEC, 2015)) we did not evaluate these documents 
because the PMAs cannot enforce or modify industry codes. 
We recorded the titles of policies and the adoption or most recent review dates. 
If more than one policy was included within a document and the policies had different 
dates, the most recent date within the overall document was considered to apply to all 
contained policies. A primary collection of policies was conducted from June 30, 2015 
to July 4, 2015 with a secondary collection from December 1, 2015 to December 7, 2015. 
At this latter time, we also recorded whether associations’ websites identified having 
received pharmaceutical industry sponsorship within the last five years for overall 
societal activities and for its accredited CME. 
When more than one policy per society addressed an item in the scoring tool, the 
highest score was taken for final calculation of the association’s score for that item. We 
report overall scores for each association and the mean score for each of the 21 items. 
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 6.4 RESULTS 
 
We assessed 235 policies, which were collectively adopted by 60 Canadian 
PMAs (range, 0 to 32 policies per association). Eight documents were inaccessible 
(“page not found” or “link broken”: 7 documents, password login required to view 
policy: 1 document) (6.12 Appendix 2). The dates of 112 documents were not provided. 
The remaining 123 policies ranged in date from 2004 to 2015. One document was more 
than 10 years old, while 68 were adopted within four years of December 2015 (6.12 
Appendix 2). 
The Canadian Medical Association’s policy on physicians’ interactions with 
industry (Canadian Medical Association [CMA], 2007) was formally adopted by 22 out 
of 60 Canadian medical associations, while 30 associations reference it in their own 
policies. For the RCPSC guidelines, the corresponding numbers are 15 and 20, 
respectively.  
Twenty-six associations received an overall score of 0/63 (0%), indicating that 
these associations either had no policies or that their policies did not address the items in 
the scoring tool. The remaining 34 medical associations received scores that ranged from 
1/63 (1.6%) to 33/63 (52.4%) (median: 25.0 (41.7%), interquartile range [IQR]: 21.3 to 
26.0 (35.4% to 43.4%)). No items in any policy received a score of 3, which represents 
the greatest restrictiveness in terms of industry involvement (Table 6.1). 
The highest mean scores (1.1/3) were achieved in the areas of commercial 
involvement in planning CME activities, presence of a review process for topics of CME 
activities, content review for balanced information, and responsibility of distribution of 
277 
 
 
funds (mean: 1.0/3). The lowest mean scores (0.1/3) were achieved in the areas of 
industry personnel, representatives, and employees, distribution of industry-funded 
educational materials at CME activities, and distinction between marketing and 
educational materials (Table 6.1). None of the 21 items were addressed by all policies. 
Awards was not addressed by any association, while the most frequently addressed item 
was presence of a review process for topics of CME activities (33 of 60 associations) 
(Table 6.1). 
Twenty-three (38%) PMAs publicly disclosed that they accepted industry 
sponsorship (Q1), while 49 (82%) PMAs received industry sponsorship specifically for 
CME activities (Q2). The policies adopted by 33 of the 60 medical associations identified 
a party responsible for oversight to ensure compliance (EA) (Table 6.2), e.g., the 
“planning committee” or “chair of the planning committee” (Royal College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Canada [RCPSC], n.d.-a). Seventeen of the 60 medical associations 
identified sanctions for noncompliance with the policies, e.g., an RCPSC COI disclosure 
form stated that “Failure to disclose or false disclosure may require the Planning 
Committee to replace the speaker” (RCPSC, n.d.-a). The College of Family Physicians 
of Canada adopted the most extensive description of action in cases of CFPC policy 
violation (The College of Family Physicians of Canada [CFPC], 2014). None of the 
medical associations stated within their policies that the results of the investigations into 
noncompliance would be made accessible on the society’s website.  
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 6.5 DISCUSSION 
 
The 60 Canadian professional medical associations received scores that ranged 
from 0% to 52.4% of the maximum possible score. Half of the medical associations 
received scores of 16/63 (25.4%) or lower. The remaining 30 medical associations 
received scores between 17/63 (27.0%) and 33/63 (52.4%). Out of the 123 policies where 
dates were provided, 68 were developed within the previous 4 years. Therefore, in these 
cases we do not feel that the poor scores reflect older policies that may have been adopted 
before FCOI became a concern. 
In general, the items that had the highest mean scores received scores of 2/3 
indicating that the medical associations retained complete control over the planning and 
topics of CME activities and were responsible for ensuring the validity and objectivity 
of educational material. The item concerning responsibility for distribution of funds 
usually received a score of 2/3 indicating that PMAs’ CME committees held the 
responsibility for distributing grants from industry. The RCPSC has stated that 
companies that provide educational grants possess “…legal obligations to ensure any 
financial support provided is directed to a specific event or activity” (Royal College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Canada [RCPSC], n.d.-b). 
The lowest scores were received in the areas of awards (mean: 0.0/3), industry 
personnel, representatives, and employees, distribution of industry-funded educational 
materials at CME activities, and distinction between marketing and educational materials 
(mean: 0.1/3). Only 12 out of 60 medical associations addressed the item regarding 
funding for CME activities in their policies, mean score of 0.2/3 (Table 6.1), indicating 
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that medical associations tend to permit one or more commercial sponsors to provide 
funding for CME events.  
 Scores of 1/3 indicate permissiveness and tend to have an effect which is equal 
to that of a non-existent policy. However, it was important to distinguish between areas 
where even permissive policies existed and where policies were non-existent. This 
distinction allows CME participants and providers to identify the areas that have been 
addressed, even if permissively, as opposed to completely left out. 
Given the number of medical associations that formally include or reference the 
guidelines from either the Canadian Medical Association or the Royal College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, if one or both of these associations changed their 
guidelines, those changes would have a wide ranging effect.  
Critics of conflict of interest regulation might argue that adopting and enforcing 
stringent policies assumes wrongdoing and attaches blame to the individual or institution 
engaging in the financial relationship (Brody, 2010). However, and importantly, this 
criticism may not appreciate the degree to which institutional FCOI relationships could 
threaten not only the trust that physicians and patients have in the roles of associations 
(Brody, 2010), but also the independence of the content included within CME programs 
(Katz, Goldfinger, & Fletcher, 2002). 
International literature on institutional financial relationships between PMAs and 
commercial industry supports the need for critical analysis of their policies on industry 
involvement and influence in CME activities. Cosgrove and Bursztajn (2010) argue that 
if CME activities are sponsored by industry, the completeness and accuracy of the 
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educational information provided may be not only incomplete, but also biased. They 
recommend a system of checks and balances and clear enforceable policies to safeguard 
against the potential for industry influence in the CME activities in which physicians 
participate.  
Kesselheim and colleagues (2011) found that off-label prescribing of medications 
by physicians was encouraged through teaching and research activities, including CME. 
In over half of the cases in their study, speakers chosen for CME were known to promote 
off-label medication use. Steinman and colleagues (2006) found that drug companies use 
CME activities as a venue for direct-to-physician promotion to convince both current 
prescribers and non-prescribers to increase new prescriptions.  
It is possible for PMAs to reduce their financial dependence on, and relationships 
with, industry. At its annual meeting and CME conferences, the North American Spine 
Society prohibits company logos on promotional items and does not sell lists of CME 
participants to companies in order to prevent “robo calls” to participants’ hotel rooms at 
CME events. It further rejects funding for meals and snacks at its CME events. To 
account for the decrease in industry funding for CME, annual membership and meeting 
registration fees and fees charged for exhibit hall booths were increased modestly. 
Despite these modest increases, physician membership has also increased (Schofferman 
et al., 2013). The Oregon Academy of Family Physicians no longer accepts any grants, 
restricted or unrestricted, for its CME events or allows drug companies to have booths 
in its exhibit hall during conferences (Silverman, 2008). In response to the increasing 
awareness and concern over industry’s influence via financial relationships, over 100 
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large medical institutions in the US severed their financial ties with industry (Wilson, 
2010).  
In Canada, CME programs for physicians receive a substantial portion of funding 
from pharmaceutical and medical device companies, although it is widely accepted that 
industry involvement in education influences physicians’ prescribing choices (Spithoff, 
2014; Tabas et al., 2011). It is unlikely that companies would donate substantial funds 
without any expectation of return from increased sales (Spithoff, 2014).  
 
 6.6 LIMITATIONS 
  
 Although we attempted to make the scoring tool as universally applicable as 
possible, some associations’ policies and documents included important areas for which 
the scoring tool did not account, for example peer selling and FCOI of CME moderators 
or facilitators. We view our tool as a living document that needs further study and 
refinement and in this process these additional items and other areas should be addressed.  
 We attempted to do a thorough search of each association but it is possible that 
the key words that we used and our manual searches missed relevant policies. 
Where policies did not directly reflect the content of the scoring system, we had 
to determine if their contents complied with the spirit of the scoring system and, 
therefore, our interpretation of the policy may have had a subjective element. 
Importantly, the overall score for each policy for a single item may have been based on 
more than one phrase in one or more policies of a PMA. Although the scoring tool 
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separated FCOI into many discrete activities, associations’ policies were not necessarily 
structured in the same way. Therefore, a clause in a policy could have been relevant to 
more than one item in the tool and, as a result, would have been scored under both items.  
We did not contact medical associations to see if they were in agreement with 
our assessments. We also evaluated policies without analyzing any CME events 
sponsored by these associations. Despite permissive policies, CME events accredited by 
PMAs might still be free of possible industry bias. A comparison of policies and practice 
is an area for future research in order to determine the extent to which policies are 
enforced. Finally, although we attempted to ensure that our tool had face validity by 
having it peer reviewed we recognize that there will always be an element of subjectivity 
in any such tool. 
 
 6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
We conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the policies on CME activities and 
industry involvement adopted by 60 Canadian medical associations. We found the 
policies to be generally weak or non-existent. This weakness was coupled with the 
majority of associations having disclosed industry sponsorship for CME activities in the 
last five years. 
In order to avoid institutional FCOI relationships with industry, PMAs should 
avoid seeking and accepting industry funding for CME activities. Alternative 
mechanisms for financing CME activities may include modestly increasing membership 
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dues and registration costs (Pellegrino & Relman, 1999). Another approach might 
include lobbying provinces to reimburse physicians for attending CME events and some 
provinces have already taken this initiative (Marlow, 2004). PMAs could also lessen 
possible bias by only accepting anonymous industry sponsorship, a move recommended 
by a recent report from the College of Family Physicians (Task Force on the CFPC’s 
Relationship with the Health Care/Pharmaceutical Industry (HPI), 2013).  
The Canadian PMAs ought to take a leadership position on behalf of their 
physician members and the patients that they serve when it comes to acceptable conduct 
in the context of FCOI relationships (Pellegrino & Relman, 1999). We urge the medical 
associations that have not adopted any policies to, at the very least, adopt the policies 
from the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada and the Canadian Medical 
Association. We also encourage Canadian PMAs to review and strengthen their policies 
to protect the integrity of the education that Canadian physicians are receiving and 
applying in the treatment of their patients.  
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6.8 LESSONS FOR PRACTICE 
 
 Currently, PMAs in Canada generally allow pharmaceutical industry involvement 
in, and funding of, CME for physicians. 
 The majority of PMAs in Canada disclosed having received funding from drug 
companies for CME in the last 5 years. 
 PMAs’ policies on industry involvement in, and funding of CME, coupled with the 
disclosures of industry sponsorship of CME by Canadian PMAs indicates that these 
programs may be vulnerable to bias. 
 There are methods by which PMAs can fund CME for physicians without financial 
assistance from industry. 
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TABLE 6.1: SCORING TOOL ITEMS AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS BY ITEM 
 
Item No. of 
PMAs 
(%) with 
no policy 
(score=0) 
No. of 
PMAs (%) 
with 
permissive 
policy 
(score=1) 
No. of 
PMAs (%) 
with 
moderate 
policy 
(score=2) 
No. of 
PMAs (%) 
with 
restrictive 
policy 
(score=3) 
Mean 
score per 
item, x/3 
Commercial 
involvement in 
planning CME 
activities 
28 0 32 0 1.1 
CME committee 
members’ 
involvement in 
CME activity 
planning 
decisions 
49 6 5 0 0.3 
Presence of a 
review process 
for topics of CME 
activities 
27 1 32 0 1.1 
Control over 
CME activity 
speakers 
31 3 26 0 0.9 
Speakers: 
Financial conflict 
of interest 
disclosures at 
CME activities 
28 19 13 0 0.8 
CME committee 
members and 
officers: Financial 
conflict of interest 
disclosures at 
CME activities 
29 19 12 0 0.7 
Review of 
educational 
materials by CME 
committee 
A. Content 
review for 
balanced 
information 
28 1 31 0 1.1 
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B. Origination of 
content 
33 26 1 0 0.5 
Funding for CME 
activities 
48 10 2 0 0.2 
Disclosure and 
transparency for 
CME activities 
30 30 0 0 0.5 
Responsibility of 
distribution of 
funds 
29 3 28 0 1.0 
Awards 60 0 0 0 0.0 
Industry 
personnel, 
representatives, 
and employees 
56 3 1 0 0.1 
Distribution of 
industry-funded 
educational 
materials at CME 
activities 
57 3 0 0 0.1 
Distinction 
between 
marketing and 
educational 
events 
55 3 2 0 0.1 
Branded items 31 23 6 0 0.6 
Exhibit halls and 
booths 
35 24 1 0 0.4 
Use of brand or 
trade names 
30 28 2 0 0.5 
Promotion of 
unapproved uses 
or off-label 
indications 
33 0 27 0 0.9 
Sharing attendee 
information 
35 25 0 0 0.4 
Satellite symposia 33 1 26 0 0.9 
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TABLE 6.2: SUMMARY OF RESULTS BY PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION 
 
Name of 
association 
Total 
score 
out of 
63 (%) 
Does the 
medical 
association 
publicly 
disclose on 
its website 
that it has 
industry† 
funding 
generally, 
unrestricted
, or 
otherwise? 
(Yes/No) 
Does the 
medical 
associatio
n publicly 
disclose 
on its 
website 
industry 
funding 
specificall
y for 
CME 
activities? 
(Yes/No) 
Enforcement of CME-related 
policy/section of policy 
Is it clear 
within the 
policy that 
there is a 
party 
responsible 
for general 
oversight to 
ensure 
compliance
?  
(Yes/No) 
Is it clear 
within the 
policy that 
there are 
sanctions 
for 
noncomplia
nce?  
(Yes/No) 
 
Is it clear 
within the 
policy that 
the results 
of 
investigati
ons into 
noncompli
ance will 
be publicly 
accessible 
on the 
association
’s website?  
(Yes/No) 
Association of 
Medical 
Microbiology and 
Infectious Disease 
Canada 
0 (0) No  Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Academy of Child 
and Adolescent 
Psychiatry 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Academy of 
Geriatric 
Psychiatry 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Academy of 
Psychiatry and the 
Law 
9 (14) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Academy of Sport 
and Exercise 
Medicine 
0 (0) Yes Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Anesthesiologists' 
Society 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
                                                 
† “Industry” refers to any commercial, for-profit company including but not limited to pharmaceutical and 
medical device companies as well as advertising agencies, including medical education communication 
companies (MECCs) (Steinbrook, 2008), whose purpose is to develop promotional materials often labelled as 
“educational” or “continuing medical education” (CME) materials that promote their clients’ products and 
services. MECCs may be accredited to provide CME (Relman, 2001). 
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Canadian 
Association of 
Emergency 
Physicians 
18 
(29) 
No Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Gastroenterology 
22 
(35) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
General Surgeons 
25 
(40) 
No No Yes No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Interventional 
Cardiology 
0 (0) Yes No No No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Medical 
Biochemists 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Medical 
Oncologists 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Neuropathologists 
0 (0) No No No No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Nuclear Medicine 
17 
(27) 
No Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Paediatric 
Surgeons 
0 (0) No Yes No  No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Pathologists 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Physical 
Medicine & 
Rehabilitation 
29 
(46) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Radiologists 
24 
(38) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
Radiation 
Oncology 
0 (0) Yes Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Association of 
0 (0) No No No No No 
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Thoracic 
Surgeons 
Canadian 
Cardiovascular 
Society 
25 
(40) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian College 
of Medical 
Geneticists 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian Critical 
Care Society 
1 (2) No Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Dermatology 
Association 
24 
(38) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian Fertility 
and Andrology 
Society 
23 
(37) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Geriatrics Society 
24 
(38) 
No Yes Yes No No 
Canadian Heart 
Rhythm Society 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Hematology 
Society 
0 (0) No No No No No 
Canadian 
Neurological 
Society 
25 
(40) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Neurosurgical 
Society 
26 
(41) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Ophthalmological 
Society 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Orthopaedic 
Association 
16 
(25) 
No Yes Yes No No 
Canadian 
Paediatric Society 
19 
(30) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Pain 
Society 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian 
Psychiatric 
Association 
24 
(38) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian 
Rheumatology 
Association 
26 
(41) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
for Clinical 
Investigation 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
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Canadian Society 
for Transfusion 
Medicine 
0 (0) Yes Yes No No No 
Canadian Society 
for Vascular 
Surgery 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
of Allergy and 
Clinical 
Immunology 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian Society 
of Cardiac 
Surgeons 
25 
(40) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian Society 
of Colon and 
Rectal Surgeons 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian Society 
of Cytopathology 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
of 
Echocardiography 
0 (0) No No No No No 
Canadian Society 
of Endocrinology 
& Metabolism 
27 
(43) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
of Internal 
Medicine 
25 
(40) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
of Nephrology 
28 
(44) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Canadian Society 
of 
Otolaryngology 
— Head & Neck 
Surgery 
22 
(35) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian Society 
of Palliative Care 
Physicians 
11 
(17) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Canadian Society 
of Pharmacology 
and Therapeutics 
0 (0) Yes No No No No 
Canadian Society 
of Plastic 
Surgeons 
0 (0) No Yes No No No 
Canadian Society 
of Surgical 
Oncology 
0 (0) Yes No No No No 
Canadian 
Thoracic Society 
26 
(41) 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
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Canadian 
Urological 
Association 
21 
(33) 
Yes Yes Yes No No  
Occupational 
Medicine 
Specialists of 
Canada 
0 (0) No No No No No 
Public Health 
Physicians of 
Canada 
0 (0) No No No No No 
Society of 
Gynecologic 
Oncology of 
Canada 
0 (0) Yes Yes No No No 
Society of 
Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of 
Canada 
21 
(33) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
College of Family 
Physicians of 
Canada 
33 
(52) 
No No Yes Yes No 
Royal College of 
Physicians and 
Surgeons of 
Canada 
26 
(41) 
No Yes Yes Yes No 
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6.11 APPENDIX 1: POLICY SCORING TOOL FOR CONTINUING MEDICAL 
EDUCATION (CME) POLICIES ADOPTED BY PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATIONS (PMAS) 
 
Q1 Does the medical association publicly disclose on its website that it has industry‡ 
funding generally, unrestricted, or otherwise? 
Yes/No 
Q2 Does the medical association publicly disclose on its website industry funding 
specifically for CME activities? 
Yes/No 
1 Commercial involvement in planning CME activities 
 3 No commercial involvement in planning CME activities is permitted. 
2 If planning of the CME activities includes commercial involvement, the medical 
organization retains complete control. 
1 Commercial involvement is permitted in planning CME activities and there is no 
indication that the medical organization retains complete control. 
0 No policy 
2 CME committee members’ involvement in CME activity planning decisions 
 3 CME committee members must not have any past or present financial ties or 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry and this must be disclosed to the 
committee and publicly on the association’s website annually. 
2 CME committee members who have any financial relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry should request recusal during meetings in which an area 
relevant to his or her financial relationships with industry is under consideration.  
1 CME committee members should disclose to the committee any financial 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry and may stay in the meeting, but 
cannot vote in discussions that are relevant to their relationships with industry, or 
alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
3 Presence of a review process for topics of CME activities 
 3 The association has a process in place to review the topics for CME activities. The 
association is able to request changes to a proposed plan by an external 
organization or the association can reject activities. The results of this process are 
publicly available. 
2 The association has a process in place to review the topics for CME activities. The 
association is able to request changes to a proposed plan by an external 
organization or the association can reject activities. 
1 The association has a process in place to review the topics for CME activities by an 
external organization and no other information is provided, or alternative 
permissive policy.  
0 No policy 
  
                                                 
‡ “Industry” refers to any commercial, for-profit company including but not limited to pharmaceutical and 
medical device companies as well as advertising agencies, including medical education communication 
companies (MECCs) (Steinbrook, 2008), whose purpose is to develop promotional materials often labelled as 
“educational” or “continuing medical education” (CME) materials that promote their clients’ products and 
services. MECCs may be accredited to provide CME (Relman, 2001). 
297 
 
 
4 Control over CME activity speakers 
 3 The association has a process in place to review the speakers for CME activities. 
The association is able to request changes to the proposed speakers or the 
association can reject the speakers. Speakers with financial conflict of interest 
relationships within a specified duration of time will not be permitted to speak. The 
results of this process are publicly available. 
2 The association has a process in place to review the speakers for CME activities. 
The association is able to request changes to the proposed speakers or the 
association can reject the speakers. 
1 The association has a process in place to review the speakers for CME activities 
and no other information is provided, or alternative permissive policy.  
0 No policy. 
5 Speakers: Financial conflict of interest disclosures at CME activities  
 3 Speakers must be completely free of financial ties to industry, must not have 
engaged in financial relationships with industry in the past, and must not have plans 
to engage in financial relationships with industry in the future. Lack of conflicts 
must be publicly disclosed during presentations and on the CME activity website.  
2 Past and potential future financial conflict of interest relationships held by speakers 
must be disclosed on the association’s website or at the CME activity. Speakers 
with present ties to the pharmaceutical industry may not be permitted to speak at 
the CME activity. 
1 Current financial conflict of interest relationships must be disclosed for speakers 
during relevant presentations, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
6 CME committee members and officers: Financial conflict of interest disclosures at 
CME activities 
 3 CME committee members and officers must be completely free of financial ties to 
industry, must not have engaged in financial relationships with industry in the past, 
and must not have plans to engage in financial relationships with industry in the 
future. Lack of conflicts must be publicly disclosed during presentations and on the 
CME activity website.  
2 Past and potential future financial conflict of interest relationships held by CME 
committee members and officers must be disclosed on the association’s website or 
at the CME activity. Involvement of committee members with present ties to the 
pharmaceutical industry may not be permitted. 
1 Current financial conflict of interest relationships must be disclosed for committee 
members and officers during relevant presentations, or alternative permissive 
policy. 
0 No policy 
7 Review of educational materials by CME committee 
A. Content review for balanced information 
 3 The association has a process in place to review all slides and speaking points to 
ensure balanced information supported by independent sources. The association 
can request changes to content to ensure balanced and independent information. 
The process of peer-review of the content is publicly accessible on the association’s 
website. 
2 The association has a process in place to review all slides and speaking points to 
ensure balanced information supported by independent sources. The association 
can request changes to content to ensure balanced and independent information. 
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1 Content to be presented at CME events must be submitted to the association before 
the event, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
8 B. Origination of content 
 3 Educational content included in accredited CME is reviewed through a process to 
ensure that content is developed completely free of sponsors’ input regarding how 
the facilitator, speaker, or writer delivers, covers, revises, and/or edits the 
educational materials. The process for reviewing the content is publicly accessible 
on the association’s website. 
2 Educational content included in accredited CME is reviewed through a process to 
ensure that content is developed completely free of sponsors’ input regarding how 
the facilitator, speaker, or writer delivers, covers, revises, and/or edits the 
educational materials. 
1 It is the responsibility of CME content authors to state how the content was 
developed, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
9 Funding for CME activities 
 3 All funding for CME activities comes from registration fees, government funding, 
funding from the discipline, or other sources that are free of vested interests. 
2 Funding for CME activities comes from a mixture of non-commercial and 
commercial sources but no one company is permitted to supply the majority of the 
funding to individual CME activities or events. 
1 Funding for CME activities comes from a mixture of non-commercial and 
commercial sources and one company is permitted to supply the majority of the 
funding to individual CME activities or events, or all funding for individual CME 
events can come from commercial sources or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
10 Disclosure and transparency of funding for CME activities 
 3 All funding information (i.e., how funds are used for CME), the names of sponsors, 
and amounts donated by each to the association are publicly accessible on the 
association’s website when registration for the event begins. 
2 Funding information (i.e., how funds are used for CME) and the names of sponsors 
are publicly accessible on the association’s website when registration for the CME 
event begins. 
1 The names of CME sponsors are publicly accessible at the time of the event on the 
association’s website, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
11 Responsibility for distribution of funds 
 3 The CME committee is responsible for distributing restricted and unrestricted 
grants from industry. The distribution of funds is publicly accessible. 
2 The CME committee is responsible for distributing restricted and unrestricted 
grants from industry. 
1 The CME committee, in consultation or with the involvement of commercial 
industry, distributes restricted and unrestricted grants from industry, or alternative 
policy. 
0 No policy 
12 Awards 
 3 Awards (e.g., best original research, best poster at CME event) presented at the 
association’s CME activities must not be industry sponsored and must not bear the 
name of CME event industry sponsors.  
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2 Awards (e.g., best original research, best poster at CME event) may be industry-
sponsored, but must not bear the name of the industry sponsors. 
1 Awards (e.g., best original research, best poster at CME event) may be industry-
sponsored and may bear the name of the industry sponsors, or no indication that 
these are prohibited, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
13 Industry personnel, representatives, and employees 
 3 Industry personnel, representatives, and employees are not permitted in the CME 
activity areas that are association-designated “educational” or “social” areas. If 
industry employees pay to attend the CME event, their nametags must identify 
them as “Industry employee” or “Industry representative”, but must not state the 
company that they are from. They are not permitted to promote their products or 
services in any area. 
2 Industry personnel, representatives, and employees are not permitted in CME 
activity areas that are association-designated as “educational” or “social” and are 
only permitted in association-designated “marketing” areas. 
1 Industry personnel, representatives, and employees are permitted in “social” and 
“educational” areas, but are not permitted to promote their products or services in 
those areas, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
14 Distribution of industry-funded educational materials at CME activities 
 3 The association does not allow any industry-originated educational materials to be 
distributed at the association’s CME activities or materials distributed must be 
developed completely independently of industry or sponsoring organizations. 
2 The association allows some pre-reviewed industry-originated or funded 
educational materials to be distributed at the CME event, but makes it known to the 
attendees that it does not endorse these materials. 
1 The association allows the distribution of some industry-originated or funded 
educational materials at the CME event, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
15 Distinction between marketing and educational materials 
 3 The association has established a mechanism by which CME attendees are 
informed of whether the association considers the content to be “educational” or 
“marketing”. The description of the mechanism is publicly accessible on the 
association’s website. 
2 The association has established a mechanism by which CME attendees are 
informed of whether the association considers the content to be “educational” or 
“marketing”.  
1 The association allows both educational and marketing material to be distributed by 
companies at CME events without a mechanism to distinguish between the two, or 
alternative permissive policy.  
0 No policy 
16 Branded items 
 3 Branded items are prohibited from the association’s CME activities. No company 
logos are to appear on educational materials, tote bags, lanyards, pens, notebooks, 
and publications distributed to members at any CME activities. Attendees and 
company representatives may not wear or display branded items in education-
designated areas. 
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2 Branded items are prohibited from the association’s CME activities. No company 
logos are to appear on educational materials, tote bags, lanyards, pens, notebooks, 
and publications distributed to members at educational sessions at CME events. 
1 Branded items are permitted to be printed on educational materials or given to 
attendees in certain areas designated for marketing or promotional activity, or 
alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
17 Exhibit halls and booths 
 3 No exhibit hall space or booths are to be sold to pharmaceutical companies at the 
association’s CME event. 
2 Exhibit halls are explicitly defined as marketing spaces to attendees. The 
association is permitted to sell exhibit hall space to companies, provided that it is 
defined and visibly designated as an industry-sponsored advertising space that is 
physically separate from and not intermixed with non-industry sponsored 
educational material presentation space. Industry-sponsored booths are prohibited 
from being located in the obligate path to a scientific or educational session and 
must be clearly delineated so that attendees understand that they are entering a 
marketing site.  
1 The association is permitted to sell exhibit hall space to companies, provided that it 
is clearly labelled as an advertising space to attendees, or alternative permissive 
policy. 
0 No policy 
18 Use of brand or trade names 
 3 CME activities must not, at any stage of CME development, either directly or 
indirectly endorse any particular products and may not use brand or trade names of 
drugs, unless it is essential that the brand name be used (i.e., if warning about a 
particular harm of a specific brand name drug, and the generic name must 
accompany the brand name in this warning).  
2 CME activities must not, at any stage of CME development, either directly or 
indirectly endorse any particular products and may not use brand or trade names of 
drugs. Should CME activities name a brand or trade name of a drug, it must be 
used only once and all other products in the same drug class must also be named 
and granted equal prominence within the specific activity. 
1 CME activities should avoid using brand or trade names of drugs, or alternative 
permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
19 Promotion of unapproved uses or off-label indications 
 3 Any presentation on or including unapproved uses or off-label indications of 
medications in accredited CME activities is prohibited. 
2 Any presentation on or including unapproved uses or off-label indications of 
medications in accredited CME activities is permitted as long as speakers inform 
the audience that these uses are not approved. 
1 Presenting on unapproved uses or off-label indications of medications in accredited 
CME is permitted, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
20 Sharing attendee information 
 3 The association does not share participant, member, or attendee demographic 
information, including names, addresses, email addresses, and any contact 
information at any time with any pharmaceutical company. 
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2 The association has developed specific criteria that outline the conditions under 
which it will share participant, member, or attendee demographic information, 
including names, email addresses, and any contact information with pharmaceutical 
companies. Individuals may opt out of having their information shared. 
1 The association has developed specific criteria that outline the conditions under 
which it will share participant, member, or attendee demographic information, 
including names, addresses, email addresses, and any contact information with 
pharmaceutical companies, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
21 Satellite symposia 
 3 The association does not endorse satellite symposia, or allow publicity for them at 
the association’s CME events.  
2 The association does not endorse satellite symposia, but may allow publicity for 
them at the association’s CME events.  
1 The association may endorse satellite symposia and may allow for publicity for 
them at the association’s events, or alternative permissive policy. 
0 No policy 
E Enforcement of CME-related policy/section of policy 
EA . Is it clear within the policy that there is a party responsible for general oversight to 
ensure compliance?  
(Y/N) 
EB . Is it clear within the policy that there are sanctions for noncompliance?  
(Y/N) 
EC . Is it clear within the policy that the results of investigations into noncompliance will be 
publicly accessible on the association’s website?  
(Y/N) 
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6.12 APPENDIX 2: SUMMARY OF POLICIES AND DATES OF MOST RECENT 
REVIEW OR ADOPTION FOR 60 CANADIAN PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN 2004 AND 2015 
 
60 Canadian Professional 
Medical Organizations 
Name of policy Date of 
adoption 
or most 
recent 
review 
1 Association of Medical 
Microbiology and Infectious 
Disease Canada 
no specific policies n/a 
2 Canadian Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry 
no specific policies n/a 
3 Canadian Academy of 
Geriatric Psychiatry 
no specific policies n/a 
4 Canadian Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 
Disclosure form No date 
5 Canadian Academy of Sport 
and Exercise Medicine 
no specific policies n/a 
6 Canadian Anesthesiologists' 
Society 
  
  
  
  
  
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
May 2012 
Approval process for a continuing 
professional development activity for 
RCPSCP section 1 credits (accredited 
group learning activities) not-for-profit 
non-accredited physician organization 
May 2012 
Relationships with industry sponsors 
and for-profit physician 
groups/organizations in continuing 
professional development activities 
May 2012 
Approval process for a continuing 
professional development activity for 
RCPSCP section 1 credits (accredited 
group learning activities) co-
development with non-physician 
organizations 
May 2012 
CAS relationships with industry for 
accredited CPD activities 
No date 
Declaration May 2012 
7 Canadian Association of 
Emergency Physicians 
  
CAEP endorsement guidelines November 
2014 
CAEP policies on the development of 
roadshows 
June 4, 
2006 
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Procedures – roadshow development June 4, 
2006 
8 Canadian Association of 
Gastroenterology 
  
  
  
  
Industry interaction policy July 24, 
2008 
CAG policy on the dissemination of 
CAG material 
July 3, 
2008 
Policy for the publication of 
educational symposia/events 
proceedings by the CAG and industry 
June 2, 
2008 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
MOC guidelines Page not 
found 
Accreditation Page not 
found 
9 Canadian Association of 
General Surgeons 
  
  
  
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
(section 3) application form 
No date 
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of CPD options of the MOC program 
2010 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Accreditation application manual: 
Approval process, policy and 
procedure for section 1 and section 3 
program applications 
No date 
10 Canadian Association of 
Interventional Cardiology 
no specific policies n/a 
11 Canadian Association of 
Medical Biochemists 
no specific policies n/a 
12 Canadian Association of 
Medical Oncologists 
no specific policies n/a 
13 Canadian Association of 
Neuropathologists 
no specific policies n/a 
14 Canadian Association of 
Nuclear Medicine 
  
  
Policies and procedures relating to the 
review of programs submitted for 
approval under section 3 
September 
2013 
Policies and procedures relating to the 
review of CPD events submitted for 
approval under section 1 
September 
2013 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
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15 Canadian Association of 
Paediatric Surgeons 
no specific policies n/a 
16 Canadian Association of 
Pathologists 
  
  
  
  
CPD event & program accreditation No date 
Declaration of conflicts of interest No date 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
CAP-ACP Group learning application 
form: Approval of accredited group 
learning activities: Section 1 of the 
framework of CPD options of MOC 
program 
March 
2015 
Information for workshop directors No date 
17 Canadian Association of 
Physical Medicine & 
Rehabilitation 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of CPD options of the MOC program 
2014 
Conflict of interest February 
2, 2004 
Accreditation application manual: 
Approval process including policies 
and procedures MOC program 
December 
2013 
Guidelines for relationships with 
sponsors 
July 2006 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment Section 3 of 
the framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
December 
2013 
Accredited simulation activities 
application form: Approval of 
accredited simulation activities within 
Section 3 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
December 
2013 
Guidelines and process for 
accreditation of a non-physician 
organization activity 
December 
2013 
Guidelines and process for 
accreditation of a co-developed 
physician organization activity 
December 
2013 
Declaration of conflict of interest No date 
18 Canadian Association of 
Radiologists 
Accreditation of specialist 
programming group learning activities 
November 
2013 
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Accreditation application form Section 
3 self-assessment program 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines on physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Accredited self-assessment programs 
section 3 of RCPSC maintenance of 
certification program 
August 
2008 
 
19 Canadian Association of 
Radiation Oncology 
no specific policies n/a 
20 Canadian Association of 
Thoracic Surgeons 
no specific policies n/a 
21 Canadian Cardiovascular 
Society 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
External relations policy 2012 
The role and responsibilities of the 
chair of a planning committee 
No date 
CCS accreditation: MOC section 1 
educational activities: Policies 
procedures and application form 
March 
2015 
A handbook for planning committees 
developing educational programs 
October 
23, 2012 
Faculty presentation checklist No date 
Disclosure of potential conflict of 
interest 
No date 
Section 1 accreditation request form No date 
22 Canadian College of Medical 
Geneticists 
no specific policies n/a 
23 Canadian Critical Care Society no specific policies n/a 
24 Canadian Dermatology 
Association 
  
  
  
Policy on faculty disclosure of 
potential conflicts of interest and off-
label use 
No date 
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of CPD options of the MOC program 
2010 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application: Section 3 of the 
framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
2010 
25 Canadian Fertility and 
Andrology Society 
  
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
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Continuing professional development 
committee 
July 1, 
2011 
Ethical standards disclosure No date 
Self-approval requirements for rounds, 
journal clubs or other hospital-based 
educational events 
No date 
Self-approval requirements for small 
group learning activities 
No date 
MOC accreditation application: 
approval of section 1 accredited group 
learning activities of the framework of 
CPD options of the MOC program 
No date 
MOC application for accredited self-
assessment programs for approval of 
section 3 accredited learning activity 
of the framework of CPD options of 
the MOC program 
No date 
The Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada: CPD program 
guide 
May 2006 
26 Canadian Geriatrics Society 
  
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
Accreditation application manual: 
approval process including policies 
and procedures 
January 
29, 2014 
27 Canadian Heart Rhythm 
Society 
no specific policies n/a 
28 Canadian Hematology Society no specific policies n/a 
29 Canadian Neurological Society 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Lunch 'n learn guidelines No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organizations: application process for 
activities developed by physicians 
organizations for MOC section 1 
credits 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Disclosure form No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
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Standards for accredited simulation 
activities (section 3) 
2013 
Standards for accredited self-
assessment programs (section 3) 
2010 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs 
Section 3 of the framework for CPD 
options of MOC program 
2014 
Application form for MOC section 1 
accredited group learning activities 
CNSF congress co-developed 
symposium 
October 
2015 
30 Canadian Neurosurgical 
Society 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Lunch 'n learn guidelines No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organizations: application process for 
activities developed by physicians 
organizations for MOC section 1 
credits 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Disclosure form No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs 
Section 3 of the framework for CPD 
options of MOC program 
2014 
Standards for accredited simulation 
activities (section 3) 
2013 
Standards for accredited self-
assessment programs (section 3) 
2010 
Application form for MOC section 1 
accredited group learning activities 
CNSF congress co-developed 
symposium 
October 
2015 
31 Canadian Ophthalmological 
Society 
  
Accreditation guide: continuing 
professional development activities 
developed by physician organizations 
December 
22, 2014 
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Application form for accreditation of a 
CPD event developed by a physician 
organization 
No date 
COS conflict of interest disclosure 
form 
No date 
Application form for accreditation of a 
co-developed CPD event 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
32 Canadian Orthopaedic 
Association 
  
Application form: approval of 
accredited group learning activities: 
section 1 of the framework of CPD 
options of the maintenance of 
certification program 
March 
2013 
 
Royal College maintenance of 
certification program 
Link 
broken 
33 Canadian Paediatric Society 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Maintenance of certification group 
learning application form (for 
physician organizations) section 1 of 
the framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
February 
2013 
Sponsorship January 2, 
2008 
Section 3 - self assessment programs August 
27, 2015 
Accrediting your education activity November 
19, 2014 
Guidelines for CPS co-development of 
section 1 accredited group learning 
activities with non-physician 
organizations 
October 
2014 
Maintenance of certification self-
assessment program (SAP) application 
form section 3 of the framework for 
CPD options of the MOC 
August 
2015 
Disclosure of potential conflict of 
interest 
Link 
broken 
A guide for accreditation of continuing 
medical education 
October 
22, 2014 
34 Canadian Pain Society no specific policies n/a 
35 Canadian Psychiatric 
Association 
  
  
  
  
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs: 
Section 3 of the MOC program 
2010 
Continuing professional development 
mission statement 
No date 
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Criteria for section 1 approval: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities MOC program physician 
organizations 
November 
2014 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Requirements for CPA co-developed 
programs 
No date 
Self-assessment program s (section 3) No date 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of CPD options of the MOC program 
2014 
Application form for approval of 
Section 1 accredited group learning 
activities MOC program 
November 
2014 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
36 Canadian Rheumatology 
Association 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CRA industry council guidelines No date 
CRA application form for MOC 
approval: Approval of accredited 
group learning activities: Section 1 of 
the framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
May 2015 
Procedures for section 1 and co-
developed applications under the 
MOC program 
November 
2014 
Declaration of conflict of interest No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Co-development checklist May 28, 
2014 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organization 
No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with a non-accredited 
physician organization 
No date 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
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Standards for accredited simulation 
activities (section 3) 
2013 
37 Canadian Society for Clinical 
Investigation 
no specific policies n/a 
38 Canadian Society for 
Transfusion Medicine 
no specific policies n/a 
39 Canadian Society for Vascular 
Surgery 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CSVS continued professional 
development MOC 
No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Declaration of conflict of interest No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organization 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with a non-accredited 
physician organization 
No date 
Guidelines for approval of CPD 
activities developed by a physician 
organization - section 1 
No date 
CSVS application form for MOC 
approval: Approval of accredited 
group learning activities: Section 1 of 
the framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
January 
2011 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
40 Canadian Society of Allergy 
and Clinical Immunology 
no specific policies n/a 
41 Canadian Society of Cardiac 
Surgeons 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
External relations policy 2012 
The role and responsibilities of the 
chair of a planning committee 
No date 
CCS accreditation: MOC section 1 
educational activities: Policies 
procedures and application form 
March 
2015 
A handbook for planning committees 
developing educational programs 
October 
23, 2012 
Faculty presentation checklist No date 
Disclosure of potential conflict of 
interest 
No date 
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Section 1 accreditation request form No date 
42 Canadian Society of Colon and 
Rectal Surgeons 
Sponsorship No date 
43 Canadian Society of 
Cytopathology 
  
  
  
  
CPD event & program accreditation No date 
Declaration of conflicts of interest No date 
Information for workshop directors No date 
CAP-ACP Group learning application 
form: Approval of accredited group 
learning activities: Section 1 of the 
framework of CPD options of MOC 
program 
March 
2015 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
44 Canadian Society of 
Echocardiography 
no specific policies n/a 
45 Canadian Society of 
Endocrinology & Metabolism 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Guidelines and processes for 
accredited events for physician 
organizations 
No date 
Guidelines and processes for 
accredited events for non-physician 
organizations 
No date 
Application form: Approval of 
accredited group learning activities: 
Section 1 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Declaration of conflict of interest No date 
Accreditation for co-developed 
symposia at the annual meeting 
No date 
CPD disclosure form: Planning 
committee 
member/speaker/moderator/facilitator 
No date 
CPD section 1 application fee 
structure 
No date 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organizations 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Guidelines and processes for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
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Guideline and process for co-
development with a non-accredited 
physician organization 
No date 
46 Canadian Society of Internal 
Medicine 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CME/CPD mission statement No date 
CSIM application form for MOC 
approval: Approval of accredited 
group learning activities: Section 1 of 
the framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
August 
17, 2015 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs 
section 3 of the framework of 
continuing professional development 
(CPD) options of the maintenance of 
certification program 
December 
2014 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
The role of the Canadian Society of 
Internal Medicine in the approval and 
co-development of CPD activities 
November 
6, 2014 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organizations 
No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
Guideline and process for co-
development with a non-accredited 
physician organization 
No date 
47 Canadian Society of 
Nephrology 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Canadian Society of Nephrology 
guidelines for development and 
accreditation of educational activities 
No date 
 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Conflict of interest and disclosure 
policy for the Canadian Society of 
Nephrology 
No date 
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of continuing professional 
development (CPD) options of the 
MOC program 
No date 
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Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs: 
Section 3 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
No date 
Conflict of interest policy No date 
Basic conflict of interest disclosure 
form 
No date 
48 Canadian Society of 
Otolaryngology — Head & 
Neck Surgery 
  
  
  
  
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited group learning 
activities: Section 1 of the framework 
of continuing professional 
development (CPD) options of the 
MOC program 
2010 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
Policies and procedures for co-
development of CDP activities with 
physician and non-physician 
organizations 
June 2010 
Section 1 application form Page not 
found 
Accreditation toolkit Page not 
found 
49 Canadian Society of Palliative 
Care Physicians 
  
Policy pertaining to donors, exhibitors, 
sponsors, and advertisers 
November 
2, 2014 
Policy on relationship with industry October 
17, 2009 
50 Canadian Society of 
Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics 
no specific policies n/a 
51 Canadian Society of Plastic 
Surgeons 
no specific policies n/a 
52 Canadian Society of Surgical 
Oncology 
no specific policies n/a 
53 Canadian Thoracic Society 
  
  
Application form: Approval of 
accredited group learning activities: 
Section 1 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
2012 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
Link 
broken 
Policy and procedures regarding co-
development of educational programs 
May 12, 
2014 
Summary of requirements for 
accreditation 
No date 
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54 Canadian Urological 
Association 
  
  
  
  
2015 policy book June 29, 
2015 
CUA declaration of potential conflict 
of interest form 
No date 
Speaker checklist No date 
Application form: Approval of 
accredited group learning activities: 
Section 1 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
February 
2007 
CUA accreditation policy for 
physician organizations 
No date 
55 Occupational Medicine 
Specialists of Canada 
no specific policies n/a 
56 Public Health Physicians of 
Canada 
no specific policies n/a 
57 Society of Gynecologic 
Oncology of Canada 
no specific policies n/a 
58 Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists of Canada 
  
  
  
Accreditation No date 
Conflict of interest policy statement Password 
protected 
A handbook for planning committees 
developing educational programs 
No date 
SOGC accreditation: MOC section 1 
educational activities policies, 
procedures and application form 
physician and non-physician 
organizations 
No date 
Disclosure of potential conflict of 
interest form 
No date 
59 College of Family Physicians 
of Canada 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Conflict of interest form No date 
Declaration of conflict of interest June 1, 
2012 
Establishing limits on meal expenses 
related to Mainpro-accredited events 
No date 
A guide to Mainpro accreditation 2014 
Ethical review and guidelines No date 
Ethical review form November 
10, 2015 
Quick tips: Identification and 
management of conflicts of interest 
and transparency to learners 
No date 
CMA policy: guidelines for physicians 
in interactions with industry 
2007 
60 Royal College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Canada 
Accredit rounds, journal clubs and 
small groups 
No date 
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Accreditation of simulation programs No date 
Accreditation committee October 
2013 
Accreditation standards for a journal 
club 
No date 
Accreditation standards for rounds or 
other hospital-based educational 
activities 
No date 
Accreditation standards for a small 
group 
No date 
Disclosure of conflict of interest No date 
Continuing professional development 
(CPD) accreditation committee 
May 23, 
2013 
CPD activity grant No date 
Continuing professional development 
(CPD) activity grant: Guidelines and 
application form 
November 
2014 
Criteria for approval of online CPD 
events for MOC 
No date 
Education committee June 17-
18, 2013 
Education research development 
committee 
May 13, 
2015 
Evaluation of CPD group activities 2012 
Guidelines and process for physician 
organizations 
No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with an accredited 
provider 
No date 
Guidelines and process for co-
development with a non-accredited 
physician organization 
No date 
International agreement between the 
Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada and the American 
Medical Association 
January 1, 
2013 
CMA policy: Guidelines for 
physicians in interactions with 
industry 
2007 
Professional development committee May 23, 
2013 
Relationships with speakers and/or 
financial sponsors 
No date 
Renewal of previously approved SAP 
application form: Section 3 of the 
August 
2008 
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framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
Royal College accreditation standards 
for accredited CPD provider 
organizations 
No date 
Accredited simulation activities 
application form: Approval of 
accredited simulation activities within 
Section 3 of the framework for CPD 
options of the MOC program 
November 
10, 2014 
Standards for accredited self-
assessment programs (Section 3) 
2010 
Standards for accredited simulation 
activities (Section 3) 
2013 
Group learning application form: 
Approval of accredited self-
assessment programs: Section 1 of the 
framework of CPD options of the 
MOC program 
2014 
Self-assessment program (SAP) 
application form: Approval of 
accredited self-assessment programs: 
Section 3 of the framework of CPD 
options of the MOC program 
2014 
Self-assessment program checklist February 
2012 
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 INTEGRATIVE DISCUSSION 
 
An important role of Canadian professional medical associations (PMAs) is the 
provision of accredited continuing medical education (CME) programs for their 
physician members. Because accredited CME programs have received funding from 
commercial industry, it is important to evaluate the degree to which Canadian medical 
associations permit or prohibit industry involvement in these programs. The study on 
policies concerning accredited CME adopted by 60 Canadian PMAs (Chapter 6) found 
that the associations generally had nonexistent, permissive, or moderately restrictive 
policies. The categories that received the highest average scores were commercial 
involvement in planning CME activities, the presence of a review process for CME 
program topics, content review for balanced information, and responsibility of 
distribution of funds. The lowest average scores were received in the areas of awards, 
industry personnel, representatives and employees, distribution of industry-funded 
educational materials at CME activities, and distinction between marketing and 
educational materials. None of the categories received a score of 3, which would have 
indicated that industry involvement is prohibited. Furthermore, the majority of PMAs 
disclosed having received industry sponsorship for CME events in the last five years. 
Therefore, there are opportunities for not only industry sponsorship, but also industry 
involvement in the planning, logistics, and content choice of CME programs that are 
accredited by Canadian professional medical associations.  
In addition to hosting accredited CME programs for physicians, professional 
medical associations also widely distribute clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) to 
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physicians. Clinical practice guidelines are considered to be authoritative guidance 
documents that are meant to inform physicians’ treatment decisions for their patients. 
Although these guidelines should be based on the best available clinical evidence, 
recommendations have been based on lower levels of evidence or expert opinion. The 
decisions about the evidence on which to base recommendations in CPGs may be 
vulnerable to bias, since guideline authors and guideline development committee 
members may have financial conflict of interest (FCOI) relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry. The next manuscript (Chapter 7) presents an analysis of FCOI 
relationship disclosures made by authors on Canadian clinical practice guidelines, which 
were obtained from the Canadian Medical Association Infobase. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
REPORTING OF FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL 
PRACTICE GUIDELINES:  
A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF GUIDELINES FROM THE CANADIAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION INFOBASE 
 
Adrienne Shnier1, Joel Lexchin1,2, Mirna Romero1, Kevin Brown3 
 
1School of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Health, York University, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada 
2University Health Network, Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
3Epidemiology Division, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA 
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 7.1 SUMMARY 
 
Background  
Clinical practice guidelines are widely distributed by medical associations and relied 
upon by physicians for the best available clinical evidence. International findings report 
that financial conflicts of interest (FCOI) with drug companies may influence drug 
recommendations and are common among guideline authors. There is no comparable 
study on exclusively Canadian guidelines; therefore, we provide a case study of authors’ 
FCOI declarations in guidelines from the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) 
Infobase. We also assess the financial relationships between guideline-affiliated 
organizations and drug companies. 
Methods  
Using a population approach, we extracted first-line drug recommendations and authors’ 
FCOI disclosures in guidelines from the CMA Infobase. We contacted the corresponding 
authors on guidelines when FCOI disclosures were missing for some or all authors. We 
also extracted guideline-affiliated organizations and searched each of their websites to 
determine if they had financial relationships with drug companies. 
Results 
We analyzed 350 authors from 28 guidelines. Authors were named on one, two, or three 
guidelines, yielding 400 FCOI statements. In 75.0% of guidelines at least one author, and 
in 21.4% of guidelines all authors, disclosed FCOI with drug companies. In 54.0% of 
guidelines at least one author, and in 28.6% of guidelines over half of the authors, 
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disclosed FCOI with manufacturers of drugs that they recommended. Twenty of 48 
authors on multiple guidelines reported different FCOI in their disclosures. Eight 
guidelines identified affiliated organizations with financial relationships with 
manufacturers of drugs recommended in those guidelines. 
Conclusions 
This is the first study to systematically describe FCOI disclosures by authors of Canadian 
guidelines and financial relationships between guideline-affiliated organizations and 
pharmaceutical companies. These financial relationships are common. Because 
authoritative value is assigned to guidelines distributed by medical associations, we 
encourage them to develop formal policies to limit the potential influence of FCOI on 
guideline recommendations. 
 
KEYWORDS  
 
Financial conflicts of interest, disclosure, clinical practice guidelines, medicine and the 
pharmaceutical industry, treatment recommendations  
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 7.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Clinicians rely on clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) for guidance when making 
treatment decisions for patients. Although CPGs should be based on critical analysis of 
the best available scientific evidence, authors’ recommendations in some guidelines have 
been based on lower levels of evidence or expert opinion (Tricoci, Allen, Kramer, Califf, 
& Smith, 2009). Therefore, recommendations may be vulnerable to biases (Brix 
Bindslev, Schroll, Gotzsche, & Lundh, 2013), which are of particular concern since 
financial ties are common among guideline authors, committee members, and drug 
companies that manufacture medications recommended in guidelines (Abramson & 
Starfield, 2005). A common finding in the literature analyzing guideline 
recommendations is that the presence of financial conflict of interest (FCOI) 
relationships with pharmaceutical companies may have the potential to influence drug 
recommendations (Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003; Bero, Oostvogel, Bacchetti, & Lee, 
2007; Cosgrove, Bursztajn, Krimsky, Anaya, & Walker, 2009; DeAngelis & 
Fontanarosa, 2008; Kelly et al., 2006; Lexchin, 2008; Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, 
Busuioc, & Bero, 2012; Perlis, Harwood, & Perlis, 2005; Rochon et al., 1994; Sismondo, 
2008). Furthermore, international literature has demonstrated concern over 
underreporting and inconsistencies in FCOI disclosures in guidelines (Abramson & 
Starfield, 2005; Brix Bindslev et al., 2013; Choudhry, Stelfox, & Detsky, 2002; Guyatt 
et al., 2010; Norris, Holmer, Ogden, & Burda, 2011; Norris, Holmer, Ogden, Burda, & 
Fu, 2013). 
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CPGs are widely distributed by professional medical associations, such as the 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA). The CMA Infobase 
(https://www.cma.ca/En/Pages/clinical-practice-guidelines.aspx) lists guidelines that 
meet the following criteria: include information to help patients and physicians make 
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances; be produced 
by an authoritative Canadian organization or if produced outside of Canada be officially 
endorsed by such an organization; have been developed or reviewed in the last 5 years; 
and have evidence that a literature search was performed during guideline development 
(Canadian Medical Association [CMA], 2015). 
We present a case study of authors’ FCOI disclosure statements in guidelines 
from the CMA Infobase. We determine the prevalence of not only authors’ disclosed 
FCOI with drug companies in general, but also their FCOI disclosures with the 
manufacturers of the on-patent drugs that they recommend as first-line treatments in their 
respective guidelines. Our focus on on-patent drugs rests on the assumption that 
recommending an on-patent drug is directly beneficial to a single manufacturer, as 
compared to recommending an off-patent drug, produced by multiple manufacturers. 
Finally, we determine the frequency with which the guideline-affiliated organizations 
have financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies that are also manufacturers 
of the drugs recommended as first-line treatments in those guidelines.  
 
 7.3 METHODS 
Using a population approach, we analyzed 1,150 guidelines listed in the CMA 
Infobase. We did not limit our case study of guidelines by medical specialty or disease 
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category; however, we limited the eligible guidelines to the 353 listed on the CMA 
Infobase (Canadian Medical Association (CMA), 2014) that were published or most 
recently reviewed between 01 January 2012 and 06 November 2013, inclusive. We 
imposed this date restriction because the requirement for FCOI disclosure is a relatively 
recent phenomenon in guideline production (Mendelson, Meltzer, Campbell, Caplan, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011). French-language guidelines and those that could not be accessed on 
the web were excluded. 
Two pairs of study researchers (AS and MR, JL and SA) assessed and 
documented whether guidelines recommended specific drugs based on recommendation 
tables or, in their absence, within the text. We considered a “recommendation” to have 
been made when authors stated that one or more specific medications were appropriate 
first-line treatments for a particular patient population. We excluded guidelines that either 
recommended only drug classes as opposed to specific medications, or mentioned or 
acknowledged specific drugs without making clear first-line recommendations (Figure 
7.1).  
Specific drugs for first-line treatment were recommended in 102 guidelines. 
Guidelines that provided only titles of organizations, committees, or associations in lieu 
of individually named authors or committee members were excluded, leaving 77 
guidelines. Forty additional guidelines that provided neither disclosures, nor 
corresponding authors’ contact information were excluded (Figure 7.1). Any 
disagreements or uncertainties were resolved through discussion. 
From the remaining 37 guidelines, we attempted to locate disclosure statements 
for the authors. Twenty guidelines provided FCOI disclosure statements for all or some 
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of the authors named on the guideline. Disclosure statements were absent in 10 guidelines 
and seven guidelines provided links to FCOI disclosure statements on external websites. 
We successfully accessed five of these external webpages (Figure 7.2). We contacted the 
corresponding authors on 15 guidelines for one of two reasons: (1) the guideline had no 
FCOI disclosure section and there was no indication that all authors were either free of 
FCOI or had any conflicts to report (10 guidelines), or (2) disclosures were either vague, 
or missing for some authors and the guideline did not state that these authors were free 
of FCOI (5 guidelines). We received responses from 11 of the 15 corresponding authors 
whom we contacted, but only five provided us with additional FCOI disclosure 
statements.  
Ultimately, we located FCOI disclosures for all of the authors on 22 guidelines 
and some authors on 6 guidelines yielding 350 unique authors, of whom 48 were named 
on two or three guidelines, resulting in a total of 400 disclosure statements. We divided 
FCOI disclosures with pharmaceutical companies into two groups – relevant and non-
relevant. We considered FCOI to be “relevant” when they existed between an author and 
the manufacturer of a patented drug recommended for first-line treatment in that 
guideline. “Non-relevant” FCOI were those with a drug company other than the 
manufacturer of one of the recommended drugs (Norris et al., 2013). These companies 
may have produced a drug that could also be used to treat the condition being discussed 
in the guideline but they may also have produced a drug that was not useful for the 
condition. We did not attempt to distinguish between the two situations as that would 
have involved analyzing every drug made by the company and then using expert opinion 
to decide if one (or more) of these drugs could have been recommended. 
326 
 
 
We considered FCOI to include not only financial compensation, but also 
activities that are generally associated with gifting, payment, or reimbursement, even if 
a monetary value was not disclosed. We defined “vague” FCOI disclosures as situations 
when financial ties were present, but the declaration prevented a clear determination of 
the number of pharmaceutical companies with which authors held FCOI and whether 
those FCOI could be classified as relevant or non-relevant. Conflicts with “non-
commercial” organizations were defined as ties that authors disclosed with not-for-profit 
organizations such as the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 
(CADTH).  
Because of resource limitations, we decided a priori to extract FCOI disclosure 
information for a maximum of 25 authors per guideline, including chairs, co-chairs, 
principle authors, co-authors, and committee members. We assumed that all committee 
members who were named within the guideline had voted on its recommendations, even 
if they were not explicitly listed as authors. We also assumed that anyone who was not 
identified as an author or named committee member (i.e., reviewers, consultants, and 
liaisons) did not vote on the final recommendations in the guidelines and we excluded 
them. When more than 25 authors and/or committee members, which will hereafter be 
referred to collectively as authors, were named on a guideline, we assigned each a random 
value using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, 2013). Organized in ascending numerical order, 
the top 25, automatically including explicitly identified chair(s), co-chair(s), and 
principal author(s), were included in our analysis. We included these groups because we 
considered that they had the most influence in the final recommendations and, therefore, 
the presence or absence of their FCOI was particularly important. However, due to their 
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small numbers we did not analyze chairs, co-chairs and principal authors separately. We 
also extracted authors’ demographic information from the guidelines: names, academic 
and medical degrees, and hospital and academic affiliations. 
We recorded whether the medications recommended in the guidelines were on-
patent or if there were off-patent versions available in Canada by consulting the 
Compendium of Pharmaceuticals and Specialties (CPS) and Health Canada’s Drug 
Products Database (Canadian Pharmacists Association (CPA), 2012, 2013; Health 
Canada, 2013) for the years that the guidelines were either published or reviewed to 
determine whether authors’ FCOI declarations were relevant or non-relevant.  
Finally, we identified the guideline-affiliated organizations. We visited each of 
the organizations’ websites to identify the pharmaceutical companies with which they 
disclosed having financial relationships. We did not examine whether conferences held 
by these organizations had pharmaceutical company sponsors. 
This study has received ethics approval from the Ethics Review Board at York 
University and conforms to the standards of the Tri-Council Research Ethics guidelines 
(Certificate #: 2014 - 186). Written informed consent for participation in this study was 
obtained from participants.  
 
 7.4 RESULTS 
 
We obtained FCOI disclosures for authors on 28 guidelines. Twelve were most 
recently reviewed or published in 2013 and 16 in 2012. 
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Out of 400 FCOI disclosure statements for 350 unique authors, 188 (47.0%) 
declared FCOI with pharmaceutical companies. Individual authors declared FCOI with 
up to 19 drug companies (median: 3, interquartile range [IQR]: 0, 8). Out of these 188 
FCOI declarations, 97 were relevant, 65 were non-relevant, and 26 were vague. Two-
hundred and twelve (53.0%) of the 400 declarations stated that the authors were either 
free of FCOI with drug companies or had conflicts with only non-commercial 
organizations (Table 7.1).  
 
7.4.1 Author-level analysis 
 
Three-hundred and two unique authors (86.3%) were each on one guideline, 
while 46 (13.1%) were each on two guidelines and two (0.6%) were each on three 
guidelines. Of the authors on one guideline, 119 (34.0%) disclosed FCOI with drug 
companies, while 162 (46.3%) disclosed that they had either conflicts with non-
commercial organizations or were free of FCOI with drug companies. Twenty-one 
(6.0%) disclosed vague FCOI with drug companies (Table 7.2). 
Twenty-eight of the 48 authors’ declarations on two or three guidelines were 
consistent in their disclosure statements, but 20 disclosed different FCOI in their 
disclosure statements in two or three guidelines. Authors whose disclosures differed in 
their multiple statements declared a combination of the following disclosure types: FCOI 
with different drug companies, vague FCOI with drug companies, conflicts with only 
non-commercial organizations, and no FCOI (Table 7.2). 
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7.4.2 Guideline-level analysis 
 
In twenty-one guidelines (75.0%) at least one author disclosed FCOI with drug 
companies, while in six guidelines (21.4%) all authors disclosed FCOI with drug 
companies (median: 69.4%, IQR: 3.0%, 93.1%) (Table 1). In fifteen guidelines (54.0%) 
at least one author disclosed relevant FCOI (median: 6.5%, IQR: 0%, 66.7%), while in 
one guideline (3.6%) all authors disclosed relevant FCOI. In eight guidelines (28.6%), 
over half of the authors declared relevant FCOI (Table 7.1).  
The majority of guidelines identified affiliations with organizations (26/28, 
93.0%). In total, 39 organizations were found. Nineteen of the 39 organizations (49.0%) 
identified financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies on their respective 
websites. In eight guidelines (26.0%), at least one drug recommended for first-line 
treatment was manufactured by a pharmaceutical company listed on the affiliated 
organizations’ website.  
 
 7.5 DISCUSSION 
 
In this study of 28 Canadian guidelines produced or revised since the start of 
2012, we found that FCOI relationships between guideline authors and drug companies 
are common. Authors disclosed FCOI with drug companies in twenty-one guidelines 
(75.0%). Relevant financial ties are also common amongst guideline authors, as authors 
in fifteen guidelines (54.0%) reported FCOI with manufacturers of drugs that they 
recommend as first-line treatments. Twenty authors on two or three guidelines disclosed 
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different FCOI in their statements. Eight guidelines identified affiliated organizations 
that had financial relationships with drug companies that manufactured drugs 
recommended for first-line treatment.  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically describe FCOI 
disclosures by authors on Canadian guidelines, as well as the financial relationships 
between the guideline-affiliated organizations and pharmaceutical companies. We used 
a population approach to guideline inclusion and did not exclude guidelines based on 
medical specialty or disease category.  
This study contributes to existing international studies on FCOI disclosures 
across medical specialties, which have produced results similar to our findings. Cosgrove 
and colleagues (2009) found that in three psychiatry guidelines, 18 of 20 (90%) authors 
held FCOI with pharmaceutical companies and none of these ties were disclosed in the 
guideline. On two of the three guidelines assessed, 100% of the working group members 
possessed FCOI (Cosgrove et al., 2009). Neuman and colleagues (2011) found that in 14 
guidelines on screening and/or treatment for hyperlipidaemia or diabetes published by 
national Canadian and American organizations between 2000 and 2010, 138 out of 288 
(48.0%) panel members reported FCOI.  
In a study analyzing 17 cardiovascular guidelines, Mendelson and colleagues 
(2011) found that 277 out of 498 (56.0%) authors reported FCOI. A 2013 study by Norris 
and colleagues (2013) found that in 13 guidelines for glycemic control in type 2 diabetes 
mellitus from the National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC), the percentage of authors 
who disclosed one or more FCOI ranged from 0% to 94%. A 2013 Danish study found 
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that 135 out of 254 (53.1%) authors on 45 guidelines held FCOI and although FCOI were 
common, disclosures were rare (Brix Bindslev et al., 2013).  
We believe that our results provide a conservative estimate of the prevalence of 
FCOI disclosed by guideline authors as we did not conduct external web or publication 
searches to determine the completeness of the FCOI disclosures in the guidelines.  Our 
exclusion of 40 guidelines based on their lack of both FCOI disclosure sections and 
corresponding author contact information reflects findings that guidelines commonly 
contain no information about potential FCOI (Langer et al., 2012).  
Finally, consistent with related research (Brix Bindslev et al., 2013; Weinfurt et 
al., 2008), 20 authors on two or three guidelines that we assessed disclosed different 
FCOI in their disclosures. These inconsistencies may be due to five factors: (i) journals 
in which these guidelines were published may have had different FCOI disclosure 
policies and requirements, (ii) endorsing professional medical societies and associations, 
as well as the medical journals in which CPGs are published, may have had differing 
policies on FCOI disclosure and permitted relationships, (iii) authors may have engaged 
in new FCOI relationships in the time between publishing guidelines, (iv) FCOI 
declarations may have been incomplete or missing completely, and (v) reliance on 
voluntary reporting of FCOI by authors may have resulted in underreporting of these 
relationships because of the subjective decisions of individual authors (Brix Bindslev et 
al., 2013; Papanikolaou et al., 2001; Taylor & Giles, 2005). 
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 7.6 LIMITATIONS 
 
We excluded guidelines if either authors or committee members were not 
explicitly named, limiting the scope of our analysis. Additionally, our analyses accounted 
for neither drugs that were recommended for second- or third-line treatment, nor the 
strength of evidence used to make first-line drug recommendations. We did not 
differentiate among the types of FCOI that the authors disclosed. Finally, we did not 
consider the funding source(s) of the guidelines. Our results are preliminary since our 
sample size of guidelines is limited.  
 
 7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Our findings support the need for future research to measure not only the 
prevalence, but also underreporting of FCOI in guidelines. Our results also suggest a 
need for accurate and consistent disclosures. Future research is also necessary to 
determine whether guideline authors’ reported FCOI are associated with their drug 
treatment guideline recommendations.  
After the Association of Scientific Medical Societies in Germany 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wissenschaftlichen Medizinischen Fachgesellschaften, 
AWMF) instituted new disclosure rules in 2010, the prevalence of guidelines with 
disclosures increased from 8% to 95% in 2011. This reform requires guideline-creating 
groups to ensure that both their members’ declarations and the procedures used to 
declare, document, and the disclosures themselves are made public (Langer et al., 2012).  
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Physicians tend to have confidence in, and attribute value to, guidelines issued or 
distributed by official professional associations (Hayward, Guyatt, Moore, McGibbon, 
& Carter, 1997). Therefore, we encourage professional associations including the CMA 
to consider developing a policy equivalent to that which was adopted by the AWMF on 
FCOI disclosures and we recommend that the CMA refuse to list any CPGs that do not 
conform to these standards. 
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FIGURE 7.1 GUIDELINE EXCLUSION CRITERIA AND PROCESS OF 
GUIDELINE EXCLUSION 
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FIGURE 7.2 SUMMARY AND RESULTS OF LOCATING DISCLOSURE 
STATEMENTS 
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TABLE 7.1 SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (FCOI) DISCLOSURES BY GUIDELINE 
 
Clinical 
practice 
guideline 
ID# 
Year On-patent 
drugs 
recommended 
(N) 
Off-patent 
drugs 
recommended 
(N) 
Disclosure 
statements 
assessed 
(N) 
Assessed 
statements 
disclosing drug 
company 
FCOIs*, N (%) 
Assessed 
statements 
disclosing 
relevant 
FCOIs, N (%) 
Assessed 
statements 
disclosing 
non-relevant 
FCOIs, N (%) 
Assessed 
statements 
disclosing 
vague FCOIs, 
N (%) 
Assessed statements 
disclosing no FCOI 
or non-commercial 
conflicts, N (%) 
5 2013 1 1 2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (100) 
7 2013 2 8 19 18 (95) 15 (79) 3 (16) 0 (0) 1 (5) 
18 2013 0 4 22 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 22 (100) 
27 2013 4 9 21 19 (90) 18 (86) 1 (5) 0 (0) 2 (10) 
29 2013 5 7 25 18 (72) 6 (24) 12 (48) 0 (0) 7 (28) 
35 2013 3 2 5 2 (40) 2 (40) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (60) 
40 2013 3 3 13 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (100) 
44 2013 6 3 13 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (100) 
46 2013 7 0 9 9 (100) 4 (44) 0 (0) 5 (56) 0 (0) 
93 2013 1 0 19 19 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 19 (100) 0 (0) 
94 2013 3 15 22 15 (68) 10 (45) 5 (23) 0 (0) 7 (32) 
103 2013 0 1 17 12 (71) 0 (0) 12 (35) 0 (0) 5 (29) 
112 2012 2 0 4 4 (100) 3 (75) 1 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
242 2012 8 6 9 8 (89) 7 (78) 1 (11) 0 (0) 1 (11) 
244 2012 0 1 19 8 (42) 0 (0) 8 (42) 0 (0) 11 (58) 
258 2012 1 0 9 8 (89) 6 (67) 2 (22) 0 (0) 1 (11) 
260 2012 1 2 3 3 (100) 3 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
267 2012 1 0 2 2 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (100) 0 (0) 
269 2012 4 1 24 6 (25) 6 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 18 (75) 
273 2012 1 1 23 2 (9) 2 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 21 (91) 
274 2012 0 1 24 18 (75) 0 (0) 18 (75) 0 (0) 6 (25) 
283 2012 2 0 13 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (100) 
289 2012 2 0 23 1 (4) 1 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 22 (96) 
295 2012 3 1 25 1 (4) 0 (0) 1 (4) 0 (0) 24 (96) 
299 2012 8 1 16 12 (75) 12 (75) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (25) 
345 2012 2 1 8 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (100) 
349 2012 7 0 3 3 (100) 2 (67) 1 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
352 2012 1 2 8 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (100) 
Totals 400 188 97 65 26 212 
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TABLE 7.2 UNIQUE AUTHORS’ DECLARATIONS IN ONE, TWO, AND THREE 
GUIDELINES 
 
Type of 
declaration 
Number of unique authors making declarations in: 
One guideline Two guidelines Three guidelines 
FCOI* with 
drug 
companies 
119 7 0 
Non-
commercial 
conflicts or no 
FCOI 
162 21 0 
Vague FCOI 21 0 0 
FCOI with 
different drug 
companies  
0 12 0 
FCOI with 
drug 
companies in 
one or  
guideline, then 
vague FCOI in 
another 
guideline 
0 1 0 
FCOI with 
drug 
companies in 
one guideline, 
then non-
commercial 
conflicts/no 
FCOI in 
another 
guideline 
0 3 0 
Non-
commercial 
conflicts/no 
FCOI in one or 
two guidelines 
and vague 
FCOI in one or 
two guidelines 
0 2 2 
Total number of unique authors: 350 
*Financial conflicts of interest 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICIES ON FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
  
The pharmaceutical industry has had, and continues to have, the opportunity for 
pervasive involvement and engagement in financial conflict of interest (FCOI) 
relationships with physicians in the development and dissemination of medical education 
for undergraduate medical students and graduate practicing physicians. FCOI 
relationships between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians across medical 
specialties are common and can range from accepting incentives from drug companies, to 
accepting the role as speakers for companies, to participating as honorary authors of 
ghostwritten papers to be published in medical journals (Adair & Holmgren, 2005; 
Blumenthal, 2004; Campbell et al., 2007; Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan, & 
Schneider, 2006; Fugh-Berman, 2010; McFadden, Calvario, & Graves, 2007; Morgan, 
Dana, Loewenstein, Zinberg, & Schulkin, 2006). Medical research is increasingly being 
conducted by, or in partnership with, the private sector (Downie & Herder, 2007; 
Lemmens & Luther, 2007). The potential risks of FCOI relationships in medicine are far-
reaching and play out in the research, presentation, and dissemination of medical research.  
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 FCOI relationships have been useful to the pharmaceutical industry for the 
purpose of knowledge creation and dissemination through various modes of medical 
education. The voluntary self-regulation model by which medical schools, medical 
journals, and professional medical associations are governed has allowed these institutions 
to develop, adopt and enforce policies on interactions with industry without outside 
scrutiny. In general, these policies have permitted both institutional and individual FCOI 
relationships, putting the primary objective of providing the best available balanced 
medical education at risk because of potential financial interests. The positioning of these 
interests by medical institutions can be observed in their policies through analyses, such 
as those carried out in the four studies within this dissertation. What policies say, and, 
importantly, what they fail to say, are indications of medical institutions’ values and 
interests within the current scientific culture in which medical education and research is 
conducted and provided to medical students and practicing physicians. Neoliberal science 
has reoriented the medical research and writing processes to include such corporate 
practices as mass-scale hiring of contract research organizations (CROs), medical 
education communication companies (MECCs), and medical writing organizations 
(MWOs), ghostwriting and guest authorship, and the suppression of unfavourable data. 
The normalization of FCOI relationships is perpetuated as individuals with financial 
relationships with pharmaceutical companies continue to teach and publish medical 
educational materials. This teaching and publishing can occur within academic research 
institutions that also have financial partnerships with drug companies.  The normalization 
of these practices has served to encourage shifts in the medical research culture, which 
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has spurred the development of social, financial, and professional parameters within 
which FCOI policies must operate. 
 Despite claims that seek to destigmatize FCOI relationships with industry and 
delegitimize and minimize arguments and efforts in favour of regulating these 
relationships (Barton, Stossel, & Stell, 2014; Rosenbaum, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Stossel, 
2008a, 2008b), there is a substantive literature base that provides evidence to the contrary 
(see Chapter 2). The literature has found that, across various types of FCOI relationships 
through which drug companies promote their products, physicians can be unduly 
influenced. The FCOI relationships, in which drug companies and physicians participate, 
function as a vector by which companies can engage in both subtle and overt drug 
promotion. Drug companies recognize that, in the supply-demand equation, they provide 
the supply of products, while prescribing physicians are on the demand side (Gagnon, 
2009).  
In order to ensure that companies’ supply is in demand, they must convince 
physicians that their products are the best for their patients and, as Marc-André Gagnon 
states, “[p]romotion is the missing link that unites all elements of breadth and depth into 
a workable and durable regime of accumulation for Big Pharma” (Gagnon, 2009). 
Rationally, companies would not continue to spend tens of billions of dollars annually 
(United States estimate, see Gagnon & Lexchin, 2008) on efforts that might not produce 
returns that outweigh their expenditures. These promotional efforts can take many forms 
within medical education in medical schools (Austad, Avorn, & Kesselheim, 2011; 
Busing, 2008; Downie & Herder, 2007; Ehringhaus et al., 2008; Epstein, Busch, Busch, 
Asch, & Barry, 2013; Hébert, MacDonald, Flegel, & Stanbrook, 2010; King, Essick, 
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Bearman, Cole, & Ross, 2013; Persaud, 2013; Zinner, Bolcic-Jankovic, Clarridge, 
Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2009), medical journals (Angell, 2008; Fugh-Berman, 2010; 
Kesselheim, 2011; Lundh, Barbateskovic, Hrobjartsson, & Gotzsche, 2010; Lundh, 
Sismondo, Lexchin, Busuioc, & Bero, 2012; McHenry & Jureidini, 2008; Melander, 
Ahlqvist-Rastad, Meijer, & Beermann, 2003; Smith, Gotzsche, & Groves, 2014; Smith, 
2003, 2005), continuing medical education (CME) programs accredited by professional 
medical associations (Fugh-Berman & Hogenmiller, 2015; Lexchin & Vitry, 2012; 
Relman, 2001, 2003; Rothman et al., 2009; Schofferman et al., 2013; Spithoff, 2014; 
Steinbrook, 2008), and clinical practice guidelines (Abramson & Starfield, 2005; Brix 
Bindslev, Schroll, Gotzsche, & Lundh, 2013; George, Vesely, & Woolf, 2014; Institute 
of Medicine [IOM], 2011; Kung, Miller, & Mackowiak, 2012; Neuman, Korenstein, Ross, 
& Keyhani, 2011). Therefore, since there is limited literature that evaluates FCOI policies 
in Canada, it is important to conduct policy analyses on those which have been adopted 
by Canadian medical schools, medical journals that reach Canadian doctors, and Canadian 
professional medical associations. It is equally as important to conduct analyses on FCOI 
relationship disclosure practices by authors of Canadian clinical practice guidelines 
because these guidelines play a pivotal role in the way that doctors prescribe medications. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE  
LITERATURE  
 
The four manuscripts that comprise the central chapters of this dissertation 
consider FCOI relationships between physicians and drug companies to be vitally 
important to the shaping, production, and dissemination of medical research in ways that 
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are conducive to industry’s interests. Together, the four manuscripts illustrate the 
windows of opportunity for drug company interests to be expressed throughout medical 
education. This education extends broadly from undergraduate medical education, to peer-
reviewed medical journals, to professional medical associations that host accredited CME 
programs for physicians, to clinical practice guidelines that physicians consult for 
treatment recommendations for their patients. The four manuscripts provide original 
studies in each of these areas. The research for two of these studies has resulted in two 
completely novel scoring tools for examining FCOI relationships.  
 
8.2.1 “Too few, too weak: Conflict of interest policies at Canadian medical schools” 
 
Students in Canadian medical schools are often taught by faculty who have FCOI 
relationships with drug companies (Hébert et al., 2010). These relationships have the 
potential to affect not only the academic and publishing interests of the faculty members, 
but also their professional medical opinions and the material that they teach to medical 
students (Cho, Shohara, Schissel, & Rennie, 2000; Downie & Herder, 2007; Ehringhaus 
et al., 2008; Zinner et al., 2009). Institutional FCOI relationships with the pharmaceutical 
industry, whereby drug companies provide resources for medical students within medical 
schools, can also affect the information that students receive and their attitudes toward 
industry information (Epstein et al., 2013; Ubelacker, 2010). To determine the extent to 
which medical schools in Canada permit or prohibit relationships with the pharmaceutical 
industry and protect their students from potential industry influence, we conducted a 
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systematic analysis of conflict of interest policies adopted by all 17 Canadian medical 
schools.  
This study contributes a scoring tool that was modified from tools provided by 
supporting literature (American Medical Student Association [AMSA], 2012; Chimonas, 
Patterson, Raveis, & Rothman, 2011; Mason & Tattersall, 2011) to evaluate medical 
school policies on FCOI relationships with industry. In this study, the FCOI policies 
adopted by the Canadian medical schools were, in general, weak or permissive based on 
our scoring tool, indicating that policies adopted by medical schools generally did not 
discourage financial relationships with industry (Shnier, Lexchin, Mintzes, Jutel, & 
Holloway, 2013). Furthermore, over two-thirds of the medical schools in Canada had not, 
at the time of the study, required that the schools’ medical students be taught about 
conflicts of interest and drug promotion in the curriculum. This gap in the education 
provided to medical students has important consequences for their abilities to not only 
understand the implications of FCOI relationships with industry, but also to be able to 
identify FCOI relationships, drug promotional activities, and to have the skill-set to 
evaluate the information with which they are faced both as medical students and practicing 
physicians once they graduate and begin treating patients. Future research in this area can 
update the results to include medical school policies on conflict of interest that have 
updated or adopted after 2013. 
 
 
348 
 
 
8.2.2 “Honest authorship: A glossary and assessment tool to help predict 
vulnerability to corporate bias in manuscripts submitted to medical journals” 
  
Peer-reviewed medical journals are a central medium on which medical 
professionals rely at all stages of their careers to obtain important information and research 
on diseases and conditions, treatment and prescribing choices, and medical case studies. 
Research published in even the most highly regarded peer-review medical journals has 
been questioned because of the realization of the increasingly pervasive roles of drug 
companies and their hired CROs, MECCs, and MWOs in, in some cases, virtually all 
stages of the research and publishing processes (Fugh-Berman & Dodgson, 2008; Fugh-
Berman, Pike McDonald, Bell, Bethards, & Scialli, 2011; Fugh-Berman, 2005, 2010; 
Goldacre, 2012; Gotzsche, 2013; Healy, Mangin, & Antonuccio, 2013; Healy, 2012; Le 
Noury et al., 2015; Lexchin, 2012; Matheson, 2008; Melander et al., 2003; Mirowski & 
Van Horne, 2005; Ninan, Poole, & Stiles, 2008; Rothman, Brudney, Adair, & Rothman, 
2013; Sismondo & Doucet, 2010; Sismondo, 2011; Smith, 2003; Steinman, Bero, Chren, 
& Landefeld, 2006; Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & Rosenthal, 2008).  
This study provided an analysis of the corporate scientific and medical publishing 
cultures, which acquiesce to corporate values that are consistent with neoliberal science 
and the commodification of knowledge at the expense of publishing impartial information. 
As the gatekeepers to publishing research, medical journals and their editors possess 
decisive authority over policy adoption, enforcement, and the acceptance or rejection of 
manuscripts. Medical journals are, therefore, in a unique position to verify and ensure that 
their policies on FCOI relationships, disclosures, and the spirit of those policies are being 
adhered to. This study does not have an exclusively Canadian focus; however, the results 
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are still applicable to Canada because Canadian medical students, doctors, and patients 
often consult international medical journals for medical information. 
The terminology and spirit of these policies is of express importance considering 
the current landscape of the corporate scientific publishing culture, which is comprised of 
practices, now considered normative, that ensure the business goals of the sponsor. These 
practices skew the medical literature base in favour of drug companies’ business interests. 
Informed by works by Mirowski (2001, 2012) Mirowski and Van Horne (2005), and 
Sismondo (Sismondo & Doucet, 2010; Sismondo, 2004, 2007, 2011), this study provided 
a discourse analysis of not only the landscape of scientific research in the interest of the 
corporation, but also the accompanying terminology that has allowed corporations to have 
hidden, behind-the-scenes involvement in research and publishing at all stages of these 
processes. A literature review resulted in a glossary of 50 terms, which were accompanied 
by support from the literature, illustrating the importance of these terms in the context of 
medical publishing. The terms that comprise the glossary were then used to develop an 
accompanying original evidence-based assessment tool that can be used, or modified and 
then used, by researchers in future development of medical journal policies that are 
effective in detecting biased submissions. This could be completed through conducting a 
pilot study on the assessment tool by partnering with a medical journal to distribute the 
tool to prospective authors regarding their submitted manuscripts. Together, the 
researchers and journal editors could analyze the responses on the assessment tool in the 
context of the submitted manuscript to determine whether it possesses characteristics of 
corporate science that make it vulnerable to bias. This assessment tool can also be used to 
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assess the research and publishing practices that journals consider to be important enough 
to include within their policies.  
As the shift to corporate science continues, the scientific literature is heavily 
influenced by commercial messaging in medical journals. Medical journals are one vector 
by which medical professionals receive medical information that should be trusted to 
provide balanced and accurate data and conclusions. Therefore, it is the responsibility of 
medical journals to ensure that they adopt and enforce policies that demand high standards 
for transparency pertaining to the research and publishing processes. Medical journals 
reach wide audiences of physicians, as do CME programs. CME programs that are hosted 
by PMAs reach all Canadian physicians and, so, their policies on FCOI are also important 
to evaluate. 
 
8.2.3 “Continuing medical education and pharmaceutical industry involvement: An 
evaluation of policies adopted by 60 Canadian professional medical associations” 
  
The current literature on commercial sponsorship of CME programs argues the 
need for policy analysis of the development, content, and presentation of CME within the 
Canadian context (Bernat, Goldstein, & Ringel, 1998; Brody, 2010; Kassirer, 2007; 
Relman, 2003; Rothman et al., 2009; Steinbrook, 2008). To address this need, this study 
provides a systematic analysis of conflict of interest and industry involvement policies 
adopted by 60 PMAs in Canada, including the College of Family Physicians of Canada 
(CFPC) and the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada (RCPSC). These 60 
associations are recognized in Canada, by their membership, as authoritative and trusted 
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providers of CME programs for Canadian doctors. For each of the 60 associations, we 
collected the policies that they had adopted concerning relationships with industry and 
FCOI relationships as they pertained to CME programs. Because the current literature had 
not provided any policy scoring tools, we created a scoring tool in order to evaluate the 
policies.  
The scores that the medical associations received were generally weak. Twenty-
six associations had either no policies or their policies did not address the items in the 
scoring tool. None of the policies received scores that represented a restrictive policy for 
any item in the scoring tool. The highest average scores were received in the areas of 
commercial involvement in planning CME activities, presence of a review process for 
CME activity topics, and content review for balanced information. The lowest scores were 
received in the areas of awards, industry personnel, representatives and employees, 
distribution of industry-funded educational materials at CME activities, and distinction 
between marketing and educational materials. 
This study contributes an original scoring tool to the literature. This tool is based 
on supporting literature (Barnes et al., 2007; Dyck & Kvern, 2008; Kassirer, 2007; 
Rothman et al., 2009; Takhar et al., 2007)  that speaks specifically to CME programs. The 
scoring tool is supported by the literature on industry involvement in CME and helps to 
determine not only the extent to which industry involvement in CME programs is 
permitted, but also the degree to which medical associations retain control over the 
planning process and content of CME programs. Future research in this area can update 
the results to include Canadian medical associations’ policies on industry involvement in 
CME that were adopted after completion of this study. For example, the RCPSC adopted 
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a new policy in 2016 (Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada [RCPSC], 
n.d.) that will be enforced beginning in 2018 (McLean & Bruser, 2016), so if an update of 
this study were to be conducted after 2018, this policy would be included in the analysis.  
 
8.2.4 “Reporting of financial conflicts of interest in clinical practice guidelines: A 
case study analysis of guidelines from the Canadian Medical Association Infobase” 
  
Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) play a pivotal role in not only informing 
physicians about treatment standards, but also in decision making in physicians’ 
prescribing and treatment choices for their patients. CPGs are widely distributed by 
professional medical associations and consulted by physicians for the best available 
clinical evidence; however, the development of CPGs has attracted debate. Despite 
recommendations that guideline development should be transparent, rigorous, and use 
scientific evidence, clinical experiential knowledge, and patient values to inform and 
improve recommendations (IOM, 2011), international studies have called into question 
whether guidelines are developed in this manner. These studies have found that many 
guidelines have made recommendations based on expert opinion rather than clinical trial 
data, consensus statements and retrospective case studies rather than data that has integrity 
and are based on incomplete and inappropriate use of available evidence (Abramson & 
Starfield, 2005; Cosgrove, Bursztajn, Krimsky, Anaya, & Walker, 2009; Dinnes, 
Hewison, Altman, & Deeks, 2012; Kung et al., 2012; Mendelson, Meltzer, Campbell, 
Caplan, & Kirkpatrick, 2011). Furthermore, concerns about the validity of guideline 
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recommendations have been raised because of the potential for bias during the guideline 
development process (Bell et al., 2013; Guyatt et al., 2010; Spielmans & Parry, 2010). 
 Studies on guidelines in the United States and Europe have demonstrated 
concern regarding the prevalence, underreporting, and consistency of guideline authors’ 
disclosures of their FCOI relationships with the pharmaceutical industry (Brix Bindslev 
et al., 2013; Choudhry, Stelfox, & Detsky, 2002; Cosgrove et al., 2009; Langer et al., 
2012; Mendelson et al., 2011; Neuman et al., 2011; Norris, Holmer, Ogden, Burda, & Fu, 
2013; Papanikolaou et al., 2001). To provide an assessment of authors’ FCOI relationship 
disclosures on clinical practice guidelines in Canada, we conducted a case study analysis 
on authors’ disclosure statements in 28 guidelines, most recently reviewed or published 
in 2012 or 2013, drawn from the Canadian Medical Association Infobase. It is reasonable 
to analyze guidelines reviewed or published during this time because the issue of FCOI 
disclosures of guideline authors was, and continues to be, a relevant and public issue. We 
found that, in general, guideline authors commonly disclosed FCOI relationships with 
industry.  
FCOI relationships held by the authors were often with the drug companies that 
manufactured the medications recommended as first-line treatments in the respective 
guidelines. We also found that some authors who were on more than one guideline 
disclosed different FCOI relationships in their statements across guidelines. The findings 
from this study support the need for additional research to assess the prevalence of FCOI 
in guidelines in relation to recommended drugs in guidelines. For example, future research 
which assesses the quality of evidence used in guidelines where the authors have FCOI 
relationships and whether the recommendations reflect the evidence would be valuable. 
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Future research in this area can update the results to include guidelines that have been 
most recently reviewed or published in 2014 and 2015.   
 
8.3 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS 
 
The four Mertonian norms of science (i.e., universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism) (Merton, 1942) work together to create a 
culture of science in the public interest, openness, and critical analysis. If the Mertonian 
norms of science are considered to be the embodiment of the scientific ideal, then the 
analyses within this dissertation show that they have all been violated. Disclosure has been 
used by medical educational institutions as a mechanism for allowing both individual and 
institutional FCOI relationships to exist, without addressing the effects of the presence of 
these relationships. To fully appreciate the results found within the manuscripts of this 
dissertation, they must be considered within the broader FCOI literature discussed in the 
literature review. The addressing of FCOI relationships in policies as needing to be 
disclosed, but not avoided, indicates not only that these relationships have come to be 
considered as normative, but also complacency within large institutions to realize the 
importance of the effects of corporate bias to the foundation of medical knowledge.  
Transparency regarding the outsourcing of clinical research to CROs, funding of 
research, as well as origination of, ownership of, and access to data are significant to 
consider in the context of individual and institutional FCOI relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry. Employing the Mertonian norms of science help to understand 
how far corporate scientific behaviours have deviated from the assumed scientific research 
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and knowledge dissemination roles. Objective science and scientific claims that can be 
evaluated based on their content and not on the characteristics of the scientists that make 
the claims (universalism), cannot be achieved without access to the content, or data, within 
the public commons (communism). Objective and scientific claims cannot be verified as 
being free of appropriation for interested purposes, such as its commercialization for sale 
to the public using mysticisms (i.e., promotional messages) expressed in scientific terms 
via education (disinterestedness), without access to data (again, universalism) and the 
opportunity to freely and critically analyze and scrutinize the data as fact and through 
competing perspectives (organized skepticism). The maintenance of the culture of FCOI 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry and industry involvement as the norm, 
sometimes at all levels of medical research, writing, and education, indicates the broad 
unwillingness to comply with Mertonian norms of science in the public interest. Rather, 
in conformity with characteristics of neoliberal corporate science, the extensive and 
pervasive involvement of industry in medical education, generally, serves to ensure that 
data sharing, transparency, an understanding of corporate roles within medical research 
and publishing, and critical analyses of both data and these roles are never fully realized 
by those outside of the industry. 
The generally permissive institutional policy responses to not only FCOI 
relationships with the pharmaceutical industry, but also industry involvement in all levels 
of medical research, writing, and education has significant implications for science in the 
public interest. The general lack of strong policies limiting and eliminating FCOI 
relationships with drug companies and industry involvement in medical education 
indicates the continuation of the shift towards neoliberalism and particularly neoliberal 
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science and marketplace of ideas. The broad willingness of medical educational 
institutions to adhere to neoliberal ideology may seem unnoticeable or trivial at the 
individual-level and in the day-to-day operations of these institutions; however, 
systematic structural analysis indicates that this adherence, even if unintentional, is 
profound. In practice, weak policies that do not effectively address FCOI relationships, 
industry involvement in medical education, and the potential for corporate bias present a 
façade of regulation. Rather than effectively regulate, the permissive policies create a 
façade that provides a false sense of oversight of FCOI relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry. In this way, permissive policies have an effect that is opposite to 
that which may have been intended upon policy adoption. While the intended outcome 
may have been to limit FCOI relationships and the potential for bias in medical education, 
the outcome of permissive policies is that they pave the way for relationships with industry 
that individuals interpret as being acceptable according to these policies.  
In accordance with neoliberal corporate bias theory, the minimalist role of medical 
institutions in the regulation of industry involvement of medical education may be 
represented by the largely weak or non-existent policies adopted in this area by medical 
educational institutions. Neoliberal corporate bias theory, in the context of medical 
institutions, has allowed for the critical analysis of the interests of these institutions, as 
represented by their policies. Although medical educational institutions may possess their 
own interests of providing medical education to physicians, medical students, and medical 
researchers, as well as cost-containment strategies, the general allowance of industry 
funding and involvement indicates a cooperative relationship between these institutions 
and the industry. This cooperation, or pro-business deregulation, has resulted in policies 
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that are biased in favour of partnerships or accommodating financial ties with industry, 
rather than the commitment to the pursuit of unbiased medical educational information 
for dissemination. Consistent with neoliberalism, the policies analyzed within this 
dissertation generally take a minimalist role in regulation, while still allowing FCOI 
relationships and institutional financial partnerships with industry to exist. The potential 
for neoliberal corporate bias is expressed through the orientation and interests of the 
policies, which, by virtue of their permissiveness, implicitly express the value of both 
individual and institutional FCOI relationships with the pharmaceutical industry. 
The adherence of medical institutions to neoliberal ideology has been paralleled 
by the broad normalization of pro-industry behaviours that are amenable to the 
commercialization and privatization of medical knowledge. These pro-business 
behaviours have taken precedence over public health. For instance, in each of the four 
manuscripts, FCOI relationships with industry are in some way “managed” rather than 
avoided. The manuscripts that evaluated conflict of interest policies at Canadian medical 
schools (chapter 4), Canadian medical associations (chapter 6), and conflict of interest 
disclosures in clinical practice guidelines (chapter 7) found that FCOI relationships with 
drug companies were managed through disclosure. Disclosure is a mechanism by which 
the effects of FCOI relationships on medical education are perceived to be mitigated; 
however, the act of disclosure does not liberate data or its interpretations from secondary 
financial interests. The shortcomings of disclosure as a management solution for the 
presence of financial relationships with industry will be discussed in the next section. The 
manuscript that analyzed the neoliberal corporatized culture of medical research and 
publishing in medical journals (chapter 5) argued that the roles of “authors” and the drug 
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promotion industry in medical research and publishing have been transformed to 
acquiesce to the control over manuscripts that drug companies have required. The coding 
of the roles held by research and writing organizations to be muted so as to mask the true 
involvement of industry in the medical research and writing processes led to the 
development of a glossary of these terms and an accompanying assessment tool that aims 
to help predict the vulnerability of a particular manuscript to corporate bias. This tool 
attempts to provide a method by which roles in the medical research and publishing 
processes can be made to be transparent to take steps toward modestly achieving the 
Mertonian norms of science. 
  
8.4 MANAGING FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST RELATIONSHIPS: IS 
DISCLOSURE THE SOLUTION? 
  
Each of the studies within this dissertation advocated for strengthening policies on 
relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry to eliminate FCOI 
relationships that can reasonably be considered to increase the risk of industry influence 
in medical practice. A common characteristic across the two scoring tools and assessment 
tool produced within these studies is that each tool advocates for disclosure of FCOI 
relationships with industry when policies do not prohibit these relationships altogether. 
Comprehensive disclosure of FCOI relationships is considered to be the most basic 
requirement for the transparent reporting of FCOI relationships and to allow for informed 
decision-making and understanding by the audience (Lemmens & Luther, 2007). Where 
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FCOI relationships cannot be eliminated, disclosure of these relationships is important – 
as a first step.  
Disclosure of FCOI relationships is often considered to be an acceptable solution 
and has been accompanied by the rationale that disclosing these relationships provides 
medical professionals and the public with reassurance that the information that is being 
published or presented has been guided by public health, rather than commercial interests 
(Lexchin & O’Donovan, 2010). This rationale assumes that relationships with industry 
are inevitable and that disclosure effectively addresses the problem of potential bias in 
research and the presentation of information (Kesselheim et al., 2012). However, 
disclosure on its own cannot be the solution to the potential influence of industry on 
research and publishing practices through FCOI relationships. 
Although disclosure is a good first step to being able to evaluate the context in 
which the information was developed and disseminated, the effectiveness of disclosure as 
the solution to the influence resulting from FCOI relationships is limited by a number of 
factors. The nature of disclosure is such that it requires an audience to subjectively 
interpret and understand the disclosures. Subjective interpretation and understanding 
places the onus on the individual medical student, physician, or patient to determine the 
meaning, context, and potential risk of bias associated with the FCOI relationship(s) being 
disclosed. For instance, Kesselheim and colleagues (2012) found a clear relationship 
between funding disclosure variations and physicians’ perceptions of a trial’s rigor and 
results. In this study, regardless of the trial’s actual study design, if pharmaceutical 
industry funding was disclosed in the study, physicians were less likely to perceive the 
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trial as having a high level of rigor as compared with studies in which a disclosure 
statement was absent (Kesselheim et al., 2012).  
Jeffrey Drazen, current editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, 
published a criticism of Kesselheim and colleagues’ article, stating that physicians’ 
skepticism of industry funded research is a disproportionate response to a select few cases 
of drug company misrepresentation of data in the media (Drazen, 2012). Drazen (2012) 
declares that “[w]e at the [New England Journal of Medicine] think that decisions about 
how trials influence practice should be based on the quality of information conveyed in 
the full study report” (p. 1152) and continues that the Journal adheres to trial registration 
requirements in ClinicalTrials.gov and FCOI disclosure requirements as set out by the 
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE). Drazen (2012) argues that 
because the New England Journal of Medicine has taken these steps, we should “believe 
the data”. He argues that, trial participants, in their altruism in their contributions to 
science ought to be respected without concern for the source of study funding. He argues 
that interpretations of study validity should be based on study design, the quality of data 
collection, and the fairness of results reporting (Drazen, 2012). In an environment in which 
clinical research is conducted according to Mertonian norms, Drazen’s plea to “believe 
the data” might be more convincing; however, the public, physicians, and academics 
cannot be justifiably expected to simply trust that sound methodologies, as they are 
reported in published clinical trials, indicate unbiased collection, analysis, reporting, and 
interpretation of results. Lundh and colleagues’ (2012) found that industry funded trials 
are just as methodologically rigorous as non-industry funded trials; however, regardless 
of the methodological rigor of industry-funded studies, bias can still appear within the 
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research question or elements of the design of trials that are not measured by the tools that 
are commonly used. Furthermore, regardless of methodological rigor, published studies 
sponsored by industry tend to report favourable efficacy results and conclusions more 
often than non-industry sponsored studies (Flacco et al., 2015; Lexchin, Bero, 
Djulbegovic, & Clark, 2003; Lexchin, 2012; Lundh et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, clinical trial registration is not, by itself, an indicator of reliable 
results. Since clinical trial registration within a year of study completion was required by 
United States legislation in 2008, the legislation has been ignored by 60 percent to 90 
percent of trials (Anderson et al., 2015; Goldacre, 2013). Furthermore, clinical trial 
registration does not necessarily mean that the results of these trials are reported or 
published in a timely manner, or at all. In fact, Iain Chalmers, Paul Glasziou and Fiona 
Godlee (2013) argue that the systemic underreporting of clinical trial data has continued, 
despite the requirement to register trials. Chalmers and colleagues (2013) estimate that 
only approximately half of all registered trials publish at least some of their results. 
Clinical trial results that are published may be accompanied by FCOI relationship 
disclosures. Once the onus is placed on the audience, e.g., medical students or medical 
professionals, to interpret FCOI disclosures, it is their responsibility to also interpret the 
information that precedes or follows the disclosures. The audience may assume that once, 
or because, an author or speaker made an FCOI disclosure that all information following 
the disclosure is unbiased, uninfluenced, and accurate. Disclosure may also lead an 
individual to the conclusion that the presenter or author has been involved in all steps of 
the research and writing of the study that they are presenting. This assumption cannot be 
made, especially within the corporate medical research culture in which CROs, MECCs, 
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and MWOs play a role in the research and writing processes of studies and presentations 
(Rothman et al., 2013; Sismondo, 2011). 
Disclosure may also unintentionally lead physicians to provide biased 
recommendations because of two mechanisms that Loewenstein and colleagues (2012) 
explain: strategic exaggeration and moral licensing. Strategic exaggeration, the authors 
explain, is the tendency for the person who is disclosing FCOI relationships to provide 
more biased advice that is meant to counteract any anticipated discounting of their 
recommendations as a result of their disclosures. The concept of moral licensing explains 
an unconscious feeling whereby authors or presenters may feel that providing biased 
advice is justifiable because the audience has been cautioned by their disclosure 
(Loewenstein, 2012). The notion that “consumers know best” informs the widespread 
adoption of disclosure and provides the recipients of the disclosures with a false sense of 
empowerment and pseudo-accountability that allows FCOI relationships and disclosures 
to continue on as the norm (Wilson, 2014). Furthermore, an audience that has not 
undergone the necessary education about the risks of influence and bias associated with 
both individual and institutional FCOI relationships may interpret FCOI disclosures as a 
prestigious list of affiliations and achievements that they should also seek throughout their 
medical careers. 
Disclosure does not prevent future scandals (Wilson, 2014), but, as a management 
strategy, it can eliminate the need for strong policy reforms or conflict of interest 
regulation of any kind (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). Disclosure also relieves those 
who are making the disclosures from their responsibility for adverse outcomes from their 
recommendations. Disclosure does not mitigate the potential consequences that may result 
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from FCOI relationships between physicians and industry, but, instead, serves as a type 
of warning or indication mechanism that signals to the audience that the burden of 
interpreting any results has been shifted to the audience. 
 
8.5 DISSERTATION LIMITATIONS 
  
The studies that are included in this dissertation have some common limitations. 
First, we did not conduct interviews to accompany our policy analyses. Interviews may 
have provided valuable insights into both the interpretation and enforcement of the 
policies. Second, we did not evaluate educational programs that fell under the purview of 
the policies that we analyzed; therefore, we were not able to determine whether, or how, 
any potential bias may have manifested in these educational programs. Finally, we have 
not analyzed whether perceived weaknesses in policies actually result in harm to patients. 
 
8.6 FINAL STATEMENT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
The four manuscripts are complementary to each other because they each provide 
an analysis of important and far-reaching types of medical education in the context of 
increasingly corporatized science. Each study consistently found opportunities in policies, 
as guiding and standard-setting documents, for pharmaceutical industry promotional 
influence in every interstice of the medical profession. FCOI relationships with the 
pharmaceutical industry occur on a continuum ranging from the individual to institutional 
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levels of medical research. Sismondo (2011) has stated that “…the value of academic 
disguises outweighs the cost of…scandals.” These academic disguises have been revealed 
as early as medical school, through to CME programs hosted by PMAs, published papers 
in medical journals, and clinical practice guidelines. This pervasive presence of the 
pharmaceutical industry in medical research at each of these levels has aligned the goals 
of research endeavours to be conducted in the interest of neoliberal science.  
Industry involvement in medical education manifests in ways that are not 
immediately, or at all, clear to the intended audience. One must not only understand the 
language of corporate science, but also possess the ability to decode this language to 
comprehend the behind-the-scenes roles and influence of pharmaceutical, and supporting, 
companies in the production of “science”. For instance, the academic concept of 
publication planning, describing the behind-the-scenes role of a drug company in 
strategically developing and positioning its products favourably in the medical literature, 
is not a widely known phenomenon outside of industry and the research area on industry 
involvement in medical research. Likewise, a medical student, physician, or member of 
the public who is reading a peer-reviewed journal article with the acknowledgement of 
“editorial assistance” or a “medical writer” might not realize that this language, de-coded, 
may disguise the deep involvement of the drug promotion industry in a strategic 
endeavour to represent a drug favourably.  
There remains room for important improvements to be made to the policies that 
have been adopted by Canadian medical schools, Canadian professional medical 
associations, and medical journals that reach Canadian doctors to protect the interests of 
physicians, medical students, and the Canadian patient population. In addition, the 
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integrity of medical education at all stages and the resultant recommendations made by 
physicians to the Canadian patient population about treatment must also be protected from 
undue industry influence. In a medical culture in which FCOI relationships are common, 
unbiased and balanced medical research and publishing ought to be protected by policies 
adopted by the medical institutions that are considered to be the most authoritative in 
medical education.  
Conflict of interest policies adopted by authoritative medical institutions that 
provide medical education can be strengthened by inviting the engagement of medical 
students, physicians, medical and health policy researchers, medical schools, medical 
research institutions, professional medical associations, and public and private health 
insurers (IOM, 2009). This engagement may encourage the adoption, implementation, and 
enforcement of conflict of interest policies while, simultaneously, defining and endorsing 
a culture of accountability that values and provides the professional standards necessary 
for achieving transparency in medical research and publishing processes (IOM, 2009). 
Should authoritative medical research and education institutions and associations not 
voluntarily strengthen their policies on FCOI relationships with drug companies, it is 
likely that pressure will increase for regulatory reform from sources external to these 
institutions (IOM, 2009).  
Rather than remediation of bias or mistrust after participation in FCOI 
relationships, any policy reform should be informed by the precautionary principle and be 
aimed primarily toward protecting the integrity of medical professionals’ judgement and 
ensuring that public confidence and trust in medicine is preserved (IOM, 2009; Lemmens 
& Luther, 2007; Lexchin & O’Donovan, 2010). For example, if it is widely understood 
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that FCOI relationships with the pharmaceutical industry and industry involvement in 
medical research and education have the potential to expose content to corporate biases, 
the precautionary principle would argue that these relationships should be avoided. By 
way of contrast, the risk management perspective would argue that these relationships 
need not be prevented, but managed through disclosure, for example. Importantly, these 
goals can be realized only with policies in place that are clearly described and interpreted 
and accompanied by very clear and enforceable sanctions that are publicly accessible. The 
standard should be for medical professionals to avoid FCOI relationships and undergo 
training, as part of their undergraduate education or accredited CME programs, on FCOI 
relationships with industry – how to identify them, alternatives to engaging in them, and 
how to mitigate their risks.  
The current approach, which is generally permissive, that allows relationships with 
industry in medical education, will likely remain in place in the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, until the perspective that non-conflicted medical professionals ought to retain 
control over the research and publishing processes gains traction, disclosure and 
transparency, together, will be the prime approach to the contextual understanding and 
interpretation of published articles and presentations for physicians, medical students, and 
the public.  
Small-scale initiatives for effective conflict of interest disclosure and transparency 
could be achieved at the institution level by developing databases that contain FCOI 
relationship disclosures, for example, within universities, hospitals, and professional 
medical associations. These databases could be cross-referenced with each other. A large-
scale method by which financial conflict of interest disclosures within the medical 
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profession may become more transparent is through the creation of a unified publicly 
accessible online database that aggregates conflict of interest disclosures.  
Online FCOI relationship disclosure efforts of this type already exist. For example, 
the United States Physician Payment Sunshine Act (PPSA) database is housed and 
managed online by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS.gov, 2016). 
Rochon and colleagues (2010) provide a FCOI relationship checklist that covers 
administrative, study, personal financial, and authorship stages of the clinical research 
process. A disclosure checklist, such as the one that Rochon and colleagues (2010) 
recommend, could be systematically collected and housed in an online publicly searchable 
database. Another example of a disclosure effort is the free downloadable Google Chrome 
browser application (“app”) that was created at the Hacking iCorruption hackathon event 
co-sponsored by the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University and the MIT 
Center for Civic Media (Baugh, 2015). The app, called “Unearth” extracts funding and 
conflict of interest information from PubMed research articles that users view and puts 
this information on the abstract page of PubMed articles. This innovative approach 
counters the problem that sometimes disclosures are not available in manuscripts or on 
websites external to publications. This up-front viewing of disclosures, rather than 
viewing the disclosures after reading the article or not at all, allows readers to first pay 
attention to FCOI relationships prior to reading the article (Baugh, 2015). Readers’ 
interpretations of FCOI relationships in these cases remains an issue, but with the help of 
intermediaries such as consumer watchdog groups in Canada (e.g., Transparency 
International, which has a Canadian branch (Transparency International, 2015), 
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Retraction Watch (2016), and Democracy Watch (Democracy Watch, n.d.), 
understandings of disclosures could become clearer (Loewenstein, 2012). 
Although disclosures have limitations on an individual practical-use basis, 
analyses of disclosures can be very helpful in discourse analyses of medical education and 
the proverbial strings that may be attached to educational information. For this reason, a 
comparative analysis of the findings in our Canadian medical schools study (Chapter 4) 
and any reformed or newly adopted policies would provide insights into the changing 
values and interests of these institutions. The glossary and policy scoring tool developed 
in Chapter 5 may also be practically applied to the analyses and development of medical 
journals’ conflict of interest policies. Our analysis of policies adopted by Canadian PMAs 
on industry interaction in CME programs (Chapter 6) would be complemented by an 
analysis of potential biases in the CME programs held by these associations. Finally, our 
analysis of conflict of interest disclosures made by authors on clinical practice guidelines 
(Chapter 7) would contribute to analyses of the journal policies in which these guidelines 
are published, as well as the guideline development policies adopted by Canadian PMAs.  
The forward momentum for the adoption and enforcement of policies concerning 
FCOI relationships has been subject to a serious attack from those who argue that FCOI 
relationships are not a source of influence (Barton et al., 2014; Rosenbaum, 2015a, 2015b, 
2015c; Stossel, 2008b, 2015). These views against adopting strong policies on FCOI 
relationships have in turn received pushback from high-profile sources (Angell, 2008, 
2009; Kassirer, 2005, 2007; Lexchin & O’Donovan, 2010; Lexchin & Vitry, 2012; Prasad, 
2015). Research on FCOI relationships and policy development is still a deeply contested 
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terrain; therefore, the reforms suggested in this dissertation are by no means foregone 
conclusions.  
The manuscripts within this dissertation contribute to the conflict of interest 
literature a starting point for research into FCOI relationships in the various Canadian 
medical education contexts. Mirowski and Van Horne (2005) have argued that medical 
education and scientific research become successfully privatized when the boundary 
between scientific research and marketing is blurred to the point at which they are 
indistinguishable from each other and the difference between promotional messages and 
scientific research results is impossible to identify. It could be argued that weak policies 
on both pharmaceutical industry relationships in medicine and industry involvement in 
medical education are contributing to the successful privatization of medical education 
and scientific research in the Canadian context. Therefore, it is important to continue to 
conduct critical and evaluative analyses of conflict of interest and industry involvement 
policies that have been adopted by the various institutions that provide medical education.  
Based on the works within this dissertation, future research directions include 
policy evaluation updates and further analyses of the medical education context in terms 
of opportunities for industry involvement in order to keep up-to-date on not only the 
policies, but also the practices of scientific research and management and medical 
education within the culture of neoliberal science. First, an update to the analysis of 
Canadian medical schools’ conflict of interest policies (Chapter 4) would potentially 
provide analyses of new and updated policies by the medical schools since the study was 
published in 2013. An updated analysis would also determine how or whether the new 
policies provide more, less, or the same level of restrictive standards for both institutional 
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and individual relationships with the pharmaceutical industry in medical schools. 
Additionally, an important study in this context could assess whether these policies have 
a role in the day-to-day activities of the schools and their faculty and students. 
Furthermore, perhaps an initiative like the American Medical Student Association 
(AMSA) Scorecard online could help to encourage continued policy development in this 
area (AMSA, 2012).  
Another important update to the policy evaluations within this dissertation is on 
the continuing medical education policies adopted by the professional medical 
associations in Canada. For example, the College of Family Physicians of Canada has 
developed a new standard that is set to come into effect in 2018. This standard pertains to 
external influence that could lead to bias in its CME (McLean & Bruser, 2016; The 
College of Family Physicians of Canada [CFPC] & Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada [RCPSC], n.d.). This and other potentially new or updated documents 
are important to analyze and evaluate in the context of previously adopted policies to 
determine whether they add strength to policies or maintain the status quo. Another 
important study could analyze how or whether the restrictiveness of policies affects the 
content of continuing medical education hosted by Canadian professional medical 
associations.   
The medical journal glossary and assessment tool should be considered as living 
documents to be used together and updated as new terms or new interpretations are 
realized. The assessment tool should be pilot tested and revised, if necessary, for future 
use to help to assess the potential for bias in manuscripts submitted to medical journals. 
Future studies in each of these areas should continue to consider both institutional and 
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individual FCOI relationships as structural phenomena, the standards for which can be set 
and regulated fairly and equally across areas of medical education. FCOI relationships 
must also be considered in terms of patient health, as previous research has documented 
patient harms that have resulted from science management under neoliberal science (Le 
Noury et al., 2015; Elliott, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014). 
In order for medical students, physicians, and the public to receive truly 
independent scientific information about the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceutical 
products and to protect the interests of patients, medical research will have to be conducted 
by non-conflicted, independent agencies and similarly disseminated by non-conflicted, 
independent professionals (Goozner, 2004). Although difficult, many of the present FCOI 
relationships can be controlled, reduced, or rendered harmless through health policy 
reform (Rodwin, 1993). Responsibility for not only policy reform, but also setting 
professional standards for interactions with industry, rests, first, with the very medical 
institutions that are so widely considered to be authoritative in the provision of medical 
education: medical schools, professional medical associations, and medical journals. 
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